

**CANADIAN SECURITY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
STAGE 2
INSTITUTIONAL REPORT**

**PREPARED FOR
THE PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
IN FEDERAL ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS or the Service) is pleased to offer the following responses to the Commission's request for an Institutional Report addressing specific questions related to its capacity to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada's democratic processes.

(1) A listing and description of all major instances of suspected foreign interference targeting Canada's democratic processes, including summary, dates, target, country involved, key players, information flow and any responses taken.

To arrive at a list of suspected instances of foreign interference that is responsive to the Commission's question, the Privy Council Office (PCO) led a series of consultations with CSIS, Global Affairs Canada (GAC), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and Public Safety Canada (PS). The consensus list is included in the Classified CSIS Stage 2 Institutional Report.¹ The unclassified version of the list is reproduced here:

¹ The Classified CSIS Stage 2 Institutional Report ("Classified CSIS IR") delivered to the Commission on July 8, 2024 contained a list of significant instances of suspected foreign interference created at the request of the Commission. In early September 2024, CSIS informed the Commission that it had reassessed one instance which related to a specific parliamentarian, in light of additional information. On September 5 2024, CSIS undertook a review of public records related to the instance. In the course of this review, CSIS learned information that directly contradicted a significant element of the instance as described in the Classified CSIS IR and the CSIS reporting on which it was based. Since the parliamentarian was not a subject or focus of any investigation, CSIS had not tracked the publicly available information regarding the instance.

According to CSIS, this additional information revealed that this instance had a lesser impact on Canada's democratic processes than CSIS previously understood. CSIS continues to view this as a suspected instance of foreign interference as it demonstrated a foreign government attempting to build, maintain or leverage relationships with parliamentarians using clandestine, deceptive or threatening tactics as defined in the *CSIS Act*. However, CSIS now assesses that this instance is not of the same order of magnitude as other instances listed in the Classified CSIS IR, as the activity did not have the outcome intended by the foreign government. CSIS relayed this reassessment to PCO, including the National Security and Intelligence Advisor ("NSIA"). The NSIA agreed that, in light of this information, the instance should no longer be

- Reporting indicates that the Government of Pakistan (“GoP”) officials attempted to clandestinely influence Canadian federal politics with the aim of furthering GoP’s interests in Canada.
- Reporting indicates a foreign government undertook several actions, including interference, to reduce the likelihood of a specific Liberal candidate from being elected federally. It is suspected that the foreign government sought to thwart the candidate’s bid given their support for issues perceived to be contrary to the foreign government’s interests.
- A foreign government official is suspected of foreign interference that resulted in a briefing to the secret-cleared representatives of the Liberal Party of Canada shortly before the 2021 election and to the Prime Minister shortly after.
- Reporting indicates that a foreign government actively supported an individual’s 2019 federal nomination race in Don Valley North, including through the use of a proxy agent.
- The Government of India is suspected of leveraging proxy agents to clandestinely provide financial support to specific candidates from three political parties in a federal election. The receipt of funds cannot be confirmed, nor the candidates’ potential awareness of the origins.
- A former parliamentarian is suspected of having worked to influence parliamentary business on behalf of a foreign government.

(2) A listing and description of all existing means at the disposal of each government department and agency to detect, deter, and counter any foreign interference activities, including any relevant changes to or evolution in these means.

The Service’s authorities to detect, deter and counter any foreign interference activities are derived from the legislative framework in the *CSIS Act*. For years, CSIS faced significant challenges as it continued to rely on authorities designed in, and for a time of analog technology. Today’s threat environment is markedly different from the threats Canada faced when the *CSIS Act* came into effect in 1984. Since that time, the world of national security and intelligence has evolved rapidly due to advancements in technology and its impacts, particularly its borderless nature. Accordingly, so too has the way CSIS works to respond to foreign interference threats.

included in this list. Further consultation across senior government officials resulted in affirmation of this decision. Given the reassessment, CSIS has amended the Classified CSIS IR to remove this item from the list of significant instances.

Under the Service's legislative framework during the timeframe under review by the Commission, which would not include the changes made pursuant to Bill C-70,² the then-existing means to detect, deter, and counter any foreign interference activities included:

- **Section 12 – investigate threats to the security of Canada:** CSIS' primary mandate authorizes CSIS to “collect, by investigation or otherwise, to the extent that it is strictly necessary, and analyse and retain information and intelligence respecting activities that may on reasonable grounds be suspected of constituting threats to the security of Canada” and, “in relation thereto, shall report to and advise the Government of Canada.”³ CSIS may investigate threats within or outside Canada.

The Service collects intelligence further to the GC Intelligence Requirements (which are approved by Cabinet), assesses this intelligence, and reports to and advises the GC by disseminating intelligence products, such as CSIS Intelligence Reports (CIRs), Intelligence Assessments (IAs), and CSIS National Security Briefs (CNSBs). To support its intelligence collection mandate, CSIS liaises with a vast network of domestic and international partners, working closely with its Five Eyes⁴ colleagues within their respective security and intelligence agencies.

During the period under review, CSIS approved investigative authorities relevant to the Commission's mandate.

- **Section 12.1 – threat reduction measures (TRMs):** CSIS is authorized to take measures to reduce threats when there are reasonable grounds to believe that an activity is a threat to the security of Canada, and only where the required legal

² Bill C-70 received Royal Assent on June 20, 2024. See *An Act respecting countering foreign interference*, SC 2024, c 16. Part 1 amends the *CSIS Act* in major areas that close critical policy and legal gaps: information sharing, judicial authorizations, dataset collection and use, foreign intelligence collection, and a statutory review of the *CSIS Act*. Those amendments are summarized below.

³ The term “threats to the security of Canada” is defined in s. 2 of the *Act* to mean:

(a) espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage;

(b) foreign-influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person (a key example being foreign interference (FI));

(c) activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state; and

(d) activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.

Section 2 further specifies that “threats to the security of Canada” “does not include lawful advocacy, protest or dissent, unless carried on in conjunction with any of the activities referred to in paragraphs (a) to (d).”

⁴ The Five Eyes (FVEYs) international intelligence alliance includes Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand.

conditions under the *CSIS Act* are satisfied.⁵ CSIS can apply to the Federal Court for a warrant where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant is required to enable CSIS to take measures to reduce a threat to the security of Canada, after having received the Minister's approval.⁶

- **Section 13 – security assessments:** CSIS is authorized to provide security assessments, such as for individuals who require access to classified information or sensitive sites within the GC.
- **Section 14 – security advice:** CSIS is authorized to provide security advice, including advice relevant to the exercise of a power or performance of a duty or function under the *Citizenship Act*⁷ or the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Act*⁸.
- **Section 15 – investigations for security assessments:** CSIS is authorized to conduct such investigations as are required for the purposes of providing the aforementioned security assessments (s. 13) or security advice (s. 14).
- **Section 16 – collect foreign intelligence within Canada:** Foreign intelligence is that which relates to the intentions, capabilities and activities of a foreign state, a group of foreign states or any foreign person. The *CSIS Act* stipulates that CSIS may only collect such intelligence at the personal request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of National Defence and with the personal consent of the Minister of Public Safety. Section 16 was one of the areas amended by Bill C-70 to account for technological impacts on how CSIS may collect information under s. 16.
- **Section 17 – cooperate with domestic and foreign partners:** CSIS has arrangements or otherwise cooperates with many federal and provincial government departments, subject to approval of the Minister of Public Safety. CSIS may also enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof, subject to the approval of the Minister of Public Safety, after consulting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. CSIS ensures it complies with the *Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act*⁹ when disclosing or cooperating with foreign partners.
- **Section 19 – disclose information when authorized:** Though s. 19 of the *CSIS Act* limits CSIS' ability to disclose classified threat information to stakeholders outside the GC, CSIS can do so in certain, exceptional circumstances, including to support criminal investigations and prosecutions. Should the Service need to disclose information for the purposes of performing its duties and functions under

⁵ This authority was added to the *CSIS Act* in 2015 further to the *Anti-terrorism Act*, SC 2015, c 20. The Service's TRM authority came into force upon assent on June 18, 2015.

⁶ See *CSIS Act*, s. 21.1.

⁷ RSC 1985, c C-29.

⁸ SC 2001, c 27.

⁹ SC 2019, c 13, s 49.1.

the *CSIS Act*, s. 19 can allow for such disclosures. Section 19 was another area amended by Bill C-70, including to allow CSIS to disclose information to build resiliency against threats.

- **Section 21 – conduct warranted investigations:** CSIS can apply to the Federal Court for a warrant where there are reasonable grounds to believe that a warrant is required to enable CSIS to investigate a threat to the security of Canada, within or outside Canada, or perform its duties and functions pursuant to s. 16 of the *CSIS Act*. The *CSIS Act* requires that the Minister of Public Safety approve warrant applications before they are submitted to the Federal Court. New judicial authorization authorities were added to the *CSIS Act* by Bill C-70.

CSIS response to suspected FI:

With respect to instances of suspected foreign interference, major or otherwise, the Service's initial response is to advise and inform relevant Government of Canada departments or agencies so that the GC can understand the scope and severity of a threat and incorporate this understanding into its decision making, including its internal assessments and policy initiatives.

CSIS orients its activities based on the GC's intelligence priorities and requirements, and adjusts its collection of information and intelligence according to existing resources and changing threats, all to ensure the GC's intelligence needs are met.

An instance or series of instances of foreign interference may generate additional CSIS action or responses. These can include:

- acquiring a targeting (investigative) authority,¹⁰ which enables further investigation of the threat;
- acquiring a warrant, which enables more intrusive investigative techniques (see Question 5);
- providing briefings to build awareness and resilience (see Questions 7 & 9);
- engaging with both domestic and foreign partners (see Questions 4 & 6); and/or,
- undertaking TRMs.

The answers to questions 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10, below, provide additional details on responses to instances of foreign interference that the Service can take to advance its collection and investigations of threat-related information and intelligence. Question (8) is not applicable to CSIS.

¹⁰ A targeting or investigative authority allows the Service to use different operational tools and techniques requiring various levels of internal approval to investigate the activities of any person, group, issue or event when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the activities pose a threat to the security of Canada, as defined in s. 2 of the *CSIS Act*.

Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC)

The Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), created out of the GC's 2004 national security policy, "Securing an Open Society", was established to independently produce comprehensive threat assessments using a wide range of classified and unclassified sources. ITAC has focused on assessing and reporting on terrorism threats, trends and events. This includes recommending the National Terrorism Threat Level for Canada and setting terrorism threat levels for Canadian interests worldwide, including for special events and internationally protected persons. Additionally, since May 2023, ITAC has been building capacity to produce, among other things, integrated strategic threat assessments, including on topics related to foreign interference, for public officials and strategic threat briefings for Ministers, opposition leaders, and other Parliamentarians.

ITAC is intended to serve as a community resource in supporting GC decision-making and providing timely analysis to security partners. ITAC does not collect intelligence as it is solely an assessment body. Instead, ITAC relies on intelligence collected by domestic and international partners, including CSIS and law enforcement, and openly available information to produce integrated threat assessments.

The Executive Director of ITAC (EDIR) functionally reports directly to the Director of CSIS and is accountable on financial, administrative, and performance requirements for ITAC. The EDIR is also responsible for delivering mandate and policy commitments as directed by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA). The NSIA chairs the Deputy Ministers' Committee on National Security (DMNS), which acts as the governing board in reviewing ITAC's performance and providing advice on its strategic direction and approving ITAC's annual report.

Investment Canada Act

The *Investment Canada Act (ICA)*¹¹ sets out a national security review process to mitigate risks and review foreign investments on national security grounds. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) is the department responsible for the overall administration of the ICA. The Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, in consultation with the Minister of Public Safety, is responsible for conducting national security reviews and coordinating investigative bodies, such as CSIS.

As a lead investigative agency for the ICA National Security Review program, CSIS prepares intelligence assessments on foreign investments of concern, leveraging the Service's subject matter expertise, intelligence collection, and allied relationships. CSIS also supports other ICA investigative agencies through the sharing of intelligence and subject matter expertise.

The intelligence assessments prepared by the security and intelligence agencies of the ICA community are then used by ISED and the GC to inform decision-making on how to

¹¹ RSC 1985, c 28 (1st Supp).

address the identified national security risks using the ICA or, if necessary, other policy or regulatory authorities.

Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement

In November 2019, the CSIS Director created a Stakeholder Engagement Program to ensure that the Service is better positioned to work with communities, openly and transparently, to both learn from their experiences, including on FI. The program was designed to help protect communities most vulnerable to FI by sharing relevant information and providing mitigation advice. The Stakeholder Engagement Program was further developed to complement the Service's existing Academic Outreach Program. Over the years, Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement has commissioned several studies and presentations by subject matter experts on areas related to FI to help sensitize both CSIS employees and others across the GC on FI matters. The program also publishes an external newsletter, "Need to Know", to share information. The March 23, 2023 issue was jointly edited with the Chinese-Canadian National Council for Social Justice and discussed FI.

Amendments to the CSIS Act Relating to the Service's Capacity to Detect, Deter and Counter Foreign Interference

Prior to 2015, the *CSIS Act* had not been substantively amended since the Service's creation in 1984. Since 2015, the *CSIS Act* has seen four amendments that while not specifically related to FI, do impact the Service's capacity to detect, deter, and counter foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada's democratic processes.

April 2015 – "Bill C-44" – *Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act*, SC 2015, c 9

- Strengthened protections for CSIS human sources in judicial proceedings (s. 18.1 class privilege); and
- Clarified that CSIS can conduct certain activities outside Canada, and that the Federal Court can authorize activities outside Canada (ss. 12(2), 15(2) and 21(3.1)).

June 2015 – "Bill C-51" – *Anti-terrorism Act, 2015*, SC 2015, c 20

- Introduced the Service's mandate to conduct TRMs, including a regime for obtaining TRM warrants (ss. 12.1 and 21.1); and,
- Introduced assistance orders, which the Court can authorize if a third party's assistance is required to give effect to a warrant (s. 22.3)
- Enacted the *Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act*.¹²

June 2019 – "Bill C-59" – *National Security Act, 2017*, SC 2019, c 13

- Amended the *CSIS Act* by:
 - Clarifying the threat reduction mandate;

¹² SC 2015, c 20, s 2.

- Adding a new justification framework for acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences;
- Adding new exemptions related to the establishment and use of covert identities; and
- Adding a new framework for the collection, retention and use of datasets.
- Enhanced review and accountability by:
 - Replacing the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC) with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA); and
 - Establishing new, third party oversight with the Intelligence Commissioner.
- Clarified domestic cooperation by:
 - Enacting the *Communications Security Establishment Act*,¹³ which set out new powers and authorities for CSE; and
 - Amending the *Security of Canada Information Disclosure Act*.¹⁴
- Clarified foreign cooperation by:
 - Enacting the *Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act*, which requires Governor-in-Council directions in place of Ministerial directions.

June 2024 – “Bill C-70” – *An Act respecting countering foreign interference*, SC 2024, c 16

- Amended the dataset authority to clarify that datasets support CSIS’ duties and functions, and authority to better enable CSIS’ use of data by, for example, increasing timelines, enabling sharing, enabling use of Canadian datasets for s. 15 investigations, enabling foreign datasets to be treated as Canadian;
- Amended s. 16 to enable CSIS to collect, from within Canada, foreign information or intelligence that is located outside Canada if the s. 16 assistance is directed at a person or thing in Canada or an individual who was in Canada and is temporarily outside Canada. CSIS’ warrant authorities were also amended to enable the Federal Court to issue warrants to give effect to this change to s. 16;
- Amended s. 19 of the *CSIS Act* to enable CSIS to (1) disclose information to any person with jurisdiction to investigate contraventions of Canadian law, (2) disclose information to non-federal partners to build resiliency against threats, and (3) with the approval of the Minister of Public Safety, disclose personal information when it is essential in the public interest and clearly outweighs privacy invasion;

¹³ SC 2019, c 13, s 76.

¹⁴ SC 2015, c 20, s 2.

- Amended s. 21 of the *CSIS Act* to repeal the former process for constituting datasets from warranted collection (this process has been replaced by new provisions within the dataset authority) and to enable the Court to issue warrants for the collection of information or intelligence, from within Canada, to assist in CSIS' performance of its duties and functions under s. 16 of the *CSIS Act* (see *section 16 above*);
- Further amended Part II of the *Act*, titled Judicial Control, by introducing a preservation order, production order, and single use warrant authorities, which are modelled on the powers routinely used by law enforcement and intelligence agencies in other democracies. It also amended the removal warrant authority in s. 23 of the *CSIS Act* to enable CSIS to remove something installed on consent and the assistance order authority in s. 22.3 of the *CSIS Act* to include the new single use warrant and the removal warrant;
- Introduced a new provision for the *CSIS Act* to be reviewed by Parliament every five years, ensuring CSIS can continue to protect and remain accountable to Canada and all Canadians; and
- Clarified that, with emergency designations, employees may be justified in committing or directing another person to commit acts or omissions that would otherwise constitute offences.

Please see **Appendix H** for details on the *CSIS Act* amendments.

The Service is responsive to the GC's intelligence requirements as well as to emerging global events by continuing to monitor and assess emerging and existing threat-related activity. The Service has a finite capacity to investigate all threats as defined in s. 2 of the *CSIS Act* and to pursue investigation related to s. 16. As such, there is a continual reprioritization of resources according to the changing threat environment over any given time-frame. There is a direct relationship between the distribution of investigations and the Service's shift in resources in response to a s. 2 threat. For example, in the 5-year timeframe of 2017 to 2021, there was a 35% increase in investigations related to s. 2(b) threats. The increased focus on this threat was at the expense of investigative capacity against other national security threats. By shifting resources to investigate FI, less resources are available to investigate espionage, sabotage and terrorism threats. The number of those investigations declined 35% over the same time frame. This constant reprioritization is necessary as CSIS has not received a corresponding increase in its resources to effectively detect, deter and counter the threat FI activities, despite the increasing threat environment.

CSIS does not have the capacity to investigate all national security threats that meet the legal threshold for investigation and does not have the capacity to seek judicial authorizations for all national security threats meeting the s. 21 legal threshold to obtain a warrant from the Federal Court.

As a result, a number of capacity-related risks exist without resources, impacting CSIS's ability to deliver on FI intelligence requirements.

(3) A listing and description of all policy proposals, legislative plans and resource requests related to foreign interference, including but not limited to memos to the Deputy Minister (or equivalent) or Assistant Deputy Minister (or equivalent). At a minimum, this should include the date of the request, date of decision (where applicable), a summary of the proposed changes and the outcome of the request.

CSIS engages regularly with PS, PCO and other partners to advance CSIS' policy proposals, legislative plans and resource requests. CSIS works with PS and PCO in a coordinated approach to national security threats to ensure cohesion with Canada's national security policies. CSIS also regularly briefs and meets with the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister's Office in order to inform the Minister of important national security developments and key elements of the Service's operational activity, as well as seek ministerial approval where needed.

CSIS actively leads and contributes to the GC's national security policy agenda, including with respect to foreign interference. While Cabinet confidentiality limits what CSIS can disclose regarding its contributions and although the final outcomes of certain MCs may no longer be covered by Cabinet confidentiality, CSIS' underlying advice to and via senior officials on the development of these initiatives remains protected. We are therefore unable to provide supporting materials.

Several legislative efforts and Treasury Board Submissions for resource requests impacting the Service's ability to detect, deter and counter foreign interference exist for the time span of the Commission's mandate, but these records have been withheld as they would reveal information protected by Cabinet Confidence.

Table 1 includes an unclassified list of partner consultations, including with diaspora communities, on the recent *CSIS Act* amendments included in Bill C-70 which received Royal Assent on June 20, 2024.

Budget 2024 proposes to provide \$655.7 million over eight years, starting in 2024-25, with \$191.1 million in remaining amortization, and \$114.7 million ongoing to the CSIS to enhance its intelligence capabilities, and its presence in Toronto. Although the budget is designed to equip CSIS to keep pace with technological developments and these targeted and significant investments will enhance CSIS' capability to detect, deter and counter FI, resource challenges remain as CSIS' baseline budget reflects its capabilities in 1984. The increasingly diverse, complex and global nature of threats today means that CSIS must now make difficult decisions on the reallocation of resources between operational demands, as well as having to allocate investigative funds to meet statutory obligations and support external oversight functions.

(4) A listing and description of all existing arrangements and undertakings (including Memoranda of Understanding) between government departments and agencies, and with international partners, aimed at detecting, deterring, and countering foreign interference activities, including the dates that the arrangements have been in place.

All of the authorities previously stated in response to Question 2 are used in varying capacities to detect, deter and counter foreign interference.

CSIS fosters strong relationships with Indigenous governments and organizations, municipal, provincial, territorial and federal governments and foreign partners in building resilience against foreign interference threats. The Service works closely with both domestic and foreign security intelligence partners to detect, deter and counter foreign interference through the sharing of intelligence. Collaboration and partnerships between domestic and international security intelligence services and law enforcement agencies are critical to ensuring collective security and bolstering CSIS' ability to counter foreign interference.

Information-Sharing Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with Domestic Partners

CSIS is able to share and exchange a broad range of information with various levels of government through information-sharing Memoranda of Understanding or arrangements. Exchanging information with all levels of government and law enforcement in Canada is crucial to CSIS fulfilling its mandate to lawfully advise the GC of threats to the national security of Canada.

See **Table 2** for a listing of CSIS' Memoranda of Understanding/Arrangements.

Cooperation with Foreign Entities

Exchanging information with foreign agencies is an integral part of CSIS' mandate and is a crucial component of Canada's ability to effectively investigate, assess, and counter threats to Canada and its interest. For example, the Service maintains longstanding partnerships within the Five Eyes alliance. Cooperation with these countries is robust, across a range of threats from foreign interference to violent extremism, and is critical in helping safeguard Canada's national security.

CSIS is able to share or exchange a broad range of information with foreign entities through the authorities granted under paragraph 17(1)(b) of the *CSIS Act*. Per that paragraph, the Service may, "with the approval of the Minister after consultation by the Minister with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with the government of a foreign state or an institution thereof or an international organization of states or an institution thereof". A 17(1)(b) arrangement permits CSIS to engage in a more collaborative way with a foreign agency for the purpose of performing the Service's duties and functions under the *CSIS Act*. Such

arrangements are not specifically aimed at detecting, deterring and countering foreign interference activities but may include intelligence sharing related to foreign interference. The list of existing arrangements includes agencies in a great many countries.

In 2018, CSIS maintained 306 arrangements and at present (June 2024), CSIS has 317. This growth allows CSIS to respond to an evolving threat landscape.

Depending on the nature of the arrangement, the Service may cooperate with the foreign partner on one or more of the following: (1) immigration vetting and security assessments, (2) acquisition or exchange of information, and (3) technical assistance.

(5) A listing and description of all warrant applications related to foreign interference submitted to the Minister of Public Safety, and ministerial authorizations submitted to the Minister of National Defence, including date submitted to the Minister, date approved by the Minister, date of decision by the Federal Court and, if applicable, the reasons for decision.

Under s. 21 of the *CSIS Act*, a designated judge of the Federal Court may issue a warrant if satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that a warrant is required to enable the Service to investigate a threat to the security of Canada, which may include foreign interference threats. A designated judge may also issue a s. 21 warrant if satisfied that there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that a warrant is required for the Service to perform its duties and functions under s. 16. Section 21 warrants are generally issued for a maximum period of one year.¹⁵

Section 21.1 of the *CSIS Act* further allows the Service to seek a Federal Court warrant to carry out certain TRMs. During the period under review by the Commission, the Service did not seek any s. 21.1 warrants.

The Federal Court can also issue assistance orders, ordering an individual or entity to assist CSIS to give effect to a warrant (ss. 22.3(1)), and order measures to ensure the confidentiality of such an order (ss. 22.3(2)). Note that Bill C-70 introduced additional judicial authorities, as summarized in response to Question 2, above.

In its warrant applications and dealings with the Federal Court, CSIS has a “duty of candour” to be full, fair and frank with respect to all facts, including exculpatory information, relating to warrant applications before the Federal Court.

As part of CSIS’ duty of candour obligations, CSIS discloses any instances of warrant-related non-compliance to the Federal Court. On a bi-annual basis, CSIS produces the Warranted Compliance Incident Report (WCIR) to keep the Court apprised of warrant-related non-compliance instances. To increase transparency with the Court, CSIS also attends a quarterly Case Management Conference to answer any questions related to the WCIR or with regards to the state of the Compliance program at the Service. CSIS has a duty to proactively advise the Federal Court, the Minister of Public Safety and NSIRA on issues of non-compliance pertaining to Canadian law, Ministerial Direction and potential unlawful activity.

¹⁵ Warrants issued for 2(d) threats (i.e. subversion) are limited to 60 days (see s 21(5)(a) of the *CSIS Act*).

(6) A listing and description of the date, venue, participants and summary of discussion for all engagements by senior executives (ADM and above, including Ministers) with representatives of foreign governments where the subject of foreign interference was raised.

Table 3 lists engagements by CSIS senior executives (ADM and above) with representatives of foreign governments where the subject of foreign interference was discussed at the meeting.

(7) A listing and description of all education campaigns aimed at Parliamentarians and their staff, political parties, government employees at federal, provincial or municipal levels, diaspora groups, or the general public related to foreign interference.

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(9) A listing of all engagements at divisional Director level (or equivalent) or above with representatives of diaspora groups where the subject of foreign interference was discussed. Listing should include dates, names of departmental and diaspora representatives and summary of discussion.

The mechanisms by which CSIS conducts engagement activities and education campaigns overlap. CSIS proactively engages with members of Canadian society to promote dialogue and build awareness on national security matters. This includes engaging with stakeholders to increase awareness and understanding of foreign interference including with Parliamentarians and their staff, political parties, government employees (federal, provincial, territorial, municipal and Indigenous), diaspora groups, and the public. In recent years, CSIS has increased its public engagement and communication efforts due to the pervasive nature of the foreign interference threat. Through increased transparency, CSIS fosters a more informed national security discussion and, by doing so, ultimately builds resiliency against foreign interference. Due to constraints on the Service's former s. 19 disclosure authority, engagements with those outside of the GC were generally limited to unclassified and general threat information. CSIS, however, has also leveraged its threat reduction mandate to inform others of threats in order to reduce them in specific circumstances.

CSIS uses its full authorities under the *CSIS Act* to investigate suspected interference by foreign states that would undermine Canada's democratic processes, threaten the lives and wellbeing of Canadians, or intimidate Canadian communities. Certain foreign states routinely attempt to threaten and intimidate individuals around the world through various state entities and non-state proxies. Relationships with diaspora communities are invaluable for CSIS to effectively execute its mandate, as such, the Service takes every measure possible to ensure safeguards are in place to protect those relationships.

By working in collaboration with domestic and international partners, the Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement (AOSE) program has facilitated over 150 engagements with civil society partners to build resilience against foreign interference,

espionage, and other hostile state activities and has provided over 200 security briefings to elected and unelected officials at all levels of government to build resilience against foreign interference and espionage. AOSE has met with senior university administrators across Canada to build awareness of the extent of foreign interference activities, such as monitoring, intimidation, and harassment targeting international students on Canadian campuses. AOSE has also facilitated security clearances for leadership of Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK) to provide a mechanism for information-sharing with Inuit leaders to better support Inuit self-determination and to increase awareness and understanding of foreign interference.

Most CSIS interactions with stakeholders do not occur in a formal meeting but rather are based on an informal series of interactions over a prolonged period of time. CSIS takes great effort to establish and build upon its relationships that are nurtured after years of effort. Through the hundreds of informal engagements with our network of partners and stakeholders, CSIS is working hard to build relationships of trust.

As such, it is difficult to include all stakeholder interactions in formal reporting. **Table 4** lists formal meetings with Canadian partners, including with diaspora communities, on the topic of FI. The table represents CSIS efforts at educating other partners, including Indigenous representative bodies on this threat. The table does not reflect the various informal interactions.

Educating Members of Parliament

Canada's democratic institutions are a significant focus of foreign interference. In response, for several years CSIS has prioritized the briefing of Parliamentarians and public officials and their staff (federal, provincial, territorial, municipal, Indigenous). C-70 recently provided the Service further disclosure authorities. However, up until very recently, specific provisions of the *CSIS Act* currently limited the extent to which classified information could be disclosed during these engagements. Despite being limited to providing unclassified information, CSIS was able to provide details about the tactics, tradecraft and methodologies of foreign interference threat actors targeting elected officials. The briefings were designed to provide enough information to build awareness to make foreign interference efforts unsuccessful while still respecting our obligations under the *CSIS Act* as well as protecting sources and methodologies.

Please refer to the updated **Appendix D** from the Stage 1 Institutional Report for a list of engagements to educate Parliamentarians and their staff, political parties, employees within the federal, provincial, municipal or Indigenous government on the threat of foreign interference.

Educating Government Employees

In light of the ever-increasing threat of foreign interference and espionage, CSIS has created new products related to granting security clearances to educate and build

awareness within the GC – including how to mitigate and manage the risks to Canadian assets and information.

Public Education

CSIS has published unclassified reports, including, for example, “Foreign Interference and You,” in eight languages including the languages of several diaspora communities directly targeted by foreign interference (Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Simplified Chinese, Traditional Chinese, Punjabi, English and French). In August 2023, the Service conducted a public campaign on disinformation to build awareness on the topic. Since 2018, CSIS has released annual public reports. Prior to 2018, CSIS published a public report every two or three years. CSIS has steadily released more information in each subsequent public report. The 2023 annual public report continues to build on this trend.

CSIS also uses social media to educate the public on FI. In 2023, there were over 9.7 million views of CSIS content, 157% more than in 2022.

By sharing as much information as widely as possible, CSIS builds understanding across Canada of the threat environment and supports informed dialogue on national security issues. This objective is achieved, in part, by offering information on CSIS’s public website and social media accounts; delivering public remarks; appearing before Parliamentary committees; and media interviews. As mentioned previously, since 2018, the Director of CSIS has also delivered an annual public speech which is intended to educate the public on national security, including foreign interference.

See **Table 5** for a non-exhaustive listing of all public engagements at the ADM and DM-level and **Table 6** for a listing of screenshots of all social media engagements.

CSIS senior executives have openly discussed the fact that one of the best mechanisms to counter foreign interference, generally and in our democratic processes specifically, is through transparent discussion with Canadians on what foreign interference is and how it is conducted. Exposing the mechanisms used by certain foreign states to improperly interfere in Canadian affairs limits their efficacy and increases the resiliency of Canadian institutions and society. As noted earlier, for the period under review by the Commission, CSIS had statutory limitations on its ability to publicly share information collected under its mandate. Although Bill C-70 will not entirely lift these statutory limitations, the Service will have new authorities to disclose for the purpose of building resiliency.

CSIS supports the Commission’s mandate to conduct its affairs in a transparent manner. CSIS undertook an unparalleled effort to respond to the Commission’s requests for unclassified summaries of classified topics of interest to the Commission. CSIS authored 13 of the 14 topical summaries released under the Commission’s mandate, summarizing highly classified intelligence on sensitive matters in a manner that could be disclosed publicly. This undertaking represents the broadest release of

intelligence relating to foreign interference into democratic processes by the Service. These disclosures facilitated a robust public discussion on matters of national security, without causing harm to Canada's intelligence collection capabilities.

CSIS also responds to media requests, providing as much information as possible. Since late 2022, there has been a considerable increase in requests for information related to FI. CSIS takes its responsibility to be as transparent as possible seriously for requests from the public; this includes transparency with respect to releasable information related to FI in its holdings. In 2023, CSIS received 3,387 *Privacy Act*¹⁶ requests and 941 *Access to Information Act*¹⁷ (ATIA) requests. For the 2023 calendar year, CSIS on-time compliance stood at 94% for *Privacy Act* requests and 92% for ATIA requests.

See **Table 7** for a listing of the topical summaries of classified intelligence released to date.

(8) (PCO and/or Public Safety) For each interdepartmental committee related to foreign interference, listing of meeting frequency (or meeting dates if ad hoc) and description of what documentation is routinely produced for each committee (e.g. agendas, list of participants, annotated agendas for the Chair, meeting summaries, minutes).

Question (8) is not applicable to CSIS.

(9) See page 13 for combined answer to Question 7 and Question 9

(10) Any relevant updates related to the information provided in the Stage 1 Institutional Report.

Please see the following updated unclassified appendices from the CSIS Stage 1 Institutional Report:

APPENDIX B2 – June 2024 Addition: 2022 and 2023 CSIS Annual Public Reports

APPENDIX G – Overview of FI TRMs (Updated June 2024)

¹⁶ RSC 1985, c P-21.

¹⁷ RSC 1985, c A-1.

TABLE 1

CSIS Act Amendments – Consultations

In addition to the below consultations, CSIS also supported Ministerial briefings related to the FI-related legislative amendments.

In November 2023, the Government of Canada launched public consultations on possible amendments to the *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act* (the *CSIS Act*) that would better equip CSIS to carry out its mandate to investigate, advise the Government of Canada, and take measures to reduce threats to the security of Canada and all Canadians. The consultations included an online survey available to the public and direct engagement with provincial and territorial governments; Indigenous governments; the private sector; academia; legal, privacy and transparency experts; community and religious representative organizations; and other civil society stakeholder and partner groups. The consultation process was a valued experience for the Government, and provided an opportunity to reach out to and learn from many civically-engaged members of Canadian society.

Participating Canadians indicated a general understanding that advancements in technology and evolving threats have created a need for changes to the *CSIS Act*, and favoured amendments. Respondents held a generally positive view toward the amendments under consideration, though there was variability between the categories in the degree of support.

While support was strong, not all participants favoured the proposals. A minority of respondents expressed concerns specific to privacy and the need for strong oversight and accountability, with contributions also reflecting the importance of building trust in CSIS and encouraged continued transparency.

Taken as a whole, most participants acknowledged that the proposed amendments could better equip CSIS and the Government to respond to national security threats such as foreign interference.

TABLE 2

<p align="center">Memoranda of Understanding / Arrangements related to Foreign Interference (2018 – 2024)</p> <p align="center"><i>The list below is reflective only of the MOUs relevant to the Commission’s mandate and in place during the identified timeframe; it is not an exhaustive list of the Service’s MOUs / Arrangements. It is neither reflective of renewals of MOUs / Arrangements nor their initial start date.</i></p>		
Title	Date	Description
<p>CSIS RCMP Framework for Cooperation (One Vision)</p>	2015-11-10	<p>The purpose of the One Vision Framework is to establish a clear and transparent framework to govern information sharing between CSIS and the RCMP as they both exercise their separate national security mandates.</p>
	2020-10-30 <i>(One Vision 2.0)</i>	
	2021-11-10 <i>(One Vision 3.0)</i>	
<p>Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and OCCE</p>	2019-09-26	<p>CSIS and OCCE share a goal of preventing covert, clandestine or criminal activities interfering with or influencing electoral processes in Canada.</p> <p>The need to ensure the integrity of Canada’s electoral processes, while effectively managing national security threats in a dynamic and fluid threat environment, requires a clear framework for cooperation that allows for the collaborative threat assessment and consideration of the best means of response.</p> <p>This MOU provides for a means of cooperation to determine the most effective and efficient way to address a threat in accordance with each Participant’s respective legislative authorities.</p>
<p>Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and the Commissioner of Canada Elections</p>	2019-09-26	<p>The MOU provides for a means of cooperation to determine the most effective and efficient way to address a threat in accordance with each Participant’s respective legislative authorities.</p>
<p>Memorandum of Understanding between PPSC, DoJ, RCMP, and CSIS</p>	2020-10-13	<p>Concerning certain roles and responsibilities in relation to national security investigations.</p>

Memorandum of Understanding between CSIS and the House of Commons (Office of the Sergeant-At-Arms, SAA)	2023-03-30	This MOU sets out the roles and responsibilities of the Participants in sharing information for the purpose of enhancing the safety and security of members of the House.
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TABLE 3

Engagements by CSIS Senior Executives with Representatives of Foreign Governments (2018 – 2024)

TABLE 4

**Academic Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement (AOSE) including Diaspora
Community Engagements on the Topic of Foreign Interference (2018 – 2024)**

TABLE 5

Public Engagements on the topic of Foreign Interference (2018 – 2024)			
<i>The list below is not an exhaustive list of the Service's public engagements.</i>			
Topic	Forum	Document Date	CSIS Executive / Branch Present
Annual Speech by CSIS Director David Vigneault	Economic Club of Canada	2018-12-04	Director
FI General, Economy, Espionage	Standing Committee on Industry and Technology (INDU)	2020-06-11	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Economy, Espionage	Standing Committee on Industry and Technology (INDU)	2020-06-11	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Economy, Espionage	Standing Committee on Industry and Technology (INDU)	2020-06-18	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Economy, Espionage	Standing Committee on Industry and Technology (INDU)	2020-06-18	Assistant Director Requirements
UFWD	Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)	2020-11-02	Director
FI General	Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)	2020-11-25	Deputy Director Operations
Annual Speech by CSIS Director David Vigneault	Centre for International Governance Innovation	2021-02-09	Director

FI General	Canada China Legislative Association (CACN)	2021-03-11	Director
FI General, Economy, Research	Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)	2021-05-12	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Economy, Research	Standing Committee on Industry and Technology (INDU)	2022-01-27	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Espionage, Cyber	Standing Committee on National Defence (NDDN)	2022-03-22	Assistant Director Requirements
Annual Speech by CSIS Director David Vigneault	University of British Columbia	2022-05-04	Director
FI General, Democratic Institutions	Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security (SECU)	2022-11-01	Deputy Director Operations
FI General	Canada China Legislative Association (CACN)	2023-02-06	Director
FI General, Democratic Institutions	Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)	2023-02-09	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Democratic Institutions	Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)	2023-02-09	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Democratic Institutions	Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)	2023-03-02	Director and Deputy Director Operations

FI General, Democratic Institutions	Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)	2023-04-27	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Democratic Institutions, Threats against MPs	Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs (PROC)	2023-06-13	Director and Assistant Director Requirements
CSIS Director David Vigneault participation	Emerging Technology and Securing Innovation Summit	2023-10-17	Director
FI General, Economy, Research	Standing Committee on Science and Research (SRSR)	2023-10-23	Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships
FI General, Disinformation	Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics (ETHI)	2023-11-20	Assistant Director Requirements
FI General, Economy, Research	Standing Committee on Science and Research (SRSR)	2023-11-22	Director and Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships
Annual Speech by CSIS Director David Vigneault	Canadian Museum for Human Rights	2023-12-11	Director

TABLE 6

Social Media Engagements

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 9, 2023

All Canadians have a role to play in protecting Canada against **foreign interference**.

By raising awareness of these issues, CSIS aims to sensitize Canadians to the threat and help build resilience to protect all that we stand for as a democratic and free Canada. 🇨🇦

Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

1.2K replies, 1.6K retweets, 4.9K likes, 1.1M views

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 20, 2023
 Canadians beware

The People's Republic of China's Intelligence Services (PRCIS) are targeting Canadian citizens inside & outside of China.

This thread explains how targets are approached and cultivated.

Don't be a target of China's Intelligence Services ONLINE RECRUITMENT

2531 PR# · Jun 20, 2023 · 653K views

All: View post engagements

47K · 1.9K · 2.4K · 343

Post your reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 20, 2023

Step 1 – The PRCIS identifies Canadian recruitment targets by using proxies, also known as "targets". They identify people who are actively looking for jobs in strategic sectors or who have high-value credentials.

1 ONLINE TARGETING

Identification and online research on recruitment targets by Chinese intelligence service proxies referred to as "targets"

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 20, 2023

Step 2 - The PRCIS then approaches their target under cover via LinkedIn, posing as anything from an HR recruiter to a security consultant. They then move the communication to secondary platforms at the earliest opportunity, such as WeChat, WhatsApp or email.

2 APPROACH

Initial approaches are conducted and cover via LinkedIn with communication moved to secondary platforms (WeChat, WhatsApp, email) at earliest opportunity

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 20, 2023

Step 3 - Not knowing the true motive, targets are asked to write reports for client "consultants" in exchange for payment. Targets may also be invited to meetings with "clients". Both the consultant and the client are in fact intelligence officers.

3 TARGETS ARE APPROACHED

- a) Targets are asked to write reports for "clients" in exchange for payment
- b) Targets may be invited to a virtual meeting, made formally introduce themselves to clients who are intelligence officers

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 20, 2023

Step 4 - These new recruits start receiving payments in exchange for confidential, privileged information that is of interest to the PRCIS.

4 RECRUITMENT

- a) Recruits begin receiving payments in order to provide confidential information
- b) Intelligence officers may offer to pay for their true affiliation in order to provide plausible deniability

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 20, 2023

Don't become a target of PRCIS recruitment. Be careful who you connect with on LinkedIn, and all other online platforms.

Don't become a target!

Canada

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Attention Canadian professionals, scientists & academics

CSIS is aware of hostile state actors currently targeting Canadian professionals, scientists & academics in an effort to obtain Canadian knowledge and expertise.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien de renseignement de sécurité

Canada

3:53 PM · Nov 20, 2023 · 219.7K Views

View post engagements

324 996 1.3K 94

Post your reply **Reply**

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Nov 20, 2023

These types of talent recruitment initiatives can result in the misuse of Government of Canada resources, as well as a loss of proprietary and sensitive information, to the benefit of hostile state actors.

11 39 140 13K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Nov 20, 2023

If you have been offered well paying research placements or collaboration opportunities from suspicious international sources, contact your respective security office, Chief Security Officer, or CSIS if needed.

16 91 207 16K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 13

Did you know that the Government of Canada has introduced legislation that contains amendments to the CSIS Act?



ALT Canada

59 71 120 18K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference will harden Canada against foreign interference (FI) threats by equipping CSIS with the right tools to respond to threats targeting Canada.

9:14 AM · May 13, 2024 · 1,835 Views

View post engagements

11 8 22 2

Post your reply **Reply**

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 13


Learn more about how the legislation supports CSIS' efforts against FI: canada.ca/en/public-safe...

3 3 17 1.6K

Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 9

In 2023, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of Iran, and India continued to engage in a variety of hostile foreign interference & espionage activities to advance their personal, economic, and political interests.



74 216 372 36K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In response, CSIS continued to detect, investigate, and reduce foreign interference and espionage threat activities.


Learn more about CSIS' response in the 2023 Public Report: [canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://canada.ca/en/security-in-...)

10:11 AM · May 9, 2024 · 2,731 Views

4 13 53 5

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 7

The Government of Canada has introduced An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference, an important piece of legislation that will strengthen Canada's approach to countering foreign interference.



107 120 234 24K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

The legislation includes amendments to the CSIS Act that will help CSIS address the evolving foreign interference threat.

Learn more about the proposed legislation: [canada.ca/en/public-safe...](https://canada.ca/en/public-safe-...)

8:19 AM · May 7, 2024 · 3,191 Views

2 3 33 3

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 30
 In November 2023, the Government of Canada (GoC) launched public consultations on proposed amendments to the CSIS Act that would better equip CSIS to carry out its mandate to protect national security.

What We Heard and Learned Report
 CSIS Act

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 30
 The proposed amendments focused on five categories related to information disclosure, warrants, foreign intelligence collection, data analytics, and the introduction of a requirement to review the CSIS Act on a regular basis.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 30
 The consultations included an online survey available to the public and direct engagement by CSIS and GoC representatives with governments at all levels, including Indigenous; the private sector; community organizations; and other key partners.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 30
 Respondents indicated a general understanding that advancements in technology and evolving threats have created a need for changes to the CSIS Act, and favoured amendments.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 30
 Respondents also held a generally positive view toward the amendments under consideration, although, some respondents noted concerns specific to privacy and the need for oversight.

Overall, most respondents acknowledged that the proposed amendments could better equip CSIS and the GoC to respond to national security threats, such as foreign interference.

To learn more, read the "What We Heard and Learned Report":
publicsafety.gc.ca/ent/fr/ctcs/pblc...

11:25 AM · Apr 30, 2024 · 912 Views

View post engagements

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 26

The Government of Canada published the "What We Heard and Learned Report" regarding public consultations on proposed amendments to the CSIS Act.



What We Heard and Learned Report
CSIS Act

ALT Canada

12 14 30 4.2K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In partnership with Public Safety, CSIS is proud to share this report that details the perspectives of Canadians on the proposed amendments that seek to better equip CSIS to counter foreign interference:

publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblc...

9:49 AM · Apr 26, 2024 · **1,693** Views

View post engagements


5 5 15 3

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Foreign interference targets all facets of Canadian society.

Despite the hard work CSIS does daily, we all have a role to play. Citizens need to know about the threats and be equipped to protect themselves from foreign interference.

Learn more here:
canada.ca/en/security-in...



REPORT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

1-800-267-7485 Canada.ca/CSIS
To report immediate threats, call your local police.

ALT Canada

11:00 AM · Mar 7, 2024 · **18.9K** Views

On Monday, CSIS Director discussed at the @CAHRF_News how Foreign Interference threatens our democracy. Read the key messages on #FI in this thread

A Human Rights-Centered Approach to National Security
Remarks by CSIS Director, David Vigneault
Hosted by Isha Khan, CEO of the Canadian Museum for Human Rights

1 "It is not acceptable for states to seek influence within our democratic institutions, to suppress the fundamental rights of our people within our borders, or to interfere in democratic processes."

2 "It's perfectly normal for states to build relationships and strategically position their interests abroad." "But it is not acceptable for states to seek influence within our democratic institutions, to suppress the fundamental rights of our people within our borders, or to interfere in democratic processes."
--CSIS Director, David Vigneault

3 "Our adversaries are attempting to use elected officials, public servants, business leaders and academics, often unknowingly, to support foreign state objectives and undermine democracy."
--CSIS Director, David Vigneault

4 "Today I would like to emphasize the human aspect – the real harm and violations of basic rights inflicted on individuals by foreign state actors. There is a toll imposed directly on Canadians, and it is tangible."
--CSIS Director, David Vigneault

Visit this link for more information on FI: canada.ca/en/security-in-...
3:41 PM - Dec 13, 2023 - 2,039 Views

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Nov 28, 2023

Issue #1: Currently, the CSIS Act does not generally authorize CSIS to disclose information/intelligence outside the Government of Canada. This prevents a full and frank understanding of threats.



Public Consultation
CSIS Act

48 70 169 37K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Countering foreign interference requires an informed society, to better equip Canadians to protect themselves.

Should CSIS be authorized to disclose information more widely? Let us know your thoughts here: canada.ca/en/security-in-...

9:57 AM · Nov 28, 2023 · 7,366 Views

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

This year, learn how you can play an important role in protecting Canada from #ForeignInterference.

canada.ca/en/security-in-...



FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND YOU

3:00 PM · Jan 15, 2024 · 17.5K Views

View post engagements

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Espionage and foreign interference pose a significant threat to Canada's national security, democratic institutions, and economic prosperity. We work to identify, counter, and reduce these threats to Canada.

Learn more about espionage and FI: [Canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://Canada.ca/en/security-in-...)



The image shows the cover of the CSIS Public Report 2022. It features the CSIS logo, the text 'CSIS Public Report 2022', and the tagline 'A safe, secure and prosperous Canada through trusted intelligence, advice and action.' The cover has a blue and orange color scheme with a globe-like background.

10:03 AM · May 24, 2023 · 59.5K Views

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 9, 2023

Foreign interference poses one of the most important strategic threats to Canada's #NationalSecurity, targeting our sovereignty and democratic institutions.



The graphic shows two silhouettes of people in a dark setting, with the text 'Foreign Interference' overlaid. Below the text is a stylized representation of the word 'FOREIGN' in a grid-like font.

173 254 562 45K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 9, 2023

Hostile state actors use Canada-based entities as proxies. They do so by cultivating witting or unwitting individuals to assist them, which enables them to operate with plausible deniability on Canadian soil.

14 23 77 5.7K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 9, 2023

Hostile state actors also monitor, intimidate and harass communities in Canada in an attempt to silence dissidents and promote favourable narratives.

13 26 84 4.2K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Learn more about foreign interference in our 2022 Public Report: [Canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://Canada.ca/en/security-in-...)

11:35 AM · May 9, 2023 · 3,974 Views

The screenshot shows a Twitter thread from CSIS Canada (@csiscanada) dated May 16, 2023. The thread consists of four tweets:

- Tweet 1:** "The spread of #misinformation and #disinformation remains a persistent and significant threat to Canada's #NationalSecurity. 🇨🇦" (238 retweets, 179 replies, 353 likes, 57K views)
- Tweet 2:** "CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 16, 2023
The spread of extreme conspiracy theories and false narratives are a contributing factor in the radicalization of IMVE actors. Some of whom, have mobilized to violence in recent years." (14 retweets, 20 replies, 52 likes, 3.4K views)
- Tweet 3:** "CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 16, 2023
Hostile states have been involved in actively spreading such #disinformation in an effort to discredit our government institutions." (13 retweets, 12 replies, 39 likes, 2.5K views)
- Tweet 4:** "CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 16, 2023
In 2022, CSIS observed multiple instances of hostile states manipulating social media, amplifying a particular message, or "trolling" users when appropriate to serve their interests." (6 retweets, 17 replies, 49 likes, 3.9K views)


The final tweet includes a link to a report titled "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND YOU" published by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Service canadien de renseignements de sécurité). The report cover features the text "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND YOU" and the CSIS logo. The tweet has 1157 retweets, 115 replies, 45 likes, and 4.177 views.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In 2022, key national security threats facing Canada all accelerated and evolved.

While threats of foreign interference and IMVE are not new, CSIS observed these threats increase in scale, scope and complexity.

Read the CSIS 2022 Public Report: [Canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://Canada.ca/en/security-in-...)



3:38 PM · May 4, 2023 · 37.3K Views

View post engagements

144 98 189 14

Post your reply Reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 4, 2023

Rest assured, CSIS will continue to use the full extent of its mandated authorities to counter these threats and protect Canada's security.

Read more on how CSIS protects Canadians from current security threats: [Canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://Canada.ca/en/security-in-...)

17 8 34 3.2K

Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

All Canadians have a role to play in protecting Canada against foreign interference.

By learning more about all the tactics foreign states use, Canadians can help build resilience to foreign interference and protect all that we stand for as a democratic and free Canada. 🇨🇦



12:58 PM · Mar 10, 2023 · 159.1K Views

View post engagements

392 516 1.7K 19

Post your reply Reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 10, 2023

Inform yourself here: [Canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://Canada.ca/en/security-in-...)

14 38 113 9.5K

Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 9, 2023

All Canadians have a role to play in protecting Canada against **foreign interference**.

By raising awareness of these issues, CSIS aims to sensitize Canadians to the threat and help build resilience to protect all that we stand for as a democratic and free Canada. 🇨🇦



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien de renseignement de sécurité

Canada

1.2K 1.6K 4.9K 1.1M

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 7, 2023

Cyberattacks are often related to **foreign interference**.

What do they share in common: They are purposely covert, malign, and deceptive.

Help protect Canada's #NationalSecurity, [canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://canada.ca/en/security-in-...)



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien de renseignement de sécurité

Canada

4 20 25 5.1K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 6, 2023

CSIS continues to observe increasing **foreign interference** activity by state actors, including the People's Republic of China (PRC). Given the nature of today's geopolitical environment, these activities will almost certainly intensify.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

62 143 307 33K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 3, 2023

Foreign interference is a complex, and very serious threat to Canada's **#NationalSecurity**. It threatens our:

- ✓ Political systems
- ✓ Democratic processes
- ✓ Social cohesion
- ✓ Academic freedom
- ✓ Economic prosperity
- ✓ Rights & freedoms



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

- intimidation
- disinformation
- blackmail
- illicit financing
- coercion
- cyber attacks

Canada

317 398 943 95K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Learn more about foreign interference and how you can protect yourself: canada.ca/en/security-in...

10:37 AM · Mar 3, 2023 · 6,014 Views

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In light of the banning of TikTok on all government devices, we want to bring Canadians' attention to the threat of foreign interference #FI and cyberattacks.



2:56 PM · Mar 2, 2023 · 36.5K Views

View post engagements

40 108 226 10

Post your reply **Reply**

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 2, 2023

Read our publication on FI for more information on how you can protect yourself and your loved ones from this threat.

canada.ca/en/security-in...

6 6 33 3.7K


Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Foreign Interference (FI) differs from normal diplomatic conduct or acceptable foreign state actor lobbying.

Active, overt diplomacy and lobbying are healthy parts of democracy. Clandestine or deceptive FI is not.

ow.ly/avnZ50MrTUS



1:03 PM · Jan 19, 2023 · 9,002 Views

View post engagements

5 43 64 3

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Dec 30, 2022

In 2022, we briefed elected officials across all levels of government in Canada about **foreign interference (FI)** to build awareness and resiliency against FI related threats targeting Canada.



Briefing Elected Officials
2022
YEAR IN REVIEW

Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

5 6 42 5.1K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Dec 29, 2022

In 2022, we warned Canadians about the threat posed by **foreign interference** by state actors, which undermines the security of our country. For example, Iranian-Canadians continue to be targeted & intimidated by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its proxies: [cbc.ca/news/politics/...](https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/)



Spotlighting Foreign Interference
2022
YEAR IN REVIEW

Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

5 18 43 4.8K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Dec 19, 2022

21st century technological advances have made our lives easier. But convenience has come with a price: Canadians are now more vulnerable to foreign state interference in cyberspace.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND YOU

Canada

6 10 39 7.2K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Learn how to recognize and protect yourself & your loved ones from foreign interference: [canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://canada.ca/en/security-in-...)

10:21 AM · Dec 19, 2022 · 1,721 Views

View post engagements

2 3 4

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Dec 5, 2022

Foreign interference can be a single act, but most of the time it is a series of activities and behaviours that occur over a period of time and may include threats, harassment, and intimidation.

Sound familiar? Contact us.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

REPORT FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

1-800-267-7485 Canada.ca/CSIS
To report immediate threats, call your local police.

Canada

2 16 26

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

How might foreign interference (FI) affect you, your friends, or your loved ones?

Learn more about how to protect yourself from this threat facing Canada and the Canadian population:
ow.ly/4Flx50LwvPs



12:04 PM · Nov 10, 2022

View post engagements

27 19 25

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Oct 28, 2022

Canada was one of over 50 signatories to the "Declaration for the Future of Internet" that affirms our commitment to protecting human rights, security and freedoms online. #FutureOfTheInternet



2 4 17

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Oct 28, 2022

In support of the declaration's objectives, we are working with our partners to investigate and counter state-sponsored malicious cyber activity.

1 3 5

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

These threats include the spread of #ransomware affecting the security and resilience of our critical infrastructure, as well as #disinformation and other foreign interference activities.

1:29 PM · Oct 28, 2022

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1 2 7

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Hostile states actively spread #disinformation in an effort to discredit Canada's democratic institutions and gain influence for their own strategic objectives.

Learn about #ForeignInterference threats to Canada's democratic process: bit.ly/3wuEFoB



2:03 PM · Oct 6, 2022

View post engagements

8 44 59 3

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Part of our mission involves identifying and investigating threats to Canada's #NationalSecurity.

To report espionage or foreign interference, call 1-800-267-7685 or visit ow.ly/ctGR50KtkhT



2:03 PM · Sep 27, 2022

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Canadians need to be aware that state-sponsored #disinformation campaigns represent one of the many avenues for foreign interference. Learn more about the threats facing Canada and how you can mitigate the threat: bit.ly/3KgkTmc



2:02 PM · Aug 30, 2022

13 48 55 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Aug 24, 2022

A core part of CSIS's mandate is investigating and advising the Government of Canada on threats posed by espionage and foreign influenced activities.



12 14 48

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

This is why CSIS works tirelessly to identify, disrupt, and stop all acts of espionage and foreign interference that seek to harm our national interest and collective economic prosperity.

To learn more about what we do, visit: bit.ly/3AHbBwy


3:52 PM · Aug 24, 2022

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Outreach and Stakeholder Engagement Program


CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Aug 18, 2022

'Protecting National Security in Partnership with all Canadians'
 This report highlights how CSIS is partnering with Canadians to protect Canada's #NationalSecurity.
bit.ly/3K9k7eV




CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Aug 18, 2022

'Smart Cities and National Security'
 Ever wondered how smart cities could affect Canada's #NationalSecurity? Learn how they open up new areas for threat actors to exploit.
bit.ly/3Q9R7vN



CSIS Canada @csiscanada

'Foreign Interference & You'
 With this report, we aim to spread awareness of the threat posed by foreign interference and provide Canadians with the information they need to keep themselves and their loved ones safe. bit.ly/3dc6d8c




12:19 PM - Aug 18, 2022

View post engagements

Post your reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Aug 18, 2022

'Protect Your Research'
 As a global research leader with world-class institutions and expertise, Canada is an attractive target for hostile foreign threat actors. Learn how to protect your valuable research: bit.ly/3sdq5tW



Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Myth: Canada 🇨🇦 is safe from the damage caused by foreign interference.

Fact: Canada is a G7 nation with world-class scientific researchers and robust democratic institutions. This makes Canada an attractive target 🎯 for hostile foreign state actors.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

12:04 PM · Jul 27, 2022

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6 19 41 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In May, CSIS Director David Vigneault spoke at @UBC about the evolving threats facing Canada, foreign interference, and the importance of building trust and community partnerships.

Missed it? Watch the speech here: ow.ly/9bXu50Kqg4Q



12:04 PM · Aug 23, 2022

View post engagements

3 6 20 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jul 19, 2022
"Foreign Interference and You" is our primer on the threat of foreign interference (FI) facing Canada 🇨🇦 and Canadians: bit.ly/3w0gzKE
But, you may ask yourself: "Why should I care?"



CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jul 19, 2022
Hostile states engage in FI to advance their interests, sometimes at Canada's expense, in an effort to achieve a strategic advantage.
This poses a significant threat to our democracy, economic prosperity, and challenges Canadians' rights and freedoms.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jul 19, 2022
With "Foreign Interference and You", we aim to spread awareness of the threat posed by foreign interference and provide Canadians with the information they need to keep themselves and their loved ones safe.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada
Oh, by the way, "Foreign Interference and You" is available in multiple languages in order to reach communities from coast-to-coast: bit.ly/3B2nhu8

3:21 PM · Jul 19, 2022

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CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 22, 2022

Since March 2020, #CSIS has observed more state-sponsored #Disinformation campaigns via social media and online platforms in Canada. This activity = foreign interference



17 42 71

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 22, 2022

Hostile states engage in these #Disinformation campaigns in hopes of discrediting our democratic institutions, negatively impacting social cohesion, and sowing discord among Canadians

16 8 32

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Learn more about what #CSIS is doing to protect Canada and Canadians from foreign interference: canada.ca/en/security-in-... #Disinformation

10:15 AM · Jun 22, 2022

View post engagements

4 9 25

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

You may not know it, but you or your work might be targeted by threat actors.

Learn about foreign interference threats in CSIS's 2021 Public Report: ow.ly/KSvp50J9gvQ



0:01

1:00 PM · May 19, 2022


View post engagements

4 8 16 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

#ICYMI: Last week, #CSIS Director David Vigneault spoke at @ubcSPPGA about the evolving threats facing Canada, foreign interference, and the importance of building trust and community partnerships.

Missed it? Read his speech here: ow.ly/imUJ5a3C



2:01 PM · May 11, 2022

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3 2 10 2

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In 2021, key national security threats facing Canada all accelerated and evolved.

While threats of espionage and foreign interference are not new, CSIS observed these threats increase in scale, scope and complexity.

Read in the CSIS 2021 Public Report: bit.ly/3kPzDwK



1:30 PM · May 6, 2022

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3 15 17 4

Post your reply Reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 6, 2022

Rest assured, CSIS will continue to use the full extent of its mandated authorities to counter these threats and uphold Canada's security.

Read more on how CSIS protects Canadians from current security threats: bit.ly/3kPzDwK

2 6

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

When briefing stakeholders about #CdnNatSec we use our "Foreign Interference and You" document which is now available online: ow.ly/wXUI50HOC9T

Want to learn even more?

- Public Report: bit.ly/34EFIRs
- Director's speech to @CIGIonline: bit.ly/3rxs3L7



3:15 PM · Feb 11, 2022

View post engagements

10 15 1

The image shows a social media post from CSIS Canada. The main content is a text-based announcement about a document titled "Foreign Interference and You". It includes a link to the document and two additional links for a public report and a speech. Below the text is a thumbnail image of the document cover, which features the Canadian flag, the CSIS logo, and the title "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND YOU". The post is dated February 11, 2022, and shows engagement metrics of 10 retweets, 15 likes, and 1 bookmark.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Canada is a target of foreign interference because we have an advanced economy, an open democracy, an innovative private sector and leading academic institutions. Learn more about the threat of foreign interference and what you can do here: ow.ly/paZz50HORzU




3:15 PM · Feb 8, 2022

View post engagements

18 78 101 1

The image shows a social media post from CSIS Canada. The main content is a text-based announcement explaining why Canada is a target of foreign interference, citing its advanced economy, open democracy, and leading academic institutions. It includes a link to a document for more information. Below the text is a thumbnail image of the document cover, which features the Canadian flag, the CSIS logo, and the title "FOREIGN INTERFERENCE AND YOU". The post is dated February 8, 2022, and shows engagement metrics of 18 comments, 78 retweets, 101 likes, and 1 bookmark.



CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Interested in #CdnNatSec (Canadian National Security)?
Learn all about the current threat environment, including espionage, foreign interference, violent extremism, cyber threats, and more in our most recent public report: ow.ly/EhNt50Hy8ay



9:30 AM · Jan 20, 2022

View post engagements


33 7 27 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

You can report threats to Canada's national security directly to CSIS.
Threats include:

- violent extremism
- espionage
- foreign interference

Report threats here: ow.ly/LqLe50Hx4Zp




12:15 PM · Jan 18, 2022

View post engagements

4 13 17 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

You might have heard the term "foreign interference" in the news, but do you know what it means? Watch the video below for an explanation and read more about techniques used by threat actors here: ow.ly/1c7Y5QHjERC



11:45 AM - Jan 6, 2022

View post engagements

16 22 37 3

The video thumbnail shows a document titled "Espionage & Foreign Interference" with a signature at the top. A text overlay at the bottom of the video frame reads: "You've probably heard terms like espionage and foreign interference in the news lately."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

As 2021 comes to a close, we're highlighting some of CSIS's critical work throughout the year:

As part of Canada's ongoing efforts to protect our democratic processes, CSIS published a report to highlight the threat of foreign interference: ow.ly/8BUr50HhxLf




10:30 AM - Dec 30, 2021

View post engagements


5 14 33

The report cover features a dark blue background with a network of glowing blue nodes and lines. The text "Report on foreign interference" is on the left, and "2021 YEAR IN REVIEW" is on the right, with a crown icon above the year. Logos for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Government of Canada are at the bottom.

 **CSIS Canada** @csiscanada

CSIS works to identify espionage and foreign interference threatening our economic prosperity and national interests.


To learn more about what we do, visit: ow.ly/vjxX50H5vRf



11:02 AM · Dec 9, 2021

[View post engagements](#)


3 3 10

 **CSIS Canada** @csiscanada

CSIS investigates threats to Canada's national security, including:

- ✦ Terrorism
- ✦ Espionage
- ✦ Foreign interference

If you have information related to one of these threats, please report it here: ow.ly/64pg50GIQcC



12:03 PM · Nov 10, 2021

[View post engagements](#)

4 8 9 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

CSIS has been highlighting the threat of foreign interference for some time. For more information, watch this video and follow these links:

2020 Public Report: ow.ly/j6VH50FBKIW
CSIS Director's speech to CIG: ow.ly/nzYF50FBKIZ
Far From Home: ow.ly/QtgT50FBKIV



3:19 PM · Jul 22, 2021

View post engagements

4 25 53 3

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

As part of Canada's ongoing efforts to protect our democratic process, CSIS has published a report to highlight the threat of foreign interference. Read about it here: ow.ly/eSqb50FBJwY



Canada

3:01 PM · Jul 22, 2021

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12 110 185 25

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

When asked about the most critical threat to national security, residents of Quebec typically ranked cyber attacks on critical infrastructure as a top concern whereas those in BC said foreign interference and women said terrorism. Public opinion research: ow.ly/AOaR50FBqZK



10:35 AM · Jul 22, 2021


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2 5 9

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

The Manitoba economy is driven by agribusiness, aerospace, advanced manufacturing, and a growing tech sector, to name a few.

Unfortunately, sectors of the knowledge economy are particularly vulnerable to foreign interference. Learn how to #ProtectCdnResearch, read [+](#)



2:32 PM · Jul 16, 2021

View post engagements

1 1 4 1

Post your reply [Reply](#)

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jul 16, 2021


Check out our post from Monday to understand which sectors are at risk of foreign espionage, what is targeted, methods used, and what you can do to protect Canadian research.

Learn more: bit.ly/3yRL1gh
Report espionage threats here: bit.ly/319nT6g

4 3

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In addition to our COVID-19 outreach efforts, CSIS is also increasing awareness of the current threat environment to support informed decision making on issues such as foreign investment, research security, and foreign interference.



Canada

11:02 AM · Jun 9, 2021


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2 1 7

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

A number of foreign states engage in hostile actions that routinely threaten and intimidate individuals in Canada to instill fear, silence dissent, and pressure political opponents.

If you've been threatened through [#ForeignInterference](#), report it here: ow.ly/vqph50ERzql



Canada

12:25 PM · May 27, 2021

View post engagements

3 13 18

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 18, 2021

Canada has world class researchers leading innovations in various tech sectors. Unfortunately this makes them a target for espionage + **foreign interference**.

CSIS works with researchers to ensure they're aware of threats. Learn how to #ProtectCdnResearch: ow.ly/d4I250EN5Ec



Canada

3 4 14

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Earlier this year Director Vigneault gave a speech to @CIGonline highlighting the need for a sophisticated dialogue on #CdnNatSec. To learn more about what he said on topics like #ForeignInterference and #CyberSecurity, read here: ow.ly/Bk4v50EFt5E



« Peut-être vous direz-vous qu'en tant qu'universitaires, scientifiques ou entrepreneurs, la sécurité nationale ne vous concerne pas. Peut-être n'avez-vous aucun intérêt pour la géopolitique.

Et bien, je vous assure que la géopolitique s'intéresse à vous. »

– David Vigneault, directeur du Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité Canadian Security Intelligence Service

Canada

2:01 PM · May 5, 2021

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6 7 4 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Our Twitter poll showed you want to know more about Foreign Interference.

#DYK that CSIS's work helps investigate the corrosive effects of FI in Canadian society?

Read more about it in our 2020 Public Report:
ow.ly/xtW850Ewkwf



12:02 PM · Apr 26, 2021


View post engagements

7 9 17 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

CSIS is mandated to investigate #ForeignInterference, advise government, and take measures to reduce threats.

If you are under immediate threat from foreign interference, first contact your local police, then report it to CSIS by calling 1-800-267-7685.
ow.ly/7Mbm50Eto0e



1:55 PM · Apr 20, 2021

View post engagements

8 13 20 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In 2020 #CSIS warned Canadians about the increased risk of foreign interference & espionage. These threats continue to persist but we are working diligently to protect Canada and advise Canadians. Read more here: ow.ly/7q5d50EmPAj



The graphic features the CSIS logo and the text: "In the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, espionage and foreign interference threats continue to persist, and in some areas are increasing...". At the bottom, it says "CSIS PUBLIC REPORT 2020" and "Canada".

5:50 PM · Apr 12, 2021

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7 9 19

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Answer: If you guessed d) All of the above, then you guessed right! Foreign Interference takes many forms. Learn more about it here: bit.ly/3rW2K2u

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Apr 6, 2021

Did you watch our video last week? We want to know if you can identify which item(s) below could be #ForeignInterference :

Show this poll

3:50 PM · Apr 6, 2021

View post engagements

2 2 4 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Did you watch our video last week? We want to know if you can identify which item(s) below could be #ForeignInterference :

a) online disinformation	4.9%
b) disrupting markets	0%
c) election interference	1%
d) all of the above	94.2%

103 votes · Final results
11:16 AM · Apr 6, 2021

View post engagements

7 2 7 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

#DYK Canada is a target of espionage and foreign interference? Our advanced economy, strong democratic institutions, innovative research sectors, and more... all make 🇨🇦 a target. Various states want to spy on or steal valuable Canadian information. ow.ly/M9Dq50EeLrS



1:58 You've probably heard terms like espionage and foreign interference in the news lately.

2:38 PM · Apr 1, 2021


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2 6 15 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

What do election interference, disinformation and disrupting financial markets all have in common? ...

They're all acts of **#ForeignInterference**; where foreign entities try to secretly influence change in **🇨🇦** to suit their own interests. Watch **📺** & Learn: ow.ly/Zpij50EbCL5



Trudeau
Espionage & Foreign Interference

You've probably heard terms like espionage and foreign interference in the news lately.

1:58

2:35 PM · Mar 30, 2021

View post engagements

12 16

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Director Vigneault has said he considers **#espionage** and **#ForeignInterference** to be the greatest threats to Canada's prosperity and national interest.

Those threats continue to increase in complexity, scale and impact. Learn more: ow.ly/ur0a50EbCA1



Canada

10:02 AM · Mar 30, 2021


View post engagements

5 10 17 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 29, 2021
Let's talk about #ForeignInterference and #Espionage. Do you know the difference?

The risk of these national security threats has increased with #COVID19. We want to ensure you know what they are and how to report them. Watch the video and read below. #CdnNatSec

Espionage



1:51
Generally, espionage is about foreign organizations trying to acquire our information

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 29, 2021
Generally speaking:

Espionage ➔ Foreign entities trying to acquire 🇨🇦 information.

Foreign Interference ➔ Foreign entities attempting to manipulate outcomes in 🇨🇦.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Mar 29, 2021
Canada is a target because we have an advanced economy, strong democratic institutions, an innovative private sector, as well as goods & information that other states want to spy on or steal.

CSIS investigates these threats, takes measures to reduce them, and advises government.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

If you've witnessed acts of espionage or foreign interference, report it here: bit.ly/3fmnBZO

11:35 AM · Mar 29, 2021

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CSIS Canada @csiscanada

If you believe you have information related to national security, please report it.

Key threats include:

- Terrorism
- The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
- Espionage
- Foreign interference
- Cyber-tampering affecting critical infrastructure

Report it:
ow.ly/kTM750DZc4J



2:01 PM · Mar 15, 2021

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6 5 22

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Economic Security = National Security.

Canadian companies have been targeted, compromised, and suffered losses from threats like espionage and foreign interference. CSIS has observed and actively investigates sophisticated state-sponsored threat activity. [#ProtectCdnEconomy](#)



1:10 PM · Mar 9, 2021

View post engagements

4 9 31

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Since the onset of the #COVID19 pandemic, CSIS has been working with various businesses, organizations, and levels of government to advise of the increased risks of foreign interference and economic espionage. Read more about it here: ow.ly/VYWR50DCS2B



Canada

1:35 PM · Feb 17, 2021

View post engagements

4 9 25 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

#ICYMI last week Director Vigneault spoke @CIGonline about the current #CdnNatSec threat environment with a focus on economic security, espionage and foreign interference. Watch his speech here:

Governance Innovation
20 years

National Security, Economic Prosperity and Canada's Future



Aaron Shull
Managing Director,
Centre for International
Governance Innovation



David Vigneault
Director,
Canadian Security
Intelligence Service

National Security, Economic Prosperity and Canada's Future

From cigonline.org


2:42 PM · Feb 16, 2021

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1 2 13 2

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Today Director Vigneault spoke to business leaders & academia at a virtual event hosted by @CIETonline. He spoke about the threat environment, impacts of #COVID19 on #CdnNatSec, economic espionage, foreign interference, and more. Read his speech here: canada.ca/en/security-in-...



8:17 PM · Feb 9, 2021

View post engagements

16 45 95 5

Post your reply

Reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"COVID-19 has created a situation ripe for exploitation by threat actors seeking to cause harm or advance their own interests."

3 6 15

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"While violent extremism remains an ongoing threat to our safety and a significant preoccupation for CSIS, the greatest strategic threat to Canada's national security comes from hostile activities by foreign states."

2 3 13

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"Today our adversaries are more focused on intellectual property and advanced research held on computer systems in small start-ups, corporate boardrooms, or university labs across the country."

2 4 13

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"Canadian companies, in almost all sectors of our economy, have been targeted. They have been compromised and have suffered losses from human and cyber enabled threats."

3 8 17

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"Any individual with inside knowledge of - or access to - an organization's systems can be targeted by hostile intelligence services to wringily or unwittingly steal sensitive information."

2 4 17

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"I can assure you that CSIS, along with Government of Canada and international partners, are actively investigating, monitoring and disrupting harmful threat actors when our lawful mandates allow."

4 6 25

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 9, 2021

"We must work together to harden the targets and protect our national interests. I ask all of you to work with CSIS in advancing this call to action to protect the security of Canadians and the health of our economy for our future and that of our children."


5 7 21

Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

In 2020 we stepped out of the shadows to talk to those at risk of foreign interference and espionage during #COVID19.

Read about it in the article that @ppforumca shared as part of a series of stories on public service innovation during the pandemic:
ow.ly/y9gw50D5CbE



Canada Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien de renseignements de sécurité Canada

12:25 PM · Jan 14, 2021


View post engagements

7 10 25

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

#DYK that you can call CSIS to report non-immediate national security threats related to foreign interference, espionage, terrorism, and cyberattacks?

Reporting threats helps keep Canada secure.
Report here: ow.ly/I70U50CZqSI or call +1 (613)-993-9620.



Canada

11:35 AM · Jan 8, 2021

View post engagements

7 52 82 8

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

We are hours away from 2021, but let's look one more time at our 2019 public report. Protecting Canada's economic interests from foreign interference and espionage may sound very 2020, but we were seized with these threats before the pandemic. Read more: ow.ly/Bod150CTIFa



10:45 AM · Dec 31, 2020

View post engagements

9 26 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

During #COVID19, Canada's life sciences sectors have been specifically targeted by threat actors through espionage & foreign interference.

Other sectors that are targeted include: aerospace, clean technology and artificial intelligence. #ProtectCdnEconomy



2:46 PM · Dec 17, 2020

View post engagements

5 11 28

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Our efforts toward raising awareness of threats like foreign interference & espionage in the 🇨🇦 research sector continue. Our Deputy Director Policy & Strategic Partnerships Tricia Geddes joined @usask Global Café to discuss how CSIS helps protect research & intellectual property



10:30 AM · Nov 19, 2020

View post engagements

2 6 41

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Thanks @mcgillu, @SFU, other panelists, and host @ISED_CA for a great event! #CSIS' Deputy Director Policy & Strategic Partnerships, Tricia Geddes was pleased to discuss how researchers can protect their intellectual property from threats like espionage and foreign interference.

Canadian Science Policy Centre (CSPC) @sciencepolicy · Nov 16, 2020

Thanks to @ISED_CA for organizing today's #CSPC2020 panel on maintaining open and collaborative science while ensuring research security in Canada! Many thanks to panelists @SFU @drjoyjohnson, @mcgillu Martha Crago, @cybercentre_ca Eric Bisailon & @csiscanada Tricia Geddes!

4:29 PM · Nov 17, 2020


View post engagements

2 6

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

#DYK that you can call CSIS to report non-immediate threats related to espionage, foreign interference, terrorism, cyberattacks and weapons of mass destruction?

Reporting threats helps keep Canada secure.
Report here: ow.ly/qMym50BRqKX or call +1 (613)-993-9620.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

11:45 AM · Oct 14, 2020

View post engagements

5 12 18

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Myth: Canada is safe from foreign interference.

Fact: Canada has a strong economy, leading scientific researchers, and robust democratic institutions. These are just some things hostile states want to spy on, influence and disrupt. Learn more: canada.ca/en/security-in...



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

11:02 AM · Oct 9, 2020

View post engagements

1 6 16

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Do you know what the greatest threats are to our economic security? They're Foreign Interference & Espionage.

These threats can have a great impact not only on our economy, but on our sovereignty & national security too.

Learn how we #ProtectCdnEconomy: canada.ca/en/security-in...



12:50 PM · Sep 24, 2020


View post engagements

3 20 34

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Canada's innovative research on #COVID19 vaccines and treatments may be at risk of foreign interference and espionage.

CSIS is working with medical researchers and businesses to #ProtectCdnResearch & provide guidance on how to mitigate risks.




10:40 AM · Sep 1, 2020

View post engagements

1 22 46

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Canadian researchers working tirelessly in the global efforts to find a vaccine to #COVID19 are facing increased risks of being targeted by foreign interference and espionage. We're proud to help #ProtectCdnresearch by working with researchers to raise awareness on these threats.



1:30 PM · Aug 19, 2020


View post engagements

3 16 39

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

CSIS sees an increased risk of foreign interference & espionage due to the effort of our businesses & research centres. CSIS is working with these organizations to ensure that their work remains safely in their control.

Learn how we #ProtectCdnResearch: ow.ly/H0zD50AVLaG




1:20 PM · Aug 14, 2020

View post engagements

2 16 33

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

Canada attracts foreign investment and a small % poses a threat. Foreign entities may seek to invest in  companies to access:

- Sensitive technology
- Critical infrastructure

#ProtectCdnresearch & report foreign interference threats here:
ow.ly/eqWd50ARqx8



2:20 PM - Aug 5, 2020

View post engagements

1 2 14 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

#DYK that  companies and researchers involved in the #COVID19 vaccine development/treatment may be at risk of foreign interference and espionage?

More info on how CSIS is helping these organizations to
#ProtectCdnresearch ➤ ow.ly/ELtc50AEhN2



3:02 PM - Jul 21, 2020


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2 15 32 1

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
Listen to CSIS Director David Vigneault speak to @stephanecarpin and @ctd/cece on @hrhgh/podcasts about Canada's threat environment, intelligence to evidence, going dark, intelligence priorities, hiring 21st century spies and accountability to Canadians x.com/forcece/status...

5 120 34

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"We need to be more open, better understood, demystified a little bit and that job rests with CSIS and as Director it is part of my responsibility to be out there talking to Canadians about what we do."



1 8 11

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"Domestic and international events have a significant impact on our activity – so you have to be intellectually flexible to turn around on a dime and re-adjust. This is what makes the job very interesting."

1 1 8 11

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"A couple of weeks ago we were looking at the risk of a potential nuclear attack and now a few weeks later we're talking about a peace treaty between the two Koreas. That fluidity and dynamic environment makes our job more difficult."

1 11 8 11

CSIS Canada @csiscanada
"The most significant threat to our democracy and the long-term prosperity of the country is economic espionage and foreign interference. These are threats that undermine our democratic processes and Canada's ability to continue to innovate and create wealth for its citizens."
10:08 AM · May 11, 2018

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Post your reply

Reply

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"The intelligence to evidence issue is one of the most significant policy, legal and operational questions facing the national security community. Our adversaries are not working in democracies and do not have to abide by the rule of law. CSIS has to:"

3 13 14 11

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"I personally think that it's going to be extremely beneficial for the country and for CSIS. People will better understand what we do, how we do it, our ethos, the complexity of the environment, the fact that the men and women of CSIS are incredibly dedicated."

1 5 11 11

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"We have a very diverse group of people. We're almost equally distributed between men and women – which is not something that most people would think. We speak more than 110 languages."

1 13 11 11

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 11, 2018
"The work of making sure that CSIS is representative of Canada is never finished – It will never be finished!"

2 5 16 11 11

Add another post

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Feb 23

Yesterday, Director Vigneault met with Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs, Dominic LeBlanc, to discuss CSIS' priorities, successes, and ever-changing challenges in protecting Canada from #NationalSecurity threats.



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

Canada

20 22 60 5.4K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Dec 13, 2023

Replying to @csiscanada

"[It] is not acceptable for states to seek influence within our **democratic institutions**, to suppress the fundamental rights of our people within our borders, or to interfere in **democratic processes**."



Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

"It's perfectly normal for states to build relationships and strategically position their interests abroad."

"But it is not acceptable for states to seek influence within our democratic institutions, to suppress the fundamental rights of our people within our borders, or to interfere in democratic processes."

- CSIS Director, David Vigneault

Canada

2 16 30 1K

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 24, 2023

Espionage and foreign interference pose a significant threat to Canada's national security, **democratic institutions**, and economic prosperity. We work to identify, counter, and reduce these threats to Canada.

Learn more about espionage and FI: Canada.ca/en/security-in-...



402 205 556 59K

The video player shows a blurred image of a person, likely a security official, with the text "Foreign Interference" overlaid. The video is paused, as indicated by the "GIF" button and the "II" icon. The video player also shows the CSIS logo and the text "Canada" in the bottom right corner.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · May 9, 2023

Foreign interference poses one of the most important strategic threats to Canada's **#NationalSecurity**, targeting our sovereignty and **democratic institutions**.



173 254 562 45K

The video player shows a blurred image of a person, likely a security official, with the text "Foreign Interference" overlaid. The video is playing, as indicated by the "GIF" button and the "II" icon. The video player also shows the CSIS logo and the text "Canada" in the bottom right corner.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Oct 6, 2022

Hostile states actively spread #disinformation in an effort to discredit Canada's **democratic institutions** and gain influence for their own strategic objectives.

Learn about #ForeignInterference threats to Canada's democratic process: bit.ly/3wuEFoB



6 44 59

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jul 27, 2022

Myth: Canada 🇨🇦 is safe from the damage caused by foreign interference.


Fact: Canada is a G7 nation with world-class scientific researchers and robust **democratic institutions**. This makes Canada an attractive target for hostile foreign state actors.



6 19 41

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

Protecting National Security in Partnership with All Canadians* is #CSIS's latest publication on how we are partnering with Canadians to protect #NationalSecurity.



CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

What is the #NationalSecurity Threat? "Extremist narratives are rapidly growing transnationally, in both resonance and reach. #Canada is no exception to this trend. In fact, Canadians are active producers and consumers of these narratives."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

"Violent extremists of all motivations exploit crisis situations, capitalizing on public fear, distrust and unrest to boost radicalization efforts and incite acts of violence."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

"Social media and global connectivity have accelerated the speed and reach of extremist narratives, amplifying false and misleading messages."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

How is it impacting communities? "Extremism in all forms poses a threat to the safety and security of Canadians and to the fabric of our society."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

"The impact of these threats is often felt most acutely by those in communities of colour and other traditionally marginalized groups."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada

"The spread of violent rhetoric and the manipulation and propagation of information can erode trust and confidence in our democratic systems and institutions, and polarize communities."

1:15 PM · Jun 28, 2022

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CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

What is #CSIS's role? "CSIS continue to closely monitor the evolving threat posed by violent extremists and can employ a variety of #NationalSecurity tools as needed."

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

What can we do together? #CSIS is committed to increasing dialogue with communities and organizations in order help develop national resilience and learn from the experiences of community groups who are deeply affected by the ideologically-motivated violent extremist threat.

CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

"We are committed to working together with the public. Working closely with communities and our government partners across the country enables us to effectively fulfill our mandate and commitment to keep all Canadians safe."


CSIS Canada @csiscanada · Jun 28, 2022

Learn more about how #CSIS is building partnerships with Canadians through dialogue, mutual respect, and reciprocal action.


Read the full report: bit.ly/3wYACR1P

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Add another post



CSIS Canada @ccscanada · Oct 27, 2020
We all have "that relative" who shares posts online before thinking or verifying if it's true.
While it may seem harmless, spreading #disinformation can have serious and widespread negative impacts.
Read more about disinformation [+](#) and tag "that relative" in your comments!



CSIS Canada @ccscanada · Oct 27, 2020
It's important to define #disinformation vs. #misinformation:
Disinformation = false information spread on purpose to mislead others.
Misinformation = false information spread by accident, or shared in good faith.
[#Misinfo101](#)


CSIS Canada @ccscanada · Oct 27, 2020
[#Disinformation](#) can be created by threat actors with malicious intentions. They seek to influence public opinion to better suit their own interests. They aim to trick you into believing their post is real so you'll share their false message to more people.

CSIS Canada @ccscanada
The spread of #disinformation can have serious consequences:

- Threats to the safety and security of Canadians
- Erosion of trust in our democratic institutions
- Confusion about government notices, including health information about #COVID19



CSIS Canada @ccscanada · Oct 27, 2020
Disinformation can be difficult to spot because the posts often look like real news articles. Verify before sharing:

- Check the link before clicking
- If you recognize the source, read the entire article
- If something seems untune, verify it.
- Don't spread #disinformation.




CSIS Canada @ccscanada · Oct 27, 2020
Disinformation can be difficult to spot because the posts often look like real news articles. Verify before sharing:


- Check the link before clicking
- If you recognize the source, read the entire article
- If something seems untune, verify it.
- Don't spread #disinformation.

 **CSIS Canada** 
@csiscanada


Myth: Canada is safe from foreign interference.

Fact: Canada has a strong economy, leading scientific researchers, robust democratic institutions. These are just some things hostile : want to spy on, influence and disrupt. Learn more: [canada.ca/en/security-in...](https://canada.ca/en/security-in-...)



 Canadian Security Intelligence Service / Service canadien du renseignement de sécurité

11:02 AM · Oct 9, 2020

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TABLE 7

Topical Summaries of Classified Intelligence	
Topic	CAN DOC ID
Don Valley North (DVN) Liberal Party Nomination Race in 2019	CAN.SUM.000001
Intelligence Relating to Han Dong and Communication with People’s Republic of China Officials Regarding the “Two Michaels”	CAN.SUM.000002
People’s Republic of China Officials – Foreign Interference Activities in greater Vancouver in the 2019 General Election	CAN.SUM.000003
Possible People’s Republic of China Foreign Interference-Related Mis or Disinformation	CAN.SUM.000004
Country Summary: People’s Republic of China	CAN.SUM.000005
Country Summary: Russia	CAN.SUM.000006
Country Summary: India	CAN.SUM.000007
Country Summary: Pakistan	CAN.SUM.000008
Country Summary: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	CAN.SUM.000009
People’s Republic of China – Threat Actors, Contact with Candidates and Staff, and Funding of Threat Actors	CAN.SUM.000010
Threat Reduction Measure Conducted in 2019	CAN.SUM.000011
Government of India Foreign Interference Activities in the 2021 General Election	CAN.SUM.000012
Comments by Individual People’s Republic of China Officials on Expressed Partisan Preferences in the 2019 and 2021 General Election	CAN.SUM.000013
Country Summary: Iran	CAN.SUM.000014