

## Intelligence Relating to Han Dong and Communication with People's Republic of China Officials Regarding the "Two Michaels"

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## SUMMARY

Intelligence reporting indicates that:

1. In early 2021, Han Dong (henceforth Dong), MP for Don Valley North, expressed views in private on a range of topics, including the state of the PRC-Canada relationship. Dong made it clear he was not speaking on behalf of the Government of Canada but sharing his personal views on the matter.
2. MP Dong's comments focussed primarily on the House of Commons' Uyghur Genocide in Xinjiang motion. The "Two Michaels" (Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor) were also raised in the broader context of Sino-Canada relations.
3. On the "Two Michaels", MP Dong emphasized that the Canadian public believed that the PRC's approach to the Two Michaels was wrong and lacking legal justification. Canadians believed that Canada was merely fulfilling its legal obligation in relation to Meng Wanzhou, Chief Financial Officer for Huawei.
4. More precisely, MP Dong's reference to the detention of the "Two Michaels" came in the context of MP Dong noting the difficulty of getting people to change perspectives once particular positions solidified. MP Dong expressed the view that even if the PRC released the "Two Michaels" at that moment, opposition parties would view the PRC's action as an affirmation of the effectiveness of a hardline Canadian approach to the PRC.
5. MP Dong stressed that any transparency provided by the PRC in relation to the "Two Michaels", such as a court hearing or a court date, would help to placate Canadian public opinion and provide some valuable talking points to his own political party against the opposition.
6. MP Dong also noted that a Canadian hardline approach to the PRC would be detrimental to Sino-Canada relations.