

## Targeting of Parliamentarians

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- **Summary may be incomplete:** *The summary summarizes some, but not necessarily all, the intelligence information on this topic that is available to the Government of Canada's national security and intelligence community. For example, it only contains relevant information that can be appropriately sanitized for public release.*
- **Summary does not indicate time of collection:** *This summary does not indicate, unless expressly stated, when the summarized information was collected or obtained. This information was collected and analyzed over a period of time, which may/may not have been available to decision makers across the Government of Canada during the writ-period. As such, for example, it should not be assumed that the information was collected close in time to the events being described.*
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- **Summary does not analyze information:** *This document is a summary of intelligence; it is not an analysis of the overall import, meaning, or strength of intelligence.*

*The Commission has been provided with all relevant intelligence and assessments, which indicates information on reliability and corroboration of the information contained therein.*

**Targeting of Parliamentarians:** *Information relating to the targeting of Parliamentarians by foreign actors for perceived anti-PRC positions, including but not limited to, positions taken in relation to the Uyghur genocide motion. Please include in the summary an account of the relevant intelligence products and their dissemination (including timing and recipients), in addition to a detailed account of actions taken in response.*

### **The People's Republic of China's Targeting of Parliamentarians for the Purpose of Exerting Influence**

1. Like other countries, the People's Republic of China (PRC) seeks to influence elected officials on matters of importance to the PRC through overt, influence-based diplomatic practices. This can involve "targeting" an individual occupying a position of power or influence, or an individual that the PRC assesses may occupy such a position in the future. The term 'target' in this context can be understood as the PRC taking a heightened interest in an individual for the purpose of influence activities.<sup>1</sup> Again, this approach is not unique to the PRC; countries seeking to exert influence will almost certainly have some sense of who their 'targets' are. Targeting an individual in a diplomatic context is not nefarious—it means taking intentional steps to try to convince someone to support a certain view.
2. However, targeting can cross the line from overt diplomacy to become foreign interference. When attempts to influence evolve to include deceptive, clandestine, or coercive approaches, such as through the use of proxies or direct threats, it is no longer acceptable diplomatic behaviour. In a case where a Member of Parliament (MP) is being 'targeted', certain activities may sometimes start as overt diplomatic engagements, and escalate to activities that may include coercive, deceptive, or clandestine acts by foreign officials.
3. Some federal MPs have been targeted by the PRC in relation to their positions on a number of issues of relevance to the PRC. This is mainly through overt influence activities, but CSIS assesses that some have also been targeted through clandestine, deceptive and/or coercive activity.
4. As one example, the PRC took initial steps to try to influence MPs to vote against a February 2021 motion in the House of Commons recognizing the PRC treatment of Uyghur and other Turkic Muslims as a genocide. This included diplomatic activities with the intent to influence MPs to vote against the motion. The motion passed 266-0.
5. The PRC sought to build profiles on a number of MPs following their support of the motion. This research may have informed the PRC's decision to impose economic sanctions on some of those MPs or may have informed other actions.
6. In the first half of 2021, CSIS disseminated related intelligence products including formal intelligence report(s), analytical product(s), and issues management brief(s) to relevant Government of Canada departments and agencies. Some of these products were sent to

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<sup>1</sup> The terms 'target' or 'targeting' can be used in other contexts, such as to describe the use of cyber operations to target specific individuals. Other forms of "targeting" are not the subject of this topical summary.

relevant departments while others were sent only to senior officials as part of restricted dissemination lists.

7. Some MPs targeted by the PRC for their positions on the Uyghur motion, or for other reasons, were provided security briefings. This includes the MPs who have been publicly identified as having received classified briefings under the CSIS Threat Reduction Measure authority in 2023; see: CAN.DOC.000021 regarding the Honourable Michael Chong (MP Chong), CAN.DOC.000022 regarding former MP the Honourable Erin O'Toole, CAN.DOC.000023 regarding MP Jenny Kwan and CAN.DOC.000024 regarding former MP Kenny Chiu.
8. In June 2023, as part of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force's (SITE TF) monitoring of by-elections, Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Canada detected a potential foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) campaign targeting MP Chong. The campaign took place on WeChat between May 4 to 13, 2023, and sought to propagate false and misleading narratives about MP Chong's character and heritage, his political views, and his family. A further topical summary sets out additional information on how MP Chong was of interest to the PRC. The timing of the campaign coincided with Canada declaring PRC diplomat Mr. Zhao Wei *persona non-grata* and was not related to the by-elections that were originally being monitored by RRM Canada and the SITE TF.