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CSIS Threat Reduction Measures

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*This is a summary of some intelligence information that is available to the Government of Canada's national security and intelligence community on a certain topic, presented such that it can be released to the public without disclosing information that would cause injury to national security and international relations. As such it has several important limitations. **The summary must be read in light of these limitations, otherwise the summary has the potential to mislead the reader.** The limitations are the following:*

- Summary may be incomplete:** *The summary summarizes some, but not necessarily all, the intelligence information on this topic that is available to the Government of Canada's national security and intelligence community. For example, it only contains relevant information that can be appropriately sanitized for public release.*
- Summary does not indicate time of collection:** *This summary does not indicate, unless expressly stated, when the summarized information was collected or obtained. This information was collected and analyzed over a period of time, which may/may not have been available to decision makers across the Government of Canada during the writ -period. As such, for example, it should not be assumed that the information was collected close in time to the events being described.*
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- Summary does not indicate the source of information:** *The summary may present information from different types of sources without identifying the type of source (i.e. open source, human sources, technical intercepts, etc.). Nor, does it indicate whether it was translated from another language than the language in which it is presented.*
- Summary does not indicate corroboration or lack of corroboration:** *The summary does not indicate whether other information exists that may corroborate the summarized information, or, alternatively, whether there is no such corroborating information.*
- Summary does not analyze information:** *This document is a summary of intelligence; it is not an analysis of the overall import, meaning, or strength of intelligence.*

The Commission has been provided with all relevant intelligence and assessments, which indicates information on reliability and corroboration of the information contained therein.

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CSIS was granted the authority to undertake threat reduction measures (TRMs) under the *Anti-terrorism Act*, 2015. A TRM is an operational measure whose principal purpose is to reduce a threat to the security of Canada as opposed to collecting information and intelligence to investigate such threats. The *CSIS Act* places several conditions on CSIS TRMs.

1. It first requires that there be reasonable grounds to believe that a particular activity constitutes a threat to the security of Canada.
2. It further requires that the proposed measure be reasonable and proportional in the circumstances and that CSIS consult with federal entities, as appropriate, as to whether they are in a position to reduce the threat, prior to CSIS implementing a specific TRM.
3. The TRM must be conducted pursuant to a warrant issued by the Federal Court where the Service's activity would limit a *Charter* right or freedom or would otherwise be contrary to Canadian law.
4. The *CSIS Act* also forbids TRMs that fall within six prohibited conducts (*i.e.* causing bodily harm or death to an individual; violating a person's sexual integrity; obstructing justice).

TRMs can be generally understood to take the form of one of three broad categories of activity: messaging, leveraging, and interference.

1. Messaging TRMs serve to push information, directly or indirectly, to a subject, either a threat actor or a person impacted by the threat, in an attempt to influence their behaviour to reduce the threat.
2. Leveraging TRMs involve CSIS activity – typically disclosing information to a third party – to enable this third party to take action, at their discretion and pursuant to their own authorities, against the identified threat-related activities. The intent of leveraging TRMs is to impede the subject from engaging in threat-related activities, hence helping to reduce the threat, but the means of doing so are under the control of the third party.
3. Interference TRMs are measures whereby CSIS officials directly affect the ability of the subject to do something. The intended outcome of interference is to impede the subject from engaging in an activity assessed to be threat-related to reduce the threat.

The National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) is notified of all Threat Reduction Measures undertaken by CSIS.

Between January 2019 and the present, CSIS conducted nine (9) non-warranted TRMs related to foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions and processes.

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Activities undertaken by CSIS as part of these TRMs *and* that can be publically disclosed include the following:

- On multiple occasions, CSIS sought to disrupt the influence of a foreign government official, or a proxy thereof, that was conducting foreign interference activities by engaging directly with the individuals the official or proxy was attempting to influence. The Service informed them of the interference intentions and/or provided a security awareness briefing to sensitize the individual to the threat, with the intended outcome of reducing the overall threat to them.
- The Service provided briefings to sensitize federal public officials as to the foreign interference threat, including as it directly related to them. These briefings sought to reduce the threat posed by the foreign government and/or their proxy(ies) by enabling the officials to better protect themselves.
- The Service sought to mitigate a proxy's ability to conduct foreign interference activities on behalf of a foreign government, to the detriment of Canada's interests, by disrupting their relationships with foreign government officials, with the intended outcome of directly reducing the threat.
- The Service engaged community members a foreign government was leveraging to knowingly or unknowingly conduct activities to the detriment of Canada to inform them as to the threat, with the intended outcome of reducing the foreign government's potential influence.
- The Service advised individuals impacted by a foreign government's foreign interference activities that the Service is aware of the foreign government's activities and that they will not be tolerated. Through this process, the message would be communicated back to the foreign government, with the intent of reducing the threat.
- The Service reported user accounts of actors conducting foreign interference activities to online platforms with the intent of limiting the effectiveness of the foreign interference activities, reducing the threat.