

UNCLASSIFIED

Suspected Instances of Foreign Interference

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- **Summary may be incomplete:** *The summary summarizes some, but not necessarily all, the intelligence information on this topic that is available to the Government of Canada's national security and intelligence community. For example, it only contains relevant information that can be appropriately sanitized for public release.*
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- **Summary does not analyze information:** *This document is a summary of intelligence; it is not an analysis of the overall import, meaning, or strength of intelligence.*

The Commission has been provided with all relevant intelligence and assessments, which indicates information on reliability and corroboration of the information contained therein.

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The Commission requested that Canada provide an unclassified list of “all major instances of suspected” foreign interference targeting Canada’s democratic processes.” It is worth noting that foreign interference activities can not necessarily be characterized as “instances”. Relationships between foreign state actors and individuals can be nurtured over long periods of time, where foreign interference efforts are gradual and incremental. In addition, some foreign state interference efforts can be a number of related small actions that are intended to have a combined overall effect.

To respond to the Commission’s request, and in keeping with on-going efforts at transparency, the Government has provided the below list of examples pertaining to countries outlined in the Commission’s mandate that are among the most significant, and that can be publicly released, which were observed during the time period of the Commission’s mandate. To determine the most significant instances, factors such as potential for actual impact on democratic processes and potential to undermine public confidence were considered. In each case, there needed to be an element of clandestine, deceptive or threatening behavior by the foreign state actor involved.

The list below is the unclassified, publicly releasable, version of the classified list provided to the Commission. Therefore, the classified version of the list includes information that cannot be released publicly. The Commission has been provided all relevant classified documentation related to the list.

To date, there has not been any identified large scale initiative by any foreign state to change the outcome of a general election. In the examples below, the objective of the foreign state is to impact specific ridings, e.g. the election of specific MPs that are viewed by the foreign actor as being more supportive of the foreign state (or to undermine a candidate seen as less sympathetic) and/or influence individuals on a specific issue of relevance to the foreign state.

To achieve their objectives, foreign states and foreign state actors employ a number of tactics, such as elicitation, cultivation, coercion, and illicit financing. Foreign states and foreign state actors may use different methods within different facets of Canada’s democracy to achieve their objectives.

Foreign state actors have undertaken a number of activities that are suspected to constitute foreign interference since 2018. Examples of foreign interference have been broadly grouped as those conducted in electoral processes and those related to democratic institutions.

- Reporting indicates that the Government of Pakistan (“GoP”) officials attempted to clandestinely influence Canadian federal politics with the aim of furthering GoP’s interests in Canada.
- Reporting indicates a foreign government undertook several actions, including interference, to reduce the likelihood of a specific Liberal candidate from being elected federally. It is suspected that the foreign government sought to thwart the candidate’s bid given their support for issues perceived to be contrary to the foreign government’s interests.
- A foreign government official is suspected of foreign interference that resulted in a briefing to the secret-cleared representatives of the Liberal Party of Canada shortly before the 2021 election and to the Prime Minister shortly after.
- Reporting indicates that a foreign government actively supported an individual’s 2019 federal nomination race in Don Valley North, including through the use of a proxy agent.
- The Government of India is suspected of leveraging proxy agents to clandestinely provide financial support to specific candidates from three political parties in a federal election. The receipt of funds cannot be confirmed, nor the candidates’ potential awareness of the origins.
- A former parliamentarian is suspected of having worked to influence parliamentary business on behalf of a foreign government.