

RE: CNSB RSESN 22/19 - 2019 10 29 - CSIS National Security Brief (CNSB) / Rapport du SCRS sur les enjeux de sécurité nationale (RSESN)

From: [redacted]
To: "King, Lyall" <[redacted]@cse-cst.gc.ic.ca>, [redacted]
Cc: [redacted]
Date: Fri, 01 Nov 2019 15:12:08 +0000

Classification: Top Secret//Canadian Eyes Only
Classification: Très secret//Réservé aux Canadiens
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Lyall,

I understand this was discussed and dealt with at Artur's level with DG IAB, Cherie Henderson. Additionally, prior to DMOC both our Director and DDO were updated on the particulars of this issue.

Thanks,

From: King, Lyall [mailto:[redacted]@cse-cst.gc.ic.ca]
Sent: 31-Oct-19 8:04 AM
To: *CSIS SITE Representative*
Subject: RE: CNSB RSESN 22/19 - 2019 10 29 - CSIS National Security Brief (CNSB) / Rapport du SCRS sur les enjeux de sécurité nationale (RSESN)

Classification: TOP SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY

Hi [redacted]

We discussed the above-noted CNSB at yesterday's SITE TF meeting, and I just wanted to follow up to make sure I captured my comments/thoughts clearly in a constructive manner.

I was quite surprised when I received/read the referenced CNSB yesterday. The intelligence contained is extremely interesting and there is a lot of detail. But at the same time, I was really disappointed. This document is massively problematic from my perspective. And will raise many questions. Things in my head:

- **Intelligence sharing:** SITE had no visibility of this reporting. It is certainly possible that elements of this were briefed with less detail over the course of our engagements, but at no time was the narrative around [redacted] made clear. I have not been able to find any reference [redacted] in reporting passed to me. It is also clear from the content that this has been a long-standing effort [redacted]. I have to question why this was not shared in advance with SITE – particularly given the severity of the alleged activity. Again, it is possible that *some* components of the story were passed, but they were not clearly linked into a coherent narrative. If elements were shared, I certainly wasn't able to piece it together. And there could have been [redacted] [redacted] – but we are not able to establish those potential linkages without explicit knowledge of the intelligence.

- **Dissemination of intelligence:** Directly linked to the above point - the dissemination of this is problematic. By consistently limiting distribution to a handful of very senior people, it effectively renders the intelligence meaningless. How can we identify and understand the complete picture and explore ways to mitigate a problem if only 5 people receive the information - and no-one in an operational capacity. There must be better trust in our community of intelligence professionals – we are a small community [redacted] Again, we are unable to get a complete picture of activity, and we are unable to make linkages/connections across our intelligence source. Silos do not help.
- **Assessment and Timing:** The statement in para 14 is massively problematic – and the timing is not good. [redacted] This will raise so many questions – and one week after the election – when this information was clearly known beforehand and built up over time. There will be questions as to why this was not brought forth sooner. Have we had a chance to properly assess the material impact, and make such a statement? This is not a minor statement to make.
- **Integrity of SITE:** How do we respond when asked what SITE thought of the information? Questions will be asked - more than likely at today's DMOC - about what SITE TF knew and when. **Indeed, I need to be able to give my DM/ADM some guidance on what to say.** The whole purpose of SITE was to review, share, assess and respond to foreign interference. This puts us in a very difficult spot, and brings into question the integrity of SITE TF.

Finally, this is fundamental to the way we are supposed to work together as an intelligence community. I do not understand the benefit/logic in issuing such a note separately to the P5, the week after the election, without SITE being apprised of the complete picture and bottom line assessment. To put it another way, I have to question what CSIS' view/response/thoughts would be if it was CSE that sent a note like this to the P5 with such a statement – without notifying or sharing the intelligence with SITE TF partners. I cannot imagine it would be good.

There is a lot to pick through here, and we will have to speak about this in the coming days as we work through lessons learned.

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From: [redacted]
Sent: October 29, 2019 2:33 PM
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PCO: (James Lampe) Please share a copy of this report with Ian Shugart and Catherine Blewett.

CNSB External Dissemination
For the following recipients' eyes only:

- PCO-NSIA Bossenmaier
- PCO-Director of Operations Tayyeb
- PCO-Assistant Secretary, Security and Intelligence Xavier
- GAC-DM Morgan
- GAC-Associate DM International Trade Costello
- JUSTICE-DM Douin
- JUSTICE-Associate DM Daigle
- PS-DM Wilson
- PS-Associate DM Beauregard
- CSE-Chief Bruce
- CSE-Deputy Chief SIGINT Rogers
- PCO-Clerk of Privy Council Shugart)
- PCO-Deputy Clerk of Privy Council Blewett
- SITE-Gallit Dobner (GAC), Eric Gordon (RCMP), [redacted] (RCMP), Lyall King (CSE)

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Please use the attached feedback form to send your comments, via CTSN, to [redacted]

Veuillez utiliser le formulaire de rétroaction ci-joint pour nous transmettre vos commentaires par le RCTS, à l'adresse [redacted]

Thank you / Merci
IAB/DER

>>>*****[INFO DEPOT START / DÉBUT INFO DÉPÔT]*****

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Date : 10/29/2019 2:33:27 PM

>>>*****[INFO DEPOT START / DÉBUT INFO DÉPÔT]*****

Sender / Envoyeur : [redacted]

Recipients / Receveurs : King, Lyall; [redacted]

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Date : 11/1/2019 11:12:06 AM