

CAB 2021-22/89 November 3, 2021

# CSIS Engagement with Elected Officials on Foreign Interference: An Initiative of National Significance

# **Key Points**

Members of Parliament (MPs). I designed to better equip elected	nbarked on a landmark national engagement campaign with a diverse group of federal This engagement involved the delivery of unclassified 'defensive briefings' specifically officials (and, in some cases, their staff) to inform them of the problem of FI in Canada how to create political resiliency against the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) on Canada. (S//CEO)
	a Threat Reduction Measure (TRM) concerning FI activities
(S//CEO)	
appreciation for CSIS' engagem	positive feedback from recipients of these briefings. Recipients repeatedly shared their ent, the quality of the material provided, and the overall focus of the discussion. MPs discussions, and many noted all GC MP's would benefit from such briefings to raise

- There was a general sense among the interviewees that there is a need for more information on FI for all politicians and their staffers, particularly as it pertains to preventative measures against potential threats. Based on the success of the CSIS will explore additional opportunities in the future to engage with a broad range of elected officials and their staff to strengthen Canada's democratic institutions and processes. (S//CEO)


#### **PRC-Related Efforts**

What was the Briefing Initiative and Why did it Take Place?

From June - August 2021, CSIS successfully met with MPs across the country to provide defensive briefings on FI threats with a PRC nexus. (S//CEO)

A bulk of these briefings took place in early August 2021, before the writ dropped. MPs were from three political parties: the Liberal Party of Canada (LPC), the Conservative Party of Canada (CPC), and the New Democratic Party of Canada (NDP).

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			the PRC		as PRC-based entities such as the Ministry of
				(CCP's) United Fro	nt Work Department (UFWD),1 are highly
inte	rested in Cana	dian elected offic	ials		
	These	efforts can take p	place around election cy	cles, though are no	t limited to them. (TS//CEO)
agg PR obje	ressive postur C's FI efforts, ( ectives of the b ress perceived	e taken by PRC to SIS determined riefings were to p FI efforts (e.g., a lal concerns or w	hreat actors towards Ca that MPs in Canada cou rovide elected officials	nada in recent year uld benefit from an u with a better unders ud to FI tradecraft, e	concerns about PRC FI and the increasingly rs. Based on previous experience with the unclassified and general briefing on FI. The standing of FI and FI tradecraft; tools to stc.); and contact information for follow-up if
Wh	at was the Cor	tent of the Briefin			
			format across the coun I FI. The briefings broad		s, CSIS tailored engagements to account for ajor topics:
•	CSIS' manda enforcement		Government of Canada	(specific attention	was paid to emphasize CSIS is not a law
•	The definition and	of FI and what d	oes or does not constitu	ite FI from CSIS' pe	erspective (with a strong focus on the PRC);
•	FI tradecraft a	nd how MPs can	protect themselves and	their staff. (S//CEC	0)
defi cros thre to C fore Gov	nition of foreig ssed when spe atening some canada but mu ign governme	n interference bar cific activities are one in Canada to st be detrimental of is not FI and to nada (including)	sed on s.12, 2(b) of the clandestine, or decepti comply or face consequate to the interests of Cana herefore is not of conce	CSIS Act, and the leave, or constitute a to process. CSIS added a. CSIS clarified to m. One of the place	we issues. The placemats provided CSIS' oriefings indicated that the 'threshold' of FI is hreat to a person (e.g., a foreign government and that these activities can be within or relating that, per this definition, overt engagement with emats contained contact information for the and to report an act of FI during the upcoming

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¹ The UFWD reports directly to the Central Committee of the CCP, and is a Party entity, not a government entity. The UFWD's primary role is to ensure, via its vast network, that 'united front work' (i.e. work to strengthen a united front coalition that furthers the influence and interests of the CCP) is carried out effectively both inside and outside the PRC. While united front work is primarily conceived, implemented and overseen by the UFWD, numerous other elements within the PRC are involved in united front work and foreign interference more generally. (S//CEO)



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
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	(TS//CEO)	
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Next Steps			
CSIS assesse oriefings	s that based on the outcomes of the engagements so far, all of were exceeded.	objectives of the briefing strategies (defens	ive
zirollingo	word discound.		7
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pelieve they a zone,' where t	eatest challenges for MPs appears to lie in correctly identifying re being targeted. Many of the interactions between MPs and the nature and motivations of the contact are ambiguous. This at could be legitimate diplomatic advocacy from clandestine as (TS/CEO)	foreign officials appear to fall into the FI 'gi increases the challenge of distinguishing	
ecognize that ncreased effo are targeted, a considerable e	gagements clearly demonstrated that elected officials are grow there is a serious FI threat from the PRC. This grow rts to engage with and sensitize our elected (and appointed) of and how to better protect themselves. Based on the success of emphasis the PRC, in particular, has placed in attempting to in SIS will be seeking to engage with additional MPs in the coming	wing concern is reflective of the need for officials as well as their staff about FI, how of this effort, and in the context of the nterfere in Canada's democratic processes	they



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