

TOP SECRET [REDACTED] /LIMITED/CANADIAN EYES ONLY
2022 10 26

BLUF: The PRC [REDACTED] clandestinely supported candidate [REDACTED]

Background

- [REDACTED] mobilizing support for preferred candidates at all levels of government, [REDACTED]
- PRC officials in Canada often conduct election-related foreign interference through local networks [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED] channeling donations and other assistance to preferred candidates will foster a bond of obligation to the PRC that will pay dividends for the promotion of CCP interest if elected.

Current Situation

- [REDACTED] to acquiesce to PRC officials and the United Front Work Department, co-opted community leaders and associations provided assistance in fundraising and material support [REDACTED] This activity is often covert, likely illegal, and therefore constitutes foreign interference by the PRC.

○ [REDACTED]

- *PRC officials could be emboldened in their electoral interference efforts by the 2021 defeat of former Richmond MP Kenny Chiu*
- [REDACTED]

TOP SECRET [REDACTED] /LIMITED/CANADIAN EYES ONLY
2022 10 26

- [REDACTED]
 - The PRC is known to target and/or leverage family as part of its FI and other threat activity, through Operations FOXHUNT and SKYNET for example. The PRC could potentially threaten or intimidate [REDACTED]
- The PRC missions in Canada continue to learn from their experiences across the country and refine their approach to FI activity. This demonstrates the breadth and depth of PRC efforts at sub-national levels of government (provincial, municipal and indigenous).

Next Steps

- CSIS officials are investigating and assessing the foreign interference threats [REDACTED]
 - Ongoing investigation will help inform, for example, whether a threat reduction measure would be appropriate in this case.
- CSIS officials had previously met [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED]