

CAN005784_R01

INTEL	LIGENCE ASSESS				
2020 02 18	SECRET//CANADIAN EYES ONLY	CSIS IA 2019-20/80			
	ceign Interference Network	n an			
active foreign interferen		an			
		which interference is			
carried out via a networ	carried out via a network of closely connected, PRC-linked individuals working to advance				
PRC interests.	at least eleven 2019 federal candidate	es were implicated ²			
through at least one dir	ect connection	(S//CEO)			

Key Assessments

•	Г	his network of PRC-
	linked individuals work in loose coordination with one another to	covertly advance PRC
	interests through Canadian democratic institutions. (S//CEO)	

² For the purposes of this assessment, "implicated" indicates that an individual has at least one direct connection to a person of interest in ______ It does not, in and of itself, indicate that the "implicated" individual is knowingly involved in threat activity. In some cases, the implicated individual is unaware of the activities and motives of the person of interest.



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
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¹ Foreign Interference refers to "activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person". It is referred to as "foreign-influenced activities" in Section 2(*b*) of the *CSIS Act*. The more frequently used term "foreign interference" or "FI" will be used throughout this assessment. (U)

- In addition to PRC official members of the known network include political candidates, their staff, and local community leaders. These individuals often conduct threat activity with minimal direction from the PRC and under the guise of their overt professional roles.
- at least eleven candidates in the 2019 federal election, along with 13
 members of their staff, are implicated in PRC FI networks Some of these
 individuals are likely unknowingly vulnerable to PRC interference
 Others appear to willingly cooperate in threat

activity. (S//CEO)





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Network Component	
L.	
2. Individuals oper	this FI network is centred on individuals within four professional communities: (1) the PRC (2) leaders of ganizations; (3) staff of targeted candidates/ elected officials; and (4) political candidates/officials themselves. (5//CEO) ating within these communities leverage their overt roles to loosely coordinate adverse activity to interfere with Canadian ions on behalf of Beijing.
	(S//CEO)
3	
	Xi's "Magic Weapon": the United Front Work Department (UFWD) The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) body responsible for conducting covert influence operations, both inside and outside China. Its goals are: (1) to
•	clandestinely influence overseas communities, foreign governments and other actors to take actions or adopt positions in support of Beijing's preferred policies; (2) to discourage individuals living in open and democratic societies from discussing issues that are unfavourable to the CCP; and (3) to
	harass or undermine groups that are critical of CCP ideology, programs or policies. The UFWD conducts these operations outside of the PRC through official and quasi-official entities, including other government and military organizations, cultural and
•	(S//CEO) "friendship" associations, and academic groups. The intended audiences of UFWD influence campaigns are often mistakenly under the impression that
	UFWD-linked individuals and entities are operating independently from the CCP or the state. (U)


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
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	5.	PRC very likely conducts effective but subtle interf in which individuals leverage their overt roles to accomplish ba	ference operations asic tasks on behalf of the PRC		
	(S//CEO)				
	б.				
		(S//CEO)			
	7. PRC relationships with political candidates, proxies	plays a central role in loosely coordinating Fl activity , their staff, and leaders of local community organizations. In some			
	proxies		(S//CEO)		
	•				
	(5)				
	•				
	(S//CEO)				
	•				
Lin	(S) ks to the UFWD: A Pervasive Enabler of	f Fl			
	8.	direct contacts between the UFWD	and Canadians that are actively		
	involved in an election campaign elev	vate the risk of PRC interference in Canada.	(S//CEO)		
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	(S//CEO)				
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		(\$//CE0)			
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


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CAVEATS, INFORM CSIS IMMEDIATELY.

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