

*CSIS National Security Brief*

*Rapport du SCRS sur les enjeux de sécurité nationale*

● CNSB 44/19  
● FEBRUARY 25, 2020

TOP SECRET/[redacted]/CEO

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[redacted] **PRC Foreign Interference** [redacted]

[redacted]

**Background**

[redacted]

**Relationship with PRC Threat Actors**

[redacted]

[redacted]



Intelligence Assessments Branch  
Direction de l'évaluation du renseignement



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CSIS National  
Security Brief

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TOP SECRET

CEO

### Xi's "Magic Weapon": the UFWD

The United Front Work Department (UFWD) is a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) body responsible for conducting covert influence operations, both inside and outside China. PRC founder Mao Zedong referred to the UFWD as one of three "magic weapons" to be used to subdue the CCP's enemies, alongside Party-building and military activity. In a speech given in 2014, President Xi Jinping reportedly re-invoked Mao's terminology to describe the UFWD.

The UFWD's goals are: (1) to clandestinely influence overseas communities, foreign governments and other actors to take actions or adopt positions in support of Beijing's preferred policies; (2) to discourage individuals living in open and democratic societies from discussing issues that are unfavourable to the CCP; and (3) to harass or undermine groups that are critical of CCP ideology, programs or policies. The UFWD conducts these operations outside of the PRC through official and quasi-official entities, including other government and military organizations, cultural and "friendship" associations, and academic groups. The intended audiences of UFWD influence campaigns are often mistakenly under the impression that UFWD-linked individuals and entities are operating independently from the CCP or the state. (U)

Under President Xi, the CCP has elevated and expanded the operations of the UFWD as part of an assertive approach to foreign policy. While much of this activity could be mistaken for regular lobbying or diplomacy, the UFWD operates with purposeful deception to obscure the PRC's official role; it often breaks Canadian laws and regulations, and sometimes intimidates or harasses Canadians. CSIS considers the UFWD a tool of foreign-influenced activity as defined by the *CSIS Act*. (U)


● **CNSB 44/19**  
● FEBRUARY 25, 2020

*CSIS National  
Security Brief*


*Rapport du SCRS  
enjeux de sécurité nationale*

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**[Redacted] and the Risk of Foreign Interference**



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● **CNSB 44/19**  
● FEBRUARY 25, 2020

*CSIS National  
Security Brief*

*Rapport du SCRS  
enjeux de sécurité nationale*

**TOP SECRET**  /CEO



Intelligence Assessment Branch  
Direction de l'évaluation du renseignement

4 / 5

● **CNSB 44/19**  
● FEBRUARY 25, 2020

*CSIS National  
Security Brief*

*Rapport du SCRS  
enjeux de sécurité nationale*

**TOP SECRET//**  /CEO

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LES PRÉSENTES INFORMATIONS SONT COMMUNIQUÉES UNIQUEMENT À DES FINS DE RENSEIGNEMENT ET NE PEUVENT ÊTRE UTILISÉES DANS LE CADRE D'INSTANCES JUDICIAIRES. IL NE FAUT PAS MODIFIER LA COTE DU PRÉSENT DOCUMENT NI LE COMMUNIQUER, EN TOUT OU EN PARTIE, SANS LE CONSENTEMENT ÉCRIT DU SERVICE CANADIEN DU RENSEIGNEMENT DE SÉCURITÉ (SCRS). IL PEUT FAIRE L'OBJET D'UNE EXCEPTION PRÉVUE PAR LA *LOI SUR L'ACCÈS À L'INFORMATION*, LA *LOI SUR LA PROTECTION DES RENSEIGNEMENTS PERSONNELS* OU TOUTE LOI PROVINCIALE OU TERRITORIALE APPLICABLE. SI VOUS RECEVEZ UNE DEMANDE D'ACCÈS PRÉSENTÉE SOUS LE RÉGIME DE CES LOIS, VEUILLEZ CONSULTER LE SCRS RELATIVEMENT À L'APPLICATION DES EXCEPTIONS PRÉVUES. EN OUTRE, LE SCRS PRENDRA TOUTES LES MESURES NÉCESSAIRES PRESCRITES PAR L'ARTICLE 38 DE LA *LOI SUR LA PREUVE AU CANADA* OU PAR TOUTE AUTRE MESURE LÉGISLATIVE POUR PROTÉGER LES PRÉSENTES INFORMATIONS. SI VOUS APPRENEZ QUE CES INFORMATIONS ONT ÉTÉ OU POURRAIENT ÊTRE COMMUNIQUÉES OU QUE LES PRÉSENTES MISES EN GARDE N'ONT PAS ÉTÉ RESPECTÉES, OU SI VOUS NE POUVEZ PAS VOUS Y CONFORMER, VEUILLEZ EN INFORMER LE SCRS IMMÉDIATEMENT.



Intelligence Assessment Branch  
Direction de l'évaluation du renseignement

5 / 5