

For Public Release

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# CANADIAN CENTRE FOR **CYBER SECURITY**

## Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process

### Presentation to the Advisory Committee for Political Parties (ACPP)

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Communications  
Security Establishment

Centre de la sécurité  
des télécommunications

# Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process

- The Cyber Centre is working on the fourth iteration of “Cyber Threats to Canada's Democratic Process”
  - Public document – Planned release in Fall 2023
- Dataset that includes all national level elections globally since 2015
  - Open source and classified data
  - Informs Global Trends section
- Evaluate the threat to Canada's Democratic Process

# TDP 2021 - Key Considerations

- Why Target Canada's Democratic Process?
  - Canada takes an active role in the international community, participating in key multilateral forums.
- Effects of Cyber Activity Against Democratic Processes
- Impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Democratic Processes
  - Overall, the changes to electoral procedures due to COVID-19 appear to have had limited impacts on the cyber threat to elections.

## SHORT-TERM GOALS



- Call into question legitimacy of election process
- Amplify false or polarizing discourse
- Reduce voter turnout

## MEDIUM-TERM GOALS



- Polarize political discourse
- Weaken confidence in leaders


## LONG-TERM GOALS



- Reduce confidence in democracy
- Promote foreign economic, ideological, or military interests
- Create divisions in international alliances

# AI and disinformation

- Biggest change from former TDP's is the introduction of AI
- "AI" = Machine Learning Enabled technology



# Global Trends: Initial Key Findings

- **Trend 1: Targeting of democratic processes has increased**
  - Since 2021 we observe that the proportion of elections targeted increased from 23% in 2021 to 26% in 2022.
- **Trend 2: A small number of countries continue to be responsible for most of the attributed cyber threat activity targeting foreign elections**
- **Trend 3: The majority of cyber threat activity targeting elections is unattributed**
  - Since 2021, more than half of the perpetrators of cyber threat activity targeting national elections were unknown.
  - The number one type of incident = Denial of Access or Distortion of Election Commission Website(s)
- **Trend 4: Online disinformation is now ubiquitous in all national level elections globally and generative AI is increasingly being used to influence elections**
  - Between 2021 and spring 2023 all national elections (146 in total) were subject to online disinformation
  - Since 2021, we have detected an increase in synthetic content being produced relating to national level elections, almost certainly related to the increased accessibility of many of these technologies.

# Traditional Cyber Threats to Elections

Two main themes:

- **Cyber Threat Activity Against Election CI**
  - How Cyber Threat Actors target election systems and infrastructure.
  - Ex: DDoS on Election Commission website, Hacking into an electronic voter database, etc.
- **Cyber Enabled Influence Campaigns**
  - How Cyber Threat Actors try to influence the electorate through influence campaigns that are cyber-enabled.
  - E.g.: “hack-and-leak”, social media account hijacking.


# AI Technology and Disinformation

## AI Technologies: Deepfake videos, fake profiles/GAN imaging and text generators (ChatGPT)

- How Cyber Threat Actors try to influence the electorate using AI
- Deepfake detection models; inaccuracies in detecting deepfakes and generated text



# The Cyber Centre's Election Security





# Cyber Centre Services

- Hotline
  - Actions after dissolution of the House of Commons
  
- Subscription Services
  - Cyber Alerts
  - Cyber Flashes
  - Weekly Technical Report
  
- Reporting and Analysis Services
  - Malware.gc.ca
  - Incident Reporting Portal
  - Partner: RCMP Fraud Reporting portal

**Register via: [contact@cyber.gc.ca](mailto:contact@cyber.gc.ca)**




## Targeting of Senior Officials

- Almost certainly routinely targeted by foreign intelligence services
- Personal accounts and devices of senior officials present an alternative to hardened accounts and services
- State-sponsored actors may be particularly aggressive during periods of transition or heightened tension
- Cybercrime and hacktivism are assessed to be considerably less damaging to Canada's strategic position than sophisticated cyber threat activity

# Protecting One's Online Presence – Best Practices

- Utilize a PIN, complex password or passphrases to protect yourself
  - Passphrases are a memorized phrase consisting of mixed words with or without spaces
- Keep private information private including your personal information, informative pictures, geotagged photos and banking or financial information private
- Use multi-factor authentication (MFA)
- Review your privacy settings often to control who can see what
- Phishing, spear-phishing and whaling
  - Stop, review, and reach out to the sender
- Protect your website



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# Discussion