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# CANADIAN INTELLIGENCE PRIORITIZATION

## PROCESSES, BACKGROUND, and ANALYTIC AIDS

VERSION: SEPTEMBER 2021

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## Executive Summary

Canada's Intelligence Priorities setting process is a vital part of ensuring accountability and managing risk within the intelligence community. Strategic intelligence prioritization is key in ensuring that our finite Canadian intelligence capabilities meet government objectives. The purpose of this analytical aid is to provide a transparent, outcomes-based framework to assist the community to identify Priorities and Requirements, which will enable an effective allocation of operational resources.

Intelligence production is secretive, illusive, and enigmatic – and for good reason. The Government of Canada needs to protect its sensitive sources and capabilities to ensure it can continue producing valuable intelligence into the future. Government organizations also have to work collaboratively on common objectives to make the best use of intelligence resources. Therefore, transparency in prioritization processes is critical to making the opaque world of intelligence function most effectively.

This analytic aid consolidates unclassified information with the goal of providing guidance on setting Priorities and the prioritization of Intelligence Requirements in Canada. It aims to provide key intelligence stakeholders with a clear outline of the process and methodologies and (if new to the intelligence field, or an experienced practitioner looking to go back to basics) a foundational understanding of the "intelligence" business and community. For a classified discussion of the current Intelligence Priorities, please refer to the document entitled 2021-2023 Intelligence Priorities Strategic Guidance.

**Part One** of this aid focuses on the process and standards for setting whole-of-government Intelligence Priorities and Requirements.

**Part Two** provides a background on the core concepts of intelligence, the intelligence community (including roles and functions of these organizations), and the intelligence cycle. This section has been created for those new to the intelligence prioritization world.

Hopefully, intelligence practitioners and consumers who read this analytic aid will walk away with an enhanced understanding of intelligence, their place in the Canadian intelligence community, and how to provide the most effective input for future discussions on the national Intelligence Priorities and the Intelligence Requirements.

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***“[Intelligence] excellence requires more than a standard of quality. I believe it also demands a specific approach to the craft of intelligence analysis: it **requires a service mentality**. A service mentality is the opposite of a product mentality, which often seems to drive the work of intelligence analysis, and the difference is easiest to explain by comparing the two.***

*In a product mentality, the focus is on the producer, who thinks of a product as his or hers. It is also about packaging that product and disseminating it widely. Success is measured in numbers—how many units were produced or how many received each unit. It is about filling a book or producing a product to demonstrate that an analyst is ready for the next big step in a career.*

*In a service mentality, the focus is on the customer—the consumer of our services—and specifically on how best to meet the customer’s needs. It is not about the author or the producing component; it is about the recipient. It is about helping that customer understand an issue. **It is about being timely, relevant, expert, and corporate in our approaches to providing service, intelligence analysis. Success is measured not by the number of units produced, but by how well the product addresses and answers the specific concerns of an identified and targeted audience.**”*

**Martin Petersen**

*Former Deputy Executive Director and  
Former Acting Executive Director of the CIA*



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## PART ONE: The Intelligence Priorities Process

***This section covers the process, standards, and methodologies for setting and managing the Canadian Intelligence Priorities and Canadian Intelligence Requirements.***

*For new members of the intelligence community, or those new to the Priorities and Requirements process, Part Two of this document provides foundational knowledge and concepts for Canadian intelligence.*

## 1.1 Overview

### 1.1.1 Memorandum to Cabinet

Every two years an appropriate Cabinet Committee sets strategic-level Canadian Intelligence Priorities via the **Memorandum to Cabinet (MC)** on Intelligence Priorities. The MC is then submitted to full Cabinet for ratification. Strategic identification of Intelligence Priorities is essential to having an effective intelligence community; they set the direction for both producers (collectors and assessors) and consumers, and scope national interests into clear and manageable categories.

### 1.1.2 Ministerial Directives

Following approval of the Priorities by Cabinet, the Ministers of National Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness issue **Ministerial Directives (MDs)** to their portfolios. The MDs articulate the Minister's expectations with regards to implementation of the Priorities. This does not necessarily mean the Minister is outlining specific activities or Requirements for their organizations, but rather they are codifying the MC's management processes and requiring their organizations to follow them. The MC sets out the Government's *intent*, and MDs require organizations to take *action*.

Additionally, the MDs ensure the Minister is aware of and can be held accountable for the security and intelligence activities their organizations undertake. PCO provides a template to assist the departments and agencies responsible for the issuance of the MD.

### 1.1.3 Intelligence Requirements


Intelligence Requirements are set at ADM INT, in accordance delegated authority provided in the MC and the guidelines found in the Performance Management and Results and Delivery Framework.

### 1.1.4 Accountability and Reporting

After the first year following ratification of the MC, PCO is required to update the relevant Cabinet committee on the community's support to the Intelligence Priorities over the past year. This Mid-Cycle Update (MCU) should detail the implementation and support by each organization. Each department and agency is expected to contribute to the MCU.

Expenditure reporting for the MCU is provided via the National Intelligence Expenditure Review (NIER), which is managed and coordinated by an NIER coordinator (appointed by ADM INT). This report includes resource expenditures by Intelligence Priority and function (such as collection, production, or support) and is designed to demonstrate to Cabinet the extent to which intelligence production and resource allocation supports the Priorities.

An End-of-Cycle Update is provided to Cabinet upon the re-issuance of the MC, after two years. The End-of-Cycle Update provides a summary of information for the past two years.




**Priorities** are not ranked and are intentionally broad. They direct the intelligence community's focus to the issues of greatest importance to the Government of Canada, but do not provide specific activities or entities of interest.

**Requirements** are specific entities or topics of interest associated to a priority ranked by importance via standardized tiers.

## 1.2 Priority Governance Structure

The Intelligence Priorities are designed to capture key areas of Government interest requiring intelligence support. A robust governance structure ensures clear direction is provided to intelligence producers; this creates a solid foundation for an effective Canadian intelligence community. The governance hierarchy for Canadian Intelligence Priorities is displayed below.

The process for setting Intelligence Priorities is important to the functioning, management, and accountability of the intelligence community. It provides a forum for discussion and debate, as well as compromise and coordination.



### 1.2.1 Cabinet and Deputy Minister Committees

The setting of the Intelligence Priorities is assigned to an appropriate Cabinet committee, whose members include key ministers with responsibilities in intelligence roles, specifically the Ministers of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, National Defence, and Foreign Affairs.

At the Deputy Minister Level, the Intelligence Priorities are assigned to the Deputy Ministers' Committee on National Security (DMNS), which is well placed to have strategic conversations about intelligence and national security. DMNS oversees the provision of information to Cabinet regarding implementation of the Intelligence Priorities, and is supported by ADM INT. The Deputy Minister Intelligence Committee also supports this process, where appropriate.



### 1.2.2 Assistant Deputy Minister Intelligence Committee and Sub-Committees

The Assistant Deputy Minister Intelligence Committee (ADM INT) is responsible for:

- approving the Intelligence Requirements,
- overseeing performance measurement and resource allocation, and
- recommending new MCs to Cabinet, via DMNS.

PCO's Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence chairs ADM INT. This committee has two sub-committees, which hold detailed negotiations and discussions regarding the prioritization of Intelligence Requirements and related issues. Prior to presentation and discussion of issues at ADM INT, there is normally preliminary discussions within these sub-committees.

- Director General Intelligence Committee (DG INT): Senior executives, typically Directors General, working group; reports to ADM INT.
- Intelligence Working Group: Director-level working group, reports to DG INT.

#### Members of ADM INT include:

- PCO (National Security and Intelligence Advisor)
  - Security and Intelligence Secretariat, Chair
  - Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS)
- Canada Border Services Agency
- Canadian Coast Guard
- Canadian Security Intelligence Service
- Communications Security Establishment
- Department of Finance
- Department of National Defence
- Environment and Climate Change Canada
- Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Canada
- Global Affairs Canada
- Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada
- Innovation, Science, and Economic Development Canada
- Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre
- Public Health Agency of Canada
- Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada
- Royal Canadian Mounted Police
- Transport Canada
- *Ad Hoc: Other participants may be invited on a case-by-case basis (e.g. Natural Resources Canada).*

### 1.2.3 The Role of PCO

PCO provides a critical governance and leadership role for the Intelligence Priorities. Under the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSIA), the Security and Intelligence Secretariat directly supports the Cabinet committee responsible for considering Intelligence Priorities. PCO advises Cabinet and the Prime Minister on security and intelligence issues from the broadest governmental lens, and plays a leadership, coordination, and mediation role in the development of the MC and the Requirements.

### 1.2.4 Impact of the Intelligence Priorities

The Intelligence Priorities capture the government's strategic and operational Priorities for departments and agencies involved in intelligence. The Communications Security Establishment (under s. 16 of the *Communications Security Establishment Act*) is the only intelligence producer that is required, by law, to report intelligence in accordance with Government of Canada (GoC) Intelligence Priorities. However, as the Intelligence Priorities set out in the MC reflect a whole-of-government strategic view of intelligence needs, it is understood and expected (i.e., via MDs) that other intelligence report and assessment producers also align their reporting activities with the Priorities (where consistent with their mandate).



## 1.3 The Intelligence Priorities

### 1.3.1 The Memorandum to Cabinet on Intelligence Priorities

The Memorandum to Cabinet on Intelligence Priorities (the MC) normally includes a strategic level overview of Canada's national security environment and identifies strategic Intelligence Priorities for the intelligence community. As noted earlier, the Intelligence Priorities within the MC are intentionally broad since they are designed to capture the government's strategic policy and operational Requirements.

Every two years, the Privy Council Office's Security and Intelligence Secretariat Strategic Policy and Planning (SPP) team drafts the MC in consultation with key consumers and producers from the intelligence community, via the governance process detailed above.

Renewing the Intelligence Priorities is an opportunity to assess current national interests and ensure they are reflected accurately to direct the intelligence community. It is also an opportunity to think critically about the international environment, estimate what will be of greatest interest in the two years to come, and pre-position the intelligence community to respond effectively.

Requirements may change in response to current trends, threats and preoccupations, but Priorities are long-term commitments. They are meant to objectively capture areas of national interest that will be steady for the mid-term future. If they are comprehensive and strategically chosen in alignment with well-based critical analysis, they will positively enable Requirement identification for the next two years.

The sections below provide a methodology for identifying and setting Intelligence Priorities in the MC.

#### Theory of Strategy

John Lewis Gaddis in *On Grand Strategy* (2018) speaks heavily of the importance of "the alignment of unlimited aspirations with necessarily limited capabilities" when formulating national level strategies.

*"If you seek ends beyond your means, then sooner or later you'll have to scale back your ends to fit your means. Expanding means may attain more ends, but not all, because ends can be infinite and means can never be. Whatever balance you strike, there'll be a link between what's real and what's imagined: between your current location and your intended destination. You won't have a strategy until you've connected these dots – dissimilar though they are – within the situation in which you're operating."*

The Intelligence Priorities can be seen as the intelligence *ends* (or outcomes) that would be most beneficial for the Government of Canada. The intelligence community use their available *means* to achieve these ends. Gaddis reminds us that our intelligence strategy must have clear and realistic ends which take into account the finite nature of means if they are to be effective.

### 1.3.2 Process

The following details the general process for an MC. These are not required deadlines, but give an overview of the typical process timelines.

~5 months  
prior to  
tabling

**Initiation:** An MC is initiated roughly five months prior to the deadline for tabling to Cabinet (e.g. if renewal is required in April, review will be initiated in December of the previous year). The PCO chair of the Intelligence Working Group (INT WG) officially launches a review via the tabling of a Critical Path timeline at the INT WG.

~5 months  
prior to  
tabling

**Strategic Policy Consultation and Threat/ Interest Environment Assessment:** During the first month of the review, the PCO Chair conducts consultations with strategic policy and operational personnel within the intelligence community. Points of contact are identified by the INT WG. These consultations help inform Priority identification and national interest environmental assessments (described below).

~5-4 months  
prior to  
tabling

**Drafting of MC:** Based on the consultations, the PCO chair begins drafting the MC and Priorities. This includes updating the performance management framework and the results and delivery strategy.

~4 months  
prior to  
tabling

**Key Stakeholder Review:** The draft Priorities and MC are circulated to the INT WG and Strategic Policy points of contact at the working level (i.e. departmental Directors). At this time, INT WG members should consult internally within their departments with key subject matter experts, and provide any comments back to PCO in accordance with deadlines outlined in the Critical Path.

~3 months  
prior to  
tabling

**Group Review:** Following the Key Stakeholder Review, PCO updates the draft and recirculate for final INT WG review. The INT WG seeks concurrence on the draft contents.

~2 months  
prior to  
tabling

**DG INT Review:** DG INT is convened to review and approve new MC and Priorities.

~1 month  
prior to  
tabling

**ADM INT Review:** ADM INT is convened to review the new MC and Priorities. When reviewing the MC, ADM INT officials will ensure that:

- They are satisfied the MC aligns with Government Priorities and direction;
- The Priorities are appropriately positioned to respond to dynamic changes in national interests over the next two years; and,
- The roles, responsibilities, and accountability measures assigned to intelligence community members are appropriate and realistic.

~3 weeks  
prior to  
tabling

**DM NS Review:** DMNS approves the MC. PCO arranges for the MC to be assigned a date for the relevant Cabinet committee.

**Appropriate Cabinet Committee:** Cabinet reviews and provides approval in principle for the MC. It is then ratified by full Cabinet.

**Ministerial Directives Issued by appropriate Ministers**

**Requirements Issued by ADM INT**





### 1.3.3 An Outcomes-Based Priorities Model

There are many ways to set Intelligence Priorities, all with their benefits and drawbacks. What matters is that the Priorities are **clear** for the intelligence community to enable effective intelligence production for the next two years.

One method is to provide topics of greatest interest and importance. This provides direction on issues, but leaves much to be desired for the intelligence community. Topics of interest often do not provide enough direction for producers (collectors and assessors) to understand *why* the government needs information on those topics. It also focuses the narrative on the *problems* themselves rather than *solutions* or *goals* that the intelligence community can support.

An outcomes-based Priorities model provides a more focused approach to agenda-setting; identifying topics where intelligence support is needed, but supporting this with additionally identifying **valuable** and **feasible** goals to which intelligence can contribute. This approach ensures that the Priorities take into account the actual capabilities of the intelligence community, and sets a solid foundation for measuring success. Consider the following guidelines when drafting valuable and feasible outcomes:

Value	Feasibility
<p><b>Issue Based:</b> Outcomes should relate to a clear topic of interest that is relevant to the activities of the Government of Canada. Stating that the intelligence community should "inform decision-makers" on its own does not provide any useful direction for intelligence activities.</p> <p><b>Strategic:</b> Intelligence Priorities should focus on outcomes that are not only going to be useful when they are set, but for the entire two years they are in effect. The Priorities should take into account the potential trends and changes in the national interest environment moving forward.</p> <p><b>Effective:</b> Outcomes should focus on issues that are likely going to make a difference. Resources are going to be devoted to these Priorities, thus they should be clearly focused on those outcomes that are going to be of most benefit to the Government.</p> <p><b>Whole-of-Government Interest:</b> The Government has a wide variety of interests and mandates. Intelligence outcomes should be focused on issues that contribute to, and align with, high-level strategic government interests and goals.</p>	<p><b>Realistic:</b> Outcomes should focus on <u>attainable</u> objectives. <i>For example, during the de-nuclearization period after the Cold War, it would have been unrealistic for the Canadian intelligence community to be presented with the outcome of "detecting and identifying all locations of USSR nuclear weapons, related infrastructure, and key players to enable complete elimination of their program." A realistic outcome would be "identification of positions/strategies of key leadership in USSR de-nuclearization negotiations to better enable strategic negotiating advantage for Canada." The first outcomes-based statement is ineffective; it does not provide a clear interest and enabling "complete elimination" is just unrealistic. The latter provides a clear interest, key leaders, and a clear goal, supporting Canadian counter-proliferation negotiations.</i></p> <p><b>Measurable:</b> Outcomes should be goals that, upon review of activities, can be assigned a level of <i>meaningful</i> success. This normally means they can be measured with qualitative measures, rather than quantitative. <i>Taking the Post-Cold War example used above, intelligence consumers would measure whether they were provided with "strategic negotiating advantage." They could say, "no, intelligence had a negligible effect on developing the negotiating strategy, it simply repeated already known information" or they could say, "yes, intelligence was highly valuable in providing information that enabled a shift in strategy that benefitted Canada's negotiating strategy." This outcome cannot be measured with numbers: "agencies provided 20 reports to consumers on this topic" does not provide a meaningful measure of success of the intelligence community.</i></p> <p><b>Intelligence Contribution:</b> Intelligence may not always be the <i>best</i> way to reach an outcome. Sometimes, the information needed can be provided outside of sovereign intelligence channels, e.g. through allied intelligence agencies, open source information, independent research programs, or non-governmental organizations. It is important to think of the <i>sovereign</i> intelligence need, and sovereign intelligence cost that setting an outcome will have.</p>

### 1.3.3(B) Input, Action, Result | Priorities, Outcomes, and Interests



An **Input, Action, Result model** shows how intelligence products influence daily decisions of Government of Canada officials, and support national interests and Canadians. Within this model:

- 1) Intelligence producers provide products to intelligence consumers (input);
- 2) Intelligence consumers make informed decisions (action); and
- 3) National interests are supported (result).

Within the outcomes-based Priorities model, the Intelligence Priorities, outcomes, and national interests mirror this framework. This logic model enables the Priorities to not only serve as topics of consumer interest, but also as tools to demonstrate the role intelligence can play in support of broader Government of Canada activities.

The **Priorities** are topics of highest intelligence value for the Government of Canada. The Priorities direct intelligence community production to particular areas of interest. The Priorities direct what intelligence is available to consumers (i.e. what intelligence will **input** into the operational and policy decision making process).

- For example, if terrorism is identified as a Priority, it will be further defined within the Requirements, and producers will provide intelligence products (**inputs**) to consumers on this topic (**Priority**); perhaps an intelligence product is issued on a terrorist entity's plans for an attack on a Canadian Forces unit in theatre.

**Outcomes** are objectives that intelligence products can support. Outcomes focus on consumer use of intelligence towards particular Government of Canada goals or objectives, or in other words, what **actions** will be supported based on the inputs.

- Continuing our example, based on intelligence products regarding terrorist activity, a consumer will make informed operational and policy decisions (**action**) to support Government of Canada objectives (**outcomes**); perhaps, based on intelligence, military personnel take operational action to increase defences leading to better force protection.

Broader Canadian **strategic interests** are supported as a **result** of achieved outcomes. Through the provision of intelligence, operational and policy decisions are made which support Government of Canada goals.

- Based on this intelligence, operational decision makers supported Canadian military and defence initiatives, which kept our military personnel and assets safe.



### 1.3.4 Identifying Priorities

#### 1.3.4 (A) Threat and Interest Landscape Evaluation

As outlined above, Priorities should be strategic and align with the current national interest environment. However, they should also aim to be reflective of near-future fluctuations. An objective evaluation of the national interest landscape should be completed before setting Priorities, in order to enable strategic forward thinking on this subject. An objective evaluation includes conducting base-level examinations of areas of interest (or specific entities of interest) to establish:

- the current threats/opportunities based on open source (see table below) and classified research
- potential changes in the next two years
- current level of threat/opportunity\*
- potential level of threat/opportunity in two years time\*
- ability and capacity of intelligence to respond to the threat/opportunity
- alignment with Government of Canada initiatives and priorities

Evaluations should be reviewed by relevant subject matter experts.

\* Threat level evaluations can be conducted in accordance with the Requirement Tier methodology outlined in section 1.4.5.

Areas of interest identified for in-depth evaluation can be chosen in a variety of ways; for example, topics could be chosen based on existing Priorities from the MC. Existing Priorities may still endure, but conducting an objective assessment of the status of each one could provide a new baseline to ensure it continues to be accurately reflected in the Priorities. Assessments could also be conducted based on specific entities of concern.

#### Open Source Resources:

Government Publications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>CSIS Public Report</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>Public Safety Report on Threat to Canada</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>Canadian Centre for Cyber Security Annual Cyber Threat Report</u></a></li> </ul>
Worldwide threat assessments from allied nations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>Global Trends Report - US ODNI</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>The Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community</u></a></li> </ul>
Allied nation intelligence or national security strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>The US National Intelligence Strategy</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>The UK National Security Capability Review</u></a></li> </ul>
Think tank and Academic Assessments	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>NATO Association of Canada Threat Assessment</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>University of Ottawa Centre for International Policy Studies Reports</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>RAND Global Security Articles</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>Centre for Strategic and International Studies</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>The International Institute for Strategic Studies</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>The Lowy Institute</u></a></li> <li>○ <a href="#"><u>Chatham House</u></a></li> </ul>

#### 1.3.4 (B) Organizing Priorities

National interests do not exist in a vacuum; they are intersectional and unpredictable in many ways. However, grouping similar interests into themes is a valuable exercise, which allows easier organization and measurement. Outcomes-based Priorities should be aligned with a small number of key themes. These themes will also ensure that the outcomes remain "issue-based." **However**, categories, groupings, or themes are only valuable if they accurately reflect the Priorities within them. If organizing priorities into groups, it is important to avoid forcing everything into boxes if they do not fit. The "national interest" touches on so many broad and intersectional topics, sometimes topics cannot be effectively sorted. There is no value in fitting one orange into the apple 'theme' just because it is a fruit; in the end, it is probably best to just call an orange an orange.

## 1.4 Intelligence Requirements

### 1.4.1 Overview

As mentioned above, the Intelligence Priorities are broad. The Requirements, by contrast, are granular, identify specific topics of interest, and are ranked by Tier. Requirements fall under a Priority and each Priority falls under an Outcome. The Requirements are approved and managed through the ADM INT governance structure.

The Requirements are organized into charts, with one chart per Priority and theme, where applicable. The charts include all of the Requirements per Priority, their Tiers. The Requirements seek to provide an overall picture of what intelligence is being sought by consumers. The Requirements are therefore consumer-centric and collection-type agnostic. For example, if one collector cannot produce on a Requirement, this does not mean it will be at a lower Tier. However, if *no* collectors can produce on a Requirement, it will not be included on the charts but will be noted as a gap for future conversations.

**Issuance of Requirements:** The Requirements are issued by ADM INT within two months of the ratification of the MC, and are reviewed and updated in accordance with the Performance Management and Results and Delivery Framework. *See 1.4.4(A) for more information.*

There are two methods through which the Requirements can be updated: full community reviews, and amendments via ADM INT.

**Full Community Review:** ADM INT may initiate a full community review, as needed. A full review may occur one year after the issuance of the first round of Requirements, if ADM INT feels it is necessary. The purpose of a full review is to ensure that Requirements for each Intelligence Priority remain current to the national interest environment. It allows the community to: holistically re-assess intelligence needs, remove items that are no longer relevant, or add issues that may become important in the very near future. A full review is also an opportunity to facilitate collection of information that could help support performance reporting to Cabinet, or information that can help policymakers and officials understand potential gaps or trade-offs facing collectors. *See 1.4.4(B) for more information.*

Any department or agency that uses intelligence can table Intelligence Requirements for consideration during a review. For this reason, the Requirements reviews are also an opportunity for consumers and producers to form valuable connections and initiate more in-depth conversations regarding intelligence needs and opportunities. However, the Requirements reviews do not replace bilateral cooperation between consumers and producers on specific intelligence needs.

**ADM INT Amendment:** ADM INT is responsible for managing the Requirements. As a result, should committee members identify a new Requirement or feel a Requirement is no longer relevant, they may update the Requirements charts by seeking an amendment at ADM INT. The Requirement submission form must be provided for ADM INT review and approval. *See 1.4.4(C) for more information.*

**Exigent and Urgent Situations:** ADM INT can add new Requirements under Priorities identified by Cabinet, but may also issue Requirements which do not align with an identified Priority in urgent or exigent circumstances and in line with specific conditions noted in the MC. In line with the Performance Management and Results and Delivery Framework, if such a Requirement is issued, ADM INT must provide a briefing to Cabinet, via DMNS, justifying the urgent or exigent addition as soon as is feasible. A standardized Requirement submission form must be documented, however, given the urgent or exigent circumstances, the submission form does not have to be submitted for the ADM INT discussion to occur. A submission form, if not available for ADM INT discussion, must be provided to the Chair as soon as feasible.



**1.4.2 Tier Levels**

While the Priorities are not ranked, the Requirements are: Tiers 1-4. Tier 1 Requirements are those where the need for sovereign intelligence is greatest and likelihood and impact are highest, whereas Tier 4 Requirements are those where the need for sovereign intelligence, impact, and likelihood are lowest. See section 1.4.5 (B) for more information.



**1.4.3 Chart Structure**

Requirements charts are grouped by theme or associated outcomes, and each Priority has one chart. Each chart begins with an overview of the Priorities and Tiered Requirements within the given outcome. Each individual Priority chart displays the Requirements and their associated Tier level, and also provides information to deconflict Requirements found within separate Priorities.

PRIORITY NAME			
• Description of priority from Memorandum to Cabinet.			
Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3	Tier 4
Requirement	Requirement	Requirement	Requirement

*Notes: Notes on Requirements on this Chart.*



**Deconfliction:**

- Information about placement of Requirements that may relate to this Priority, but are found in other Charts.

### 1.4.4 Requirements Process


#### 1.4.4 (A) Issuance of Requirements

The following timeline details the general process for the issuance of Requirements upon the ratification of an MC. The process gives a general overview of required timelines, in accordance with the two-month deadline to issue Requirements set in the Intelligence Priorities Management Framework and Results and Delivery Strategy.



#### 1.4.4 (B) ADM INT Amendment Process



If a department or agency is of the view that an amendment to the Requirements chart is required, their ADM INT representative can request a change at any time by submitting a new or amended Requirement submission form (see 1.4.5) to the ADM INT Chair for discussion at an ADM INT meeting. It is a best practice to first submit a draft Requirement submission form to the chair of the INT WG for review and discussion at the working level. Subsequent review at DG INT is also recommended, prior to ADM submission to the ADM INT chair.





### 1.4.4 (C) Full Community Review Process

The following timeline details the general process for a full community review of the Requirements, if ADM INT deems it necessary. Generally, a full review should only take place if ADM INT feels that multiple Requirements charts require multiple updates.



### 1.4.5 Requirements Submissions Forms

#### Identifying and Prioritizing Intelligence Requirements

*“Of these [national] interests, the primacy of some is self-evident – those that deal with large and known threats, those that deal with neighbouring or proximate states, and those that are more severe. But the international arena is dynamic and fluid, so periodic readjustments of priorities are likely even among the agreed key interests ... Given that intelligence should be an adjunct to policy and not a policy maker in its own right, intelligence priorities should reflect policy priorities.”<sup>1</sup>*

Requirements, which are informed by departmental **Requirements Submission Forms**, are prioritized (see *Tier levels at section 1.4.2 and 1.4.5(B)*) within the Requirements charts. Each Requirement on the Requirements charts matches with at least one associated Requirement form.

These forms serve multiple purposes:

- They allow producer departments to have a comprehensive understanding of consumers' intelligence needs.
- They provide key contacts for producers, directly associated with specific Requirements.
- They provide rationales for each individual Requirement, to enable accountability, transparency, and documentation for each Requirement.
- They justify Tier placement of each Requirement on the chart.
- They enable challenge function and review of Requirements, and easier identification of Requirements that are no longer relevant or needed.

Requirements forms contain essential questions that justify the inclusion of a Requirement on the charts. While the answers to the questions on the forms may seem apparent to a subject matter expert, they can provide essential context for documentation, review, and amendment purposes. For example, in two years time, it will be clear whether the Requirement is still relevant based on the input within the associated form. Additionally, should a review body conduct a review of the Requirements, they will be provided with comprehensive documentation that enables them to understand why each Requirement is on the chart, and why it is at its current tier level.

Requirements forms **are not**:

- Prescriptive to production, nor intended to limit their associated Requirement to *only* intelligence production on their specific operational issue. The forms provide *examples* of what intelligence on the Requirement could provide for the Government, and inform the identification of broader, formal, Intelligence Requirements in the final charts.
- Indicative of *final* Tier levels. The forms include the consumer assessment of what the potential Tier level for the resultant Requirement *could* be. The PCO INT WG chair provides a challenge function to Tiering of Requirements when consolidating Requirements into charts, and final Tier levels are decided by ADM INT.

The following sections outline required questions and assessments present on the submission forms.

<sup>1</sup> Mark Lowenthal, *From Secrets to Policy* (7th edition, 2016), p. 75.

#### 1.4.5 (A) Important Considerations: What is an Acceptable Requirement?

The following questions and considerations should be applied when identifying Requirements. If the answer is **no** to one of the following questions, serious consideration should be given to the need for it as an Intelligence Requirement.

- **Is the Requirement reflective of GoC Priority?** Something may be a very high departmental priority, but its merit as a national Intelligence Requirement may not translate directly. Highest Tiers should be reserved for issues where there is a need for sovereign intelligence and which are most relevant to the GoC strategic vision or that pose the highest threat or opportunity to Canadian strategic national interests.
- **Is the Requirement a long-term national interest?** Long term Requirements will likely still be in the strategic national interest for at least another two years. Short-term Requirements placed at high Tiers may take resources away from longer-term Requirements. If something is a short-term interest, does its importance and impact justify it taking away resources from other Requirements to develop new intelligence collection capabilities?
- **Is adding a new Requirement or increasing the Tier level of a Requirement worth decreasing resources on another?** Requirement creep should be avoided; adding one Requirement without removing or deprioritizing another can cause inflation of the number of high Tier Requirements. This can lead to a devaluing of the higher Tier, and pose resource and collection challenges for intelligence producers.
- **Is intelligence really the answer?** Consider if non-intelligence resources could be used instead. For example, could non-intelligence open source research provide required answers? Could the government reach out to a bilateral or multilateral partner to answer the question?



### 1.4.5 (B) Prioritizing Intelligence Requirements: Methodology

If all of these questions lead to the determination that the Requirement should be included in the Requirements, three additional questions are particularly important in determining the appropriate Tier for the Requirement. These questions and associated rank may be used in a quantitative analysis of the Requirements to determine the appropriate tier; however, they are not solely determinative of a Requirement's Tier.

#### 1. What is the need for sovereign intelligence on the Requirement, on a scale of 1-10?

- Would allied governments and intelligence organization cover this topic? If so, the Requirement may score lower on this scale. If the Priority is a *specific* concern to *Canadian* strategic national interests (e.g. something only Canadian organizations care about), this should score higher.
- For a fictitious example, maple syrup trade would not be as important to Five Eyes partners as it is to Canada; a Requirement on maple syrup would therefore score higher.

#### 2. What is the *importance* of the Requirement to GoC strategic interests, on a scale of 1-10?

- Something that is of critical (10) importance to Canadian national interests would be an issue that has and will continue to have a *clear and direct impact on the security, safety, or welfare of Canadians on a daily basis*. Officials *rely on the intelligence* to make decisions, and *not having intelligence on a critical issue would directly affect the national interests of Canada*.
- Something of moderate (5) importance would be an issue that has or may pose a moderate impact on the security, safety, or welfare of Canadians. Not having intelligence on this issue could possibly affect some aspects of Canada's strategic national interest, and GoC officials would appreciate intelligence to make informed decisions.
- Something that is of low (1) importance would be an issue that may pose a low impact on the security, safety, or welfare of Canadians sometime in the future. Not having intelligence on the issue would not necessarily have an impact of the ability of the GoC to deal with the issue.

#### 3. What is the *likelihood* that the issue will affect strategic interests, on a scale of 1 to 10 (with the following guidelines)?

Rank	Percentage Likelihood	Description
10	100%	Certain
8-9	93% give or take about 6%	Almost certain, virtually certain, all but certain, highly probable, highly likely, odds [or chances] overwhelming.
6-7	75% give or take about 12%	Probably, likely, we believe, we estimate.
5	50% give or take about 10%	Chances about even, chances a little better [or less] than even, improbable, unlikely
3-4	30% give or take about 10%	Probably not, we believe that . . . not, we estimate that . . . not, we doubt, doubtful.
1-2	7% give or take about 5%	Almost certainly not, virtually impossible, almost impossible, some slight chance, highly doubtful.

(Table From: Sherman Kent, *Words of Estimative Probability*, from the Fall 1964 issue of *Studies in Intelligence*)

Mark Lowenthal gives the following example to explain this prioritization methodology: "During the cold war, a Soviet nuclear attack would have been judged a high-importance but low-likelihood event. Italian government instability would have been judged a high-likelihood but low-importance event. Of the two, the Soviet issue would rank higher as a priority or intelligence concern because of its potential effect, even though an attack seemed possible in only a few instances and an Italian government fell several dozen times."<sup>2</sup>


<sup>2</sup> Lowenthal, *Secrets to Policy*, p. 77.



The following matrix also demonstrates this prioritization methodology. Likelihood is indicated on the X-axis, importance is indicated on the Y-axis, and need for sovereign intelligence is indicated by the size of the Requirement's mark on the graph (the larger the need for sovereign intelligence, the larger the dot). Requirements with lower likelihoods and lower importance will fall to the bottom left of the graph, and generally have lower.

Refer to the matrix for the following examples of how the methodology could be applied.

- Priority B would clearly be a Tier 1 Requirement. It is of highest importance, likelihood, and has a high need for sovereign intelligence.
- Priority D could be a Tier 1, due to its importance and likelihood, however there is a low need for sovereign intelligence. If there are a large amount of other Tier 1s, this Requirement could be considered to move to Tier 2.
- Priority C is of moderate importance and low likelihood, and also has a moderate need for sovereign intelligence. This could be placed at Tier 2, but if there are low amounts of Tier 1s, could be increased due to the sovereign needs.
- Priority A is of low-moderate importance and low likelihood, but there is a need for sovereign intelligence—either the issue is only related to Canadian strategic national interests or allies have not chosen to cover it as a high priority. Despite its low likelihood and importance, this could be considered for higher Tier placement depending on the number of other Requirements.



See Annex 1 for a Requirement prioritization aid.

## 1.5 Accountability and Expenditure Reporting

### 1.5.1 National Intelligence Expenditure Review

The National Intelligence Expenditure Review (NIER) is a retrospective annual review that captures the expenditures associated with implementing the Intelligence Priorities. The NIER informs Cabinet of the level of resources that the Canadian intelligence production community allocated to the Intelligence Priorities during the previous fiscal year.

Led by PCO Security and Intelligence Strategic Policy and Planning (S&I SPP), CBSA, CAF/DND, CSIS, CSE, GAC, FINTRAC, ITAC, PCO, and RCMP contribute to the NIER. These departments and agencies are subject to varying mandates, authorities, and budget allocations. Therefore, the NIER Coordinator provides a standard methodology (approved by ADM INT) to participants to ensure that, regardless of the aforementioned considerations, the contributing departments and agencies follow the same process when determining allocated expenditures.

For more information on the NIER, contact PCO S&I SPP.

### 1.5.2 Mid-Cycle and End-of Cycle Update Process

The Mid-Cycle Update (MCU) informs Cabinet of the intelligence community's implementation of the Intelligence Priorities. PCO S&I SPP is responsible for, in consultation with the intelligence community, drafting the Mid-Cycle Update. The NSIA presents the MCU to the relevant Cabinet committee.

The Mid-Cycle Update normally contains the following information:

- Feedback from the intelligence community on intelligence received in the past year, including (but not limited to) intelligence outcomes, decisions influenced, gaps in intelligence received, or areas of improvement;
- An updated GBA+ assessment; and
- The most recent NIER, or a summary thereof.

The End-of-Cycle Update contains similar information to the Mid-Cycle update. It is provided to Cabinet with the next Memorandum to Cabinet on Intelligence Priorities to inform the issuance of new direction.

## 1.6 Providing Valuable Feedback

Feedback will be sought often and is encouraged at regular ADM INT and sub-committee meetings. It is also required for the Mid-Cycle Update, the End-of-Cycle Update and for drafting the MC.

In the intelligence community, there are generally four main types of feedback regarding intelligence; that it: **provided context, influenced a decision, resulted in action taken, or needed improvement**. Each feedback "bucket" is valuable in its own way, and the provision of each type of feedback from consumers to producers is essential for maintaining an effective and responsive intelligence community. For the first three types of feedback, a **Situation, Intelligence received, Use, Result, and Value** format should be employed.

- **Context:** Describe what the intelligence need or gap was, why your department required intelligence on the situation or topic.
- **Intelligence/Assessments Received:** Describe (and provide reference numbers, if possible) the intelligence or assessments received by your department, and what it said. Also if possible, include how the information was received (in a system, via a CRO).
- **Use:** Describe what was done with the reporting received. Was it briefed to senior executives formally or informally, was there an action-on or sanitization to share, etc.?
- **Result:** Describe the outcomes the use facilitated. Did the decision-maker change their position, was a threat thwarted, and opportunity seized?
- **Value:** Provide insight on how the intelligence aided in the result. Could the result have been achieved without the intelligence? Was it the only evidence, the final piece of the puzzle, etc.?

For example:

- **Context:** Department was unsure of a threat from XYZ
- **Intelligence/Assessment Received:** Department received intelligence from CSIS regarding XYZ threat to ABC.
- **Use:** Department used intelligence in briefing note to Minister.
- **Result:** Minister took action to stop the threat.
- **Value:** Intelligence in this case was essential to protecting the safety and security of Canadians, and the Minister would not have been able to make the decision without it.

When providing feedback on intelligence products topics or products that "**need improvement**" it is important to have a strong explanation; simply saying that intelligence was not timely enough will not help producers get to the core of the issue. Use "needs improvement" feedback to further define your Requirements or questions to help producers better serve their client base. When providing "needs improvement" feedback, ensure to include the following:

- **Requirement Requested:** Provide reference to the Requirement you feel need improved intelligence, and the associated Tier level of the Requirement.
- **Current Intelligence:** Describe what intelligence, if any, you are currently receiving.
- **Specific Issue with Current Intelligence:** Describe why you feel the intelligence being provided does not meet the Requirement set. Is intelligence detailed and thorough, but not delivered in a timeframe that allows its use? Is the intelligence not focused on the right targets or topics? Is it too detailed?
- **Areas of Improvement:** Provide suggestions for what the intelligence producer can do to better meet the stated Requirement.
- **Consequences of "Needs Improvement" Intelligence:** Describe how having intelligence that needs improvement impacts your department or agency. Are your seniors lacking information to make informed decisions, was a threat mitigation opportunity missed?
- **Impact Improved Intelligence Could Have:** Describe how having improved intelligence on the Requirement could positively have an impact on your department or agency. If you had better intelligence, what would the outcome be?



For example:

- **Requirement Requested:** Our department has had a Tier 1 Requirement on X in Requirements Chart Y for three years.
- **Specific Issue with Current Intelligence:** Current intelligence is extremely well written and thorough, however, for our needs, it comes too late.
- **Areas of Improvement:** The nature of this Requirement is operational and tactical and thus requires quick, precise, and responsive intelligence, rather than long summaries of the past few weeks of activity.
- **Consequences of “Needs Improvement” Intelligence:** Without timely intelligence on this topic, our department was exposed to threats that could have otherwise been avoided. A report was released with a few weeks of information about the threat, one week after we encountered it in real life.
- **Impact Improved Intelligence Could Have:** From the example above, if there had been an initial short report of activity when the threat was first uncovered, it would have enabled us to mitigate it before it got worse. Having shorter, more responsive, tactical reporting that is delivered in a timely manner is imperative. In other areas, we appreciate having more thorough long term analysis of situations, but for this Requirement, we really need the most up-to-date information as soon as possible. With more tactical reporting, our Department would be able to assess threats more actively and respond to them. Though not threat to life situations, time is of the essence on this file, and our senior executives need the information.

### ***1.6.1 Providing Intelligence Gaps or Trade-Offs (Producers)***

As detailed earlier, prioritization is a key factor in ensuring the most relevant and effective intelligence is delivered to clients across the GoC. However, even despite prioritization efforts, resources for intelligence collection, reporting, and assessment are limited. Intelligence producers (collectors and assessors), therefore, often have to make internal resourcing decisions to focus on one Requirement over another. These decisions are based on a variety of factors unique to each production and assessment organization; for example, is the Requirement best suited for an organization’s collection methods and mandate, are there enough employed linguists to work on the file, are other intelligence allies working on similar Requirements, etc.?

Though these resourcing decisions are internal to collection and assessment organizations, it is important for the broader intelligence community and high-level intelligence decision-makers to understand these resourcing trade-offs and potential intelligence gaps. Having knowledge of gaps and trade-offs allows officials to understand why they may not be getting intelligence on specific Requirements, and facilitates community-level discussions about intelligence resourcing or Requirement adjustment.

Intelligence gaps can also arise for other reasons than resourcing. For example, classified intelligence assets can become ineffective, leaks can compromise operations, or targets and sources could be lost. Though intelligence producers often have no control over these occurrences, it is important that senior officials are aware of changes in collection abilities. Again, this will enable discussions about resourcing and Requirement adjustment, as necessary.

Communicating resource trade-offs and uncontrollable changes in the collection environment that affect the production of intelligence enables centralized decision-makers to respond and help the intelligence community fill critical gaps. This is why the provision of trade-offs and gaps that arose since the issuance of the MC should be briefed to Cabinet in the Mid-Cycle Update, the End-of-Cycle Update and in the MC.

Intelligence producers should provide insight on these issues, guided by the following questions:

- **Have there been resource decisions made which resulted in a decrease in intelligence collection, production, or assessment efforts on an Intelligence Requirement or Priority?**
  - **Which Intelligence Requirements or Priorities were affected?**
  - **Resource Change:** Describe how resourcing was shifted on the Requirement/Priority (e.g. reorganization of teams, re-training of linguists, creation of new directorates, shift in access development plans, etc.)
  - **Impact (both benefits and drawbacks):** Describe what impact the resourcing decision had on the production of intelligence or assessments (e.g. decreased reporting on one Priority, increased reporting on another, loss of longstanding target set/access to develop new ones on a different topic of higher need.)
  - **Driving factors in this decision:** Describe what the key reasons for the resource shift (e.g. increase in focus on other Requirements, access capacity, direct bilateral conversations with clients about their needs, change in Tier level of Requirements, etc.)
- **Have intelligence gaps arisen which resulted in decreased collection, production, or assessment capabilities on an Intelligence Requirement.**
  - **Which Intelligence Requirements or Priorities were affected?**
  - **Cause:** Describe what happened that led to the gap (e.g. target changed their operating posture, access aged off due to technological advancement, leak of classified information or asset burned a resource, etc.)
  - **Impact of the gap on you:** Provide information on how the change has had an impact on intelligence collection, production, or assessment at your department (e.g. decreased collection on target, decreased reporting, increased resources required to develop new access, had to update internal business plans, etc.)
  - **Impact on clients:** Provide information on how the gap is having an impact on your clients (e.g. they are receiving less reporting, they are no longer receiving any reporting, they are not relying on allied reporting).
  - **Response:** Describe how your organization has responded to the gap (and any follow-on impacts), impediments to resolving the gap, or rationale for how the gap is currently not rectifiable (e.g. diverting resources, not enough resources, cannot justify fixing gap due to other competing priorities, etc.)

Templates in Annex 1 (A1-2 and A1-5) provide guidance on how to provide feedback.

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## PART TWO: An Introduction to Intelligence

***This section provides a background on the core concepts of intelligence, the Canadian intelligence community (including roles and functions of organizations), and the intelligence cycle with a focus on how these concepts relate to the management of Intelligence Priorities and Requirements.***

*Understanding of these concepts provides foundational knowledge that can help members of the intelligence community contribute most effectively to intelligence prioritization and Requirements setting through the processes detailed in Part One.*

The word "Canada" in a serif font, with a small red maple leaf icon above the letter 'a'.



## 2.1 What is Intelligence?

**Data, information, and intelligence are different things.**<sup>3</sup> Data are individual points of fact (unopen to discussion). Information is a description of connections or trends in various data points. *Intelligence* is data and information that has been curated, collated, deemed relevant, and organized into a product that presents a situation in an unbiased manner for a consumer.

Intelligence communities (ICs) around the world focus on "national security" or "national interest" intelligence; but what is the "national interest." Generally speaking, the national interest refers to Canada's sovereignty, democratic processes and institutions, security, territorial integrity, economic prosperity, social cohesion, clean environment, and resilient communities. Upholding Canadian national interests involves safeguarding the health, safety and security of Canadians, and maintaining a robust defence posture at home and abroad. Our national interest is advanced in a manner that adheres to Canada's fundamental values, especially those enshrined in the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms*. In short, **issues of Canadian national interests then are issues that relate to protecting the safety, security, welfare, and prosperity of Canadians both at home and abroad.**

**National Interest Intelligence** (henceforth, intelligence) is the body of **classified intelligence reports** available to intelligence consumers, which contain curated information related to **issues of strategic national interest**. This curated information is: 1) created by **intelligence collectors** who collect, process, and analyze information to formulate intelligence products in line with Canada's national Intelligence Priorities, and 2) intended for use by **intelligence consumers** and **assessors** to aid in informing **national decision makers**.



*"Intelligence is not about truth. If something were known to be true – or false – states would not need intelligence agencies to collect the information or analyze it. Truth is such an absolute term that it sets a standard that intelligence rarely would be able to achieve it. It is better – and more accurate – to think of intelligence as proximate reality. Intelligence agencies face issues or questions and do their best to arrive at a firm understanding of what is going on. They can rarely be assured that even their best and most considered analysis is true. Their goals are intelligence products that are reliable, unbiased, and honest."*

- Mark Lowenthal \*

<sup>3</sup> <https://www.recordedfuture.com/threat-intelligence-data/>

\* Mark Lowenthal, *From Secrets to Policy* (7<sup>th</sup> edition, 2017), p. 8.

## 2.2 Why do we need Intelligence?

The primary reason for intelligence in a democratic society is to support policymakers in their pursuit of upholding strategic national interests. Within this objective, there are three major reasons why every nation produces intelligence despite the existence of modern international institutions for global cooperation.

First, to **avoid strategic surprise**. Strategic surprise can be defined as an event for which Canada is not adequately prepared and that may result in damage to national interests. A primary function of a government is to preserve its security, sovereignty, and prosperity. As a result, nations use intelligence agencies to increase their awareness of threats, developments, events, and developments capable of endangering national interests with the goal of avoiding strategic surprises.

Second, to **provide long-term expertise**. Intelligence organizations are institutions that stand despite changes in political leadership or government direction. They provide a solid foundation of knowledge and expertise about long-term strategic national interests and are unbiased informants ready to assist policy makers.

This leads to the third reason for intelligence, **support for the policy process**. If policy makers solely based decisions on public information, they would be at a severe disadvantage. Tailored "intelligence provides invaluable background, context, information, warning and assessment of risks, benefits and likely outcomes"<sup>4</sup> to aid policymakers in making fully informed decisions. Intelligence does not advocate for a specific policy choice, but serves a support function for those in positions of authority.

Domestically produced intelligence, from an unbiased institution of government, can therefore be seen as a critical pillar in a government's national interest decision-making process.

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<sup>4</sup> Lowenthal, *Secrets to Policy*, p. 4-5.



## 2.2 Types of “Intelligence”

Intelligence is often divided into sub-sections based on the threats posed or opportunities presented, e.g. foreign intelligence, criminal intelligence, security intelligence, and defence intelligence. Despite all having varying uses, focuses, targets, authorities, and practitioners, all relate to “national interest” concepts. These sub-divided categories are not mutually exclusive; certain foreign intelligence products may also meet the definition of security intelligence, and vice versa. *[To learn about how these type of intelligence are collected, see section 2.3.]*



**Foreign intelligence**, under Canadian law, can be generally defined as information about the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign individuals, states, or organizations as they relate to Canadian international affairs, defence, and security.

The *Communications Security Establishment Act* (s. 2) defines foreign intelligence as information about the capabilities, intentions or activities of a foreign individual, state, organization, or terrorist group, as they relate to international affairs, defence, or security.

The *Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act* (s. 16.1) similarly defines foreign intelligence as information that is related to the capabilities, intentions or activities of any foreign state or group of foreign states (or any person other than Canadian citizens, permanent residents or corporations) that also relates to Canada’s defence or international affairs.



**Security Intelligence** in the *CSIS Act* (s.12) is intelligence respecting activities that may, on reasonable grounds, be suspected of constituting **threats to the security of Canada**.

*Threats to the security of Canada are defined in s. 2 of the CSIS Act as:*

- a) *espionage or sabotage that is against Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in support of such espionage or sabotage;*
- b) *foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person;*
- c) *activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political, religious, or ideological objective within Canada or a foreign state; and*
- d) *activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of, the constitutionally established system of government in Canada.*



**Criminal Intelligence** can be defined as intelligence related to organized and serious crime in or affecting Canada, including data on criminals or suspected criminals and businesses or organizations if they are involved in organized crime or serious crime that may affect more than one jurisdiction.<sup>5</sup>



**Defence Intelligence** is “intelligence in support of military objectives and planning, either international or domestic, and including strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence for a spectrum of activities from the formulation of military policies, plans, and direction, to a commander’s understanding of adversarial capabilities and intentions, to specific threats and hazards a commander may face in achieving a specific mission or objective.”<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/en/executive-summary-the-privacy-impact-assessment-pia>

<sup>6</sup> NSICOP 2018 Annual Report, p. 64.



## 2.3 Intelligence Oversight and Review

Most intelligence work is done in secret to maintain the security of the classified sources behind it. As a result, the activities of intelligence agencies are often concealed from public. For this reason, the role of independent review bodies for the intelligence community is essential to ensuring accountability and transparency. The Intelligence Priorities process ensures that the activities of the intelligence community are aligned to a strategic government vision, that Ministers with an intelligence mandate are aware of the activities their organizations take to operationalize the Priorities, and that their expenditures are reported annually.

The mandate of the **National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)** is to review:

National Security and Intelligence  
Committee of Parliamentarians



Comité des parlementaires sur la  
sécurité nationale et le renseignement

- national security and intelligence (NSI) legislative, regulatory, policy, administrative and financial frameworks;
- activities carried out by a department that relates to NSI, unless the activity is an ongoing operation and the appropriate Minister determines review would be injurious to national security, or the activity is subject to Cabinet Confidence; and
- matters relating to NSI that a minister of the Crown refers to the Committee.

Committee members come from both Houses of Parliament; all hold Top Secret clearances and are permanently bound to secrecy under the *Security of Information Act*. On this basis, members can receive classified briefings and materials related to the conduct of the Committee's work.

The **National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA)** is an independent and external review body, which reports to Parliament. The NSIRA reviews all GoC NSI activities to ensure that they are lawful, reasonable and necessary. NSIRA also hears public complaints regarding key national security agencies and activities.



National Security and  
Intelligence Review  
Agency

Office de surveillance des activités  
en matière de sécurité nationale et  
de renseignement

The **Office of the Intelligence Commissioner (IC)** is an independent oversight body. Under the *IC Act*, the IC is responsible for performing quasi-judicial reviews of approvals issued by Ministers for certain authorizations and decisions (as defined in the *CSE Act* and the *CSIS Act*).



Office of the Intelligence  
Commissioner

Bureau du commissaire  
au renseignement

**Beyond oversight and review**, the intelligence community must also cooperate with and assist other GoC governance and oversight bodies, such as the Auditor General of Canada, the Privacy Commissioner, and the Information Commissioner.

## 2.4 Intelligence Alliances

States are not alone on the international stage. Allies often work together on matters of trade and transport...but just as common is intelligence cooperation. Allies often have overlapping national interests (for example, terrorism or transnational organized crime) and therefore cooperating and sharing intelligence on mutually relevant issues can provide more comprehensive coverage of intelligence questions and limit the existence of intelligence gaps.



*The Five Eyes is an intelligence sharing alliance between Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand that has existed since the 1940s.*



*The North Atlantic Treaty Association (NATO) delivers intelligence to senior NATO leaders and member nation's senior government decision makers.<sup>7</sup>*

Allies should not be relied on to provide coverage of all Canadian specific national interests. Therefore understanding what intelligence alliances provide is an important aspect of prioritizing what is collected domestically.

<sup>7</sup> <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2019/10/29/a-new-era-for-nato-intelligence/index.html>

Photo from NATO, [https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics\\_52044.htm](https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52044.htm)

## 2.5 The Intelligence Cycle

Intelligence products are created through a process known widely as the **Intelligence Cycle**. This defined process ensures intelligence that is efficient and relevant to policy makers and Canada's national interests. The Canadian intelligence cycle involves (1) identifying Requirements, (2) collection, (3) analysis, (4) reporting and dissemination, (5) consumption, (6) assessment, and (7) feedback. This cycle is not necessarily linear and involves a whole-of-government approach to function. Each step of the cycle will be explored in greater detail below.





### 2.5.1 Who is involved in the Canadian Intelligence Cycle?

Within the intelligence community, there are those who are primarily intelligence producers and those who are primarily intelligence consumers ("primarily" because most intelligence producers are also consumers of intelligence from other producers). The charts below detail the roles core and other members of the intelligence community.

Producers		Consumers
<b>Collectors:</b> collect intelligence (see 2.5.3) and produce reporting (see 2.5.5 and 2.5.7(A))	<b>Assessors:</b> receive intelligence reporting, and produce assessments (see 2.5.7(A)).	Receive intelligence reporting, and use to inform policy decisions and actions.

Organization	Core	Mandate/ Responsibilities
<b>Communications Security Establishment</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collects and reports on foreign signals intelligence.</li> <li>Protects information and information infrastructures of importance to the GoC.</li> <li>Assists government departments.</li> </ul>
<b>Canadian Security Intelligence Service</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Collects intelligence and advises on threats to the security of Canada.</li> <li>Takes measures to reduce threats.</li> <li>Collects foreign intelligence within Canada at the request of the Minister of Foreign Affairs or National Defence.</li> <li>Conducts security assessments.</li> </ul>
<b>Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Conducts 'full spectrum' intelligence operations to support military operations and other defence activities.</li> <li>Collates and assesses intelligence.</li> </ul>
<b>Royal Canadian Mounted Police</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Investigates national security offences and organized crime.</li> <li>Enforces federal legislation.</li> <li>Conducts threat assessments</li> </ul>
<b>National Security and Intelligence Advisor (Privy Council Office)</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Provides intelligence assessments (Intelligence Assessment Secretariat)</li> <li>Advises the Prime Minister/Cabinet.</li> <li>Coordinates security and intelligence community.</li> <li>Provides a challenge function for the security and intelligence community.</li> </ul>
<b>Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre</b>	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Analyzes terrorism threats to Canada and Canadian interests.</li> <li>Assesses and recommends the National Terrorism Threat Level.</li> <li>Assesses and sets terrorism threat levels against Canadian interests worldwide, including special events and internationally protected persons.</li> </ul>

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Organization	Core	Mandate/ Responsibilities
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Canada's financial intelligence unit (FIU).</li> <li>• Produces financial intelligence relevant to investigations of money laundering, terrorist activity financing and threats to the security of Canada.</li> <li>• Produces financial intelligence assessments that inform on trends and typologies related to money laundering or terrorist financing activities.</li> <li>• Assists in the detection, prevention and deterrence of money laundering and the financing of terrorist activities.</li> </ul>
Global Affairs Canada	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Manages foreign policy, including international security issues.</li> <li>• Manages emergency response overseas.</li> <li>• Obtains privileged information through personnel posted abroad and provides focused diplomatic reporting on intelligence priorities.</li> <li>• Manages foreign intelligence relationships.</li> <li>• Produces all-source strategic assessments.</li> </ul>
Canada Border Services Agency	✓	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ensures border integrity at ports of entry.</li> <li>• Uses intelligence and other data to make risk-based decisions regarding the admissibility of persons and goods to Canada.</li> </ul>
Canadian Coast Guard		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mission: support government priorities and economic prosperity and contribute to the safety, accessibility and security of Canadian waters.</li> <li>• Ensures safe and accessible waterways for Canadians.</li> <li>• Ensures public safety on the water.</li> <li>• Ensures Canada's sovereignty and security by establishing a strong federal presence in our waters.</li> </ul>
Natural Resources Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Natural Resources Canada develops policies and programs that enhance the contribution of the natural resources sector to the economy, improve the quality of life for all Canadians and conduct innovative science in facilities across Canada to generate ideas and transfer technologies.</li> </ul>
Transport Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Work to make our transportation system safe, secure, efficient, and environmentally responsible.</li> <li>• Ensure green and innovative options are available through regulation and oversight and working with partners across the country and the world.</li> <li>• Assess national security threats to Canadian transportation infrastructure (including air, marine, and rail) in Canada and abroad</li> </ul>
Public Health Agency of Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandate is to promote and protect Canadians' health by preventing and controlling chronic and infectious diseases and injuries as well as preparing for and responding to public health emergencies.</li> </ul>

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Organization	Core	Mandate/ Responsibilities
Public Safety Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mandate is to keep Canadians safe from a range of risks such as natural disasters, crime and terrorism.</li> <li>• Support the Minister's responsibility for all matters related to public safety and emergency management not assigned to another federal organization.</li> <li>• Exercise leadership at the national level for national security and emergency preparedness.</li> <li>• Support the Minister's responsibility for the coordination of entities within the Public Safety Portfolio.</li> </ul>
Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supports science research and the integration of scientific considerations into investment and policy choices.</li> <li>• Works to position Canada as a global centre for innovation where investments support clean and inclusive growth, the middle class prospers through more job opportunities and companies become global leaders.</li> <li>• Focus on improving conditions for investment, supporting science, helping small and medium-sized businesses grow, building capacity for clean and sustainable technologies and processes, increasing Canada's share of global trade, promoting tourism, and building an efficient and competitive marketplace.</li> </ul>
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develops and implements policies, programs and services that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ facilitate the arrival of people and their integration into Canada;</li> <li>○ protect refugees and people in need of protection; and</li> <li>○ enhance the values and promote the rights and responsibilities of Canadian citizenship.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Responsible for the Passport Program; overseeing and managing distribution and use of Canadian travel documents.</li> </ul>
Department of Finance		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Develops and implements economic, fiscal, tax, borrowing, security, and international/ domestic financial sector policies and programs for the GoC.</li> <li>• Prepares federal budget and annual federal financial reports.</li> <li>• Manages federal borrowing on financial markets.</li> <li>• Administers transfers of federal funds to provinces/territories.</li> </ul>
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Supervises federally regulated financial institutions and pension plans, and risk management framework for financial institutions</li> <li>• Makes recommendations to the Minister of Finance regarding new, or changes to existing, federally regulated financial institutions.</li> </ul>



## 2.5.2 Identifying Requirements

### 2.5.2 (A) What are the most important matters of “National Interest”

There are many aspects to preserving Canada's national interest, and in a perfect world, decision makers would have comprehensive intelligence on every issue of national interest. However, given limited time and resources, it is imperative that the IC prioritizes issues of national interest and intelligence questions related to these issues. Therefore, Intelligence Requirements are key to a healthy intelligence cycle.

*Intelligence Requirements are those “policy issues or areas to which intelligence is expected to make a contribution, as well as decisions about which of these issues has priority over the others.”<sup>8</sup>*

In the Canadian Intelligence Community (IC), Canada sets Cabinet-approved Intelligence Priorities via the **Memorandum to Cabinet (MC) on Intelligence Priorities** every two years. These Intelligence Priorities are then operationalized into the **Intelligence Requirements**. Clear communication of national interests and Requirements, from both Cabinet and from the SIRs Requirements ensure intelligence producers can provide the most effective, relevant, and useful products for policymakers.

### 2.5.2 (B) Intelligence Requirements.

The departments and agencies in the IC use the strategic Priorities set in the MC, and for producers, any direction received in the MD, to create the **Intelligence Requirements**. See Part One for an in-depth overview of the Requirements process.

At a high level, Requirements are drafted via consultations and prioritization discussions between intelligence producers and consumers. Subject matter experts, policymakers, and intelligence professionals convene to discuss specific intelligence questions. These intelligence questions are meant to guide intelligence producers in their production to ensure the most relevant intelligence is being delivered to those who need it.

The Requirements are not meant to replace consumer-producer coordination, however. They ensure a whole-of-Government approach is applied to Intelligence Requirements and help guide division of effort and should help guide intelligence producer focus.

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<sup>9</sup> Lowenthal, *Secrets to Policy*, pg. 74.

### 2.5.3 Collection

Once the Priorities are set and the Requirements are identified (see Part 1), intelligence collectors make internal decisions regarding collection activities. This is important because intelligence agencies are not like Google; despite what you see in the movies, they have limited space, time, and funding and cannot collect every piece of information the world has to offer. Intelligence collectors prioritize what information they collect.

***“Requirements will be better met by specific types of collection; some may require the use of several types of collection.”<sup>9</sup>***

Intelligence collection agencies take the Intelligence Requirements and incorporate them into their operational and collection plans. Internal prioritization and collection plans are created to guide the intelligence collector’s activities based on the Requirements, but also on their individual collection resources and legal authorities. Some agencies are better suited to collect on some Priorities or Requirements, and therefore not all Priorities or Requirements may be covered by all intelligence producers.

#### 2.5.3 (A) Adjusting Collection in Response to Priority Changes

Intelligence collection agencies have limited resources, and therefore limited collection capabilities. Intelligence consumers should be aware of this and take this into consideration when providing Requirements to the intelligence community.

When Requirements are added, there is often a need to decrease or even cease collection on other Requirements. If a new Requirement is identified, it may take time before any relevant intelligence can be gathered on the topic. Collectors may be required to invest vast resources to amend their collection plans, change or update systems, or even hire new employees before they can effectively pivot their collection activities to new targets or Requirements.

#### 2.5.3 (B) Canadian Intelligence Agency Collection Overview

Different intelligence collectors collect information in various ways, and collection is often dependent on mandate. Two of Canada’s intelligence collection agencies, for example, collect information as follows:

- The Communications Security Establishment (CSE) is Canada’s foreign signals intelligence agency. They are mandated under the *CSE Act* to collect information, covertly or otherwise, on or through the global information infrastructure while not directing activities at Canadians or persons in Canada. They may also use publicly available information (open source).
- The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is Canada’s security intelligence agency. They collect information necessary for their investigations in various ways, including through:
  - open sources such as newspapers, periodicals, academic journals, foreign and domestic broadcasts, official documents, and other published material;
  - members of the public, human sources, foreign governments, Canadian partners; and
  - technical interception of communications and inquiry (note: investigations that rely on these collection techniques are subject to a rigorous process of accountability and review).<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Lowenthal, *Secrets to Policy*, pg. 74.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.canada.ca/en/security-intelligence-service/corporate/collecting-and-sharing-intelligence.html>





### 2.5.3 (C) Types of Intelligence Collection

Key intelligence collection methods are detailed below.



#### **Signals Intelligence**

CSE defines Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) intelligence based on the **interception, decoding or decryption, and analysis of communications and other electronic signals**. Today, the world of signals intelligence includes interception of electronic communications or emissions, such as telephone calls and text messages, computer and internet communications, satellite signals, and more. SIGINT includes:

- Communications Intelligence, COMINT, is intelligence gained from the interception of communications.
- Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence, FISINT, is intelligence gained from interception of electronic emissions from modern weapons and tracking systems.<sup>11</sup>
- Electronic Signals Intelligence, ELINT, is intelligence derived from the collection of electronic signals from sensors not directly used in "communication", e.g. radar, beacons, etc.



#### **Human Intelligence**

Human intelligence (HUMINT) is defined by NATO as "intelligence derived from information **collected and provided by human sources**." It may involve sending clandestine officers to recruit sources to provide information.<sup>12</sup>



#### **Open Source Intelligence**

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) is defined as intelligence derived from analysis of **information which is available to the public** (including information behind paywalls). OSINT can include media analysis, public data, academic and professional consultations, and much more. Though the information collected may be unclassified and open source, the combination of specific intelligence targets and priorities as well intelligence analyst conclusions from the data may necessitate resulting intelligence products to have a higher classification than the original source data.

<sup>11</sup> Lowenthal, p. 126.

<sup>12</sup> Lowenthal, p. 137.



### **2.5.4 Analysis**

Analysis is a key component of the creation of intelligence products. As mentioned earlier, intelligence is not just information. Intelligence agencies collect a lot of information, but they do not just transfer collection straight to intelligence consumers. Intelligence analysts use their knowledge of regional, national, and global trends to assess the quality of all types of information collected. Information is translated, deemed relevant to Intelligence Priorities and intelligence producer mandates, connected to other information and previous intelligence, and organized into a comprehensive narrative.

While analyzing information that is collected, intelligence agencies often coordinate with consumers to further scope intelligence questions and Requirements based on direction in the Intelligence Priorities MC and the Requirements. Consulting intelligence consumers directly while conducting analysis can help intelligence analysts more directly meet their needs.

### 2.5.5 Reporting and Dissemination

The process of dissemination, or reporting, involves moving intelligence from the producers to the consumers. This process is managed largely by the originating agency of the intelligence, and product types. Reporting should respond to Requirements.

CSE and CSIS intelligence reports are produced by personnel in each organization and provided on a need-to-know basis to specially cleared officials in over 20 government departments and relevant ministers through a highly classified communications network or through Client Relations Officers. Global Affairs Canada obtains privileged information through its personnel posted abroad and distributes its reports through a classified network. For its part, DND/CAF uses its intelligence capabilities to support deployed forces abroad.

There are many types of intelligence reports, for example, short reports with essential information only distributed to a select need-to-know community, long-form strategic reports detailing lengthy collection and analysis operations, or summary reports that condense various other short reports.

#### 2.5.5 (A) Classification and Handling

Intelligence reporting is often classified to protect the classified assets (also known as equities) used to produce it (for example, methods of acquisition, tradecraft, clandestine sources, partnerships, etc.). Without strict adherence to classifications, and the protection Requirements that accompany them, classified intelligence assets can be placed at severe risk. Justice Canada provides the following definitions for classified information and assets<sup>13</sup>:

- **Classified Information:** The security designation applied to GoC information related to the national interest (i.e., concerning the defence and maintenance of the social, political or economic stability of Canada) that may qualify for an exemption or exclusion from disclosure under the *Access to Information Act* or *Privacy Act*. The unauthorized disclosure of Classified Information could reasonably be expected to cause injury to the national interest. Classified information is categorized based on the gravity of injury caused by unauthorized disclosure and is marked accordingly, i.e., Confidential (simple injury), Secret (serious injury) and Top Secret (exceptionally grave injury).
- **Classified Assets:** GoC assets whose compromise could reasonably be expected to cause injury to the national interest.

According to Treasury Board Secretariat policy, intelligence reports must be clearly classified with an appropriate marking in the top right-hand corner. Respecting corporate, security, and classification policies are of the utmost importance when handling intelligence. Consult relevant handling guides for more detail.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/abt-apd/la-man/security-securite/a.html>

### 2.5.6 Consumption

The goal of the intelligence cycle is to put intelligence in hands of consumers. During this phase, policy and decision makers are provided with answers – in whole or in part – to intelligence questions posed in the Requirements. Analysts across the GoC receive intelligence and can use it in various ways to contribute to the strategic goals of keeping Canadians safe and promoting Canadian interests.

#### 2.5.6 (A) Using Intelligence: “Actioning On” Intelligence and Onward Sharing

An important consideration in the consumption of intelligence is what consumers *do* with the intelligence products they receive. For example, analysts and decision makers can receive intelligence that confirms their suspicions and reassures them that they are already taking the right actions that will provide the best results; in this case, the intelligence was useful, but the analysts will not do anything that reveals they ever read the intelligence – they will just carry on with their plans as normal. However, an analyst could receive intelligence that requires immediate action to prevent something bad from happening.

In this latter case, it is important for the analyst to consider any action-on or sharing conditions attached to the intelligence. Intelligence producers have approval processes and specific Requirements for intelligence consumers who wish to take action on or share intelligence information. If taking an action on a piece of intelligence would jeopardize the classified assets of the information, the originating intelligence agency is responsible for assessing risk to the intelligence community that losing that asset would have. Whenever acting on intelligence, it is required for consumers to consult with the originating Canadian intelligence agency responsible for disseminating it – this is often referred to as an “action on” request.

Additionally, sharing intelligence onward to other consumers must be done with caution and in line with appropriate policies and procedures. Intelligence reporting should not be provided without a need to know or without appropriate clearances. Sometimes, intelligence cannot be removed from a specific database, cannot be printed, or cannot even be talked about outside of an appropriately secured facility. To share information with someone who has a lower clearance than the original report indicates (or who is outside of the original distribution limitations of the original report), or to share information over a lower-cleared system, intelligence consumers must consult with the originating Canadian intelligence agency for approval to “sanitize” the intelligence to a lower classification – this is often referred to as a “sanitization” request.

Intelligence consumers must be actively aware of the action on and sharing Requirements of the intelligence they consume. Should any breaches of policy or processes occur, it is important to take appropriate steps to document the incident via appropriate channels to ensure minimal impact on classified assets.



### 2.5.7 Assessment

An assessment usually involves multiple sources of information or intelligence, including media reports, academic research, privileged contacts, metadata, or highly classified information from human sources or intercepted communications. Assessments may be used by policymakers and operational departments as contextual information, to support policy deliberations, or to refine or change operational programs. Assessments may provide statements of likelihood, such as "it is assessed as certain that this will occur" or "it is assessed as unlikely that they will take this course of action." Assessments can also provide deep dives into issues to provide context, again often with indications of likelihood, e.g. "the fact that this transpired was likely due to these factors."

Several organizations write intelligence assessments for the use of a broad range of officials, including senior government officials and ministers.

#### 2.5.7 (A) Assessments vs. Intelligence Reporting and Summaries

Assessments should not be confused with intelligence reporting. Intelligence reports cover specific topics and provide context about events that have occurred. Intelligence does not speculate or estimate likelihood or long-term trends, or overtly display analysis of future outcomes that are not provided in information collected via intelligence assets. Intelligence summaries should also not be confused with assessments. Intelligence summaries are reports, which may reference or combine information from various intelligence reports or sources into a new document.

<i>Intelligence Reporting Example</i>	<i>Intelligence Summary Example</i>	<i>Assessment Example</i>
<p><i>Report 1: German troops were seen making moving preparations, packing munitions and belongings, in trenches at 19:00.</i></p> <p><i>Report 2: German scouts spotted making map notations 0.5 km north of current trench position.</i></p> <p><i>Report 3: Aerial surveillance indicated a small group of German soldiers have set up camp 1 km north of current trench.</i></p> <p><i>Report 4: Trench digging supplies delivered to northern camp.</i></p>	<p><i>Reporting indicates, over the past few weeks, German troops have been observed making moving preparations; including packing munitions and belongings and sending scouts to note trails towards north.</i></p> <p><i>Reporting also indicates trench diggers have arrived 1km north of current camp, and have been supplied with means to enforce a new trench.</i></p>	<p><i>Intelligence indicates German troops are making moving preparations and that reinforcements have arrived with supplies to enforce a new defensive line.</i></p> <p><i>Given current stalemate it is unlikely that enemy will move, as their retreat would allow allied advantage to attack. It is assessed as extremely likely this is a diversion tactic split allied troops towards the new decoy trench, as was done on the Western front in June of last year.</i></p>

### 2.5.8 Feedback

Intelligence is made for consumption, and therefore the success of an intelligence community is determined in the feedback it receives from intelligence consumers. Dialogues between consumers and producers is important to give the intelligence producers a sense of how well they are meeting government Requirements. Consumers should “give continual feedback to their intelligence producers – detailing what has been useful, what has not, which areas need continuing or increased emphasis, which can be reduced, and so on.”<sup>14</sup>

Feedback – both positive and negative – is critical to effective intelligence production. In the Canadian intelligence community there are various ways to provide feedback on intelligence:

- **Directly in reporting databases:** Certain reporting types are delivered via secure dissemination systems to those with relevant clearances and need-to-know. These tools come equipped with in-system feedback forms, which allow consumers to comment directly on the usefulness or value of a report or assessment. Did it meet the intelligence need, did it influence a decision or action, or was it lacking clarity and precision?
- **Via Client Relations Officers (CROs):** Some intelligence organizations provide embedded intelligence client engagement support staff to intelligence consumers. These CROs are often in the offices of senior level officials at high consumption departments. They are great contacts for providing feedback or intelligence gaps to intelligence producers.
- **Via contacts on reporting (operational subject matter experts):** Often intelligence reports will have the contacts for the team who produced the report. If clients have follow on questions or feedback on the report, and the feedback cannot be provided via the dissemination system, one can contact the point of contact listed.
- **Mid-Cycle Update and End-of-Cycle Update:** The Mid-Cycle Update is an update to Cabinet regarding the activities of the intelligence community for the first year after the issuance of an MC. Within the Mid-Cycle Update process, feedback is gathered from intelligence consumers regarding the level of intelligence support, or lack thereof, that they received respective to the Intelligence Requirements within a defined period of time. The End-Cycle-Update is a similar update that is provided to Cabinet when updating the Priorities, within the new Memorandum to Cabinet on Intelligence Priorities.
- **Requirements Review Process:** The Requirements Review process involves direct consultations between producers and consumers. This process is also a great platform to meet with subject matter experts and provide feedback or areas of Requirement directly to intelligence producers.

For more information on providing feedback, see section 1.6.

<sup>14</sup> Lowenthal, p. 86.

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# ANNEX 1: Working Aids



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## INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT PRIORITIZATION AID

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*Input appropriate CLASSIFICATION when complete*

*At the working group level, to add a Requirement, or to increase the Tier of a Requirement on the Intelligence Requirements chart, a copy of this form should be submitted to the Chair of the Intelligence Working Group.*

Requesting Department: Click or tap here to enter text.

### REQUIREMENT DETAILS:

Addition  or Change

Chart: Click or tap here to enter text.

Tier Recommendation: [Choose a Tier.]

Old Tier (if change): [Choose a Tier.]

Requirement Recommendation:

Click or tap here to enter text.

### CONSIDERATIONS:

How is this Requirement reflective of Government of Canada (GoC) Priorities?

Click or tap here to enter text.

Is the Requirement a long-term national interest or short-term?

Long  Short

Could the Requirement be answered outside of intelligence channels? Why or why not?

Click or tap here to enter text.

What Requirement would you downgrade to allow room for this one?

Click or tap here to enter text.

### PRIORITY ASSESSMENT: Below each rating, indicate rationale.

Importance to GoC Strategic Priorities [Choose a Level.]

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

Likelihood to impact to GoC National Interests [Choose a Level.]

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

Need for Sovereign Intelligence [Choose a Level.]

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

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## INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT FEEDBACK AID

*For "Provided Context," "Influenced a Decision," and "Resulted in Action" Feedback*

**UNCLASSIFIED WHEN INCOMPLETE**

*Input appropriate CLASSIFICATION when complete*

*This template should be used to provide feedback related to the Intelligence Requirements for the Mid-Cycle Update to Cabinet, the End-of-Cycle Review or during a Requirements review.*

**Feedback From:** Click or tap here to enter Organization Name.

**Date:** Click or tap here to enter date.

**Context:** Describe what the intelligence need or gap was, why your department required intelligence on the situation/ topic.

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Intelligence Reports/Assessments Received:** Briefly describe (and provide reference where possible) the intelligence or assessments received by your department. Also if possible, include how the information was received (in a system, via a CRO).

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Use:** Describe what was done with the reporting received. Was it briefed to senior executives formally or informally, was their an action-on or sanitization to share, etc.?

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Result:** Describe the outcomes the use facilitated. Did the senior executive change their position, was a threat thwarted, an opportunity seized?

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Value:** Provide insight into how the intelligence itself aided in the result. Could the result have happened without the intelligence? Was it the only evidence, the final piece of the puzzle, etc.?

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

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## INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT FEEDBACK AID

*For "Needs Improvement" Feedback*

**UNCLASSIFIED WHEN INCOMPLETE**

*Input appropriate CLASSIFICATION when complete*

*This template should be used to provide feedback related to the Intelligence Requirements for the Mid-Cycle Update to Cabinet, the End-of-Cycle Review or during a Requirements review.*

**Feedback From:** Click or tap here to enter Organization Name.

**Date:** Click or tap here to enter date.

**Requirement Requested:** Provide reference to the Requirement you feel need improved intelligence, and the associated Tier level of the Requirement .

**Click or tap here to enter rationale.**

**Current Intelligence:** Describe what intelligence, if any, you are currently receiving.

**Click or tap here to enter rationale.**

**Specific Issue with Current Intelligence:** Describe why you feel the intelligence being provided does not meet the Requirement set. Is intelligence detailed and thorough, but not delivered in a timeframe that allows its use? Is the intelligence not focused on the right targets or topics? Is it too detailed?

**Click or tap here to enter rationale.**

**Areas of Improvement:** Provide suggestions for what the intelligence producer can do to better meet the stated Requirement .

**Click or tap here to enter rationale.**

**Consequences of "Needs Improvement" Intelligence:** Describe how having intelligence that needs improvement impacts your department/agency. Are your seniors lacking information to make informed decisions, was a threat mitigation opportunity missed?

**Click or tap here to enter rationale.**

**Impact Improved Intelligence Could Have:** Describe how having improved intelligence on the Requirement could positively impact your department/ agency. If you had perfect intelligence, what would the outcome be?

**Click or tap here to enter rationale.**



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## INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT TRADE-OFF AID

*For Intelligence Trade Offs*

**UNCLASSIFIED WHEN INCOMPLETE**

*Input appropriate CLASSIFICATION when complete*

*This template should be used to provide information regarding an intelligence trade-off related to the Requirements for the Mid-Cycle and End-of-Cycle Updates to Cabinet. One response for each gap should be provided.*

**Feedback From:** Click or tap here to enter Organization Name.

**Date:** Click or tap here to enter date.

**TRADE-OFFS:** Resource decisions made (in the year after the issuance of the MC) which resulted in a decrease in intelligence production and assessment efforts on an Intelligence Requirement or Priority.

**Intelligence Requirements or Priorities affected?**

Click or tap here to enter text.

**Resource Change:** Describe how resourcing was shifted on the Requirement/Priority.

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Impact (both benefits and drawbacks):** Describe what the impact the resourcing decision had on the production of intelligence or assessments.

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Driving factors in this decision:** Describe what the key reasons for the resource shift.

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

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## INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENT FEEDBACK AID

*For Intelligence Gaps*

**UNCLASSIFIED WHEN INCOMPLETE**

*Input appropriate CLASSIFICATION when complete*

*This template should be used to provide information regarding an intelligence trade-off related to the Requirements for the Mid-Cycle and End-of-Cycle Updates to Cabinet. One response for each gap should be provided.*

**Feedback From:** Click or tap here to enter Organization Name.

**Date:** Click or tap here to enter date.

**GAPS:** Issues that have which resulted in decreased production or assessment capabilities on an Intelligence Requirement (outside of resourcing decisions).

**Intelligence Requirements/Priorities affected?**

Click or tap here to enter text.

**Cause:** Describe what happened that led to the gap

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Impact of the gap on you:** Provide information on how the change has impacted intelligence production or assessment at your department.

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Impact on clients:** Provide information on how the gap is impacting your clients

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

**Response:** Describe how your organization has responded to the gap (and any follow on impacts), impediments to resolving the gap, or rationale for how the gap is currently not rectifiable

Click or tap here to enter rationale.

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