

For Public Release

Disinformation – China

- China shows growing sophistication in carrying out online information campaigns to influence audiences in Canada and around the globe.
- Beijing can move quickly to saturate social media platforms with its preferred messaging, but also nimble enough to micro-target its message to Anglophone, Francophone, and Chinese-speaking audiences in Canada.
- US-based social media companies (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube) have helpful measures to identify PRC-based accounts, such as labeling policy.
- However, PRC-based social media companies (WeChat and TikTok) less compliant with industry standards on labeling.
- Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and social media companies curtailing Kremlin-aligned account activity, China is de facto the best resourced power to propagate its influence online.

FRENCH : PRINCIPAUX MESSAGES [ce titre doit être retiré] [maximum de 200 mots au total, y compris l'anglais]

- **Maximum de trois puces brèves et facile à lire en langage simple, en caractères gras, espacement à 1.15 et 6 pt après chaque puce.**
- **Une phrase concise par puce; points de discussion non scénarisés.**
- **Police Arial de taille 16.**

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SUPPLEMENTARY MESSAGES

- China's strategy is to blanket online spaces with its preferred narrative of events or incidents.
 - China uses a combination of real and bot-like accounts (or coordinated inauthentic behavior).
 - User engagement with English/French language information operations from PRC is low.
 - Beijing is more successful in targeting mainland Chinese and diaspora audiences through PRC-based platforms like WeChat and Weibo.
- During GE44, Rapid Response Mechanism Canada (RRM) observed unusual account activity on WeChat that constitutes disinformation, and attempt by various parties to influence votes in ridings.¹
 - RRM was not able to fully attribute this activity to a foreign government, due to the closed nature of the WeChat platform.
 - WeChat maker, Tencent, does not provide disclosures to public on when it discovers or suspects an incident of foreign interference.

UPDATE

- [IOL unclear if there is an update to provide in this section]
- RRM Canada will continue to monitor Canada's information environment for signs of foreign interference online

SUPPORTING FACTS AND FIGURES

- Before drop of the writ, GAC notifies foreign missions in Canada to respect the election period, and withhold views that affect bilateral relations

BACKGROUND

- China has a large network of state-controlled media assets engaged in foreign influence, including:
 - Radio and television entities that broadcast in over 50 languages

¹ This phrasing was used by DM Rob Stewart in June 2022 during a SECU Committee meeting:
<https://www.ourcommons.ca/DocumentViewer/en/44-1/SECU/meeting-27/evidence#Int-11727603>

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- Official diplomatic accounts on Twitter
- State-backed “influencers” on Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube
- Print media entities like the People’s Daily, Xinhua and the China Daily that cater to mainland Chinese and diaspora audiences in Canada
- China is more successful in reaching audiences on platforms like WeChat and Weibo because
 - these companies are HQ’d in China, has more leverage to legislate surveillance and censorship mechanisms
 - the primary spoken language on these platforms is Mandarin, and primary written language is simplified Chinese

ATIP PROTECTED BACKGROUND

[IOL has no information to provide in this section]

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- Lines referring to cabinet discussion " ____ was approved by Cabinet, waiting for Cabinet approval etc."
- Any references to Treasury Board Submissions, Memoranda to Cabinet, etc.
- Communications between Ministers of the Crown (i.e. references to letters between ministers)
- Orders in Council that are under deliberation/development and have yet to be announced formally.
- Specific references to draft legislation/draft regulations that have yet to be formalized.

NOTE: According to ATIP principles, Cabinet Confidences are removed based on principle/the nature of the information and ought to *a/ways* be excluded regardless of sensitivity of injury.

Maximum 1 page when combined with the supporting facts and figures and background, Arial 13 font.