

## For Public Release

Rapid Response Mechanism Canada | Open Data Analysis Report  
 Mécanisme de réponse rapide du Canada | Rapport d'analyse des données

## WeChat account activity targeting Canadian parliamentarian suggests likely foreign state involvement

微信公众号攻击加拿大议员的行动表明可能有外国政府介入

### Summary

#### 内容概要

Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) Canada has detected an information operation on WeChat targeting Michael Chong, Member of Parliament for Wellington-Halton Hills.

加拿大快速应对机制（Rapid Response Mechanism Canada）发现在中国社交媒体平台微信上出现针对加拿大惠灵顿—荷顿山选区国会议员庄文浩（Michael Chong）的资讯操纵行动。

The operation occurred between May 4 and 13, 2023, and coincided with Canada's designation of a Chinese diplomat as *persona non grata* (PNG) and China's subsequent retaliatory designation of a Canadian diplomat as PNG.

该资讯操纵行动发生于2023年5月4日至13日期间，与加拿大将一名中国外交官员列为不受欢迎人物（*Persona non grata*），而中国随后作出报复性反制措施，将一名加拿大外交官亦列为 PNG 的时间吻合。

The network involved in this information operation amplified a large volume of false or misleading narratives about Mr. Chong. Most of the activity centred on spreading false narratives about his identity, including commentary and claims about his background, political stances and family heritage. It is the assessment of Global Affairs Canada that nothing observed represents a threat to the safety of Mr. Chong or his family.

此资讯操纵行动散佈了大量关于庄文浩先生的虚假或误导性陈述。大部分虚假陈述集中于庄先生的身份，包括他的背景、政治立场和家族传承等的评论和主张。加拿大全球事务部评估，目前所观察到的资讯并无迹象显示会对庄先生或其家人的安全构成威胁。

Following an analysis of the network and the operation, Global Affairs Canada has a high level of confidence that China played a role in the information operation. Several indicators of foreign information manipulation and interference suggest this, including but not limited to:<sup>1</sup>

- coordinated content and timing
- highly suspicious and abnormal shifts in volume and scope of engagement
- the concealment of state involvement

加拿大全球事务部分析了此操纵行动及其网络，高度确信中华人民共和国参与了这次的资讯操纵行动。多项外国资讯操纵与干扰（*Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference*）的指标显示

<sup>1</sup> "Foreign information manipulation and interference" refers to the activity or behaviour of a foreign entity intentionally manipulating the information environment to increase or decrease the reach of a given narrative. For more information, visit [Tackling Disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference](#).

## For Public Release

Rapid Response Mechanism Canada | Open Data Analysis Report  
 Mécanisme de réponse rapide du Canada | Rapport d'analyse des données

了这一点。这些指标包含但不限于：<sup>2</sup>（1）协调的内容和时间；（2）高度可疑的参与数量、范围，以及其异常变化；（3）隐瞒国家参与的行为。

One third of the network included known state-media outlets and accounts that are likely linked to the Chinese state apparatus but whose linkages may be opaque. Two thirds of the accounts were anonymous and had not previously published any news stories on Canadian politics. Moreover, these accounts published or interacted with content at similar times and dates, increasing the likelihood WeChat users would see the false narratives by creating an increased volume on this topic.

三分之一涉及操纵行动的网络为已知的中国官方媒体，以及可能与中国国家机构有联系的账户，但其联系并不透明。其余三分之二的账号为匿名用户，这些账号此前从未发布过任何关于加拿大政治的新闻报道，然而却在相近的日期和时间发布或互动有关庄文浩先生的内容——透过在此话题上增加互动率与流量，加剧了微信用户看到虚假陈述的可能。

The false narratives about Mr. Chong likely violated WeChat's user code of conduct on false information and coordinated inauthentic behaviour; however, RRM Canada found no indication WeChat attempted to apply its own content moderation standards.

关于庄先生的虚假陈述可能违反了微信虚假信息和协同性造假行为（Coordinated Inauthentic Behaviour）的公众号使用规范。但是，RRM Canada并未发现任何迹象显示微信曾对有关庄先生的虚假陈述进行内容审核。

It is difficult to provide the exact number of users who viewed or engaged with the content through liking, sharing and commenting. WeChat has over 1.3 billion monthly active users, and at least 100 million of those users are located outside China. WeChat has not revealed how many of its users reside in Canada, but some marketing firms put the number at over 1 million. RRM Canada estimates that between 2 and 5 million WeChat users viewed this content globally. Implications.

关于有多少用户通过点赞、分享和评论等方式浏览或参与了内容的互动，RRM Canada无法提供确实的数字。微信每个月的活跃用户（Active users）超过 13 亿，当中至少有 1 亿用户并不位于中国。微信没有透露过有多少用户居住于加拿大，但一些营销公司认为这一数字超过了 100 万。据 RRM Canada 估计，全球约有 200 万至 500 万微信用户浏览了这些内容。

## Implications

### 影响

Foreign information manipulation and interference undermines Canada's democracy and the ability of Canadians to exercise their rights and freedoms free from intimidation. It could discourage members of Parliament from carrying out their duties and speaking out on important issues, and it negatively impacts diaspora communities living in Canada.

<sup>2</sup> 外国资讯操弄与干扰（Foreign information and manipulation and interference, FIMI）指的是外国机构故意操纵信息环境以扩大或压抑特定叙述触及率的活动或行为。详情请参考European External Action Service, "Tackling Disinformation, Foreign Information Manipulation & Interference".

## For Public Release

**Rapid Response Mechanism Canada | Open Data Analysis Report**  
**Mécanisme de réponse rapide du Canada | Rapport d'analyse des données**

外国资讯操弄与干扰破坏了加拿大的民主制度，削弱了加拿大人在不受威吓下行使的权利和自由。亦可能会阻碍国会议员履行职责和就重要问题发表意见，并对生活在加拿大的移民社区（Diaspora Communities）造成负面影响。

**Methodology****研究方法**

Located at Global Affairs Canada, RRM Canada leads the G7 RRM on an ongoing basis, supports Canada's international engagement to counter foreign state-sponsored disinformation and monitors the digital information environment, looking for indications of foreign information manipulation and interference.<sup>3</sup> Its responsibilities include acting as an early warning system for the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force during general election cycles and by-elections.<sup>4</sup>

设于加拿大全球事务部（Global Affairs Canada）中的RRM Canada，持续领导七国集团（G7）RRM的工作，支持加拿大在国际上参与打击外国支持的虚假信息，并监测数码信息环境，找寻外国资讯操弄与干扰的迹象<sup>5</sup>。此职责包括在大选和补选期间，充当Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force的预警系统<sup>6</sup>。

RRM Canada takes an evidence-based approach in its monitoring and collection work. Its open-source data analytics are based on both primary open-source data and secondary sources to identify emerging trends and tactics related to foreign information manipulation and interference in democratic processes and institutions. RRM Canada's work is subject to an ethical and methodological framework, publicly available on the Internet,<sup>7</sup> which outlines how its methods respect and reinforce human rights and freedoms. This includes the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and equality. The framework anchors the team's analytical activities in an existing policy, legal and regulatory context and is intended to provide transparency and accountability to Canadians.

RRM Canada在其监测和数据搜集的工作中采取循证实践、以数据为依据的方法（Evidence-based approach）。其开源情报的数据分析以开源情报数据以及二手资料为基础，辨识外国资讯操弄与干扰民主制度和进程的相关策略和趋势。RRM Canada的工作受道德与研究方法框架规范，详情可在互联网细看。该框架概述了其数据搜集及研究方法是如何在尊重和巩固人权与自由的前提下进行，包括隐私权、言论自由和平等的权利。该框架为RRM Canada研究分析的核心，旨在现有的政策、法律和监管规条下，为加拿大人提供透明度和问责制。

**Next steps****下一步**

<sup>3</sup> For more information, consult Global Affairs Canada's [Rapid Response Mechanism Canada](#)

<sup>4</sup> For more information, consult the Government of Canada's [Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force](#)

<sup>5</sup> 详情请参考加拿大全球事务部网站，[Rapid Response Mechanism Canada](#)。

<sup>6</sup> 详情请参考加拿大政府官网，[Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force](#)。

<sup>7</sup> See [Global Affairs Canada's Ethical and methodological framework for open source data monitoring and analysis](#)

<sup>8</sup> 加拿大全球事务部，["Ethical and methodological framework for Open source data monitoring and analysis"](#)。

## For Public Release

Rapid Response Mechanism Canada | Open Data Analysis Report  
Mécanisme de réponse rapide du Canada | Rapport d'analyse des données

The Government of Canada will continue to monitor the digital information environment for foreign information manipulation and respond when necessary and appropriate, including through public disclosure.

加拿大政府将继续监测数码信息环境内的外国资讯操纵行为，并在必要和适当时做出回应，包括向公众披露等行动。

The Government of Canada will continue to be observant of any and all recommendations made by the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs in the course of their ongoing reviews of foreign interference in the 44th and 45th Canadian federal general elections.

加拿大政府将持续关注国家安全与情报审查局（National Security and Intelligence Review Agency）、国家安全与情报议员委员会（The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians）以及国会程序与国会事务委员会（Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs）针对外国干涉第 44 届、第 45 届加拿大联邦大选之持续审查中提出的建议。

The Government of Canada has established numerous mechanisms for Canadians to report suspected foreign interference. Further details are available on Public Safety Canada's website.<sup>9</sup>

加拿大政府建立了众多机制，供加拿大人报告可疑的外国干预，更多详情请浏览加拿大公共安全部的网站<sup>10</sup>。

---

<sup>9</sup>See Public Safety Canada's [How to report foreign interference](#)

<sup>10</sup>加拿大公共安全部，Public Safety Canada，[“How to report foreign interference.”](#)