

SECRET

TAB C

CATEGORY 1 RECOMMENDATIONS: EARLY ACTIONS (0-6 months timeframe)

ACTION	NEXT STEPS	TIME LINE	RELEVANT RECOMMENDATION(S)	COMMENTS
1. Resume Panel meetings, with the first one to be held in April 2023 to ensure a baseline understanding among members of their mandate, their roles and of the threat environment.	Work with SITE agencies to provide regular updates to the Panel	March 2023	<p>(6) It is recommended that the Government consider options to ensure that the Panel is well-prepared in advance, and as much as possible, continuity of members is maintained between elections.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Briefings of new Panel members should begin immediately after they assume their positions.</i> - <i>Former Panel members, after changing positions, can attend Panel meetings as observers.</i> - <i>Panel members taking on new roles close to election can remain full Panel members.</i> - <i>Membership of the Panel should be described as a core responsibility of their positions.</i> <p>(7) Briefings of the Panel should begin much earlier in the mandate and include non-government actors with expertise on interference and disinformation.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Briefings should include information on interference efforts in elections in other democratic states.</i> <p><i>Provide time for the Panel to be briefed by non-government actors, including civil society organizations, academic researchers and social media platforms.</i></p>	Lead: PCO-DI and S&I
	Resume Panel meetings by holding a meeting on Panel members' roles and responsibilities and to provide an update on the threat environment	April 2023		
	Second Panel meeting to discuss the updated public communications approach and longer-term recommendations related to the changes to the Protocol	July/ Aug. 2023		
	Third Panel meeting (Topic TBD - could include a presentation of interference and disinformation NGOs and academics)	Sept./ Oct. 2023		

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2. Provide unclassified briefings to Parliamentarians, political parties and senators, with a first set of briefings to begin in September 2023	Engage with the Library of Parliament, the Government House Leader and the Government Representative in the Senate	March 2023	<p>(14) The national security agencies should develop a program of unclassified briefings to increase the awareness of Members of Parliament and Senators on foreign interference and on election interference and on measures they can take to safeguard themselves and their online information.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Some political parties would like more assistance from NSAs to identify whether there are foreign states supporting potential candidates for Parliament who are promoting their interests.</i> <p>This would further respond to National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians' recommendation to brief MPs and senators upon being sworn in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada, as found in their 2018 special report on the Prime Minister's trip to India in February 2018 and in their 2019 annual report.</p>	<p>Lead: PCO-S&I Support from PCO-DI</p> <p>Will require engaging with the Library of Parliament, the Government House Leader and the Government Representative in the Senate in order to review existing MPs' and Senators' onboarding, briefing and training structures to integrate information by NSAs on interference and cyberthreats.</p>
	Develop material for series of unclassified trainings to MPs and Senator	March to Sept 2023		
	Contact all MPs and all Senators – support from DI	Aug. 2023		
	Provide the first set of briefings to MPs and Senators	Sept. 2023		

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3. Update and enhance the communication s strategy around Government efforts to protect democratic institutions, the Protocol and the Panel	Engagement between PCO-DI and PCO-Comms	Feb. 2023 - ongoing	(1) Public communication about the Protocol should provide a clear explanation for the inclusion of domestic actors (<i>i.e., the increased focus on domestic actors in 2021 vs 2019</i>) and of the types of activities that are of concern.	Lead: PCO-DI and Communications with support from PCO-S&I
	Release of public report of CEIPP independent assessment	March 2023 TBC	(4) There should be an announcement, within a year of the previous election, about the Government's plan to safeguard the integrity of Canada's elections, including an explanation of the reason for the Protocol.	A second meeting of the Panel (summer 2023) could be an opportunity to discuss the communications approach.
	Development of updated communications package	March to July/ Aug. 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Communications announcement ahead of elections and early in government mandate to explain threats to democratic institutions and measures to counter them, including the CEIPP and Panel.</i> 	
	Presentation of updated communications package with Panel members during second meeting	July/ Aug. 2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Communication when election is called to remind Canadians of measures and to explain the CEIPP is operational throughout the caretaker period.</i> <p>(5) The Government's plan and public communications should acknowledge that the problem of interference occurs both before the election is called and during the caretaker period. It should be clearer on how and by whom pre-election interference will be addressed, beyond saying that it will be handled through normal ministerial channels.</p> <p>(16) Public communications on the Protocol should emphasize the full range of activities that occur during the caretaker period, rather than being focused on the announcement by the Panel.</p>	