Elections Canada

Social Media Monitoring Report for the 44th General Election

elections.ca

Table of Contents

1. Context of the 44th General Election

1.1. The Social Media Monitoring Team

The Social Media Monitoring Team was formed in 2020 drawing on lessons from the pioneering Social Media Monitoring Unit of GE43. The team falls under the umbrella of Media Relations and Environmental Monitoring, working especially closely with the Social Media Team that is responsible for Elections Canada's official accounts. The delineation of responsibilities is as follows: Media Relations focuses on traditional media interactions, the Social Media Team deals with EC's official accounts and the associated comments and questions, and the Social Media Monitoring Team monitors the external social media environment. There is close cooperation between all three teams, including staff members who have hybrid responsibilities and coordinate information sharing and problem-solving. During the 44th general election, Social Media Monitoring Team members were responsible for observing the totality of articles, comments, posts, and videos with potential operational value to Elections Canada.

The two main functions of the team are monitoring and reporting, with monitors using social media monitoring tools and keyword searches to capture relevant content, then collating that content for later reporting. When the team detects a post with an element of risk, monitors contact analysts on the team to determine the risk level and flag the issue to relevant client(s) across the agency. Examples include flagging an incorrect election date in an article on a news website to Media Relations for correction, or flagging a video discussing a future protest at a specific polling station to Voting Operations and Corporate Security. Analysts also conduct monitoring alongside the monitors, flagging issues in real time according to an established procedure, and write daily social media monitoring reports during a GE, which are distributed across the agency.

1.2. Environmental Background: 2020 US presidential election

One of the most important factors that influenced the online discourse ahead of and during GE44 was the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Early in the presidential campaign, a candidate and influential media figures started to question the integrity of the vote by mail option, with support and opposition for vote by mail mostly splitting along partisan lines, a trend that was not as distinct in Canada. The narrative took hold in the U.S. and made its way into the Canadian information ecosystem quickly. As early as August 2020, vote by mail became a leading topic in the environment and continued to be throughout GE44. Vote by mail was an issue in the provincial elections that took place between the U.S. and Canadian federal elections, with users being quick to use U.S. presidential election narratives to question the integrity of vote by mail.

Similarly, following the results of the U.S. presidential election, allegations of the use of voting machines by Dominion Voting System (DVS) to manipulate election results also made their way into Canada. DVS was the leading election-related topic of discussion on social media in Canada for months starting in October 2020. Posts and comments about DVS are

still in the environment following the GE44, fuelled by speculation from American commenters who assumed Canadian federal elections used similar methods of counting ballots as the U.S. does.

Finally, the 2020 U.S. presidential election was, in the eyes of many users, a prominent example of 'election rigging.' Before and during the Canadian election, several users would claim that GE44 would be rigged "like in the U.S." or that the leader of the LPC was acting "like the Democrats" to win.

1.3.   The COVID-19 pandemic and provincial elections

Canadian electors went through a year and a half of the COVID-19 pandemic, and witnessed elections around the world in that context, prior to GE44. Provincial elections offered a wide range of examples of what a pandemic election could look like, and the challenges that would come with having to deliver such an election. The Newfoundland and Labrador election, for example, turned a marginal narrative mainstream: the theory that the pandemic was controlled or used as an excuse to commit electoral fraud. The main argument of that theory was that vote by mail was less secure, and that voting in person would be discouraged, limited, or cancelled in order to have to opportunity to change mail in ballots or forge enough mail in ballots to secure a victory. Many commentators expressed that provincial elections were 'trial runs' for election fraud in GE44. Elections that took place without major issues, like the New Brunswick provincial election, provided an example of a 'safe and successful' pandemic election for users opposed to the incumbent government to argue in favour of a snap election, arguing that it would also be possible on a federal scale.

It is essential to note that the COVID-19 pandemic was the most important factor that influenced the leading narratives during GE44 including: mask mandates, rumors of vaccine mandates, unvaccinated poll workers, safety of voting in person, and the decreased number of polling stations.

1.4.   Work from home

The pandemic also forced the Social Media Monitoring team to be mainly working from home both during and outside GE44. Although this represented a challenge at first, the team used the opportunity to rethink its way to organize tasks and its overall workflow. The pandemic led to EC acquiring Microsoft Teams which, as described further in the report, became a major contributor to the efficiency of the team. Although team building was more difficult in a remote work environment, the team developed a strong sense of unity and care for the work of the unit. Being pushed to use tools like Teams greatly improved our organisation and division of labour.

1.5. Timeline of leading topics

Table 3 – Timeline of leading topics		
Days *	Event	Number of collated posts
Day 39	Articles predicting election to be called by the PM on August 15	161
Day 36	GE44 officially called	69
Day 33	CEO's press conference	153
Day 28	MP Freeland releases edited Twitter video of opposition leader	82
Day 26	Reactions to the lack of Vote on Campus option	130
Day 21	Concerns over rumors of vaccination requirement to vote	155
Day 15	Leader's debate	62
Day 10	Advanced polls	229
Day 6	End of advanced polls	121
Day 5	Alberta public health emergency	143
Day 3	U.S. politicians' support tweets	131
Day 2	Concerns electors with COVID-19 will not be able to vote	163
Day 0	Election day	382
Day -1	Election results published	204

1.6. News and additional languages

In GE44 the monitoring team was able to build on previous experience to create a more robust and systematic process for monitoring additional language content, in particular news articles and associated content.

In terms of monitoring Sinophone [Chinese language] content, 158 active Canadian news WeChat subscription accounts were monitored by three monitors during GE44 along with a number of other platforms, keyword searches, and a Chinese language query in Meltwater. The team detected one candidate's banner ad despite the absence of a WeChat ad registry, as well as a number of news articles in subscription accounts likely paid for by candidates. The majority of Sinophone content was found on WeChat or from traditional Chinese language print and online Canadian news outlets, though Twitter, YouTube, Facebook, and Chinese language blogs also contained significant collatable content.

Relevant Articles Updates were a key method of identifying salient articles and keeping track of the shifting nature of social media conversations, as well as to issue flags on article content that would impact electoral integrity. The team built on the ElectoFlash, collecting additional articles in multiple languages, collating relevant comments, tracking and reporting engagement, and flagging relevant issues. From August 12 to September 23, the team reported on 1447 online articles, following up with each article's comments on the relevant websites as well as on social media using the software Crowdtangle. The average article had 2416 engagement, though 135 articles had 0 engagement at the time of collection. The majority of articles in other languages were centered around the election call and the results.

Articles concerning Elections Canada during the 44th General Election	
Highest volume days	**Number of articles collected**
September 20	66
September 10	61
September 16 & 21	56
Additional Languages	**Number of articles collected**
Chinese	184
Russian	101
Korean	27
Punjabi	19
Ukrainian	10

Arabic	8
Hindi	8
Portuguese	4
Bulgarian	3
Japanese	2

1.7 Main topics

The Social Media Monitoring Team observed a wide variety of topics and narratives throughout GE44, many of which were heavily influenced by environmental factors detailed above, primarily the U.S. 2020 presidential election and COVID-19. From the American election, the team observed a very strong and persistent narrative alleging that GE44 would be "rigged," both in the months leading up to the event and during, which produced the theory that voting in person would be the only way to prevent electoral fraud. Anything that could possibly affect in-person voting became the subject of allegations, including claims of mail-in ballot fraud, and that EC would conspire to end in-person voting due to poll worker shortages or that lockdowns would be announced to justify the closing of polls. Insistence on the use of pens and against the use of machine voting/counting were also popular. When a party that did not have candidates registered in all EDs discovered they would not have representation on every ballot, the party leader posted to Twitter alleging it was "rigged," leading others to encourage electors to write-in names on the ballot to "vote federally."

COVID-19 contributed to the main topics observed, predominantly through reactions to mask and vaccine policies. When EC's mask policy was announced, many social media users alleged that it went against the constitution, and encouraged those not wearing masks to film themselves and call the police if denied entry to a polling location. Similarly, a screenshot of a text message alleging that voters would be required to show proof of vaccination to vote in person after September 13th was shared widely across social media platforms. After the deadline passed to vote by mail or special ballot, the team also observed many reactions to the news that those told to isolate under COVID-19 measures would not be able to vote. This led to social media users suggesting different methods EC could consider in order to allow COVID-affected individuals to vote, including introducing drive-in or curbside voting, extending advance polling days, and online voting.

Lastly, accessibility was a leading topic throughout the election, beginning with the announcement that there would be no vote on campus initiative. The team also observed many complaints from voters over the distance to their polling location, public transportation available to them, physical accessibility issues at the polling locations, and long lines outside polling locations. Many of these topics were amplified by candidates on social media.

2.   43rd and 44th General Elections compared

2.1. Collected content

Among the raw data the team reviewed from monitoring tools and keyword research, items of operational significance were collated in order to provide data and material for reports. The volume of collated content increased significantly from GE43 to GE44. On average, over the same period of time covering day 39 to day -3 (August 12 to September 23), the number of posts added to our data sheet increased almost threefold. Note that the reporting period for this report is the writ period with a three-day window before and after to capture the lead-up to the election announcement and winding down of engagement after election day, a total of 42 days of data for both GE43 and GE44.

Table 1 — Average number of posts collated daily over the same period			
General election	Avg. number of posts collated per day (excluding Day 0)	Avg. number of posts collated per day (including Day 0)	Increase
GE43	39.81	42.33	6,33%
GE44	108.31	114.67	5,87%

In terms of total collated content, we end up with a similar conclusion. The total of collated content during the reporting period also increased almost three times compared to GE43.

Table 2 — Total number of posts collated during GE43 & GE44		
General election	Total number of collated posts	Total number of collated posts (writ period only)
GE43	1,820	1,642
GE44	4,931	4,313

Many elements can explain this kind of increase. First off, human resources have increased, from 15 monitors to 22. However, that alone cannot explain an increase of 270%. The leading factor for this increase was the difference in technology used to monitor the environment. Our main monitoring tool, Meltwater, offered very good coverage of a handful of platforms, but more importantly, an easy way to modify queries to adapt, follow trends and avoid noise. The tool made it very easy to divide tasks among monitors, extract data, identify trends, exclude noise, and easily obtain key data such as averages. Following GE43 conclusions that our Facebook coverage was too low, the team started using Facebook's

CrowdTangle Chrome extension to find reactions to news articles from all outlets. This increased Facebook's coverage more than 5 times from GE43 to GE44 and captured the discussion found under news outlets and public group pages. Identifying a way to capture this part of the environment was a key recommendation from the GE43 takeaways and was fulfilled in GE44. This increase in collated content can also be attributed to the use of Microsoft Teams' Tasks function. The tool helped divide the labour division while also keeping track of what was in progress, completed, or had to be done and by whom. Since the vast majority of the monitors used the tool properly, we were able to keep track of the work to do while easily modifying the resources required to accomplish tasks thoroughly and avoiding work duplication.

2.2.   Raw data

Meltwater, although a more convenient and powerful tool than he one used in GE43, produced an immense quantity of content to monitor. On average, 7.45% of posts caught in our main query were collated daily during GE44. This represents a decrease in the accuracy of the results provided by our tool, as the average was 10.82% in GE43. However, as we have established earlier, the raw number of collated posts has increased significantly over the two elections. Indeed, on average, Meltwater was providing the team with around 1900 posts to monitor daily during GE44 compared to close to 800 during GE43. Therefore, we observed an increase of 250% of content found by our tool which led to a 270% increase of collated content.

The data shows that the number of retweets in the main query of GE43, using the KI Social tool, was higher than the number of retweets in GE44 using the Meltwater tool (see table 3). In GE43, retweets represented close to 81% of all the content identified by the monitoring tool. In comparison, with Meltwater in GE44, that number falls to 51%. There are two potential explanations for this. It is possible that GE44 saw more users directly taking part in the discussion and sharing more original content instead of simply retweeting or sharing, as well as using a larger variety of platforms. Also, several users that were driving astroturfing attempts (individuals or bots spamming engagement and content to make it trend) or posting salient content in GE43 were either banned or migrated to other platforms between the two GEs. One proof of that is the lack of Twitter "hashtag wars" between different political parties' supporters during GE44. Additionally, Meltwater's capacity for monitoring is wider and more accurate. For example, Meltwater captures not only Twitter but also blogs, forums, 4Chan, and Reddit posts, which do not include any "retweet" or "share" features. Therefore, a more accurate query and tool paired with a wider diversity of platforms could explain this difference.

The challenge that came with this kind of increase in content is related to human resources. This methodology requires more staff to go through the larger amount of posts but also extensive training to be able to read the content quickly and identify valuable entries, while ignoring irrelevant noise.

Table 3 — Number of posts identified by the monitoring tools in GE43 & GE44 (Day 39 to -1)		
General election	**Total number of unique posts identified (no retweets)**	**Total number of posts identified (including retweets)**
GE43	31,884	165,329
GE44	77,978	157,761

2.3. Trends in volumes and platforms

In theory, the number of platforms we monitored during this election could be counted in thousands since Meltwater monitors public blogs and forums on the internet. In reality, 42 platforms were actively monitored in 14 languages during GE44 and we collated at least one post from 46 different platforms. This is a massive increase from GE43 where posts from 10 different platforms were collated. This can be partly explained by the team's new tools and methodology as described earlier in this report. However, one element to consider to explain this increase is the new platforms that appeared since GE43 paired with 'deplatforming'. This phenomenon happens when accounts on a major platform are banned or removed, which was a significant trend following greater scrutiny of misinformation and hate speech on Facebook and Twitter in 2020. Deplatforming can also apply to entire communities within a platform, for example a subreddit. The consequence of this is that a part of the social media userbase will look for a new forum to express ideas that are considered too extreme for mainstream platforms. In response to deplatforming, some new platforms gained prominence and people joined clones of Twitter, Reddit, or Facebook as alternatives after they had been banned or felt their freedom of speech was being restricted. These echo chambers of like-minded individuals were significantly more popular than in GE43 and were described as niche platforms by the monitoring team. Some of these platforms include Gab (Twitter), OmegaCanada (Reddit), BitChute (YouTube) and MeWe (Facebook)

Table 4 — Ten most collated platforms and proportion of total collation						
Position	**GE43 platform**	**GE43 platform**	**GE43 proportion**	**GE44 platform**	**GE44 total**	**GE44 proportion**
1	Twitter	1,596	69.88%	Twitter	3,384	68.7%
2	Facebook	377	16.51%	Facebook	577	11.71%
3	Reddit	187	8.19%	Reddit	325	6.6%
4	Instagram	56	2.45%	Instagram	193	3.92%
5	YouTube	30	1.31%	Gab	113	2.29%
6	Tumblr	17	0.74%	YouTube	108	2.19%
7	LinkedIn	13	0.6%	TikTok	66	1.34%

8	4chan	4	0.18%	4chan	20	0.41%
9	Gab	1	0.04%	LinkedIn/Free Canada.win	17	0.35%
10	VK	1	0.04%	CBC's website	16	0.32%

As table 4 shows, the mainstream platforms are still the most collated, with the same 4 platforms leading. However, GE44 saw a newcomer: Gab. Gab, while already present during GE43, is a Facebook/Twitter clone that gained popularity following deplatforming. The platform has several groups focused specifically on Canadian affairs, the largest with 42,000 members. Two other fringe social media platforms made the top 10: 4chan and FreeCanada.win. It is hard to explain the increase in interest for 4chan as the platform is old and well-established. One factor might be the inclusion of daily GE44 discussion threads launched by a user throughout the entire election period. However, it is obvious that FreeCanada.win's place in the top 10 is explained by two major Canadian subreddits being banned from Reddit between GE43 and GE44. A part of the community went on to create FreeCanada.win, a very active community. This could explain how Reddit's increase in content from GE43 to GE44 is not as large as that of most other platforms. Most of the content that was identified on Reddit during GE43 was on the subreddits that have since been banned. Therefore, all the content the team identified during GE44 were from mainstream subreddits where very little problematic content is shared.

One additional consideration is the comments section of news websites. In GE43, only news articles appearing in the ElectoFlash made it to the Most Shared Articles report, and there was no explicit direction to collate comments on the websites themselves. In GE44, all news articles of relevance were reported and comments sections were skimmed, leading to a rise in collated content from the news pages themselves. Volumes might have been even higher, but CBC was experimenting with closing comments sections on their website and on their social media posts including Facebook and YouTube in GE44.

2.4.   Data on topics and narratives

Position	Topic	Number of posts	Proportion	Occurrence in GE43
1	Mail-in ballots	1,774	14.32%	Rare
2	GE44 will be rigged	1,389	11.21%	Common
3	Dominion Voting System/Machine voting	781	6.30%	Rare
4	EC is corrupt	709	5.72%	Common
5	Issues with accessibility to vote	663	5.32%	Common
6	Holding an election during a pandemic was a bad idea	604	4.87%	N/A

Table 5 – Ten most popular topics/narratives of GE44

7	Ways to vote*	522	4.21%	Common
8	Issues with lineups	489	3.95%	Common
9	Neutral conversation about GE44**	473	3.82%	Common
10	EC's mandate***	370	2.99%	Common

*Users suggesting others different ways to vote, either accurate or inaccurate
**Users discussing accurate and neutral facts or opinions about the electoral process
***Users questioning EC's actions, decisions and mandate

The team divided the online discourse into 74 key narratives that were individually counted for during the writ period exclusively (August 15 to September 20). Although the methodology was imperfect because of how new narratives would arise and vary over time, grouping posts under narratives still provides us with a good idea of the order of magnitude of different narratives. The team went through each collation sheet and matched posts and comments to distinct narratives. Many comments or posts contributed to more than one narrative, for example claiming that vote by mail was unsafe and would lead to GE44 being rigged.

Comparing narratives and topics data from GE43 and GE44 is challenging. In a minority government and therefore with monitors hired early as part of readiness preparation, the Centre managed to set up and implement a topic counting methodology that was not available at the time of GE43. This labor-intensive methodology would not have been possible following GE43 and has been made possible this time because of the help provided by co-op students, monitors, and social media agents.

2.5.   Emerging topics and narratives

Vote by mail was by far the biggest topic of discussion this election, with a total of 1,774 posts and comments mentioning the issue both positively and negatively. As a comparison, in GE43 from day 36 to day 0, a total of 1642 posts were collated. During GE43, the expressions "mail-in ballots" and "vote by mail" were identified respectively 4 and 7 times during the whole writ period. The use of Dominion Voting System or machine counting represented 12 posts or comment during GE43 compared to 783 in GE44. These two narratives are directly linked to the influence of the U.S. presidential election on Canadian public discourse. Accessibility issues including physical access to polling stations, Indigenous voting, and line ups were major topics in both elections. We observed over 14 times more accessibility posts (from 79 to 1152), likely because of the pandemic, reduced polling stations, and electors with COVID-19 not being able to vote in person. Pandemic-related topics like the use of masks to vote in person, vaccine mandate, lack of staff due to the pandemic, or claiming the election and polling stations were safe or dangerous did not appear during GE43. Other new narratives included the perceived option to "vote federally" for a party by writing the leader's name on the ballot with 88 posts and comments.

2.6. Diminishing topics and narratives

Some of the key topics of GE43 became minor ones during GE44. In GE43, non-citizen voter discussions made it to 87.5% of social media reports but never appeared in a GE44 report and represented only 0.44% of all collated content. Mentions of non-state actors like George Soros and Greta Thunberg influencing our election also went down from GE43 to GE44. We estimate the number of mentions of Soros and Thunberg influencing GE43 to be respectively over 50 and over 60. During GE44, George Soros was mentioned 14 times (0.11%) while Greta Thunberg was never mentioned, and there were far fewer posts about foreign interference by individuals in general. Several other topics like controversial lawn signs, religious accommodations for voting, and natural disasters were not part of the discussion during GE44. Finally, the famous GE43 story of ballots being "smudged" decreased in popularity in GE44 with 69 mentions compared to GE43's 90.

2.7. Comparable topics and narratives

Several topics and narratives were consistent in both elections. Accusation of foreign interference from former US president Barack Obama created similar levels of mentions, with 172 in GE44 to close to 200 during GE43. In both cases, the former President tweeted his support days before E-day. It is possible it created a bit less noise in 2021 because it was already known that it was not considered foreign interference by the CCE. Claims of deceased voters casting ballots was close in terms of scale, with 38 mentions during GE43 and 74 in GE44. Dead-naming of electors on VICs was consistent across both elections. Finally, although no data is available from GE43 on these issues, it is mentioned in the post-mortem report that perception of EC as partisan or corrupt, allegations of electoral fraud, and discussion on how and where to vote were major topics in both elections.

Table 6 – Change in key topics and narratives with available data from GE43 to GE44			
Topic	GE43 (posts & comments)	GE44 (posts & comments)	Ratio from GE43 to GE44
Mail-in ballots	11	1,774	1 : 161
DVS/Machine voting	12	781	1 : 65
Non-citizen voters	87.5	0	N/A
Soros influence	Approx 50	14	3.6 : 1
Thunberg influence	Approx 60	0	N/A
Ballot smudging story	90	69	1.3 : 1
Accessibility + line ups	79	1152	1 : 14.6
Obama influence	Approx 200	172	1 : 1
Deceased voters	38	74	1 : 1.95

3. Staffing model analysis

3.1. Structure of the team

Over the course of 2021, the monitoring team grew from one analyst and two monitors, to a team of just over 20 individuals, including some rapidly recruited and trained to address unprecedented volumes of content. Initially, the team was delineated into analysts and monitors, however as analysts took on more supervisory duties and monitors gained experience and began assisting in training and analysis, the team evolved into a structure with a lead analyst, 2 analysts (one of whom was shared with Media Relations), 3 senior monitors, and 20 monitors. This increased complexity was necessary in order to effectively delegate tasks, respond to increased content volumes and the switch to working in shifts during the GE, leverage the skills of experienced team members, and successfully integrate new employees in rapid fashion with adequate training and oversight. A key element built into the team selection was having a large range of linguistic capabilities in order to monitor in additional languages. During the writ period, the team actively monitored 13 languages in addition to French and English including Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Portuguese, and Russian.

The team structure was designed so that there could be an analyst and senior monitor present at all times between 6am and 11pm during the writ period, with an analyst and a team lead working the night shift in order to write the daily report. Writing the daily report the night of, and releasing it the following morning, allowed some distinct advantages over the system in GE43 where the previous day's report would be published later the next day. The major advantage was a faster turnaround from data collection to reporting, increasing the relevance of the information. The other advantage was less need to continuously revise the report, as all information was collected in a given day and remained relevant because stories were less likely to develop at night or in the early hours of the morning. The morning analyst could write On the Radar items as they came up during the day to assist with the report writing, with evening analysts able to update them based on any developments and quickly publish the report after management review the next morning. Text

3.2. Training

The training objective was to provide agents with the tools and resources needed to work independently and efficiently with confidence.

All training was delivered via MS Teams; trainees were working remotely.

Both enquiries & monitoring agents' training included four days of training led by the PEU training unit. The training focussed on Elections Canada's mission and vision, the Canadian parliamentary structure, the role of CEO & CCE, the electoral process, as well as mandatory cybersecurity and GC Docs training sessions.

Monitoring-specific training (three days) was led by experienced digital media monitoring team members. This included daily tasks and topics such as VPN, Entrust, MS teams &

channels, GCDocs, Meltwater, Buzzsumo, Tweetdeck, Google news, additional language, flagging, and operations. Much of the training was accomplished through presentations, simulations, group activities, discussions, and discussions.

Training was followed by a full week of applied learning as part of a buddy system where experienced agents helped new ones develop their skills.

Additionally, a new training course and training manuals were developed and delivered by team members from both Enquiries & Monitoring. This course & handbook played an integral role in providing training to new hires when PEU training agents were unavailable.

Onboarding New Employees (elections.ca)

3.3. Use of MS Teams

From April 2021, MS Teams was transformed into an organizational tool to do more than just video and text chat and work collaboratively on documents. Central to this was the Tasks feature, which was used to create a daily log which featured the expected topics and keywords of the day, as well as a checklist of all monitoring tasks and the teammates responsible for each that day. In this way, real time information on what monitoring had been completed, and what was left to do was constantly available to both managers and fellow workers, ensuring that there were no coverage gaps or duplication of work. Similarly, a task was created each day to track the relevant news articles we had detected for the twice-daily Relevant Article Update and ensure that engagement for each was analyzed using the Crowdtangle tool. Monitors would each claim articles to Crowdtangle and collate as their time permitted, and Teams allowed this dynamic work to take place seamlessly without confusion. There was also a channel to track signing into and out of the collation document in GC docs, ensuring that the document was not left signed out and creating a traffic-jam of people waiting to submit content.

Some more mundane but critical uses of Teams included a shared calendar to input key election dates, staff days off that had been approved and needed to be covered, and events from around the world such as other elections that would create 'noise' for the monitoring team. This allowed staff to get a 'day at a glance' based on different elements than what would be found in an Outlook calendar full of meetings or an aide-memoire that focused solely on Elections Canada. The Wiki feature was also used to synthesize disparate data from numerous training and reference documents into a single page to serve as a quick-reference guide for new monitors, including a section on most-used GC docs links.

3.4. Shift work

During the writ period the monitoring team divided into three overlapping shifts in order to ensure adequate coverage and flagging from 7am to 11pm, seven days a week, with the morning team catching up on posts from 11pm to 7am. Monitors were still allotted two days off a week during the writ period, though these were staggered to allow for weekend coverage. There were also opportunities for overtime on certain weekend shifts. One negative consequence of the higher number of days off compared to GE43 was that there

were not enough monitors to cover shifts toward the end of the writ period because of the need for full staff on advance polling and election days, resulting in many monitors having their days off at the same time. Due to the relative unpopularity of the night shift when assigning shifts, there would often be only one or two monitors on that shift with the two report writers. Each shift was scheduled to feature at least one analyst and senior monitor, though the staffing level of having only three analysts proved to be not sustainable. Either a shift was left without an analyst in order for the analyst to have a needed day off, or an analyst would work without taking days off.

Keeping the Daily Logs updated with detailed notes on what had been monitored when, as well as having transition meetings between each shift to facilitate information transfer was key to ensuring each shift could hit the ground running when their shift started, and to understand the context they were entering and what they should monitor and report. This process was also crucial to avoid duplication of work or gaps in monitoring and required frequent check-ups by analysts and considerable dedication and discipline on the part of monitors to ensure logs were updated. Updates and requests from senior management were relayed between analysts in a similar way and through regular meetings, check-ins, emails, and posts and chats on Teams.

3.5. Division of tasks and monitoring

One key tenet of the team was to rotate tasks and monitoring to ensure that everyone could become proficient in every task and on every mainstream platform to be able to provide cover in case of absences and due to dividing into three shifts, but also to avoid burnout and mental health deterioration from repetition or repeated exposure to toxic content. The main division of tasks each day were observing Meltwater queries, conducting keyword searches, and writing the AM and PM Relevant Articles Updates. Additional language monitoring was taken on by each monitor that spoke an additional language, with English and French monitoring taking precedence in situations where we had to prioritize. In cases where there was overlap of spoken languages the monitors could work together to divide up monitoring tasks each day, for instance one monitor using Meltwater and the other performing keyword searches in the additional language. Due to the disturbing nature of many posts on niche platforms such as Gab and 4Chan, only those who volunteered to monitor these platforms were assigned to them, and the team had enough volunteers for adequate coverage of all the niche platforms we monitored, 19 in total. An area of shared responsibility was using Crowdtangle to search comments for the URLs of all the relevant news articles of the day. Due to the large number of articles each day and the piecemeal nature of the work, the team found it was most efficient to allow monitors to claim an article to monitor whenever they had spare time, with all articles being completed by the end of the day.

3.6. Use of monitoring tools

The team's monitoring capacity varied greatly from platform to platform. To help streamline environmental monitoring, three major tools were used: Meltwater, Buzzsumo and

Crowdtangle. Although essential, these tools offered varying degrees of monitoring capacity. Meltwater uses Boolean logic to search for public posts involving specific keywords, whereas Buzzsumo and Crowdtangle are used to detect articles and search for public posts involving the articles. Thus, all three tools served complementary functions. Table 5 describes each method's capacity on all platforms observed during GE44. We grouped certain platforms together like Reddit clones (FreeCanada.win), YouTube clones (Rumble, BitChute), News comments (news website comment sections) and other languages (VK or WeChat).

Table 7 – Change in key topics and narratives with available data from GE43 to GE44			
Method	**Capacity**		
	Good	**Mediocre**	**Poor**
Meltwater	• Twitter • Reddit • Public blogs	• News comments • Other languages	• Facebook • Instagram • Gab • YouTube • TikTok • LinkedIn • Reddit clones • 4chan • YouTube clones
Crowdtangle + Buzzsumo	• Twitter • Reddit • Other languages	• Facebook	• Instagram • Gab • YouTube • TikTok • LinkedIn • Public blogs • Reddit clones • 4chan • News comments • YouTube clones
Keyword searches	• Twitter • YouTube • LinkedIn • Reddit clones • 4chan • YouTube clones	• Reddit • Instagram • TikTok • Public blogs • News comments • Other languages	• Facebook • Gab

3.7.   Deliverables

The key regular product that the Social Media Monitoring Team produces is the Social Media Monitoring Report, a document with key observations, social media volume statistics, major items that are 'on the radar' of the monitoring team, as well as examples of content captured and analysis organized by content. This report is published on a weekly basis, then twice a week leading up to the election, and daily during the writ period. The team also produces ad-hoc reports on specific topics by request in environmental scans that follow a similar format to the report.

Twice daily, the team produces an internal email of relevant articles called the Relevant Articles Update which displays the levels of engagement related to articles relevant to our mandate in the Electoflash and that have been detected in the environment, including in languages other than French and English. This update is useful to track the salience of stories and topics as well as an important step in gathering articles to run through Crowdtangle to collate relevant comments.

During the writ period, the Social Media Monitoring Team contributed daily to a section of the CEO Dashboard to alert the CEO of trending topics and specific concerns. The dashboard was created late at night so the CEO would have up to date information the following morning in addition to the Social Media Monitoring Report. The dashboard content was usually aligned with the key observations in the report, and featured a color-coded level of severity in the event of serious concerns or action items. On election day, the team provided 5 snapshot reports that described key observations every few hours as the Event progressed, which combined with the flagging to provide useful real-time updates on E-Day.

3.8.   What went well

- Evening report writing led to a report offering very fresh data in the morning. It generated less confusion in the team since the end of the day was the cut off time for data entry, offering a clear reporting period for both the readership and the monitors.
- The use of Microsoft Teams to keep track of tasks progress and division of labor provided an increase in organization, archiving, and accountability from GE43 to GE44.
- Language profiles were divided well amongst the shifts, with capacity in both official languages and additional languages on all shifts. The same goes for alternative social media monitoring capacity – people able to monitor platforms like Gab or Rumble were available on all shifts.
- Having monitors change tasks daily was met positively and likely led to increased productivity. According to the monitors, switching platforms led to better well-being, a feeling of being treated fairly, and improved the motivation to work since they were getting exposed to different parts of the environment. Flexibility to claim articles to run through Crowdtangle when monitors had free time rather than assigning each article to a monitor was appreciated.

- Months of preparation and training made the majority of monitors skilled in all our tools which partly explains the increase in content monitored and collated from GE43 to GE44.
- Even in a work from home context, information was shared between shifts and across the agency efficiently. Outside the team, the daily report was always ready for revisions every morning. Inside the team, emails sent after the morning and the night shift ensured awareness.
- Structured training with documentation, mentorship and hands-on exercises proved to provide the Center with capable monitors that were able to fulfill their tasks at similar levels.

3.9. What requires improvement

- The team did not have enough analysts to cover the three shifts (none was working the midday shift). The morning analyst, for the first half of the election, was the sole individual working on On the Radar and flags and running the team. During the evening, relying on only two analysts to write the report and lead the team led to an immense work load. With no backup, if one had to be away, it would leave the other with too much work. Comparatively, during GE43, two analysts were solely responsible for report writing in addition to several analysts, two managers, and a team lead. During GE44, three analysts were responsible for report writing, monitoring, working on schedules, flagging, and managing staff.

- Shift work was unequal, with the evening team often understaffed (sometimes having a single monitor) while it is often the busiest time of the day for web traffic.

- The fact that the team included members with diverse language profiles made it very difficult to keep delivering briefings, training, work assignments, etc. in both official languages.

- Leaving monitors to freely choose articles to work on occasionally led to unfairness. It was common for morning shift to start their day with leftover articles from the evening, though in most cases this was due to understaffing on the evening shift rather than freeriding.

- Inadequate staffing levels created the need to hire and train new employees during the writ-period. Training the new employees diverted resources from monitors and analysts during key moments.

- Significant workload on monitors and analysts produced physical and mental strain on them. In exit interviews, some monitors expressed experiencing heavy stress, despair, and performance anxiety on high engagement days. Moreover, some staff admitted after the election to have, on several occasions, not taken proper breaks to either feed themselves or working while sick.

3.10. Recommendations

- Increase the number of analysts by using core member monitors as junior analysts to back up the lead analysts (flagging, answering questions, helping with monitoring, quality control, training)

- Onboard all monitors at least one month before the writ period to ensure comprehensive training and reduce workload and disruptions during the writ period.

- Increase staffing levels to offset the days off when the centre is working 7 days a week, insuring a minimum monitoring capacity on all shifts.

- To ensure better coverage of discussion generated from news articles equally through the day, increase the night shift staffing.

- To ensure wellness of the staff, there is a need for increased staffing and enhanced vertical communication channels . Monitors need to not feel irreplaceable and have access to support from management even during busy times to address work issues, operational questions and provide HR and mental health resources.

4.   Operational flagging

4.1.   Flagged content data

Throughout GE44, the Social Media Monitoring Team detected and shared a wide variety of flags, 497 in total, or approximately 14 flags a day during the writ period

Table 7 – Flagged content data

Flag Type	# flags from GE44	% of total flags from GE44	Details
Sign Vandalism	124	25%	Reported across the country, often posted online by candidates and members of the community. Posts were often accompanied by photos with the candidate's name that allowed the team to geolocate the incidents quickly. Hate speech/symbols were common in these flags.
Long Lines	86	17%	These flags numbered approximately 17/day over 5 polling days. Posts often reflected frustration and surprise compared to previous voting experiences (see below count by province).
Photos of marked ballots	54	11%	Posts containing photos of marked ballots became more popular as narratives spread online that electors should take and post photos of their ballots to 'prove' who they had voted for amid claims of electoral fraud that spread online.
Inaccurate information on where, when, or how to vote	42	9%	The majority of these flags were a result of a screenshot distributed over social media and text telling voters they would need proof of vaccination to vote in person as of September 13th.
Non-compliance COVID measures	39	8%	These flags were most common during advanced polls and voting day, as electors shared their experiences and photos online.

Long Line Flag by Province/Territory

4.2. Long line flags by Province

There was a total of 86 flags from GE44 reporting long lines at polling places across the country. Ontario represented the vast majority of these flags, 63 in total, mostly in urban centers. Alberta was a distant second with 9 flags, Quebec with 8, British Columbia with 7 and Manitoba with 5. Nova Scotia and New Brunswick accounted for 2 and 1 long line flags respectively, while PEI, Newfoundland and Labrador, Nunavut, Yukon, and North West Territories did not have any long lineup flags.

4.3. Flagging process

In GE44, the flagging process for the social media monitoring team took a ground-up approach. Prior to the election being called, an updated flagging guide document from GE43, which outlined types of flags and how to address them, was sent out to all members of the team. The team used an Excel spreadsheet to archive flags sent by the monitoring team during GE44. This spreadsheet was originally used in GE43 but was updated to be more functional for GE44. Once GE44 began, a Teams channel was created for monitors to post social media flags for the review of the supervisor on duty. Monitors were responsible for finding posts to flag passively through their regular monitoring duties and actively through doing key word searches of specific terms associated with common flags, such as "lawn sign" and "vandalism." Once the post was reviewed by a supervisor and deemed sufficient

for a flag, the supervisor would locate the appropriate flag format in the guide document and send it off to the appropriate staff.

This system was very efficient for the few weeks of the election, but in anticipation of higher volumes during advance polls, it was adapted slightly. Six Teams channels were created to represent the most common types of flags: cannot vote, non-respect of COVID measures, issues with poll workers, vandalized campaign signs, long lines at polling locations, and photos of marked ballots. Monitors would format the most common types of flags prior to an analyst reviewing so that it was faster for the analyst to send the email. Three senior monitors were deputized as additional supervisors for the flag review and distribution process, and began to send flags after review from more experienced supervisors. Additionally, another monitor was appointed to take over documenting flags in the master list Excel sheet. This process continued through election day, and proved to be extremely efficient and insured flags could be sent in as close to real-time as possible. In the days following election day, the process became much less formal as volumes of flags decreased quickly.

Over the 37-day electoral period, the flagging guide document was updated and recirculated several times to reflect changes in the flagging process. Events evolve quickly on the social media landscape, and therefore it was crucial to keep to the document evergreen as new types of flags arose. Incorrect information around COVID-19 and voting spread and evolved quickly, and having a guide that reflected this and could be referenced across shift changes was vital to the team's operations. Similarly, a protocol of including all supervisors on the team in flag distribution emails helped keep the team up to date on flags and narratives and avoid duplication.

4.4.   What went well

- The flagging guide document created by the team before the election was an extremely useful tool. It provided not only the format and information required to draft the flag, but also an extensive list of who to send it do. The guide streamlined the flagging process and helped the team manage high volumes, and was updated several times through GE44 to reflect changes in the environment. All of this combined helped ensure that all members of the team were on the same page across multiple shifts, and removed some of the decision-making that could slow down the flagging process.

- Flagging channels organized by type on Microsoft Teams allowed monitors to quickly and efficiently bring potential flags to supervisors' attention. Having the monitors identify flags by category and fill out detailed information including ED# allowed for the team to dedicate supervisors to each channel in times of high volume and ensure that flags were being distributed as close to in real time as possible. The channels also allowed supervisors to provide monitors with feedback on their suggested flags that others could see and learn from.

- Supervisors on the monitoring team were trained and comfortable enough with the flagging process prior to the election that they were able to support and aid another team with their flags early on in GE44.

- While facing a high volume of flags during polling days, senior monitors were able to step up and help supervisors with flagging. They quickly rose to the challenge and were an incredible asset to the team.

4.5.   What requires improvement

- During polling days, volumes often exceeded levels the team was capable of meeting. Some spent entire shifts sending as many flags as quickly as possible, leaving other tasks behind.

- Though the supervisors were trained and comfortable with the flagging process before the writs were issued, not all members of the team were, as some joined later on or during the election. This created some disparities in the levels of comfort and knowledge on the flagging process among the monitors, leading to ad hoc training during GE44, and a recreation of the analyst role during GE43.

- Stakeholder feedback on the flagging guide document was limited prior to the writ period, leading to the document having some outdated information that was caught and rectified after the election began.

- Practice of the flagging process was somewhat limited in the pre-electoral period, in part due to limited content that met the threshold for flagging. Flagging processes were altered during the election to reflect stakeholder feedback, making prior training less effective. Additionally, the number of staff required to conduct flagging increased leading to on-the-job training.

- Archiving of flagged items was delayed and inefficient due to conflicting directives given to those responsible. There was duplication and re-doing of a considerable amount of work immediately following the election.

4.6.   Recommendations

- Due to high volumes, it would be beneficial for the team to have more analysts and monitors available and trained to help with the flagging process.

- To prepare the team for sending flags in a high-pressure environment, it would be beneficial to practice sending flags in a similar but controlled environment. Though the team had one "mock election" day, having more training would help all members of the team feel more comfortable with the process.

- To ensure the flagging guide document is absolutely up to date when the writs drop, the team should engage with flag recipients further in advance, as well as organize meetings to get their feedback and create contact points. Some stakeholders did not respond to requests for input until the election was underway. Additionally, contacts should be kept current to reflect staffing changes, with regular updated made to it to ensure it is up to date in the absence of a fixed date election.

- Continue to use a single flagging archive document and dedicate a member of the team to ensure all flags are added once flags are sent. Collaborate with the social media team to ensure both teams include all flagged content and all staff issuing flags know the process to archive them. This document should be used as reference to avoid duplicates.

5. Volume projections for the 45th General Election

5.1. Projections based on GE43-44

Predicting GE45 data is a complex endeavour for several reasons. It is very difficult to predict the volume of GE45 based on the volume of content picked up by our tools across elections as GE44 saw a slight decrease in the total number of main query hits due to differences in the query, tool, and environment. Unfortunately, the number of hits on the main query on our old tool KI Social is all the data we have for GE42. However, it is possible to assume how much content would have been collated in GE42 with the same technology and staffing level as GE43. KI Social and the GE43 team offered a 10.82% rate of collated content from the main query/manual research. 29% of the total number of posts would be a good estimate for the total unique posts (not retweets or shares) found on the main query. This leads to an approximation of 16,869 original posts for GE42. With an average collation rate of 10.82%, this would have provided the team with around 1.6K collated posts throughout a comparable writ period. Knowing this, we see that collated content would increase by approximately 200 posts from GE42 to GE43 and then by around 3.1K from GE43 to GE44. As explained earlier, this can be attributed to several factors including new tools (Meltwater, Crowdtangle), more monitors, better training, and a better methodology (Microsoft Teams).

When looking ahead, two scenarios can be expected. The first one is where we are keeping the current tools and methodology. The second is one where we add new tools or modify the ones we currently have. In the first scenario, our growth in monitoring capacity is closely linked with human resources, optimal scheduling, and refinement of the current methodology. The massive increase in content can be mostly explained by the sweeping changes in tools and methodology, therefore if we keep the same system, we should expect a more modest increase in collated content similar to GE42 to GE43 estimated at 12.5%. An increase in collection of posts is still possible by hiring more staff to fill the different shifts more evenly to ensure optimal coverage. In their exit interviews, many employees expressed having felt high levels of stress during writ period because they were overrun by content and felt they could not fulfill their monitoring duties.

The second scenario is one where we acquire a new tool for monitoring or, ideally, for collating and archiving data more efficiently. When it comes to a monitoring tool, we would need one that either covers a wider range of platforms or covers the content Meltwater does more effectively. It is unknown to us at the moment if such a tool exists, but such an improvement could provide a greater increase in content volumes that could be between anywhere from mild, to a large jump similar to GE43 to GE44. On the other hand, a new tool to collate data more efficiently and keep track of data better would lead to an increase in productivity from the monitor workforce. Much time was spent formatting or preparing data for the collation sheet that could be used for monitoring. Increased productivity would likely translate into more collated content. Finally, when considering projections for GE45, it is important to consider the environment itself which is likely to change between GE44 and GE45.

Concerning social media volumes in a future election, there are a number of macro trends that could influence engagement. There is a demographic shift happening where a greater

proportion of electors are comfortable with the internet and are using social media, with the younger segments feeling more comfortable asking questions online compared to calling a phone number. There are also some factors that are more difficult to predict or control that would highly impact engagement. One such factor is the length and timing of the writ period, as well as the urgency and excitement surrounding a future election. Compared to GE43, GE44 generated much less enthusiasm and the topic of COVID-19, vaccinations, and lockdowns was top of mind for Canadians. An election which results in significant changes or close races sticks around in the social media environment for much longer. The consequences of these trends will mean a greater responsibility and burden for Elections Canada's social media monitoring and social media presence.

5.2. Platform usage trends

Based on observations over the last three years of social media monitoring, there are some clear trends when it comes to platform usage in the election context that we expect to continue and impact the next GE. One of the major differences between GE43 and 44 was the phenomenon of deplatforming, where social media platforms, especially Twitter, Reddit, and YouTube, faced greater public scrutiny and became stricter with the types of content they would remove, as well as banning repeat offenders. This trend became even more serious after the U.S. Capitol Riot in 2021. The result of this process was a migration of self-proclaimed patriots and conspiracy theory related users to other platforms that promoted unfettered free speech and data privacy such as Gab, BitChute, and Reddit clones. Some of the deplatformed activist or interest groups have become more insular, having a hybrid model of public and private spaces where newcomers must be vetted before they are allowed to join private Discord or Telegram servers where sensitive discussions take place that previously occurred in the open and could be easily detected and reported to security.

Beyond this trend there is also a youth migration to favour platforms such as TikTok and Instagram that prioritize audio/visual communication as well as temporary posts and live videos which presents greater challenges for the future of monitoring. Among popular social media platforms, there is a trend of greater awareness of the potential impact of misinformation or threatening public posts. Non-anonymous platforms such as LinkedIn and Facebook thus saw a decline in collatable material over the course of the last two elections that could be attributed to a decline in popularity, greater digital literacy, or an awareness of the consequences of errant social media posts to one's career and reputation. News consumption habits are also changing, with traditional media sources often turning off their comments sections, a greater reliance on social media platforms over news websites, and a growing preference for podcasts, vlogs, newsletters, and livestreams over articles.

5.3. Service levels and staffing

Just in time for GE43, Elections Canada created its first official Social Media Monitoring Unit, composed of 18 full-time resources and 2 part-time. Most staff started early July 2019, giving the team two full months to setup the function, define methodology and put service levels in place before the writs were issued.

Between GE43 and GE44, the monitoring function was transferred over to PACE Media Relations and Environmental Monitoring. The creation of a permanent core monitoring team was started, and staffing of the core team was done through electoral resources. Staffing of the Environmental Monitoring Centre was done simultaneously for the monitoring and social media content/enquiries agents. A first group of nine agents were hired through a service-level agreement with Service Canada and their agreement with the service provider, Quantum. Later, Service Canada changed its service provider, and these agents were no longer available. Instead of losing fully-trained staff, the agents were hired as casual employees to assist the team in meeting its objectives for readiness planning. More agents were hired afterwards through an EC PM-01 pool. Four members of the centre joined other managers from EC to conduct the interviews as part of an agency-wide PM-01 hiring process.

This staffing process is lengthy and time-consuming. The assistant director and one team lead dedicated a lot of time and effort to hiring staff. This involved preparing hiring packages with Public Affairs and Civic Education (PACE) Finance and Human Resources (HR) along with administering digital competencies testing and onboarding in a remote work environment. Another difficulty came from the recommendation to classify monitoring positions as AS-01. This added to the administrative burden, forcing the creation of new statement of merit criteria, work description, job offer emails, etc. It also meant that the "best fit" evaluation of candidates, deciding if they'd be more suitable for the enquiries positions or monitoring had to be made before meeting candidates and before starting training. Re-asssignment of resources based on their strengths and interests would be easier if the positions' classification were the same.

Between September 2020 and September 2021, six waves of onboarding took place:

1. September 2020: 6 PM-01 and 3 PM-02 (shared between monitoring and enquiries/content)
2. March 4, 2021: 9 AS-01
3. April 8, 2021: 2 AS-01
4. April 29, 2021: 4 AS-01
5. August 5, 2021: 4 from AS-01

Additionally, 11 agents from PEU were added to the team on September 2 (6 were assigned to content/enquiries, and 5 to Monitoring; 1 agent resigned).

The work schedule consisted of three shifts: from 7:00 to 15:00, from 15:00 to 23:00, and from 12:00 to 20:00 (the latter helped with the transition between shifts and to cover the breaks of other agents). This created better team cohesion and a simpler work schedule.

As social media users tend to use their mother tongue when discussing when discussing elections within personal communities, in order to ensure all electors have access to accurate information on how, when, where to register and vote in languages most often spoken in Canadian households. Issues of interest to French-speaking communities and other communities are different to issues that Anglo-Canadians care about and comment online. The same goes for Indigenous communities on and off reserve. It remains essential that the monitoring include bilingual staff who are fluent in both official languages as well as Sinnophone, Russian and Indigenous languages. That being said, in order to understand social media conversations, monitors need to be aware of cultures and expressions, symbols, and popular references commonly used in digital conversations.

5.4.   What went well

- Coverage of social media posts and news in multiple languages with actionable results

- Coverage of platforms improved drastically, including developing expertise in TikTok and Gab monitoring

- Diverse staff were able to bring unique expertise to monitoring and analysis

- Rapid training of staff, including ad-hoc training on specific tasks or platforms

- Increased volumes were handled well by monitors

5.5.   What requires improvement

- Some additional languages yielded little to no results, while language gaps of potentially more active languages remain

- Not all platforms yielded consistent results, triaging platforms during peak volume or evaluating which platforms not to monitor may be necessary

- Platform monitoring tools are losing capability to monitor depending on arbitrary policy changes by platforms such as Facebook, the firehose of content is not expanding as quickly as the variety of content types and platforms

- Language and monitoring expertise shrunk when staff were terminated following GE44

- No capacity for Indigenous languages in the monitoring team

- Language expertise of new monitors is somewhat subjective, it is difficult to determine competency levels in tertiary languages

- French-language monitoring capacity currently critically low between elections

5.6.   Recommendations

- Adding a native French speaker to core monitoring staff to improve inter-election monitoring

- Determination of which platforms are to be monitored daily, weekly, and not monitored

- Hiring of staff fluent in most prolific additional languages prior to GE45, emphasis on Chinese, Slavic, Tagalog and Indian subcontinent languages

- Continued exploration of additional platforms of potential Elections Canada related content

- Maintenance of monitoring capacity outside of electoral period to determine baseline engagement levels, track narrative developments, and build expertise navigating platforms

6. APPENDICES

6.1. Highest engagement posts

Highest Engagement Collated Posts from GE44				
Engage ment	Topic	Platform	Post	Date

39.4K	Concerns about individual level foreign interference	Barack Obama, Twitter	Wishing my friend @JustinTrudeau the best in Canada's upcoming election. Justin has been an effective leader and strong voice for democratic values, and I'm proud of the work we did together.
			
			Sample comments
			Twitter user 1: this is foreign election interference **(1.8K reactions)**
			   Reply 1: Rob, I feel the authorities MUST listen to your analysis on this, as a foreign election interference expert yourself **(277 reactions)**
			   Reply 2: i put in a lot of hours doing foreign election intererence so i know it when i see it **(146 reactions)**
			Twitter user 2: Election interference? **(72 reactions)**
			Twitter user 3: Nothing says loving like interfering in a Canadian election heh? Maybe you forgot Blackface. **(38 reactions)**
			Twitter user 4: Please stop interfering in Canada's election. **(12 reactions)**
			Twitter user 5: This is foreign interference in an election. This is not ok **(5 reactions)**
			Twitter user 6: This is called foreign influence on our elections. Mind your own business. **(4 reactions)**
			Twitter user 7: Hahaha luck?! I'm sure the Canadian elections are just as rigged as the American elections. **(1 reaction)**
			Twitter user 8: Election interference. **(No reaction)**
			Twitter user 9: And here we were warned it would be the Chinese government we had to watch out for interfering in the Canadian election. **(No reaction)**
				Sept. 16

24.1K	Concerns about individual level foreign interference	Bernie Sanders ,Twitter	Canada goes to the polls Monday. There's one party that stood up for working people in the pandemic. One leader who has the courage to make the wealthy pay their fair share so everyone gets the medication they need. That's why I support the @NDP and @theJagmeetSingh	Sept. 17

Sample comments

Twitter user 1: OMG dude this is inappropriate just like it was when @HillaryClinton and @BarackObama did it. Stay in your lane and out of Canadians' business **(210 reactions)**

Twitter user 2: Is it legal for @BernieSanders to interfere in other countries politics or influence the poll?? **(112 reactions)**

  Reply 1: But what about Canadian law? Is that considered foreign interference? **(5 reactions)**

  Reply 2: Doesn't section 331 of the elections Canada Act male it illegal for a non Canadian to influence a Canadian on how to vote? Just like taking a photo of your ballot is illegal but people do it. **(3 reactions)**

Twitter user 3: You rock Mr. Sanders! **(33 reaction)**

  Reply 1: You're ok with a foreign elected offical interfering with our election**? (No reaction)**

Twitter user 4: BERNIE NO - stop - what is this? No. Foreign politicians should stay out of our election. STOP. **(23 reactions)**

Twitter user 5: Is it appropriate for a sitting senator to endorse foreign political parties? **(11 reactions)**

Twitter user 6: AGH. Stop. No more foreign interference in our election please. **(11 reactions)**

Twitter user 7: The US is just about the most screwed up country in the world at the moment, can we please stop having US politicians weigh in on our elections. **(8 reactions)**

Twitter user 8: Influencing foreign elections is cringe. **(8 reactions)**

  Reply 1: As a Canadian, I welcome Bernie Sanders' election interference. Our people yearn for the sweet air of freedom. (And frankly, I wish that more Canadian politicians would show the kind of intestinal and spinal fortitude Bernie has.) **(24 reactions)**

Twitter user 9: I hear they must show ID to vote. **(1 reaction)**

  Reply 1: Nope. U can get someone like your neighbour to vouch for you if u don't have an I'd **(2 reactions)**

  Reply 2: I do that already for my dead grandfather **(1 reaction)**

Twitter user 12: Mêlez-vous de vos affaires ! Mind ur own business ! **(1 r.)**

Twitter user 13: So, do you think it would be acceptable for Putin to interfere in the American election and endorse Trump ? I think not ! So PLEASE

|			don't interfere in the Canadian election…..! Unlike America WE have a multi party system ! **(1 reaction)** **Twitter user 14:** Why 3 americans want to influence the canadian votes. Please, take care of your own country…it deeply needs being taken care of. Canadians will take care of there's. **(1 reaction)**	

23K	Elections in a pandemic	Instagram	Justin Trudeau is asked by [Instagram user] if he will continue to demonize Rebel News or if he will answer an important question for millions of Canadians about vaccines. […]
			
			 Sample comments
			 Instagram user 1: So if everyone hates him why is he leading in second in the election polls????? Who the hell is voting for him or is he doing what Bifen did and cheat? **(117 reactions)**
			   Reply 1: the election is fixed, but. We still need to vote […] **(1 reaction)**
			   Reply 2: for sure - the machines work in his favour like the last 2 times **(No reaction)**
			   Reply 3: cheating I m sure **(No reaction)**
			 Instagram user 2: there gonna be voting fraud, Welcome to the New World Order **(2 reactions)**
				Sept. 10

20.7K	Reactions to a potential snap election	TikTok	Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and the Liberals are reportedly set to call a snap election on September 20. #covid19 #news #canada #election #trudeau
			
			 Sample comments
			 TikTok user 1: 100% they will move it to another time and he knows people won't vote him this time **(19 reactions)**
			   Reply 1: This sounds unvaccinated **(6 reactions)**
			   Reply 2: Nah the vaccine is at a experimental trail + so many problems are coming out but the news is not talking about it and I will get mine once everything **(No reaction)**
			 TikTok user 2: Can someone tell me why he called a election now, wasnt it supposed to be in 2023? **(6 reactions)**
			 TikTok user 3: vote conservative. bill C10 means you will not be able to post this **(4 reactions)**
			 TikTok user 4: Votes from the west wont matter. That's why alberta will separate **(1 reaction)**
			 TikTok user 5: I'm so confused why is this election happening? Arnt we supposed to wait another year??? **(No reaction)**
				Aug. 12

			TikTok user 6: I feel it will be fixed anyway. he will just change the majority counts again **(No reaction)** **TikTok user 7:** How can we sign up to mail by vote? **(No reaction)**	
16.6K	Concerns about individual level foreign interference	Justin Trudeau, Facebook	Thanks for your support, Barack Obama. Progress is on the ballot — and we're going to keep fighting for it. //Très heureux d'avoir reçu l'appui de mon ami Barack Obama. ***Sample comments*** **Facebook user 1:** Appearance by The right honourable, Jean Chretien, sprinkle in a bit of foreign interference with Obama, seems like the campaign is worried?? Maybe calling this election in the middle of the 4th wave was shortsighted. **(16 reactions)** **Facebook user 2:** Nothing like a little foreign interference to promote your reelection. **(10 reactions)** **Facebook user 3:** Foreign Interference in a Canadian Election. **(1 reaction)** **Facebook user 4:** Foreign interference, hmmm, what's Putin have to say? **(1 reaction)** **Facebook user 5:** Hummm!, foreign interference by a former President. **(No reaction)** **Facebook user: 6** Canada doesn't need interference in our elections from the US DEEP STATE **(No reaction)** **Facebook user 7:** China would endorse you as well, which is also election interference **(no reaction)**	Sep. 16
14.7K	Masks and other face coverings in polling locations, lack of mask requirement	TikTok	It's a mad world out there #ppc #election #canada #ForTheLoveOfBeauty #vote ***Description:** "Hi there sir are you here to vote? You betcha, I'm not missing my chance to support the PPC. Okay, anyways I'm just going to need you to toss on a mask and then you can hop right through there and its at the end of the hall on your right. Mask? No no no. I'm not wearing one of those. I don't know what to tell you sir, you're just not allowed in without a mask. (song starts to play) That was the toughest decision of my white privilege life. I wanted , no needed to support the PPC but in order to do so, I'd have to sacrifice the vey rights and freedom I was voting to protect. I didn't know what to do." ***Sample Comments*** **TikTok User 1:** I hope they choose their 'freedom' over their right to vote - please **(1.3K reactions)** **TikTok User 2:** When they voter suppress themselves lol **(853 reactions)**	Sept. 15

			TikTok User 3: Unfortunately the polling stations near me let ppc voters in without a mask. Super unfortunate. **(120 reactions)** **TikTok User 4:** you can refuse a mask, they will offer a mask, refuse and they will still let you in. My dad is a supervisor at the poll and this si they're training. **(43 reactions)** 　**Reply 1**: Not true. If you don't put on a mask and refuse to leave we've been told to call the cops. **(43 reactions)** **TikTok User 5:** I worked advance polls and masks are not mandatory to vote, although they have them at every table. Highly recommended but not required **(16 reactions)** **TikTok User 6:** it's sadly not mandatory to wear a mask to vote **(13 reactions)** **TikTok User 7:** I heard that they will clear out the whole polling station to let someone without a mask vote **(9 reactions)** **TikTok User 8:** Not even true….they can't stop and Canadian from exercising their legal right to vote…but just wear your mask its not that hard **(7 reactions)**	
11.1K	Concerns about individual level foreign interference	Twitter	I have seen my friend @JustinTrudeau show leadership in the fight for accessible child care, protected reproductive rights, and ambitious climate action. I'm wishing him and our progressive Canadian neighbors the best in Monday's election. ***Sample comments*** **Twitter user 1:** One foreign endorsement can be blown off as a friendly gesture. Two endorsements by foreign leaders is a coordinated effort and political interference. It's unacceptable. **(275 reactions)** **Twitter user 2:** Thought you were against election interference? If you actually want Canadian progressives to win you'll need to brush up on Canadian politics some. **(72 reactions)** **Twitter user 3:** Canada's elections are none of your business. **(40 r.)** **Twitter user 4:** Please don't interfere in our elections like this. Our politicians do not try to sway US voters. **(32 reactions)**	Sept. 17
11K	Spoiling/ rejecting/ calls to not	Telegram	Listen Up Canadians, My office never sent any emails or any other kind of communication to anyone about voting for anything or anyone. That is the work of PAY_Triots, paid oppositions planted by DeepState	Aug. 31

|				
	vote/ boycott		Cabal masquerading as Freedom Fighter (fooling even Police Officers), corrupted, criminals, Shills and Traitors. Are we clear?	
10K	Allegations that EC is corrupt, partisan	Instagram	Cue the "purple wave" of "this is Chris Sky's fault" ... did your vote matter? ***Description:** "surprise, look who won - did your vote matter?" ***Sample Comments*** **Instagram User 1**: Was rigged so didn't matter who we voted for **(96 r.)** **Instagram User 2**: shit was rigged! **(74 reactions)** **Instagram User 3**: They aren't even trying to make it less obvious. **(57 r.)** **Instagram User 4:** You mean to say that our corrupt government did exactly what corrupt governments do? Wowwwww. I can't believe people actually thought they could vote their way out of this. Mass civil disobedience and united non-compliance is the ONLY way **(66 reactions)** **Instagram User 5**: The result was probably already pre-determined 20 years ago **(15 reactions)**	Sept. 20

6.2. Highest impact posts

Highest Impact Posts from GE44				
Engage ment	**Topic**	**Author, Platform**	**Post**	**Date**

39.4K	Concerns about individual level foreign interference	Barack Obama, Twitter	Wishing my friend @JustinTrudeau the best in Canada's upcoming election. Justin has been an effective leader and strong voice for democratic values, and I'm proud of the work we did together.
			
			 Sample comments
			 Twitter user 1: this is foreign election interference **(1.8K reactions)**
			    Reply 1: Rob, I feel the authorities MUST listen to your analysis on this, as a foreign election interference expert yourself **(277 reactions)**
			    Reply 2: i put in a lot of hours doing foreign election intererence so i know it when i see it **(146 reactions)**
			 Twitter user 2: Election interference? **(72 reactions)**
			 Twitter user 3: Nothing says loving like interfering in a Canadian election heh? Maybe you forgot Blackface. **(38 reactions)**
				Sept. 16

			Twitter user 4: Please stop interfering in Canada's election. **(12 reactions)** **Twitter user 5:** This is foreign interference in an election. This is not ok **(5 reactions)** **Twitter user 6:** This is called foreign influence on our elections. Mind your own business. **(4 reactions)** **Twitter user 7:** Hahaha luck?! I'm sure the Canadian elections are just as rigged as the American elections. **(1 reaction)** **Twitter user 8:** Election interference. **(No reaction)** **Twitter user 9:** And here we were warned it would be the Chinese government we had to watch out for interfering in the Canadian election. **(No reaction)**	

Notes: Shortly before Day 0 of GE44, former US president Barack Obama tweeted in support of Justin Trudeau's campaign. This led to other prominent American politicians, such as Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders, to do the same. Social media users were quick to make accusations of foreign interreference and called on EC to investigate.

6.5K	N/A	Chrystia Freelan d, Twitter	Canada's public, universal health care system is one of our greatest strengths. It's part of what makes us who we are as a country. Last year, as COVID-19 raged, Erin O'Toole was asked if he would bring private, "for-profit" healthcare to Canada. He responded unequivocally: yes.	Aug. 22

Notes: Early on in GE44, Deputy PM Chrystia Freeland shared a video of the Leader of the CPC that was flagged by Twitter as "manipulated media." This led high volumes of Twitter users to call on EC to investigate the post, alleging is contravened the CEA and consisted of misinformation. Days later, the CCE determined the video did not violate laws on misleading publications.

3K	N/A	Chris Sky, Twitter	The revolution has officially begun. This is United Non Compliance. 	Sept. 6

Notes: Throughout the election, internet personality Chris Sky encouraged his followers to vote for him by special ballot, as he was not a candidate in any riding. On his social media platforms it was framed as a "revolution" and a few of his supporters also shared their own photos of marked ballots where they too had written-in his name.

N/A (Instagram story)	N/A	Maxime Bernier, Instagram	Ajax folks! Because we have no PPC representative in Ajax, you have to go to 314 Harwood (floor 2) to the elections office and vote there, ask them for a special ballot or tell then you're voting PPC. It's unfortunate.. We shouldn't have to disclose who we're voting for yet that's what I had to do today. I originally went to the community center to vote, the only representatives on the ballots were for conservatives, liberal, NDP and green party. I was told I had to go to 314 Harwood (floor 2) to vote PPC.	Sept. 12

Notes: The PPC did not have candidates running in all 338 ridings in GE44, including Ajax, resulting in the party not having a candidate on those ballots. During advanced polls, the PPC leader shared an Instagram story instructing voters to go to their local RO office, inform them of their intention to vote for the party, and request a special ballot so the voter could "write in" in the party name when a candidate was not available. This narrative became popular on social media as other electors shared photos of their marked ballots where they had "written in" their party of choice, either by special ballot or in the margins of typical ballot. Social media posts often referred to it as "voting federally" in support of a party.

342	N/A (website)	You Lead Now	Elections Canada: Open Voting Booths and Special Balloting on Campus! To Elections Canada,As a student, I find the decision to cancel the Vote on Campus program for the 2021 federal election unacceptable. Students and youth are an integral demographic to include in our democratic system. With already busy schedules and living situations often far from home, students need the Vote on Campus program in order to have fair access to the democratic process. That means having voting booths on campus that students can easily access during the school day and it means special balloting to vote in any riding in the country, so that students can have their voices heard in the communities they call home. I am calling on you to make this happen, for myself and for my generation. Our futures depend on what government leaders do now, and we have a right to a say in who our leaders are. Thank you for your consideration ***Sample comments*** **Leadnow user 1:** Why is Elections Canada ending campus voting this year of all years, when we have months left to act on the climate crisis and the largest generation of first-time voters yet becomes eligible?? **(No r.)**	Aug. 26

			Leadnow user 2: Cancelling the Vote on Campus program is a form of voter suppression. **(No reaction)** **Leadnow user 3:** Because we should do what we can to make voting accessible to all. It's our democratic right. **(No reaction)** **Leadnow user 4:** Because we need to make it easy for students to vote as they are our future **(No reaction)** **Leadnow user 5:** The government elected by this snap election will be overseeing the most sensitive years of the climate crisis as we approach the point of no return, and making it more difficult for the young people whose future this will affect to vote is obviously unconscionable. **No r.)**	
Notes: Following the announcement that the vote on campus initiative would not be offered, a petition was circulated to change the decision, earning a total of 22K signatures. There were many posts sharing the petition found across multiple social media platforms, usually shared with allegations of voter suppression.				
21	Concerns about the use of EC pencils and the integrity of ballots	Gab	Will you take a look at this Trudeau is trying to steal this election clearly we seen this shenanigans go on in the USA now they're making it our way please share this far and wide make calls to election Canada and find out what is going on. Bradley Bishop is feeling angry. My partner and I went to vote at the Elections Canada office at 920 Boul. Saint-Joseph, Gatineau QC today for advanced voting. The Elections Supervisor proceeded to ID us, confirm our voter cards, then insisted we use a PENCIL, not a pen, to WRITE OUT (not choose) the name of our preferred candidate on a piece of paper. When I pushed back against the use of a pencil in lieu of pen, he conceded and muttered something about pen being acceptable only as of this election (not previous elections). When presented with the list of Party Candidates, we noticed that our local #PPC candidate David Bruce Gottfred was nowhere to be found! I asked the Elections supervisor why our Pontiac PPC candidate was missing from the list of candidate choices, and he replied; "your candidate appears to not have amassed enough support - a minimum of 100 nominations, to be included on the ballot." I was stunned to say the least. After asking to speak to his superior, another woman walks in and they deliberate for a few minutes, while I proceed to message my PPC representative about what I was seeing. After a short discussion outside of the office (and out of ear/view of my partner and I), they returned and affirmed that our PPC representative was indeed	Sept. 10

missing, and they proceeded to add Bruce's name in messy handwriting at the bottom of the candidate list. Again, the handling of this is shocking behaviour for a Federal Elections office.

We cast our vote IN PEN, put our written ballot in an Elections Canada envelope, deposited in the ballot box, and before departing, I reiterated our disappointment and repeatedly requested that all candidate lists be updated to reflect the proper information, including party representatives that have been "omitted".

Our democratic election process is being mishandled, undermined and corrupted.

Rob Boutilier Maxime Bernier Randy Hillier- take note. #PPC2021 #Election2021 #canadavotes EDIT: I've filed a formal complaint to the Office of Elections Canada.

Sample comments

Gab user 1: Since when do people have to write out the name of preferred candidate on a "piece of paper"?! The ballots have always had the list of candidates, the party they belong to with the circle next to the name in which to put the X for preferred candidate. What you are showing here doesn't look anything like the ballots that have been offered at every single election I've voted in the past 30 years including the one I cast my vote with today."List of confirmed candidates"??? Google "images voting ballot Canadian federal elections". I don't think you actually got a legitimate ballot. Something fishy is going on there in Quebec. **(1 reaction)**

Gab user 2: This is nuts. This one incident should be enough to get the entire election overturned. They cannot just do this kind of shit, are we a banana republic, some kind of African dictatorship having a show election? Seriously, I cannot believe this. This should have people outraged. **(No r.)**

| | | | Gab user 3: It states right in the elections Canada pamphlet that you can use a pen to vote! They are going to omit the PPC Candidates in Quebec and Ontario on purpose because they know Maxime is going to win! I hope you've notified Maxime about this shit! (No reaction) | |

Notes: This Gab post heavily influenced several narratives in GE44. The elector, who resided in Pontiac, went to vote by special ballot at a RO office in another riding (Gatineau). Upon arrival, the RO office only had an outdated list of candidates for that riding, which did not yet include the PPC candidate. The RO office proceeded to add the candidate's name to the list by hand. The poster alleged that this, in combination with the use of a special ballot and pencil, constituted corruption. Other social media users then inferred that PPC candidates were being withheld from lists at RO offices and even on ballots at polling stations. References to this post became quite common across multiple social media platforms for the duration of GE44.

| 74 | Elections in a pandemic – Voting in person | Twitter | Canadian Election – September 20, 2021

The Canadian General Election is taking place on September 20, 2021.

The poster of the message below says mandatory vaccines will be in place on/by September 13:

"If you or anyone you know who is NOT vaxxed and plan to vote in person, you MUST vote in person on the ADVANCED VOTING DAYS OF SEPTEMBER 10 TO 12; don't wait until September 13."

"You must have at least 1 vaccine to enter many buildings on September 13."

"It is not clear if voting stations are exempt, but best to vote on the advanced voting dates than to have your vote not count at all!"

"You may not be able to vote on September 20 if not vaccinated."

"Summary:

Vote advanced voting only, September 10 to 12 only, NOT the 13th
Vote in person
Vote with pen
Copy, paste and share!"

9:42 AM · Aug 29, 2021 · Twitter for Android | Sept. 3 |

Notes: This screenshot post and others like it began circulating on social media as provinces announced vaccine mandates in early September. The claim that unvaccinated electors would not be able to vote after Sept. 13 spread very quickly as people copy-pasted text and images as

demonstrated above, and many reported receiving some version of it through text or private message.

6.3. Additional data tables

Additional data tables

Series 1: Volume graphs from August 12 – September 23 (writ period +/- 3 days)

Number of Flags Sent Per Day During GE44

Number of Articles Concerning EC's Mandate During GE44

## Total Engagement on Articles Concerning EC's Mandate During GE44


Series 1 Observations: Media coverage features a consistent upward trend leading to election day with spikes for rumours and announcement of the GE, advanced polls, and election day.

Engagement levels are similar to the U-shaped graph of social media content detected over Meltwater, with a decreasing interest over time except for a major spike for election results followed by a sharp decrease. This could indicate election fatigue as well as diminishing returns on election related news. Flagged content does not appear to conform to trends in engagement or content, but instead is heavily tied to operational concerns on advanced polling and election days.

Series 2: Collation and Monitoring data

Number of collated posts daily from GE44 and GE43

Posts and retweets from August 11 to September 23, 2021

Trends in posts identified by query and collated content

Legend: ▉ Number of posts collated 2021 — Number of posts on main query

Proportion of collated posts by platform (%)

TikTok, 1.34 — 4chan, 0.41 — Other, 2.14 — FreeCanada.win, 0.35
Gab, 2.29
Instagram, 3.92
LinkedIn, 0.35
YouTube, 2.19

Facebook, 11.71

Reddit, 6.6

Series 2 observations: As shown in section 2 of this report, the average volume of collated content increased close to 3 times from GE43 to GE44. As the first graph of Series 2 illustrates, for the same election calendar days, volumes of collated content were systematically higher during GE44 than GE43 with day -3 being an exception due to drastically reduced interest due to similar results. We can also observe for GE44 a W

shaped graph, with the 3 spikes being the election being called, advanced polls, and election day. Other spikes are attributed to a variety of events, mostly driven by news. The second graph shows the proportion of original posts and retweet/replies found on our monitoring tool. The third demonstrates how the main query volume and the collated content volume are generally evolving alongside each other's but at different rates. For example, big spikes in collated content did not always mean a spike in the monitoring tool's volume and vice-versa. Staffing levels and relevance of the news to our mandate were also factors. The fourth graph shows how Twitter is still the main platform where the team identified content. This can be explained by complete access to Twitter data and how politically oriented the platform userbase is. As a consequence, our analyses might be affected by an overexposure to the Twitter demographic of university educated urban dwellers. The "other" section includes 20 platforms with less than 0.35% of the total number of collated posts.

Top narratives/topics for each reporting period of the writ-period

Date	Top narrative	2nd narrative	3rd narrative	4th narrative	5th narrative
Aug. 15-16	Mail-in ballots	DVS	It's safe to vote in person	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea	EC is corrupt/Paper ballots
Aug. 16-17	Mail-in ballots	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea	DVS	GE44 will be rigged	Dangerous voting places
Aug. 17-18	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	DVS	It's safe to vote in person	Ballot counting
Aug. 18-19	Mail-in ballots	DVS	GE44 will be rigged	People should be allowed to vote without a mask	Ballot counting
Aug. 19-20	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	DVS	People should be forced to wear a mask to vote	EC is corrupt
Aug. 20-22	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	DVS	EC is corrupt	It's safe to vote in person
Aug. 22-23	Mail-in ballots	EC is corrupt	Sign vandlism	Electoral reform	DVS/Use of pencils for ballots
Aug. 23-24	Mail-in ballots	EC is corrupt	Accessibility to vote	GE44 will be rigged	Canadian Elections Act

Aug. 24-25	Mail-in ballots	Sign vandlism	EC is corrupt	DVS	Canadian Elections Act/Electoral reform/ It's safe to vote in person
Aug. 25-26	Mail-in ballots	DVS	Sign vandalism	EC is corrupt	GE44 will be rigged
Aug. 26-27	Mail-in ballots	DVS	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea	GE44 will be rigged	EC is corrupt
Aug. 27-28	Mail-in ballots	Accessibility	GE44 will be rigged	EC is corrupt	DVS
Aug. 28-29	Mail-in ballots	DVS	EC is corrupt	Sign vandlism	GE44 will be rigged
Aug. 29-30	Mail-in ballots	EC is corrupt	DVS	GE44 will be rigged	Canadian Elections Act
Aug. 30-31	Mail-in ballots	DVS	GE44 will be rigged	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea	Canadian Elections Act
Aug. 31 – Sept. 1	Mail-in ballots	DVS	EC is corrupt	Sign vandlism	Accessibility
Sept. 1-2	EC is corrupt	Ways to vote	GE44 will be rigged	Mail-in ballots	Canadian Elections Act
Sept. 2-3	EC is corrupt	GE44 will be rigged	Ways to vote	Canadian Elections Act	DVS
Sept. 3-4	DVS	GE44 will be rigged	Mail-in ballots	Ways to vote	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea
Sept. 4-5	GE44 will be rigged	Ways to vote	Mail-in ballots	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea	EC is corrupt
Sept. 5-6	GE44 will be rigged	DVS	Sign vandalism	Mail-in ballots	Ways to vote
Sept. 6-7	GE44 will be rigged	Mail-in ballots	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea	Sign vandalism	DVS
Sept. 7-8	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	Sign vandlism	Neutral conversation about GE44	EC is corrupt

Sept. 8-9	DVS	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	EC is corrupt	People should be allowed to vote without a mask
Sept. 9-10	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	Accessibility	Line ups	Holding an election during a pandemic is a bad idea
Sept. 10-11	Line ups	Accessibility	Mail-in ballots	Use of pencil for ballots	Voter suppression
Sept. 11-12	GE44 will be rigged	Accessibility	EC's mandate	Ways to vote	Mail-in ballots
Sept. 12-13	Mail-in ballots	GE44 will be rigged	EC's mandate	Accessibility	Line ups
Sept. 13-14	Line ups	Mail-in ballots	Accessibility	Canadian Elections Act	Use of pencil for ballots
Sept. 14-15	Neutral conversation about GE44	EC's mandate	Mail-in ballots	People should be allowed to vote without a mask	GE44 will be rigged
Sept. 15-16	Mail-in ballots	Obama interference	GE44 will be rigged	Ballot counting	Ways to vote
Sept. 16-17	Neutral conversation about GE44	Accessibility	GE44 will be rigged	DVS	Ways to vote
Sept. 17-18	GE44 will be rigged	Accessibility	Mail-in ballots	Obama interference	Ballot counting
Sept. 18-19	Neutral conversation about GE44	Accessibility	GE44 will be rigged	Mail-in ballots	DVS
Sept. 20	Line ups	GE44 will be rigged	EC's mandate	EC is corrupt	Mail-in ballots