



Interview Summary: Michael Chong (Stage 2)

Michael Chong, Member of Parliament for Wellington—Halton Hills, was interviewed by Commission Counsel on July 15, 2024.

Notes to Readers:

- Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.

1. Backlash to Advocacy Efforts

- [1] Mr. Chong described his advocacy efforts in the addendum to his stage 1 interview summary. Mr. Chong described receiving backlash anytime he takes a position on issues, whether foreign or domestic. This occurs through phone calls, email and social media messages. In particular, Mr. Chong described that he received an avalanche of backlash in response to his support of an anti-Islamophobia motion in the House of Commons. He has no reason to think that the backlash he has received is connected to foreign interference.
- [2] He believes that dealing with this negative response forms part of the job of a Member of Parliament (“MP”) and does not take it personally. However, backlash containing threats or crossing over into illegality is problematic and unacceptable. He has received some of those types of responses and has reported them as appropriate.
- [3] Mr. Chong’s desire to speak out on issues or carry out his work as an MP is not inhibited by the backlash he receives. In fact, he described that such backlash invigorates him to speak out louder against human rights abuses. Nonetheless, he is aware of other MPs who have reduced their advocacy efforts or who have left their roles as MPs altogether as a result of the negative reactions to their advocacy and positions they have taken as MPs.

- [4] Mr. Chong stated that he could not recall receiving any feedback, warning or guidance connected to the backlash from his advocacy initiatives from the House of Commons, security and intelligence agencies, law enforcement or Global Affairs Canada (“**GAC**”).

2. Sanctions

- [5] As Mr. Chong described in his stage 1 interview with Commission counsel, the People’s Republic of China (“**PRC**”) counter-sanctioned Mr. Chong personally in response to Canada imposing sanctions on the PRC for its actions against the Uyghur population.
- [6] Mr. Chong described that the imposition has not had any impact on his ability to fulfill his role as an MP. He described that it has emboldened him to continue publicly denouncing international law violations by China as it captures their attention.
- [7] While Mr. Chong would have no issue travelling to any country other than China as an MP, his concern with the Chinese sanctions is the potential of extra-legal extraditions for his family members and close associates by countries who are politically-adjacent to China. He provided the case of Huseyin Celil as an example. [Mr. Celil is a Uyghur refugee holding Canadian citizenship who was arrested in Uzbekistan in 2006 and extradited to China, against the objections of the Canadian government, where he was charged with terrorism and sentenced to life in prison.]
- [8] More generally, Mr. Chong believes the imposition of sanctions on Canadian officials has had no deterrent effect on MPs as they take pride in being sanctioned by authoritarian regimes and often publicly advertise the fact of having been sanctioned.

3. Government of Canada’s Response to China’s Targeting of Mr. Chong’s Family

- [9] In the addendum to his stage 1 interview, Mr. Chong described reading an article in the Globe and Mail in May 2023 that a diplomat working from the PRC consulate in Toronto had been gathering information about him since 2020 to target him and his extended family in Hong Kong. Mr. Chong described his understanding that CSIS had sent an

Issues Management Note (“**IMU**”) related to this incident to Public Safety Minister Bill Blair in May 2021 but that it had not been read.

- [10] Mr. Chong found it alarming that national security documents, such as this IMU, are purportedly going unread. Mr. Chong expressed surprise at reading in the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (“**NSIRA**”) report of the existence of three additional intelligence products —other than the IMU—which he believes also relate to the PRC government’s targeting of him and his family.
- [11] Mr. Chong believes the most relevant documents are these three intelligence products disseminated prior to the IMU. He believes it is plausible the government deliberately withheld information from him given his criticism of the government.
- [12] Mr. Chong does not recall that the House of Commons provided him with any information specific to this incident. He noted that the House of Commons regularly reaches out to all MPs to offer support in case of physical threats. Mr. Chong described that parliamentary security is robust on Parliament Hill and off-the-hill, and that non-physical security threats are disclosed promptly to MPs by either the Parliamentary Protective Service or police of local jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the threat.
- [13] In this instance however, the House of Commons was as unaware as Mr. Chong given the Government of Canada’s withholding of information. Mr. Chong noted that changes have been made in the last year with respect to the flow of information between the Government of Canada and Parliament. He understands that there are now protocols in place to transmit intelligence and information to the Sergeant-at-Arms to protect MPs. He described that, while he is not sure of the details of this new process, he has nevertheless noticed a greater level of information flow between the entities involved.
- [14] Mr. Chong described two ways in which he believes information regarding threats and security should be disclosed, premised on who is best positioned to take action to counter a threat, with the overall goal of ensuring MPs retain their ability to execute their powers, immunities and privileges:
- a. Threats and attacks that occur on Parliament Hill or jeopardize House of Commons systems, such as cyberattacks, should be addressed by the

Government of Canada with the House of Commons Administration. The House Administration should then be responsible for informing affected MPs.

- b. Threats and attacks that occur off Parliament Hill should be addressed by the Government of Canada directly with affected MPs, with the House of Commons copied on the disclosure. Under this framework, the incident targeting Mr. Chong's family should have been addressed by the Government of Canada directly with Mr. Chong.

3.1 Dissemination of Intelligence Relating to this Incident

- [15] Mr. Chong believes he was the first MP to receive a general defensive briefing ahead of the 44th General Election. This was an unclassified briefing of general application held in May 2021 in Toronto. Upon reviewing paragraph 128 of the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians ("**NSICOP**") report¹, Mr. Chong confirmed the topics of the general briefing listed therein (i.e., CSIS' mandate, definition of foreign interference and how MPs can protect themselves) are accurate. He was not told that the PRC had collected information on him and his family as part of this briefing.
- [16] Around the same time, Mr. Chong recounted that there had been rumours on Parliament Hill that the senior civil service was seeking the Prime Minister's approval to brief MPs as part of an overall action plan.
- [17] No further information was provided for almost two years, until Mr. Chong met with the Director of CSIS, David Vigneault, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor ("**NSIA**"), Jody Thomas and the Prime Minister in May 2023. Mr. Vigneault was explicit that this meeting was a threat reduction meeting, and it was clear to Mr. Chong that the meeting was occurring pursuant to an emergency and under exigent circumstances. He believes the government was in full panic mode given the media scrutiny, and that this was not a controlled way to release information. In other words, he believes the

¹ NSICOP, *Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions* (Ottawa: June 3, 2024) [NSICOP Report], **COM0000363(EN)/COM0000362(FR)**.

government would not have been releasing information at this time but for the Globe and Mail's reporting.

- [18] According to Mr. Chong, Mr. Vigneault indicated he was declassifying certain information pursuant to section 12.1 of the *CS/S Act* and proceeded to read two paragraphs from a report. The entire meeting lasted 40 minutes and contained more details than the one held in May 2021.
- [19] Mr. Chong explained that the release of information was important as it raised awareness of the actions of the Chinese consulate in Toronto, both for the public and for Mr. Chong (who frequently visited the area near the consulate).
- [20] Mr. Chong has not received any further briefings since May 2023 and has received no additional information from the Government of Canada as it relates to foreign interference since GAC and the Rapid Response Mechanism (“**RRM**”) met with him in July 2023 about a disinformation campaign against him, discussed below.

4. The NSICOP and NSIRA Reports

- [21] Mr. Chong stated that he was not involved in the reviews conducted by NSICOP and NSIRA.² He has read the public version of both reports.
- [22] When asked for his general reaction to the reports, Mr. Chong described that the government's refusal to disclose the identities referenced in the NSICOP/NSIRA reports amounts to protecting and shielding from public scrutiny those who are alleged to have engaged in foreign interference. Mr. Chong noted that, on the other hand, the victims of these same acts are being publicized. He described the government's approach as illogical.
- [23] Mr. Chong believes the way the government has approached foreign interference is “killing the result with process”. He explained that while the government has instituted three different and independent processes to investigate the allegations of foreign

² *Review of the dissemination of intelligence on People's Republic of China political foreign interference, 2018-2023* (Ottawa: May 28, 2024) [NSIRA Report] **COM0000364(EN)/COM0000365(FR)**; NSICOP Report, **COM0000363(EN)/COM0000362(FR)**.

interference, the House of Commons—through its committees—remains best positioned and equipped to investigate and deal with these allegations.

- [24] In Mr. Chong's view, the government prevented the House of Commons from doing its job to investigate at first by producing unusable redacted documents and has since used the different reviews in place to delay engaging with the issues (e.g., referring certain findings from the NSICOP/NSIRA reports to the Commission).
- [25] On the other hand, had the government been truly willing to confront the issues relating to foreign interference, the House of Commons could have thoroughly dealt with the matter, including issuing disciplinary recommendations, within six to eight months.
- [26] Mr. Chong believes that the best response to the allegations of foreign activities is to release as much information on alleged participants as possible. He believes that all information should be made public under Threat Reduction Measures or other legitimate processes such as the Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs ("**PROC**"), in particular as they relate to those who have wittingly engaged in foreign interference activities. For those who are unwitting participants in foreign interference activities, in addition to public disclosure of the information, he believes they should also be informed directly so as to take necessary action to better protect themselves.
- [27] Mr. Chong noted those who engage in foreign interference activities should not be judged on a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, on the political standard of accountability through Parliament. Not being concerned with the criminal standard of evidence would facilitate the disclosure of evidence. He also noted that other politicians have lost their jobs for far less serious actions.
- [28] At the very least, Mr. Chong believes the identity of those MPs, past and present, who are alleged to have wittingly collaborated with India to the detriment of Canada should be disclosed, as should the identity of the MP who reportedly passed along confidential information to a foreign intelligence officer and sought to arrange a meeting in that state with a senior intelligence official.³

³ NSICOP report, paras. 53-57, **COM0000363(EN)/COM0000362(FR)**.

4.1 Clearance is Not Required to Receive Classified Information

- [29] Mr. Chong has not been offered the opportunity to review the classified versions of either the NSICOP or the NSIRA reports. He believes it would be valuable for MPs to know the names of the individuals referred to in the report and that it is important for MPs to have access to all information.
- [30] Mr. Chong believes that the government is relying on “process” to refuse to release the names of the individuals referenced in the reports, which it could otherwise lawfully do, as it did [in September 2023] in the case of the assassination of Hardeep Singh Nijjar. In particular, Mr. Chong does not believe it is necessary for an individual to obtain secret or top-secret clearance through the Treasury Board secretariat’s *Policy on Government Security* before receiving classified information, and that instead, there are six different ways to receive highly classified information.⁴
- [31] For example, a person could obtain classified information under a Threat Reduction Measure. The classified information underlying the NSICOP/NSIRA reports could also be disclosed by the Prime Minister, such as was done in the case of Mr. Nijjar. Similarly, Mr. Chong is of the view that MPs can reveal secret or top-secret level information in the House of Commons,⁵ in its committees, and even potentially in public. He provided the example of bills being classified as “secret” until it is declassified upon introduction by a Minister in the House of Commons.
- [32] Mr. Chong also believes members of the King’s Privy Council can receive classified information by virtue of their oaths and role, without having to apply for a security clearance. He stated that, as both he and his party leader, Pierre Poilievre, are members of the King’s Privy Council, they are entitled to receive classified information pursuant to this membership.

⁴ See **MMC0000029** for a chart provided by Mr. Chong identifying the various ways a person, according to him, could receive highly classified information.

⁵ Section 12 of the *NSICOP Act* clarifies that members of NSICOP may not claim immunity based on parliamentary privilege for any contravention of the *Security of Information Act*. According to Mr. Chong, the existence of this provision confirms that MPs not part of NSICOP are able to rely on parliamentary privilege to disclose classified information in the House of Commons.

- [33] Mr. Chong has therefore recommended that Mr. Poilievre not obtain a security clearance through the process set out in the Treasury Board Secretariat's *Policy on Government Security*.
- [34] Mr. Chong explained that the Prime Minister is requiring any party leader who wishes to review the classified reports to obtain top secret clearance through the Treasury Board process, which leads to two problems:
- a. Doing so would prevent the person receiving the information from doing anything with it given the non-disclosure undertaking and requirements under the *Security of Information Act*. For example, Mr. Poilievre could not share the information with his caucus who could then expel a Conservative Party of Canada MP, if necessary; and
 - b. The Treasury Board process requires a person to disclose sensitive and personal information that could be politically damaging. This process is controlled by the Privy Council Office (“**PCO**”), and as such, falls under the purview of the Prime Minister. Accordingly, any information disclosed in the process of obtaining a clearance could be weaponized by the incumbent governing political party. Mr. Chong characterized the current relationship between Conservative MPs and the Prime Minister as distrustful.

4.2 All Information—Classified or Not—Should be Released

- [35] Mr. Chong is of the view that the appropriate way forward is for the government to release the classified reports, including the names of individuals involved, to PROC who can then analyze the information and produce a report with recommendations for sanctions, such as expulsion or suspension of benefits.
- [36] More generally, he believes that the government must “flood the zone with information”, and that the thinking that information can be contained and withheld is no longer practical as any void of information is likely to be filled with disinformation. Accordingly, it is better to err on the side of caution by releasing information in a controlled manner that minimizes injury to international affairs.

- [37] In Mr. Chong's view, while disclosure of classified information poses some risk, the secrecy that currently exists in Ottawa has led to a serious undermining of the public's confidence, and the lack of information has damaged reputations. The current culture of secrecy offsets any risk associated with disclosure.
- [38] Mr. Chong cited examples in the United Kingdom and the United States of America as western democracies who regularly release classified information. While this approach results in inadvertent or problematic disclosures in some instances, their systems work effectively most of the time.
- [39] Mr. Chong explained that he supports Bill C-377⁶, a bill sponsored by Alex Ruff, MP for Bruce-Grey-Owen Sound, which he believes removes one barrier from any potential argument that MPs do not have a need-to-know requirement that is sometimes attached to classified information. In other words, the Bill seeks to satisfy the need-to-know principle through a presumption imbedded in in the legislation. Mr. Chong acknowledges it is a suppletive provision that provides greater certainty, rather than the be-all-end-all solution.
- [40] In any event, Mr. Chong believes this provision is not strictly necessary as MPs are entitled to receive any and all classified information through parliamentary privilege as was done in the case of the Winnipeg lab incident. He also cited the example of the UK Parliament requesting privileged documents relating to the Irish backstop during Brexit.
- [41] Mr. Chong believes that addressing allegations of foreign interference through Parliament would ultimately restore public confidence as the public would see those engaged in foreign interference being held accountable by the House of Commons—a jury of peers who can deliver recommendations ranging from reprimand to expulsion.

⁶ A member of the Senate or the House of Commons who applies for a secret security clearance from the Government of Canada is, for the purposes of the consideration of their application, deemed to need access to the information in respect of which the application is made.

4.3 Review of Foreign Interference Tactics in NSICOP/NSIRA Reports

Targeting of family incident

- [42] Upon reviewing paragraphs 47-49 of the NSICOP report, Mr. Chong stated that these paragraphs are consistent with his understanding of the matter.
- [43] He noted that he has been long aware of the foreign interference tactics deployed by the PRC, well before the media reporting over the last two years. The main impact of these tactics on him personally has been the need to cutoff ties with family in China.
- [44] Mr. Chong explained the PRC's tactics have had a chilling effect on MPs given the electoral consequences of speaking out against the PRC government. He estimates that this impacts approximately a dozen ridings.
- [45] Accordingly, while neither Mr. Chong nor the Conservative Party have abstained from speaking out against human rights abuses and international law violations due to electoral calculus (e.g., having voted in support of Bill C-70), they have been careful and intentional with the messaging to ensure it is clear they are speaking out against the Chinese Communist Party ("**CCP**") government and not Chinese people or China as a nation itself.
- [46] Mr. Chong did note that he is aware of at least one MP that is reluctant to speak out against the PRC given the potential impact on that MP's business interests in China.

Reciprocal Relationships and the Use of Proxies, including Political Staffers

- [47] Mr. Chong indicated that he was not independently aware of other incidents involving staffers, other than one instance in which Mr. Chong was told that a staffer of an MP was terminated in the last year following suspicious activity of snooping and photographing other MPs' offices.
- [48] Mr. Chong also described that he was recently approached at a party fundraiser by an individual offering assistance in political outreach. This individual had had their employment in the government terminated a number of years ago because of concerns of links to a foreign intelligence-gathering service. Mr. Chong came to know of this

person's background using open-source information. He informed the office of the leader of the Conservative Party of the matter.

[49] He contacted the NSIA, Jody Thomas, to inquire whether this individual was still considered by the Government of Canada to be compromised. Ms. Thomas subsequently told Mr. Chong that the Government of Canada no longer had any records on this person. Mr. Chong also mentioned the situation with this individual to CSIS Director, David Vigneault. While Mr. Vigneault indicated to Mr. Chong that CSIS would be following up with him about this matter, Mr. Chong has not heard anything since.

[50] Mr. Chong characterized the hiring of political staffers as a point of vulnerability. Employment in the office of MPs is an "at-pleasure" employment with no rigorous background check. The House of Commons currently does not provide any guidelines to MPs when it comes to hiring staffers. In general, the hiring and firing of political staffers is a sensitive area, which MPs guard jealously.

[51] He described that it would be helpful to have a more rigorous standardized process that involved the House of Commons doing background checks, including receiving information from CSIS and the security and intelligence community. The hiring MP could be involved in that process as well. Moreover, the topic of hiring political staffers should form part of any general briefing relating to foreign interference given to MPs.

Political Party Governance and Administration

[52] Mr. Chong described that leadership contest races often have inadequate rules, which can be problematic since, unlike nomination contests, there are no secondary checks from Elections Canada and the stakes are much higher.

[53] From reading the NSICOP report, he understood that India sought to interfere in the 2022 Conservative Party leadership race whereas the PRC sought to interfere in both the 2020 and 2022 leadership contests. He has no additional information independent from the report, and it is unclear to him whether these foreign states' involvement was to the benefit or detriment of a particular campaign, or if it targeted the race more generally.

[54] Mr. Chong agreed with the recommendation at paragraph 155 of the NSICOP report,⁷ that party leadership be apprised of any foreign interference activities, as foreign interference targets both parties and their members.

Cyberattacks

[55] Mr. Chong could not recall any signs of cyberattacks, other than an incident in 2020 he deemed suspicious in which, during a phone call with a friend, a recorded loop of that very conversation began playing over the call.

[56] Mr. Chong is not and has never been a member of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (“**IPAC**”). He believes that the government and House of Commons should have informed the MPs who are members of IPAC of the cyberattack against them [by Advanced Persistent Threat 31 (APT31), a PRC-affiliated group]. He does not know why the targeted MPs were not told.

[57] Mr. Chong is aware of a May 2023 directive issued by the Minister of Public Safety directing CSIS to inform parliamentarians of threats to their security whenever possible. His understanding is that other incidents have been disclosed to MPs under this directive.

Disinformation

[58] Mr. Chong indicated that spreading disinformation is a pervasive tactic used by the PRC to engage in foreign interference. He cited the campaign of disinformation against him launched by the PRC a week and a half after the family targeting incident was made public. This campaign involved 1 million users on WeChat and up to 5 million people globally.⁸ His understanding is that the Canadian public was largely unaware of this campaign given it took place in a foreign language.

⁷ “[T]he government should work with all parties to establish the means to allow CSIS and other intelligence organizations to raise with party leaders specific instances of foreign interference occurring prior to, during and after an election, so that those instances may be addressed.”

⁸ <https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/wechat.aspx?lang=eng>

5. Nomination Contests

- [59] In Mr. Chong's view, the easiest way to secure nomination contests is to have political parties regulate them. He noted that parties are highly protective of their internal operations, and that accordingly, they are not favourably disposed to any kind of external regulation.
- [60] For example, he cited a proposed modification from 2004 during a Conservative Party convention that called for Elections Canada to manage membership for the party, which would be at no cost to members—a hybrid of the United States primary system. Mr. Chong described this approach as highly prescriptive and that it might not have all party support.
- [61] Rather, Mr. Chong suggested a two-fold approach:
- a. Parties should take greater enforcement action to ensure the rules that already exist within each party are respected and followed. Mr. Chong noted that the allegations of foreign interference in the Don Valley North riding arise because of not enforcing the existing rules within the Liberal Party, such as the residency requirement and the prohibition against intimidation.
 - b. Second, to the extent new rules are necessary, parties should seek to pass those as party rules governing the entity as opposed to amending their constitution, which can be a challenging and cumbersome process. Modifying or introducing party rules is a much faster process and cover topics of membership, voting requirements, timing of nomination contests and eligibility to participate in the various processes.
- [62] While Mr. Chong recognized that party rules relating to nomination contests are often not as strict as they could be, he noted that the Conservative Party rules are more stringent compared to those of other parties. For example, they require that anybody purchasing a membership use a personal credit card, a cheque or a bank draft in that individual's name. Nonetheless, he believes it is incumbent on all parties to ensure the appropriate rules are in place to safeguard the integrity of their nomination contests.

6. Mis/Disinformation

- [63] Mr. Chong reviewed paragraph 35 of the NSICOP report that described the campaign of disinformation targeting Mr. Chong starting in May 2023 and the government's response upon discovering this operation in June 2023.
- [64] Mr. Chong commended the government for its response to this disinformation operation and indicated that, from his perspective, the process worked well. He was satisfied with the information provided to him and the government's decision to release known information to counter against any potential impact of the disinformation.
- [65] In terms of how he was first made aware of the disinformation campaign, Mr. Chong indicated that the Associate Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cindy Termorshuizen, reached out to Mr. Chong to notify him that GAC had identified a campaign of misinformation targeting Mr. Chong during the RRM's monitoring and that it would be publicly disclosing this information.
- [66] GAC did not release this information until Ms. Termorshuizen was able to provide Mr. Chong with a briefing about a week later. Mr. Chong was also given an opportunity to comment on the news release. He was satisfied with the level of information contained therein.
- [67] Mr. Chong felt the government's decision to release information afforded him some protection from the awareness the disclosure created among the general public. In addition, knowing that the PRC was behind the disinformation Mr. Chong was seeing was also reassuring for him; in particular, knowing that the negative comments and labels attributed to Mr. Chong were not organic but rather the product of the PRC's actions.
- [68] Mr. Chong reiterated that releasing information is the best course of action, and that the process in responding to this disinformation campaign should also apply to instances of foreign interference more broadly, including to the allegations contained in the NSICOP and NSIRA reports.

6.1 Importance of State Attribution

- [69] Mr. Chong is of the view that it was important that allegations of foreign interference be connected to a foreign state or actor. In the event there is no connection to a foreign entity, Mr. Chong stated that the Canadian government should not be involved in such discourse or actions. In these instances, it is up to political actors to respond.
- [70] Mr. Chong acknowledged the difficulty in connecting a particular action to a foreign state. He described that, in his view, the appropriate threshold for attribution should be “some evidence of a link” to a foreign state or non-state actor.
- [71] He noted that GAC’s announcement relating to the PRC’s disinformation campaign from May 2023 was “perfect”.⁹ The announcement described that it was “likely” foreign state involvement and that it was “highly probable” that China played a role in the disinformation operation.

7. Recommendation and Areas for Reform

- [72] Mr. Chong identified money-laundering operations as a significant problem when it comes to foreign interference. He described that a large part of foreign interference involves monetary exchanges, and that existing tools, such as beneficial ownership registries, are ineffective. For example, many registries fail to capture real estate and trusts which can then be used to fund foreign interference activities.
- [73] For greater context, Mr. Chong described that China has allocated nearly USD \$2.6 billion to the United Front Work Department, a department used by the CCP to conduct foreign interference. About a quarter of this budget (approximately USD \$600 million) is being allocated to influencing foreigners and overseas Chinese. He surmises that at least 10% of this \$600M USD budget is aimed at Canada on account of the country’s

⁹ [“WeChat account activity targeting Canadian parliamentarian suggests likely foreign state involvement”: https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/wechat.aspx?lang=eng](https://www.international.gc.ca/transparency-transparence/rapid-response-mechanism-mecanisme-reponse-rapide/wechat.aspx?lang=eng)

relative size and importance. This implies that approximately CAD \$90 million annually is being allocated to foreign influence operations targeting Canada.

[74] Accordingly, new legislation and tools are necessary to be able to gather and analyze financial data in pursuit of money laundering. For example, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada's ("**FINTRAC**") enabling legislation should be updated accordingly, as should privacy legislation to give banks greater information-sharing power. Other possibilities include modernizing the RCMP's training and recruitment to include data scientists to analyze financial data and perform quantitative analysis.

[75] Mr. Chong believes Bill C-70 addresses many concerns, which is why the Conservative Party earnestly supported the bill. He believes many of the recommendations relevant to the Commission are already captured in Bill C-70.