

UNCLASSIFIED



Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference
in Federal Electoral Processes and
Democratic Institutions

Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère
dans les processus électoraux et les
institutions démocratiques fédéraux

Interview Summary: Public Safety Canada (Shawn Tupper, Tricia Geddes, Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère)

Lead officials from Public Safety Canada (“**PS**”) were interviewed in a panel format by Commission Counsel on June 20, 2024. The interview was held in a secure environment and included references to classified information. This is the public version of the classified interview summary that was entered into evidence in the course of hearings held *in camera* in July and August 2024. It discloses the evidence that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

- Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.

1. Interviewees

- [1] Shawn Tupper was appointed Deputy Minister (“**DM**”) of PS in October 2022. He is the Senior Deputy in, and is responsible for, the PS portfolio. This involves a partnering and coordination role with the PS portfolio agencies¹, and supporting the Minister in the development, coordination and implementation of policies and programs in the areas of national security, community safety, crime prevention, law enforcement and emergency management. He has served 38 years in the Canadian public service.

¹ The Public Safety portfolio agencies are: the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the Correctional Service of Canada, the Canada Border Services Agency, and the Parole Board of Canada.

UNCLASSIFIED

- [2] Tricia Geddes was appointed Associate Deputy Minister (“**DMA**”) of PS on June 20, 2022. In that capacity, she supports the DM. She had previously served as the Deputy Director, Policy and Strategic Partnerships, in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (“**CSIS**”). She has been in the national security community since 2012.
- [3] Sébastien Aubertin-Giguère was appointed Associate Assistant Deputy Minister (“**Associate ADM**”) in the National Cyber Security Branch (“**NCSB**”) of PS in June 2022. In this capacity, he supports the Senior ADM, Patrick Boucher, over the full range of his activities. In March 2023, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère was also appointed National Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator (“**NCFIC**”).
- [4] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère explained that there was no sharp distinction between his functions as Associate ADM and NCFIC. He indicated that the latter involves bringing together the national security community and coordinating government activities on issues that have a foreign interference (“**FI**”) dimension, which allows him to take on additional leadership on those files. As Associate ADM, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère remains involved in all of the day-to-day aspects of the NCSB and related national security issues more broadly. Mr. Tupper noted that his expectation is that Mr. Aubertin-Giguère works together with Senior ADM Boucher, but reports directly to him on FI issues. He also expects that Mr. Aubertin-Giguère will be PS’s lead on FI and will take a whole-of-government role on those issues. His appointment as NCFIC also increases stability on that front, but that it is a new position that they continue to develop.

2. Structure of NCSB

- [5] Mr. Tupper explained that the National Security Operations Directorate (“**NSOD**”) has an important role within the NCSB. The NSOD runs many programs, such as the assessment of the security implications of investments under the *Investment Canada Act*, is in charge of the dissemination and control of sensitive materials, coordinates work across government, and often leads briefings to the Minister.
- [6] Ms. Geddes noted that there had been significant investment to improve the tracking of intelligence, ensure consistency and ensure that PS has a robust approach to the

UNCLASSIFIED

management of information flow. She noted that a dedicated group within the NSOD is now in charge of triaging and tracking the intelligence that is sent to senior officials.

- [7] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère elaborated that the NSOD is staffed by approximately 30 employees. Three directors work under the NSOD's Director General ("DG"), two of whom are respectively responsible for a counter FI team and an operations team. The operations team manages the flow of intelligence and is also the secretariat for ADM National Security Operations Committee, which it co-chairs with the Privy Council Office ("PCO") Intelligence Assessment Secretariat.
- [8] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère also described the National Security Policy Directorate ("NSPD"). It has three teams, each managed by a director. One team is focused on counter-terrorism, passport orders, and listings under the *Secure Air Travel Act*. The second team is focused on shaping the policy agenda for national security matters. It also manages CSIS warrant applications under section 12 of the *CSIS Act* and other legislative authorities (including under the *CLOUD Act*), and coordinates, from PS's perspective, the requests flowing from the ongoing review processes into national security (such as the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency). Ms. Geddes added that the NSPD was also in charge of managing the ministerial directives to agencies.
- [9] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that the third team in NSPD is focused on economic security, including issues related to Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada, as well as Research Security.
- [10] Mr. Tupper noted that, while policy development flows through all PS directorates, as the lead policy directorate, NSPD takes a broader look at the activities of the national security community and develops overarching strategies. He explained that PS is the government agency with the primary responsibility for developing national security policy, and that it was important to have some resources who are able to "step back and breathe". He noted that this longer-term perspective was an important aspect of what PS can contribute to the national security community.

UNCLASSIFIED

[11] Mr. Tupper distinguished PS's policy mandate from PCO's, which does not typically develop policy, but rather is a convener of the national security community, with a challenge function. He opined that the exchanges between the more analytic functions of PCO and PS's policy-oriented work were mutually beneficial.

3. Intelligence Flow

[12] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that PS was presently at the midpoint of a pilot project in which an embedded CSIS official, supported by a small team, manages the tracking of intelligence within PS. He assessed that PS has airtight control over the readership of intelligence products.

[13] Mr. Tupper and Ms. Geddes noted that PS had seen an improvement in the dissemination of intelligence since the arrival of the CSIS official. The dissemination service that they are receiving as consumers of intelligence is more responsive.

[14] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère explained that this change coincided with the migration to a new platform that is now used by CSE and CSIS to disseminate intelligence to government partners. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère's view was that this new platform is a great product because it allows feedback, tracking and management of all intelligence assets.

[15] Mr. Tupper explained that the Minister of Public Safety receives intelligence from both PS and CSIS. He assessed that, with the improved tracking of intelligence, PS is able to identify what should be sent to the Minister more efficiently. He pointed out that the mandate of the Minister of PS is very broad, given his extensive portfolio. While the Minister receives intelligence briefings in both written and verbal form, the Minister makes himself available as needed for verbal briefings to discuss the most significant pieces of intelligence. Later in the interview, Mr. Tupper added that the Minister has access to several Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities ("**SCIF**").

[16] Mr. Tupper explained that he holds regular meetings with the Deputy Heads of the portfolio agencies, which allows him to: (1) build and maintain relationships with the Deputy Heads of the agencies; and (2) try to ensure coordination and cohesion across the agencies so that 'one PS voice' is engaging with the national security community.

UNCLASSIFIED

Doing so also provides an opportunity for the agencies to raise and discuss any challenges they are facing.

- [17] Reflecting on the significant amount of intelligence that flows through PS, Mr. Tupper noted that it is always challenging but necessary to process and analyze vast amounts of information and data to develop policy in any area. He indicated that PS had taken the steps necessary to build up its capacity to be able to collect, review and triage the information and intelligence it receives. He mentioned that PS had integrated its operational work (which coordinates the responses to specific events) and policy development.
- [18] With respect to the relevance of the intelligence that he receives, Mr. Tupper noted that he had been working with Client Relations Officers (“**CROs**”) [CROs are CSE employees who are housed within other departments or agencies and assist with the dissemination of classified reporting to ministerial offices and other senior government officials] for an extended period of time. Owing to this long working relationship, the CROs have a good awareness of the intelligence that will be useful to his work and an awareness of the intelligence that he does not need to see. He explained that he has taken a similar approach with the CSIS official embedded with PS, as described by Mr. Aubertin-Giguère.
- [19] Ms. Geddes said that she had a similar relationship with the CROs and the CSIS official embedded with PS and that the intelligence she receives is tailored to her particular areas of focus at any given point. Given her experience in the national security and intelligence community, she has developed a good knowledge of what exists and is available in the system, what is (or is not) useful to her work, and has confidence that she will receive those materials.
- [20] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that the pool of available intelligence, between what Canada and its allies produce, is very broad. However, he indicated that this volume was manageable because, while someone can research and read available intelligence on their own, intelligence collectors have developed a good understanding of their intelligence clients’ interests. PS has also identified key areas of interest with its CROs,

UNCLASSIFIED

and now with the embedded CSIS official. The migration to the new platform allows for more precision as it enables him to flag especially relevant intelligence to other senior officials. He distinguished between “background” intelligence (*i.e.*, intelligence that can be read some amount of time after it was issued to gain general knowledge on a given topic) and “current” intelligence (which relates more to ongoing and specific issues).

4. Policy Development

- [21] Mr. Tupper indicated that the intelligence that PS receives feeds into its efforts to assess trends to interpret and anticipate future developments. Policy work requires the ability to pull together this information to develop an acute assessment of how an issue is developing, combined with an understanding of priorities, in order to provide effective advice to the government. Ms. Geddes added that policy development does not just rely on intelligence, but also draws from other sources of information.
- [22] Mr. Tupper emphasized that anticipation was paramount in policy development to avoid getting caught behind the active evolution of threats. He distinguished between the responses to immediate threats and the responses to broader, long-term, situations. Developing policies to address the latter requires a deeper understanding that may only be acquired over time. Mr. Tupper indicated that Canada develops policies that respond to these broader issues extremely well and cautioned against confusing issue management with the broader development of policy and advice.
- [23] Mr. Tupper added that policy development involves many diverse stakeholders, who are also involved in monitoring the effectiveness of a policy. He noted that Deputy Heads of the agencies were involved in these discussions, when relevant, to coordinate the implementation of the PS portfolio. Mr. Tupper also noted that PS has exchanges with the Deputy Heads that address narrower issues.

5. Threat Landscape

- [24] Mr. Tupper noted that the understanding of the FI threat has increased over time, and one of the challenges has been to take a step back to understand the underlying issue.

UNCLASSIFIED

He indicated that he had seen some naïveté in this regard, as stakeholders are not fully informed of the extent to which the interests of hostile actors may be served by engaging in FI. The sophistication and technology available to hostile actors has significantly increased in recent years, pointing to social media and cyber attacks as examples. Although the government has seen this threat and evolved its responses, democracies are not always as quick in adapting their policies as compared to how the tactics of nefarious actors change over time.

- [25] Ms. Geddes noted that FI, like all threats, evolves quickly. She stated that governments need to quickly pivot between threats, including terrorism, foreign travelers, ideologically motivated violent extremism and FI. She also remarked that the implementation of policies to address specific threats typically triggers a response on the part of adversaries, who adapt their FI tactics, meaning that both threats and responses are constantly changing.
- [26] Ms. Geddes noted a further development that geopolitical shifts and overseas events more quickly lead to domestic impacts in Canada. Mr. Tupper agreed and observed that the recent events in Gaza and Israel had created significant and immediate pressures on Canada. Similarly, he noted that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, combined with the increased potency of cyber tools available to threat actors, had also increased the use of FI to convey false narratives with the ultimate goal of undermining social cohesion.
- [27] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère indicated that he had also observed a hardening of bilateral relationships with some threat actors, such as Russia, the People's Republic of China ("PRC") and India, all of whom have displayed a greater interest in shaping the narratives about them abroad, especially within the respective diaspora communities. He noted, however, that, despite all these changes, the fundamental objectives of FI remained the same.
- [28] With respect to the growing tensions between Canada and some countries, Mr. Tupper opined that the establishment of governmental committees concerning India and the PRC had been helpful to ensure that all relevant departments had a comprehensive awareness of their intentions. The committees also ensured that the departments were

UNCLASSIFIED

aware of what other departments were doing in response, which helped to ensure consistency and coherence. In his view, information sharing is a crucial benefit of these committees.

6. Intelligence Priorities

- [29] Mr. Tupper explained that the intelligence priorities are established via a process that is led by the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and convenes the whole national security apparatus. PS provides its input and perspective as part of the process. Part of PS's mandate is to extract deliverables from this framework that can inform how we allocate our resources and then be implemented on a more operational scale.
- [30] Ms. Geddes indicated that the intelligence collectors, not PS, were primarily responsible for determining how and whether the priorities were met. They are accountable to their respective Ministers given the ministerial direction they had received. She noted that the monitoring process was not as refined as it could be. Mr. Tupper added that monitoring is challenging because the needs of intelligence clients shift in light of current events, which cannot be captured in the intelligence priorities established by Cabinet at a particular point in time. PS can assist in refocusing priorities when this is necessary.

7. Threats to Parliamentarians

- [31] Mr. Tupper explained that PS is trying to normalize the process for how parliamentarians are briefed about FI. He indicated that the framework for sharing that information is broad, focused on raising awareness and continues to evolve. Where the issue involves threats to parliamentarians, the relevant departments and agencies engage directly with the impacted parliamentarian.
- [32] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère elaborated on the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians (the "**Direction**"). He identified four key elements in the Direction:

UNCLASSIFIED

- a) CSIS is required to investigate all threats to the security of parliamentarians;
- b) If there is a threat to the security of Parliament or a parliamentarian, CSIS will pursue appropriate lawful responses, where possible, including acting pursuant to a threat reduction measure (“**TRM**”);
- c) CSIS will inform the parliamentarian of the threat, provided that this does not compromise an ongoing investigation or source; and
- d) The Minister will be briefed.

[33] He explained that, to implement this Direction, PS coordinated the development of a protocol. As a first step, intelligence pertaining to a threat to a parliamentarian will be brought to the attention of other operational actors (namely, CSIS, CSE, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre), through the ADM National Security Operations Tactical committee, to assess the intelligence and collectively explore possible options. If the operational actors are satisfied that there is a threat, they will identify possible responses and bring those options to the attention of the relevant deputy ministers. He considered that this is a great improvement over past practice, noting that it also allows operational agencies to identify and consider creative mitigation measures.

[34] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère considered that the TRM implemented with respect to Kenny Chiu [a former Member of Parliament] pursuant to the protocol was effective, as Mr. Chiu had been made aware of the threat against him. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that informing Mr. Chiu has reduced the threat against him, because he better understands that threat. Although Mr. Tupper explained that it was challenging for PS to assess the success of an intervention pursuant to the Direction because it depends on the recipient, he also noted that transparency is beneficial, and a briefing also creates pathways with parliamentarians that permits them to come back to the national security community if they see anything further. Ms. Geddes observed that CSIS, which has an obligation to assess the TRMs it carries out, was better placed to account for the effectiveness of the TRM in any specific case.

UNCLASSIFIED

[35] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère added that, in addition to the protocol, he had delivered several unclassified briefings to Parliamentarians in his capacity as NCFIC, together with CSE, CSIS and RCMP representatives.

8. Mis- and Dis-Information

[36] On the topic of mis- and dis-information, Mr. Tupper noted that many departments across the government are attempting to refine our understanding of the associated threats and challenges, such as Canadian Heritage (“**PCH**”), the Democratic Institutions Secretariat of PCO (“**PCO-DI**”), and the Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence.

[37] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère reflected that mis- and dis-information is a complex issue that creates unique difficulties, attributable in part to sensitivities regarding the role of government in assessing the accuracy of information and the impact of false information. Each government department involved addresses mis- and dis-information from its own specific perspective. For instance, PCH focuses on the harmful and hateful content, while PCO-DI supports work to build resiliency in Canada in the information space affecting democratic institutions and elections.

[38] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère added that the Rapid Response Mechanism (“**RRM**”), housed in Global Affairs Canada, was the main monitoring forum for mis- and dis-information driven by foreign state actors. He noted that there are ongoing discussions about whether intelligence agencies should be engaged in domestic open source monitoring.

[39] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère also noted that there were ongoing discussions within government to identify the entity, either from government or the private sector, that should be responsible for monitoring the Canadian social media ecosystem. He explained that the RRM had been designed to identify and shed light on the methodology of foreign threat actors that conduct mis- and dis-information, not to judge the veracity or contents of the information that is spread. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that these various aspects of the government response to mis- and dis-information were interconnected.

UNCLASSIFIED

[40] Ms. Geddes added that it is challenging to identify mis- and dis-information that is distinctively foreign. She also noted that the solution to mis- and dis-information could not rely exclusively on debunking or rebutting every false narrative, but should rather aim to build resilience throughout Canadian society. She said that, while the RRM may lack sufficient resources to comprehensively monitor the Canadian information environment, it was worth asking whether other departments could enter this space and contribute to this type of work.

9. Strategy to Counter Hostile Activities by State Actors (the “HASA Strategy”)

[41] Mr. Tupper was asked about whether there is a difference between the concept of “HASA” [Hostile Activities of State Actors] and FI. He responded that there is little difference between the two concepts. Although PS used “HASA” as its terminology of choice, the department realized that, while others did not always understand the concept of HASA, they understood “FI”. Because of that, PS started to use FI, which Mr. Tupper referred to as essentially a “rebranding”. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that the latter concept had more resonance with stakeholders. The panelists also felt that it was important to adopt terminology that was being consistently applied across the domestic and international national security community.

[42] Mr. Tupper explained that the government’s strategy to counter HASA was borne out of a growing appreciation of the challenges created by HASA. He noted that significant time and effort were spent understanding the broader issue, detecting incidents, and reacting. PS recognized a need to understand Canada’s toolkit, identify the gaps in that toolkit and, where necessary, modernize the available responses. He also noted that this work developed during the COVID-19 pandemic, an event which required the government to make choices between competing priorities.

[43] Ms. Geddes explained that the government realized that there was a need to update the tools available to respond to HASA, to leverage transparency to counter HASA, and to implement a whole-of-government approach as part of a conversation with Canadians.

UNCLASSIFIED

The process to develop the strategy had allowed PS to develop a more refined understanding of the threats and potential solutions.

9.1. Legislative Initiatives

- [44] Mr. Tupper opined that the Government had taken significant steps to implement this strategy, most recently with the tabling of Bill C-70 [Bill C-70 received royal assent on June 20, 2024 and was enacted as *An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference*²]. Mr. Tupper noted that all parties represented in the House of Commons had supported Bill C-70. He considered that this is a testament to the soundness of the principles that underlie the government's strategy and the seriousness of the threats that it addresses.
- [45] Mr. Tupper indicated that, in his view, the main impact of Bill C-70 would be to increase transparency, in part by enabling CSIS to better engage with the public and other levels of government. In his view, because FI is a long-term challenge, improving transparency is a significant and positive step. He also noted that the creation of new FI-related offences bolsters the agencies' toolkits to address the threats. He noted that Bill C-70, and, specifically, the implementation of a registry on the influence activities of foreign agents, was designed to ensure that operational agencies would have the flexibility to adapt their practices as the threat evolves. He concluded by noting that the practical effects of this new legislation would need to be understood and assessed before implementing new initiatives in this field, so it was important to pause policy work in this area, to let the agencies do their jobs, to learn lessons from what has already been done, and then to consider what other tools the agencies may need.
- [46] Ms. Geddes noted that, in her view, the modernization of the *CSIS Act* was the other key feature of Bill C-70.
- [47] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère agreed that Bill C-70 changed the landscape, but that the implementation of the bill would be important. He explained that the enactment of new

² S.C. 2024, ch. 16.

UNCLASSIFIED

offences would not, in itself, counter the threat; their effectiveness would depend on the ability of law enforcement agencies to launch investigations and lay charges. He also noted that the discretion of the new Transparency Commissioner will be critical. Mr. Tupper agreed that they wanted this new position to be fluid and flexible.

- [48] The Panel was also asked about a specific *Counter-HASA Strategy* (which later became a *Counter-FI Strategy*) that PS had drafted. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère clarified that the “public” *Counter-FI Strategy* rested on the same pillars as the internal one and that only the language used to present them was different. The panelists agreed that the public *Counter-FI Strategy* was never published, noting that it was overtaken by other events.

9.2. The NCFIC

- [49] As NCFIC, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère explained that his objective was to bring greater coordination across government on FI issues. He indicated that the office of the NCFIC had recently secured funding, but PS had been risk managing resources since his position was created, including up to 8 employees who have been located throughout the NCSB. At present, his office includes a chief of staff and he is hiring an executive assistant and two other employees who will focus on engagement and coordination. He also works with the Director of Counter Foreign Interference and other managers and analysts within NSOD. In addition, he intends to hire another employee within NSPD who will drive Counter Foreign Interference policy.
- [50] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère indicated that the NCFIC seeks to identify horizontal issues that do not fit into any single department’s remit, to coordinate policy work and to develop a coherent response to these issues. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère pointed to transnational repression as a good example of this type of horizontal issue. He described governance committees, by contrast, as a tool for validating the work that is being done. They engage the national security community and provide a forum for seeking approval for interdepartmental work. He gave the example of the Deputy Minister Committee on FI (“**DMFI**”), which was convened temporarily in a period of intense focus on FI issues to

UNCLASSIFIED

supplement the usual governance mechanisms, as DMs needed to have a forum to discuss FI issues.

- [51] Mr. Aubertin-Giguère was also asked how his NCFIC role fit with the PCO FI Task Force Head and CSIS Counter-FI Coordinator positions. Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that the PCO FI Task Force no longer exists, but that it was a temporary initiative established to ensure that PCO had dedicated resources and extra capacity to deal with the influx of work in 2022-2023. Similarly, he described the position of the CSIS Counter-FI Coordinator as being responsive to a specific area of need, including the simultaneous reviews into the government's response to FI. Those departmental-specific positions did not and do not overlap with the NCFIC, which has a longer-term, whole-of-government outlook, but Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that they all worked together regularly on responses.

10. FI Governance Structure

- [52] Mr. Tupper noted that PS sat on most, and chaired or co-chaired some, committees concerned with national security matters, with the exception of some committees focused exclusively on operations. He identified the Deputy Minister Committee on Intelligence Response ("**DMCIR**"), the DM Committee for National Security, the DM Committee on Operational Coordination, as well as the DM committees on China and India, as some of the most relevant on which PS sits.
- [53] Mr. Tupper added that PCO has proposed a new governance structure for the national security committees, which is still under discussion. PS is not concerned with which department or agency will chair or co-chair the committees under this new structure, but wants to ensure that the proposed governance structure reflects the mandate and authorities of the national security departments and agencies that are part of these committees. He noted that PCO, as opposed to PS and other agencies, does not have the same policy or operational levers; its role is to convene the national security and other committees and ensure there is coherence across this work. Mr. Tupper was confident that, as long as a sound governance structure is in place, the national security

UNCLASSIFIED

community will be able to conduct effective work through the new committee structure, regardless of the departments that chair those committees.

11. Engagement with Stakeholders Outside of the Federal Government

- [54] Mr. Tupper noted that all federal departments have developed their own approach to engage with their provincial and territorial counterparts. He explained that, on the issues of public safety, FI and national security, PS and Justice share an intergovernmental structure. The Ministerial table is co-chaired for the Federal government by the Minister of Public Safety and the Minister of Justice, and this is mirrored at the Deputy Ministers' level and below. Mr. Tupper noted recent attempts to formalize national security issues as being a regular item on the agenda in discussions with provincial and territorial governments. This had been identified as a growing need and something the provinces and territories had been receptive to, especially those that had been directly affected by significant national security incidents.
- [55] However, these exchanges have also revealed a need to build capacity on the part of provinces and territories to receive classified information, in terms of both clearances and the ability to store such information. Mr. Tupper indicated that PS is working on formalizing a process whereby security clearances are an element for certain positions in provincial and territorial governments, to allow for direct and security-cleared contact points with PS's partners, regardless of the individuals filling these positions.
- [56] In addition, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère explained that these central working tables allowed PS to propose briefings to provincial and territorial elected officials. He indicated that this was a recent initiative, and that the goal was to build resilience in the other levels of government. He also noted that PS was working with provinces to include municipalities in these discussions. He considered that the stakeholders are actively engaged.
- [57] Mr. Tupper also noted that the Cross-Cultural Roundtable on Security ("**CCRS**") allowed PS, as well as the Minister of PS, to engage with Canadian members of diaspora communities to develop responsive policies and foster social cohesion. He explained

UNCLASSIFIED

that the CCRS had been set up many years ago, had gone through a hiatus, and had been reconstituted in 2022. Ms. Geddes noted that the CCRS, as well as the extensive consultations that PS undertook to table Bill C-70, were examples of PS's broader work to help communities feel safe to come forward and share their experiences.

[58] In response to a question by the Attorney General for Canada, Mr. Aubertin-Giguère noted that, further to discussions with other ADMs, he had stood up a working group on transnational repression, whose primary and initial objective is to develop a plan to equip Canada and its communities with a toolkit to counter repressive activities of the PRC. He characterized this working group's activities as a mix between policy, operations and engagement. As of the date of the interview, the ADM National Security Operations Committee had approved the plan developed by the working group, and it was expected that the plan would be submitted to DMCIR, further to DMCIR's request to that effect.