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in Federal Electoral Processes and **Democratic Institutions**

Public Inquiry Into Foreign Interference | Enquête publique sur l'ingérence étrangère dans les processus électoraux et les institutions démocratiques fédéraux

Addendum to In Camera Examination Summary: PMO Staff: Katie Telford, Jeremy Broadhurst, Brian Clow and Patrick Travers

Ms. Katie Telford, Mr. Jeremy Broadhurst, Mr. Brian Clow and Mr. Patrick Travers were examined in a panel format by Commission Counsel during in camera hearings held between February 28 and March 6 2024. The following addendum contains information provided by the witness that is relevant to stage 2 of the Commission's inquiry and that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to the critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.

1.1 Flow of intelligence related to Michael Chong

- Mr. Clow testified that the PMO staff learned about the allegations concerning the [1] targeting of Mr. Chong from the Globe and Mail reporting on May 1, 2023. They had not heard about it before that. The media article prompted the PMO to set up a number of conversations with the Prime Minister, Jody Thomas, and David Vigneault to discuss the reporting the following day.
- Mr. Clow went through his notes from May 2, which mention a number of meetings, [2] including that the Prime Minister was to meet with Mr. Chong at 1 pm that day. Mr. Clow did not attend this meeting, but the PM did a quick debrief of the meeting afterward. Mr. Clow provided some context to his notes on this debrief. He recalled that Michael Chong asked whether the Globe and Mail was wrong and the Prime Minister responded that as a leak there may be parts that are true and parts that are exaggerated or untrue. He explained that Mr. Chong acknowledged having previous meetings with CSIS, but

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that the information he received would have been general and would not have pertained to a specific threat. Mr. Chong did not know about this until the Globe and Mail article was published.

- [3] Mr. Clow described his notes from the 2 pm meeting with David Vigneault and Jody Thomas who reported on their meeting with Mr. Chong. Mr. Chong wanted to know whether political staff or Ministers had been informed of the information about him. The answer was no. Mr. Chong asked whether it was a political breakdown, or bureaucratic; Ms. Thomas replied that it had been a bureaucratic decision not to brief the information up to political staff or politicians.
- [4] Mr. Clow went through notes taken from a meeting he attended on May 18, 2023 [CAN017676]. He explained that this was during the period where the government was experiencing weekly explosive leaks and questions coming in from reporters, the Michael Chong article had been published, and a PRC diplomat had been expelled. There was a recognition at this point that while the Prime Minister was getting briefed on much of this information, other key ministers may not be getting the information in real time and were still, to a certain extent, in the dark. Thus, Janice Charette, then Clerk, started a series of meetings so that these ministers would be brought up to speed on things that had already been briefed to the Prime Minister and could discuss what could/should be done about it.
- [5] The May 18 briefing was attended by a CSIS subject-matter expert on China. Mr. Clow's notes record the subject-matter expert saying "PRC – No threats of physical harm to MPs or families, would cross line."
- [6] When the PMO panel was asked whether they had seen a particular intelligence report on Mr. Chong they each testified that they did not see it until after the Globe and Mail reporting on May 1, 2023.
- [7] Ms. Telford testified that when political staff receive reporting they rarely receive names, particularly relating to opposition parties. Further, she testified that they have to rely on the expertise of the senior-most officials to determine what they should see on a caseby-case basis.

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1.2 A Warrant

[8] Ms. Telford testified that she was not aware that CSIS was seeking a particular warrant at the time it was sought.