


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In Camera Examination Summary: The Honourable Dominic LeBlanc

Commission Counsel examined the Honourable Dominic LeBlanc during *in camera* hearings held in July and August 2024. Counsel for the Attorney General of Canada appeared on behalf of the Government of Canada and had the opportunity to examine the witness. The hearing was held in the absence of the public and other Participants. This summary discloses the evidence that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, would not be injurious to critical interests of Canada or its allies, national defence or national security.

Notes to Reader:

- Commission Counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets to assist the reader.

1. Examination by Commission Counsel

- [1] Minister LeBlanc confirmed the accuracy of the classified summary of his June 27, 2024, interview with Commission Counsel and adopted it as his evidence.
- [2] Minister LeBlanc currently serves as the Minister of Public Safety (“PS”), Democratic Institutions (“DI”), and Intergovernmental Affairs. Prior to his current tenure, he served in various other Cabinet positions:
 - a) From November 4, 2015 until August 2016, Minister LeBlanc was the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons;
 - b) In May 2016 until 2018, he was also appointed the Minister of Fisheries, Oceans and the Canadian Coast Guard;

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- c) In August 2018, he was appointed the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Northern Affairs and Internal Trade, and held that position until the 2019 election;
- d) After the 2019 election, Minister LeBlanc was appointed President of the then-Queen's Privy Council for Canada. This included responsibility for the DI portfolio.
- e) In the summer of 2020, Minister LeBlanc was appointed the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs. He held this office, as well as the position of President of the Queen's Privy Council, until the 2021 election;
- f) After the 2021 election and until 2023, Minister LeBlanc was the Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities and also retained responsibility for DI; and
- g) In July 2023, Minister LeBlanc was appointed Minister of Public Safety ("**PS**"), DI and Intergovernmental Affairs.

1.1 Intersection between Democratic Institutions and Public Safety

- [3] In response to questions regarding the advantages of being both the Minister of Public Safety and Minister of Democratic Institutions, Minister LeBlanc noted the increased awareness among Parliament, other levels of government, civil society and the public about the threat of foreign interference ("**FI**") to democratic institutions since the 2022–2023 media leaks. Since assuming the PS portfolio in July 2023, Minister LeBlanc has gained access to operational intelligence from the Security & Intelligence ("**S&I**") community. This intelligence has provided him with a perspective that has further shaped his perspective of the threats faced by Canadian democratic institutions.
- [4] Minister LeBlanc noted that the connection between DI and a department involved in national security is a new development. He opined that the fact that he and his predecessor were not previously linked to the PS portfolio before he assumed office had in no way limited their ability to accomplish his DI mandate. DI is part of the Privy Council Office ("**PCO**"), which is at the heart of the Government of Canada's ("**GoC**")

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bureaucratic operations. Within PCO, many institutions have access to intelligence, most notably the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (“NSIA”). Minister LeBlanc always felt that, as Minister of DI, he had access to the documents and intelligence required for developing policies to protect Canada’s democracy.

1.2 Democratic Institutions Portfolio

1.2.1 Increasing Importance of Countering Foreign Interference

- [5] Minister LeBlanc explained that countering FI has taken an increasingly important place in the DI portfolio over the years because the threat from FI has increased, as well as the public interest in the matter. The partisan debate in Parliament on this topic also increased. The media leaks in 2022 and 2023 created a particular sentiment amongst the public with regards to potential cases of FI. Minister LeBlanc noted that measures to respond to FI also increased.
- [6] In the past, most of DI’s mandate was not specifically focused on FI, but was focused on democratic participation. As such, a lot of the work at DI was done in collaboration with Elections Canada. For instance, DI works with Elections Canada to establish the Independent Commissions that review the electoral map every ten years. Further, former DI Minister Karina Gould proposed legislation that Parliament enacted amending the *Canada Elections Act* to facilitate access to voting.
- [7] In 2018, Minister Gould developed the first Canadian plan for countering FI in response to FI activities that occurred during the 2016 US elections. This was the first time the Government publicly took concrete measures to counter FI. Prior to that, FI was largely a subject of interest to security and intelligence agencies.
- [8] Minister LeBlanc was asked to contextualize the events that led to the report he co-authored with the then-Clerk of the Privy Council, Ms. Janice Charette, titled “*Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Institutions in Canada’s Democratic Institutions*” (the “**LeBlanc-Charette report**”). He explained that this report was initiated by the Prime Minister in February or March 2023, around the same time the Independent Special Rapporteur (“**ISR**”), David Johnston,

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was charged with investigating allegations of FI in Canada. The LeBlanc-Charette report was commissioned in response to the 2022–2023 media leaks and increased concerns within Parliament and among the public about FI. The Prime Minister wanted Canadians to be reassured and made aware of the steps the government was taking to address FI. The Prime Minister asked Minister LeBlanc and Ms. Charette to produce a report that would (1) take inventory of the already existing public recommendations from National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (“**NSICOP**”) and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (“**NSIRA**”) and from the Judd and Rosenberg reports on how to counter FI, (2) indicate if these recommendations had been implemented, and (3) develop an implementation plan for those recommendations not yet addressed. Minister LeBlanc and Ms. Charette collaborated with PCO to produce this report. Minister LeBlanc said that this effort was intended to bring horizontal discipline and coherence across government. This report did not, however, serve as a replacement for other policy work that was underway.

1.2.2 Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy 2.0

- [9] Minister LeBlanc explained that the first update to the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy (the “**Plan 2.0**”) took into consideration the findings and recommendations of Mr. Jim Judd, who had reviewed the operations of the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (“**SITE TF**”) and the Panel of Five during the 2019 Election, as prescribed by the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (“**CEIPP**”).
- [10] In response to questions from Commission Counsel, Minister LeBlanc discussed several recommendations made by Mr. Judd.
- [11] One recommendation was the extension of the temporal scope of the CEIPP to include the pre-writ period. This recommendation was not accepted at the time primarily for two reasons. First, Minister LeBlanc noted that it is hard to define the “pre-writ period” in the context of a minority government, where elections may not occur at a fixed date. Second, Minister LeBlanc noted that Ministers retain their accountabilities during the pre-writ period. He noted that as Minister, outside of election periods, he has the authority to act against FI and to publicly discuss instances of FI as he chooses. Cabinet should be responsible for dealing with threats to Canada’s democracy outside

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the writ period. Minister LeBlanc noted that, although Mr. Judd's recommendation to extend the CEIPP was not accepted, SITE TF's mandate was eventually extended in 2023 to apply to by-elections.

- [12] Mr. Judd also recommended DI to negotiate with social media platforms to renew the non-binding *Declaration for Electoral Integrity Online* (the "**Declaration**"). Minister LeBlanc noted that senior DI officials have met with social media companies to discuss renewal of the Declaration. Discussions centered around encouraging these companies to uphold their own policies on disinformation and misinformation. However, Minister LeBlanc noted that several other issues between social media companies and the government have since arisen that have made these discussions more complex, for example with respect to taxation where funds would then be used to support Canadian artists. Minister LeBlanc noted that Canada is not alone in engaging with social media platforms in relation to online integrity: the United States and many European countries are also active in that regard. He said this was a positive development, as it increases the opportunities for social media companies to adhere to the renewed Declaration.
- [13] Mr. Judd recommended continuing the *Digital Citizenship Initiative*, which focuses on enabling civil society to help Canadians understand and counter online mis- and disinformation. Minister LeBlanc noted that this recommendation had been implemented. He said that the government is not always the best vehicle to explain to Canadians what the threat of disinformation is and how to assess the reliability of the information they find online. Instead, it was decided to engage and finance civil society organizations and universities to conduct research on disinformation which would build resiliency within the public. Minister LeBlanc noted that the research project conducted by McGill University and University of Toronto, along with 10 other partners, is financed to help build citizen resilience. Minister LeBlanc emphasized that the issue of online information is complex, as government intervention with respect to mis- and disinformation can be perceived as impacting freedom of speech as far as open political speech is concerned. This said, Minister LeBlanc noted that the GoC is looking at best practices, such as a recent example during the election in Taiwan, where artificial intelligence and fact checking were used to counter misinformation.

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- [14] Minister LeBlanc noted that another means by which the GoC counters disinformation is through the work of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (“**RRM**”) housed at Global Affairs Canada (“**GAC**”). The RRM monitors the international information environment for disinformation. In Minister LeBlanc’s view, the RRM has proven to be an effective forum to monitor disinformation originating internationally and to share disinformation trends and specific incidents with international partners. Building on the success of the RRM, DI is currently considering policy options to monitor for disinformation. He noted that this task may prove even more important in the future with the sophistication of technology, namely artificial intelligence, which makes misinformation and disinformation more pernicious. This said, Minister LeBlanc cautioned that the government cannot police political discourse. The balance of these competing interests remains under study, with the objective of building confidence in Canadians to be able to recognize online disinformation.
- [15] A new permanent body called the Protecting Democracy Unit (“**PDU**”) was established within PCO to lead an integrated government response to protect Canada’s democratic institutions against FI and disinformation. He said PDU has so far proved useful in laying the groundwork for the upcoming second update to the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy (the “**Plan 3.0**”). PDU has helped (1) draft policies, (2) interact with provinces, territories and municipalities, and (3) interact with civil society organizations to identify the main areas of concern with respect to protecting Canada’s democratic institutions.
- [16] With respect to DI’s current work on the Plan 3.0, Minister LeBlanc acknowledged that discussions were ongoing regarding SITE TF’s membership and mandate, including the possibility of making it permanent. He stated that options were being developed but that no final decisions on that subject would be taken before reviewing the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference (“**PIFI**”)’s recommendations. Minister LeBlanc noted that the Panel of Five has already increased the frequency of meetings to better situate their work within their structure and mandate.
- [17] Minister LeBlanc reflected on the decision to activate the SITE TF during by-elections. He opined that the risk of FI during these events and the ability of the SITE TF to

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provide advice to government during by-elections should not be underestimated. He was reassured to learn the SITE TF did not witness any FI activities that required a public announcement or that could have influenced the results of the recent by-elections.

1.2.3 Engagement with Other Levels of Government

- [18] Minister LeBlanc explained that the GoC developed reference documents on FI intended for provincial, municipal, territorial and Indigenous governments to build resiliency throughout Canada. He hoped these documents would help all levels of various governments develop an understanding of the FI threat, which could prove useful in different aspects of their respective work. For example, he said that if an Indigenous government was considering foreign investors in relation to a natural resource project, Minister LeBlanc hoped it would consider the risk of FI when selecting the right investor.
- [19] In response to questions about education and the limited role of the federal government, Minister LeBlanc remarked that education lies within provincial jurisdiction. The federal government's role in providing education to the greater public regarding FI is therefore limited. Provinces have an important role to play in that matter, and could adapt school curriculum to discuss FI with youth. He said he would raise this subject with his public safety provincial counterparts in an upcoming intergovernmental meeting.
- [20] Minister LeBlanc said that his provincial counterparts have asked him many questions about the extent of the FI threat. In particular, he remembered that British Columbia Premier David Eby had been particularly interested in the issue in the aftermath of the murder of Hardeep Nijjar in British Columbia. Minister LeBlanc recalled that he had asked the Canadian Security Intelligence Service ("**CSIS**") Director to share as much information on the issue as possible with Premier Eby. However, the CSIS Director was limited by the *CSIS Act*, which did not allow for CSIS to share intelligence with provinces or territories at that time. In another case, Minister LeBlanc recalled that he had asked the CSIS Director to share any information he may have about Chinese spy balloons with the Premier of Yukon after the Premier raised the issue with him. Again, the CSIS Director's ability to do so was limited by the *CSIS Act* at that time. Minister

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LeBlanc noted that Bill C-70 will allow for deeper and more substantive conversations with provinces and territories, once appropriate security measures are in place. Bill C-70 also allows for the sharing of some intelligence with academic institutions and private companies. The expectation is that there will be a better flow of information amongst all levels of government and other organizations once Bill C-70 is operationalized.

- [21] Minister LeBlanc also noted that he had discussions with his provincial counterparts on how to best share information about PDU's work and how to build an information infrastructure for sharing classified intelligence.

1.2.4 Political Party Nomination and Leadership Races

- [22] Minister LeBlanc was invited to discuss what the role of the federal government should be regarding internal political party processes generally or regulating internal political party processes. He responded that the Liberal Party of Canada ("**LPC**") is currently reflecting on its rules governing these internal processes. He noted that there is a well-established reluctance amongst Parliamentarians and political parties to accept that a simple majority should be able to legislate regarding the internal rules of other parties.
- [23] Political parties are private entities. They are subject to political finance laws. However, should a party decide, as have the Conservatives, Liberals and NDP, to allow 14 year olds to vote in nomination processes, this is, for Minister LeBlanc, a legitimate means of giving young people a taste of politics and promoting a habit of voting and encouraging future political engagement, including voting once they turn 18.
- [24] In the current context of a minority Parliament, he was not certain that a consensus exists for changes to internal party processes, such as raising the voting age to 18 in nomination processes. Furthermore, Minister LeBlanc reiterated that he questions whether it's even the role of Parliament to interfere in such a fashion.
- [25] Minister LeBlanc accepts that nomination processes are a vulnerability, as they are an entry point for sitting in the House of Commons and potentially becoming a Cabinet Minister. However, he believes that political parties have taken seriously their responsibility to ensure that the nominations processes have integrity. He emphasized that all political parties have regulations, internal accountabilities and appeal procedures

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that are to some degree public. All parties are aware of clandestine tactics and the scale and evolution of the threat of foreign interference. Parties have an obligation to take the threat seriously and explain the counter-measures they have taken. They are accountable to the public. This is why, in part, the Government has started briefings of party representatives during election periods.

- [26] Minister LeBlanc offered a personal reflection. He expressed concerns that, in the context of a possible future majority government, opposition parties would not easily accept that a majority party could legislate the internal affairs of other parties. Indeed, he stated that doing so could set a dangerous precedent and introduce an undesirable partisan dimension, especially if a ruling party chose to legislate the internal workings of another party, and that other party later comes into power. He noted that considerations such as this one are the reason why there exists a long established parliamentary tradition against legislating through simple majority matters which relate to the rules of the House of Commons (e.g., standing orders) or federal elections.
- [27] Minister LeBlanc noted that the options for addressing the issue of nominations are not binary. It is not a choice between legislating the rules and doing nothing. For example, if as Minister of Public Safety, he became aware of intelligence indicating a foreign state was seeking to influence an opposition party's nomination processes, Minister LeBlanc could ask CSIS and PCO to share the relevant intelligence with the party so it could assess the threat and take action as necessary.
- [28] Minister LeBlanc noted that nomination contests are already regulated, to some extent, by the *Canada Elections Act* ("**CEA**"). There are campaign financing rules requiring disclosure of donations that have been put in place in the past 4 years. Also, under the *CEA*, party leaders must validate party candidates for every riding in a general election, regardless of whether they won a nomination race. Further, the *CEA* allows for a party leader to directly nominate a candidate, bypassing the nomination process.
- [29] Although there has been some evolution in the laws governing nominations, Minister LeBlanc believes that parties themselves are accountable to party members and must also have a role in deciding the rules of their internal processes.

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[30] Minister LeBlanc was asked about the statements appearing in the press that morning from the Chief Electoral Officer regarding a proposal to prohibit the bulk purchase of party membership cards. While an interesting proposal, Minister LeBlanc was of the view that this would have to be further considered. For example, this would make accessing party membership more difficult in rural communities with limited internet access. Moreover, he noted that the LPC, and likely other parties, already have processes in place to verify the identity of individuals who have purchased membership cards.

1.2.5 Han Dong

[31] Minister LeBlanc explained that the Prime Minister had asked him to assess, in light of the media leaks, the possibility of reintegrating Member of Parliament (“MP”) Han Dong to the LPC caucus.

[32] In the fall of 2023, Minister LeBlanc met with MP Dong. The Commission asked questions and the witness gave evidence relating to this meeting.

1.3 Public Safety Portfolio

1.3.1 Intelligence Flow

[33] Minister LeBlanc said that his status as a consumer of intelligence increased significantly when he was appointed Minister of PS. In this function, he receives intelligence through oral briefings as well as written updates provided on a regular basis. Further, he is sometimes alerted to specific intelligence by the CSIS Director or the PS Deputy Minister during discussions he has with them.

[34] Minister LeBlanc explained that he may be alerted to other sensitive information by the heads of the different agencies within the PS portfolio [the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (“RCMP”), CSIS, the Canada Border Services Agency, Correctional Service of Canada and the Parole Board of Canada]. For instance, the RCMP Commissioner sometimes informs Minister LeBlanc that they need to discuss a specific incident or intelligence over a secure line.

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- [35] These briefings and conversations are held either over a secure line or in a SCIF. Minister LeBlanc stated that while travelling he is able to attend secure briefings since SCIFs can be found across Canada.
- [36] Minister LeBlanc noted that while he does not sign documents to indicate which information was communicated to him, he understands that there are notes taken of what was briefed. The Minister noted that warrant applications, of which there are different types, are treated differently based on the subject matter of the warrant and they necessitate an elevated degree of precision [based on the authorities being requested]. A close tracking system exists for this purpose.
- [37] Minister LeBlanc explained that the process through which he approves a CSIS warrant application is very formal. When there is a warrant that requires his approval, he is notified and a briefing is scheduled. He is brought to a SCIF where the warrant application is available and then is briefed by CSIS on the contents. During these briefings, Minister LeBlanc has the opportunity to ask any questions he may have.
- [38] Minister LeBlanc noted that each warrant application is different. For instance, some utilize novel techniques, others are renewals, etc. There are rigorous protocols for warrants and they typically arrive to the Minister's office within 24–48 hours after they have been reviewed and approved by the Deputy Minister. The Minister stated that the process for warrant approval flows very efficiently.

1.3.2 National Security Council

- [39] Minister LeBlanc explained that the Prime Minister created the National Security Council (“NSC”) [a Cabinet committee] in an effort to ensure relevant ministers have access to relevant intelligence. Minister LeBlanc explained that the NSC deals with national security issues. This is not limited to traditional terrorism or FI-related matters; it also includes other matters such as economic security. The Prime Minister changes the composition of the meetings based on the subject matter at hand. In addition to relevant Ministers, relevant senior public servants also attend meetings to share their expertise with Ministers. The NSIA acts as the NSC Secretary.

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- [40] Minister LeBlanc stated that he did not agree with NSICOP's finding that the "roles, mandates and accountabilities of the NSC and supporting governance committees are unclear." In his experience, there never was any confusion as to the purpose of NSC meetings. He found that the meetings are an effective and efficient way to bring information to the relevant Ministers.
- [41] Minister LeBlanc explained the NSC is not a decision-making body. If the Prime Minister is satisfied with the information provided by the Ministers and officials, and the matter requires a quick decision, Minister LeBlanc assumes that the Prime Minister would speak to the Clerk of the Privy Council and provide him with instructions as to next steps.

1.3.3 Canada's Countering-FI Strategy

- [42] As part of its work, PS prepared a Counter-FI Strategy. Drafts of this Strategy were prepared both at the end of Minister Mendicino's tenure and at the beginning of Minister LeBlanc's tenure as Minister of PS. However, the development of the Counter-FI Strategy was ultimately put on hold given the rapidly changing political discourse around FI in Canada.
- [43] Minister LeBlanc recalled that, in the aftermath of the media leaks in late 2022 and early 2023, Prime Minister Trudeau appointed Independent Special Rapporteur David Johnston to investigate allegations of FI in Canada's democratic processes. Mr. Johnston later resigned and PIFI was established. In this context, Minister LeBlanc opined that the Government would wait for PIFI's recommendations before adopting a Countering-FI Strategy. Minister LeBlanc believed that this would further allow the Government to benefit from other reports on FI, namely the NSIRA and NSICOP reports. Minister LeBlanc also noted that other events overtook a lot of the strategy itself, including consultations around a foreign influence transparency registry and Bill C-70. In response to a direct question, Minister LeBlanc noted that communicating a public version of the government's overall strategy to countering foreign interference has value and that the Commission's report would be one of the most important elements of whatever the revised strategy would look like.

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[44] In May 2024, Minister LeBlanc tabled Bill C-70, which (1) introduces a Foreign Agents Transparency Registry, (2) amends the *CSIS Act* and (3) creates new criminal offences, among other things. Minister LeBlanc believed that the fact Bill C-70 had been adopted in record time was a testament to how important and unanimous these changes were.

1.3.4 Bill C-70 Operationalization

[45] Minister LeBlanc spoke about the operationalization of Bill C-70, and more precisely, about two elements. First, he said that the appointment of a Foreign Agents Transparency Registry Commissioner is a priority for the Government. He hoped that work on setting up this registry would start as early as possible. Second, he said that PS and CSIS officials were working on making sure the appropriate infrastructure exists to allow CSIS to share intelligence with provincial, municipal, territorial and Indigenous governments, as well as with academic institutions. This means ensuring that the appropriate physical infrastructure exists around the country, and determining which individuals should receive relevant security clearances. In this regard, inspiration is being drawn from what is done in the United States where they have an established protocol of sharing information with large private sector entities that might be the subject of a threat.

1.3.5 Briefing Parliamentarians

[46] Minister LeBlanc was asked some questions about the Ministerial Directive on Threats to Parliamentarians. Minister LeBlanc testified that, shortly after becoming Minister of PS, he confirmed to CSIS and PS officials that he would maintain the Ministerial Direction to CSIS on Threats to Parliament and Parliamentarians, which had been issued on May 16, 2023, by his predecessor at PS, Minister Mendicino.

[47] In August 2023, PS and CSIS sought his opinion on how to implement this Ministerial Direction. He remembered that the CSIS Director had expressed his concern that, if he briefed parliamentarians and shared with them highly classified information, and then the parliamentarians referred to the classified information received in statements made in the House of Commons, they might rely upon parliamentary privilege to effectively exempt themselves from the responsibility to protect the security of the information

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provided. Minister LeBlanc said he understood and shared this concern. In his view, parliamentarians have the incumbent responsibility of treating classified information that is shared with them with a certain level of security to protect the intelligence sources and operational protocols. He noted parliamentary privilege has been developed to encourage free speech in Parliament, and free debate, and to keep people immune from harassing civil lawsuits.

- [48] Minister LeBlanc stated that protecting democracy should be a non-partisan issue. Every elected official has an interest in ensuring that Canadians have confidence in their democratic institutions. The creation of PIFI is a testament of this. It is one of the rare times where all political parties have come together to find solutions to a pressing issue, namely, FI.

2. Examination by the Attorney General of Canada

- [49] Minister LeBlanc was asked about the governance protocol and whether his formal approval was required. Minister LeBlanc clarified that PS and CSIS only sought his opinion on how to implement the Ministerial Direction to CSIS on Threats to Parliament and Parliamentarians; and that no formal approval from him was required.¹
- [50] Minister LeBlanc was asked about Threat Reduction Measures and whether his formal approval was required for CSIS to conduct them. Minister LeBlanc clarified that he is required to approve certain TRMs with an elevated level of risk, including briefings to MPs that fall within this category.
- [51] Minister LeBlanc was asked about the scope of the changes to the Plan to Protect Democracy 2.0. Minister LeBlanc confirmed that six changes were made to the CEIPP further to Mr. Judd's recommendations prior to GE 2021. He also confirmed that one of the changes being considered was regarding social media platforms. This included the need to address online behaviour and content that undermined democratic norms, including the need to address evolutions in the digital space since 2019.

¹ CAN021638, p. 5/16.

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- [52] Minister LeBlanc confirmed that the SITE TF was stood up for by-elections starting in June 2023.
- [53] Minister LeBlanc was asked about the nature of engagements with provinces and territories. Minister LeBlanc clarified that discussions about FI with Provincial and Territorial Governments have been ongoing for a number of years, going back to 2018.
- [54] Minister LeBlanc was asked to opine on whether the delay in publishing the Counter-FI Strategy had an impact. Minister LeBlanc opined that it did not have a negative impact on the government's capacity to develop tools to counter FI. He stated that, absent publishing this strategy, the GoC is doing everything it can to tackle this issue effectively, including the publication of toolkits and the establishment of PIFI.
- [55] Finally, Minister LeBlanc was asked to further elaborate on his remarks about the possibility of regulating political processes, such as nominations. Minister LeBlanc noted that, to the extent that there is hesitation within political parties to address the issue of nominations, it is hesitation to move straight to a legislative solution. All of the parties have an interest in ensuring that their rules and processes are enforced and capable of protecting their processes from foreign interference, which could be accomplished through better awareness of the FI threat, tightening up of existing rules, ensuring transparency around nominations process, etc.
- [56] More broadly, Minister LeBlanc was concerned about the risk of a future Parliament changing internal procedures of other parties for partisan purposes, and for the potential to create such a precedent. He noted that these risks are less evident in a minority Parliament, but that he expects many Parliamentarians would be very uncomfortable if this type of legislation were to be proposed. In his view, serious thought and consideration must be given to ascertaining the right mechanism to address FI in political processes.