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**PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
INSTITUTIONAL REPORT – GLOBAL AFFAIRS CANADA**

Information requested by the Commission:

- (1) An overview of the department or agency's mandate;
- (2) A description of the programs, policies and procedures that were implemented by each department and agency to respond to both the general threat and the actual incidents of foreign interference associated with the 43rd and 44th general elections;
- (3) A listing of key executive positions whose responsibilities were related to the matters covered by the Commission's Terms of Reference (a)(i)(A) and (a)(i)(B) in relevant departments and agencies, and the names of their incumbents since September 2018, with descriptions of their duties;
- (4) All means/channels within relevant departments and agencies by which information prepared by intelligence agencies related to possible foreign interference is provided to the Deputy Minister, Minister's office, and Minister;
- (5) All means/channels by which information related to possible foreign interference is provided from relevant departments and agencies to PCO and PMO;
- (6) For each occasion on which there was an oral or written briefing relating to the matters covered by the Commission's Terms of Reference (a)(i)(A) and (a)(i)(B) to the SITE Task Force, the CEIPP panel, a Deputy Minister (or equivalent), the National Security Intelligence Advisor, the Clerk of the Privy Council, PMO or the Prime Minister since September 2018, a listing of the dates, briefing entity and person, including where possible the content of the briefing, and specific cases raised where applicable;
- (7) A listing of the dates and subjects covered for each occasion where a department provided advice and/or a recommendation to a Minister or a Minister's office in response to specific intelligence on foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions, including interference in parliamentary business, since September 2018;
- (9) A listing of all intelligence products related to the threat or incidence of foreign interference in Canadian democratic processes and institutions developed since September 2018;
- (10) A listing of all the Threat Reduction Measures related to foreign interference in Canadian democratic processes and institutions that have been undertaken since September 2018.

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(1) An overview of the department or agency's mandate;

1. Global Affairs Canada (GAC) is responsible for advancing Canada's international relations, including:
 - a. Developing and implementing foreign policy;
 - b. Fostering the development of international law, international trade and commerce;
 - c. Providing international assistance (encompassing humanitarian, development, and peace and security);
 - d. Overseeing the Government of Canada's global network of missions abroad.
 - e. Providing consular services for Canadians abroad;
 - f. Providing assistance and support for foreign embassies and consulates in Canada; and
 - g. Engagement in La Francophonie's institutions.
2. GAC fulfills its mandate under the leadership of three Cabinet ministers:
 - a. Minister of Foreign Affairs, The Honourable Mélanie Joly;
 - b. Minister of International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development, The Honourable Mary Ng; and
 - c. Minister of International Development, The Honourable Ahmed Hussen.
3. GAC stands as a foundational member of Canada's Security and Intelligence (S&I) Community. Recognizing that numerous critical national security threats, such as foreign interference, have a direct link to foreign policy, GAC actively engages in the S&I community. Through its efforts to promote global and regional security interests and navigate bilateral and multilateral relationships, GAC assumes a vital role in both preventing and responding to threats that impact Canadians and Canada's international interests.
4. GAC is among the largest consumers of intelligence in the federal government. Information regarding the capabilities, intentions, and activities of foreign states, gathered through collaboration with domestic and allied intelligence partners, plays a crucial role in shaping various initiatives within the Department. This intelligence informs not only policy development but also contributes significantly to ensuring the security of Canada's missions abroad. The Department's recommendations to the Minister of Foreign Affairs also rely on both in-house foreign policy analysis as well as intelligence assessments performed by both GAC and other government departments (OGDs).
5. GAC also produces specialized diplomatic reporting and open-source reporting on foreign interference related issues, as well as strategic intelligence assessments.

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6. Within the S&I community, GAC actively engages in collaborative efforts for policy development. This involves consistent coordination with other Departments and Agencies to ensure that newly formulated policies or legislation not only incorporate foreign policy considerations but also align seamlessly with Canada's overarching foreign policy direction.
7. Operationally, GAC, in accordance with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act and Communications Security Establishment Act, holds the mandate to ensure that activities conducted fall in line with Canada's broader foreign policy interests and objectives. Additionally, GAC has the authority to request specific activities that support Canada's foreign policy goals.
8. Examples of GAC's potential responses to foreign interference include:
 - a. Issuing demarches, planning or cancelling high level visits, taking retaliatory measures, such as reducing or suspending diplomatic engagement, denying visas and licenses, declaring Embassy personnel as *Persona Non Grata*, closing Missions abroad, or reducing/limiting the performance of Canada's obligations under Canada's bilateral agreements;
 - b. Deepening bilateral and multilateral cooperation with partners and allies to address and counter foreign interference;
 - c. Publicly attributing hostile activities by foreign actors, including as it relates to cyber incidents, using the GAC-led Government of Canada (GoC) attribution framework; and
 - d. Using communications to counter disinformation on public platforms and programming activities (including supporting research into disinformation and information manipulation, as well as projects seeking to counter it).

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(2) A description of the programs, policies and procedures that were implemented by each department and agency to respond to both the general threat and the actual incidents of foreign interference associated with the 43rd and 44th general elections;

1. GAC engages in bilateral and multilateral forums to share information and best practices with respect to countering foreign interference. This includes the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (G7 RRM), which was established by Leaders at the 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix. The G7 RRM strengthens coordination between G7 countries to identify and respond to diverse and evolving foreign threats to democracy. These threats include hostile foreign state activity targeting democratic institutions and processes. It also includes threats targeting the media and information environment, and the exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
2. The G7 RRM comprises government officials from the G7 community, known as Focal Points, that leverage their respective institutional structures to support whole of government engagement. In addition, Australia, New Zealand, the NATO Secretariat, the Netherlands, and Sweden attend as observers..
3. Since its inception, the G7 RRM has focused on addressing foreign-sponsored disinformation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the G7 RRM served as a useful tool for information exchange around foreign state-sponsored information manipulation and pandemic-related disinformation. The G7 RRM has also enabled real-time information sharing and collaboration with respect to Russian disinformation about the invasion of Ukraine.
4. In Canada, the G7 RRM is coordinated by GAC on an ongoing basis, through the RRM Canada secretariat, which also monitors the digital information environment using open source data analytics for indicators of foreign state-sponsored information manipulation and disinformation. All RRM Canada monitoring activities are guided by a public [Ethical and methodological Framework for Open source data monitoring and analysis](#) available on the Internet. RRM Canada also represents GAC on the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE), acting as an early warning system for indicators of information manipulation and other threats to democracy.
5. The RRM Canada team is positioned in the Centre for International Digital Policy. This unit operates under the Office of Human Rights, Freedoms, and Inclusion, which falls under the purview of the International Security and Political Affairs branch. The RRM Canada team leverages the leadership of the G7 RRM to bring the experiences countering electoral interference from other G7+ countries to Canada. Additionally, the RRM Canada team engages leading civil society organizations to support monitoring and reporting activities.

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6. GAC's communications adhere to the government guidelines established for conduct during an election period. Typically, GAC announcements are minimized during such periods. Nevertheless, exceptions may be granted under specific circumstances, subject to the discretion of senior management within GAC's Public Affairs branch and/or Deputy Minister's office, if required. This includes:
 - a. in the case of a significant international or domestic event where the failure to have the Prime Minister or minister comment would do damage to Canadian interests or prestige;
 - b. announcements relating to the health and safety of Canadians, such as updates to travel advice and advisories; and
 - c. public notices for legal purposes.
7. During General Election 43 (GE 43), RRM Canada monitored the digital information ecosystem for signs of foreign-sponsored disinformation and other forms of information manipulation, and produced daily updates for the SITE. These updates supported SITE's efforts to brief the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP).
8. In GE 43, GAC was one of the four members of the SITE. GAC's key representative to SITE was the Director of the Centre for International Digital Policy, which houses RRM Canada. GAC contributed regular reporting to the SITE and was closely involved in the drafting of the after-action report.
9. RRM Canada also contracted a leading civil society organization in the field of detecting information manipulation, the Atlantic Council's Digital Forensic Research Lab, to provide independent updates on their observations of the digital information ecosystem, and a final retrospective report. RRM Canada produced one ad-hoc report about a specific situation that arose during the GE 43 campaign.
10. Beginning in August 2020, in the lead-up to General Election (GE 44), analysts in RRM Canada prepared standard departmental briefing notes for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to support their participation in the CEIPP.
11. In January 2021, in advance of the election period for GE 44, RRM Canada began to produce reports, seeking to establish a baseline of activity which would be used to compare activity during the GE44 election period.


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12. During General Election 44 (GE 44), GAC again held a position as one of the four members of the SITE. GAC's key representative to SITE was the Director of the Centre for International Digital Policy, which houses RRM Canada.
13. RRM Canada monitored the digital information ecosystem for signs of foreign-sponsored disinformation and other forms of information manipulation and produced daily updates for the SITE. These updates supported SITE's efforts to brief the CEIPP Panel. In addition to daily updates, RRM Canada produced five weekly reports, summarizing key trends observed each week.
14. During the GE 44 election period, RRM Canada produced four ad-hoc reports covering emerging situations during the GE 44 campaign, which were shared with the SITE Task Force. GAC was also involved in the drafting of the after-action report for GE 44.
15. As part of established practice, on September 11, 2019 during GE 43 and August 20, 2021 during GE 44, GAC circulated a Notice to all foreign missions in Canada cautioning them to respect the election period, and withhold views that could affect bilateral relations. The notice was sent via email and reminded diplomats and staff of obligations under Canadian law, Article 41 of the *Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations*, and Article 55 of the *Vienna Convention on Consular Relations*.
16. The 2021 Notice reminded foreign diplomatic staff to ensure that "diplomatic and consular representatives do not conduct activities, which may either be perceived as inducing electors to vote for a particular candidate, or prohibiting them from voting for a particular candidate in any way during an election period. Furthermore, accredited foreign representatives should not – directly or indirectly – make any financial contribution to a candidate, political party or political event." The 2021 Notice also included links to further information, notably, the Public Service Commission of Canada's Guidance Document for Participating in Non-Candidacy Political Activities, and links to the pertinent sections of the *Canada Elections Act*.

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(3) A listing of key executive positions whose responsibilities were related to the matters covered by the Commission's Terms of Reference (a)(i)(A) and (a)(i)(B) in relevant departments and agencies, and the names of their incumbents since September 2018, with descriptions of their duties;

1. Below is an organizational chart of key executive positions with descriptions of their duties.



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(4) All means/channels within relevant departments and agencies by which information prepared by intelligence agencies related to possible foreign interference is provided to the Deputy Minister, Minister's office, and Minister;

More information is contained in the classified version of GAC's institutional report.

(5) All means/channels by which information related to possible foreign interference is provided from relevant departments and agencies to PCO and PMO;

1. The RRM Canada team collaborates with relevant bureaus at the Privy Council Office (PCO), including Security & Intelligence (S&I) and Democratic Institutions (DI), when contemplating a potential response related to RRM Canada reports (e.g., the August 9, 2023, and October 24, 2023, statements).
2. Two PMO employees (policy advisor and senior policy advisor) are included in RRM Canada's GoC distribution list for reports, a list exclusively utilized outside of election periods.

(6) For each occasion on which there was an oral or written briefing relating to the matters covered by the Commission's Terms of Reference (a)(i)(A) and (a)(i)(B) to the SITE Task Force, the CEIPP panel, a Deputy Minister (or equivalent), the National Security Intelligence Advisor, the Clerk of the Privy Council, PMO or the Prime Minister since September 2018, a listing of the dates, briefing entity and person, including where possible the content of the briefing, and specific cases raised where applicable;

1. In the months leading up to, and during, GE 44, the Centre for International Digital Policy prepared a number of briefing notes for the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs to support their role as a member of the Panel of Five. This includes notes drafted for Panel meetings on the following days:
 - a. August 14, 2020;
 - b. January 27, 2021;
 - c. June 12 and 18, 2021;
 - d. July 26, 2021;
 - e. August 23 and 30, 2021;
 - f. September 7, 15, and 23, 2021; and
 - g. November 5, 2021.

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(7) A listing of the dates and subjects covered for each occasion where a department provided advice and/or a recommendation to a Minister or a Minister's office in response to specific intelligence on foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions, including interference in parliamentary business, since September 2018;

NIL.

(8) A description of the national security and intelligence governance inter-departmental architecture, including Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister and Director General level committees (e.g. the Deputy Ministers Committee on National Security).

1. A full description of the national security and intelligence governance architecture is found in the Institutional Report of the Privy Council Office. Of the governance entities listed, GAC participates in the following:
 - a. Deputy Minister Committee on Intelligence Response;
 - b. ADM Election Security Coordinating Committee (co-chaired by PCO and Elections Canada);
 - c. ADM SITE; and
 - d. ADM Foreign Interference.

(9) A listing of all intelligence products related to the threat or incidence of foreign interference in Canadian democratic processes and institutions developed since September 2018;

The listing is contained in the classified version of GAC's institutional report.

(10) A listing of all the Threat Reduction Measures related to foreign interference in Canadian democratic processes and institutions that have been undertaken since September 2018.

NIL.