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PART C INSTITUTIONAL REPORT FOR THE PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE

I. DEPARTMENTAL MANDATE

The Privy Council Office (PCO) reports directly to the Prime Minister. PCO:

- Supports the development and implementation of the Government of Canada's policy and legislative agenda;
- Supports, among other PCO portfolio ministers, the Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions and the Government House Leader (GHL);
- Coordinates responses to issues facing the Government and the country; and
- Supports the effective operation of Cabinet.

PCO is headed by the Clerk of the Privy Council, who also serves as Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister, Secretary to the Cabinet, and head of the Public Service.

- As Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister, the Clerk is the most senior public servant and is responsible for the administration of PCO. The Clerk's job is to advise the Prime Minister and Cabinet ministers in fulfilling the executive functions of government. The Clerk does so from an objective, non-partisan, public policy perspective.
- As Secretary to the Cabinet, the Clerk is responsible for supporting the effective decision-making processes of government. This includes working with departments and agencies to develop policy options and choices for the government, advising and supporting ministers in making policy decisions, and exercising a coordinating and convening role to ensure effective and efficient government responses to circumstances that arise. The Clerk ensures that Cabinet meetings are well structured and supported, with briefings on information and documentation necessary for ministers to make informed decisions. The Clerk informs departments and agencies about Cabinet decisions, works with the public service to carry out decisions in a timely and effective manner, and supports the proper implementation of Cabinet decisions across the Government.
- As Head of the Public Service, the Clerk has overall responsibility for the public service as an institution. The Clerk also advises the Prime Minister about the workings and activities of the public service, including those undertaken by other Deputy Ministers within Government.

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II. PCO'S ROLE IN THE POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

As set out above, PCO provides the Prime Minister with public service support and directly assists the Prime Minister in performing all of his or her duties and responsibilities as head of government. It is also the Cabinet secretariat. In these capacities, PCO supports the Prime Minister, other PCO portfolio ministers, and Cabinet in the development of major policies and the implementation of the government's policy and legislative program.

The content of the government's policy and legislative program is ultimately the responsibility of the Prime Minister. The main thrusts of the program are determined by Cabinet. The program's day-to-day legislative implementation is overseen by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons.

After a proposed measure is included in the government's policy and legislative program, the next step is generally to prepare a submission to Cabinet to seek policy approval and authority to proceed. This is done by way of a Memorandum to Cabinet (MC), prepared in accordance with the guidance documents issued to other departments by PCO. When a bill is being proposed, the MC generally includes an annex of drafting instructions, which provides the framework for drafting the bill.

As the central agency that serves as secretariat to the Cabinet and its policy committees, PCO is responsible for reviewing policy proposals and providing a foundation to enable consensus on recommendations to Cabinet. It also ensures that policy proposals can be considered strategically by ministers. In particular, PCO is responsible for:

- Advising departmental officials on policy questions and the Cabinet system to ensure coherence with the government's broad agenda, priorities, and policy framework;
- Ensuring that departments follow through on the government's commitments so that they are addressed;
- Ensuring that the sponsoring department has followed all steps in the process, including consultation with appropriate departments and agencies and stakeholders where appropriate;
- Posing questions about the proposed measure, including questions about whether it is needed at all; and
- Ensuring that other interested central agencies are aware of the proposed measure so that it can be thoroughly studied before being considered by Cabinet.

After Cabinet has approved a Minister's policy proposal, if legislation has been proposed, then a bill is drafted by the Department of Justice to reflect the Cabinet decision. Priorities in drafting legislation are established by the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, who also undertakes final scrutiny of a bill before it is approved by Cabinet for introduction in Parliament

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on his or her recommendation. PCO supports the Leader of the Government in the House of Commons, and Cabinet more broadly, in these functions.

If the proposal has funding or machinery of government implications, PCO supports the Prime Minister in decisions on these elements of the proposal.

III. PRINCIPAL PCO SECRETARIATS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES RELATED TO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

PCO is comprised of several branches, including the Deputy Clerk to the Privy Council and the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (DC-NSIA), Intergovernmental Affairs, Operations, Plans and Consultations, Governance (including Legislation and House Planning and Machinery of Government) and Senior Personnel. The most relevant secretariats for the purposes of this report are described in more detail below.

A. Deputy Clerk and National Security and Intelligence Advisor and Supporting Secretariats

The DC-NSIA provides the Prime Minister and Cabinet with strategic assessments, strategic policy advice, and operational advice in relation to national security and intelligence to improve the understanding, management, and response to threats. In doing so, the DC-NSIA engages with and plays a strong coordination role in the security and intelligence community across the government to help steer key national security decisions, particularly those coming out of the National Security Council. This includes providing advice on policy initiatives, including evaluating existing approaches to determine what is working, what needs adjusting, and providing options to improve the overall functioning of the system. The DC-NSIA also oversees and guides the intelligence process and interfaces with Ministers regarding current and emerging threats, as set out in greater detail below. It is a dynamic, ever-changing, and evolving role depending on current affairs and priorities.

The DC-NSIA is Nathalie G. Drouin. The DC-NSIA is supported by the:

- Deputy National Security and Intelligence Advisor, to whom the Emergency Preparedness and Security and Intelligence Secretariats report;
- Intelligence Assessment Secretariat;
- National Security Council Secretariat;
- Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor, to whom the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat reports; and
- Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference Secretariat.

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i. Deputy National Security and Intelligence Advisor

The position of Deputy National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister and Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet (Emergency Preparedness), or DNSIA, was created in May 2023. The DNSIA supports the NSIA in providing advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet on issues of national security and intelligence, and in the coordination within the government with respect to national security issues. Further, the DNSIA supports the NSIA in liaising with other foreign governments and the intelligence community in the discharge of their duties. The DNSIA also supports the Minister of Emergency Preparedness in their functions. The DNSIA reports to the NSIA and has two secretariats reporting to it: the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, and the Emergency Preparedness Secretariat.

The DNSIA is Daniel Rogers.

ii. Security and Intelligence Secretariat (S&I)

S&I provides policy advice and support to the NSIA (via the DNSIA) on national security and intelligence matters, including coordination of operational responses to national security issues. S&I performs the traditional PCO “challenge function” on the policy proposals, legislative plans and resource requests developed and/or submitted by departments and agencies that relate to security and intelligence and supports the NSIA in briefing the Prime Minister and Cabinet on key national security issues, policies, operations, and crises.

In addition, S&I plays a convening function in governance across the S&I community, and co-chairs security and intelligence bodies, which includes secretarial functions for various Assistant Deputy Minister and Deputy Minister committees. In particular, S&I acts as the secretariat for the Deputy Minister Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR) and is a co-chair of the Assistant Deputy Minister National Security Operations (ADM NS Ops) and Tactical (ADM NS Ops Tactical) committees. Through the two ADM committees, S&I convenes departments and agencies to develop and execute options to respond to threats to national security, many of which are brought forward to DMCIR to seek Deputy Minister advice on actions.

S&I is also responsible for coordinating the government’s Intelligence Priorities process, as discussed in greater detail below.

S&I consists of four units:

- Strategic Policy and Planning (SPP): coordinates and advises on strategic policy initiatives across the security and intelligence community;
- Operations (OPS): coordinates and advises on security and intelligence operations, events, and issues;

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- Review Coordination Unit (RCU): centrally manages the security and intelligence community's relationship with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) and liaises with NSICOP and NSIRA for reviews implicating PCO; and
- Security Operations Directorate (SECOPS): conducts security screening for PCO and PMO employees, conducts background checks on candidates for Governor in Council (GiC) appointments, and provides security briefings. The aspects of this work that relate directly to foreign interference are discussed at greater length below.¹

The Foreign Interference Task Force, which was established in January 2023 to provide surge capacity on matters pertaining to foreign interference and coordinate the policy response, was absorbed into S&I in June 2023.

Nabih Eldebs is the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Security and Intelligence.

iii. Intelligence Assessment Secretariat (IAS)

IAS produces all-source strategic intelligence analysis and assessments on foreign trends and developments that impact Canadian interests. In recent years, IAS expanded its focus to include thematic topics that overlap with both foreign and domestic issues (e.g., economic security, emerging technology, and foreign interference). IAS analysis draws from all-source information including open sources, diplomatic reporting, and classified intelligence from foreign and domestic partners.

In addition, IAS plays a convening function for strategic intelligence assessments across the security and intelligence community and is responsible for chairing and supporting various intelligence assessment-related committees.

The Intelligence Profession and Training Division within IAS plays a central agency leadership role in advancing intelligence analysis tradecraft across the security and intelligence community through two inter-related teams. First, the Intelligence Analysis Community of Practice (IACOP) is a community-wide initiative that focuses on intelligence analyst recruitment, EDI initiatives, career development, mobility, academic outreach, tradecraft, standards and guidelines, community collaboration, networking, and partnerships. Second, the Canadian Academy for Intelligence Analysis (CAIA) is a horizontal training program which delivers core competency analytic training for the security and intelligence community and promotes intelligence analysis best practices.

IAS's work is policy-relevant and policy-neutral, in that the intelligence assessments are reflective of senior clients' intelligence requirements, without being influenced by desired policy or operational outcomes. While IAS supports and works closely with the other NSIA policy and operational secretariats, IAS does not generate policy or operational analysis.

¹ TS_CAN047279

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Following the retirement of Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet – Intelligence Assessment, Martin Green, on July 5, 2024, the DC-NSIA announced that the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat would merge with the National Security Council Secretariat, under the leadership of Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Marie-Hélène Chayer, effective July 8, 2024. This merger was undertaken with a view to further enhance the successful cooperation between IAS and the NSC Secretariat, augment the intelligence support to the NSC and the Prime Minister while continuing to support other clients, and fully integrate policy neutral and relevant intelligence assessment into strategic decision-making processes.

iv. National Security Council Secretariat

In 2023, the government created a new Cabinet committee, the National Security Council (NSC). Chaired by the Prime Minister, the National Security Council is a forum for strategic decision making on Canada's interests related to national and economic security, intelligence, defence, and foreign policy, as well as for sharing analysis of intelligence in its strategic context. The NSC fosters a comprehensive and horizontal approach to managing security issues that have broad and potentially long-lasting impacts on Canada's interests, and provides Cabinet-level direction to departments that is reflected in subsequent policy work going to other Cabinet committees.

The NSC Secretariat within PCO was established to support the newly created NSC directly, as well as to support the Cabinet Committee on Global Affairs and Public Security and the national-security-related meetings of the Incident Response Group. The NSC Secretariat reports directly to the DC-NSIA and provides strategic advice on the horizontal and complex issues presented to the National Security Council. The Secretariat raises strategic awareness of policy, operational and tactical developments affecting national security, supports the implementation of NSC directions, and drives the associated policy outcomes. In doing so, it leverages intelligence and policy networks with national and international partners and stakeholders.

As part of its intelligence coordination function, the NSC Secretariat is working on measures to improve the dissemination and tracking of intelligence to decision makers. This includes working with key departments and agencies to maximize their use of digitized systems to disseminate and track intelligence reports, as well as their implementation of departmental processes to maintain sound records of verbal intelligence briefings.

Marie-Hélène Chayer is the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet for the National Security Council Secretariat.

v. Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor and Secretariat (FDP)

FDP is responsible for monitoring, coordinating and providing advice to senior PCO officials and the Prime Minister on foreign policy and defence issues, including international diplomacy, security, defence, trade and commerce, development assistance, environment, international law and human rights and related areas. FDP also supports Cabinet conversations and performs the

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traditional PCO “challenge function” on the policy proposals, legislative plans and resource requests developed and/or submitted by departments and agencies on foreign policy and defence issues.

Stephen de Boer is the Foreign and Defence Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister.

vi. Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference Secretariat

The Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference Secretariat is a temporary team created to coordinate the Government of Canada’s participation in this inquiry.

The Secretariat collaborates with participating departments, security agencies, and legal teams to:

- Ensure timely, comprehensive, and transparent responses to Commission requests;
- Advise senior officials on inquiry-related matters; and
- Safeguard national security interests.

Jeffery Hutchinson, Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet for the Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference, leads the Secretariat.

B. Governance Branch (Machinery of Government and Democratic Institutions Secretariats)

The Governance branch of PCO is comprised of several secretariats, including the Machinery of Government Secretariat and the Democratic Institutions Secretariat.

i. Machinery of Government

The Machinery of Government Secretariat supports the Prime Minister on the organization of the Ministry, the structure of Cabinet and the allocation of portfolio responsibilities among Ministers, including the identification of priorities through the issuance of ministerial mandate letters. The issue of foreign interference has been incorporated into ministerial mandate letters since as early as February 2017.²

ii. Democratic Institutions

The Democratic Institutions Secretariat (DI) is responsible for supporting the Minister responsible for democratic institutions in the Minister’s full range of responsibilities, including

² [ARCHIVED - Minister of Democratic Institutions Mandate Letter | Prime Minister of Canada \(pm.gc.ca\)](#)

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the achievement of mandate commitments, Cabinet and parliamentary affairs, and corporate responsibilities. At the Prime Minister's discretion, the responsibilities for democratic institutions can be assigned to a dedicated minister or can be added to the responsibilities of another minister. As of 2024, these responsibilities fall to the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs.

DI is led by a small group divided into two distinct teams: the Protecting Democracy Unit (PDU) and the Electoral and Senate Policy Unit (ESPU). DI received additional funding in Budget 2022 (\$2M/year) to create the PDU, with the mandate to lead an integrated government response to protect Canada's democratic institutions, including the federal electoral process, against foreign interference and disinformation, working with domestic and international partners. Issues related to foreign interference in democratic processes, primarily as part of the Plan to Protect Canada's Democracy, fall primarily to the PDU. However, the ESPU is also involved because it leads initiatives related to the *Canada Elections Act*.

As part of the Plan to Protect Canada's Democracy, since January 2024, DI also provides secretariat support, in collaboration with the S&I Secretariat, to the Panel of deputy ministers administering the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (CEIPP). In accordance with a recommendation made by Morris Rosenberg in his independent assessment, Panel meetings resumed in January 2024. However, the aspects of the secretariat role related to managing top secret information, such as intelligence, is handled by S&I.

IV. RESPONSES TO THE COMMISSION'S MAY 21, 2024 QUESTIONS**(1) A listing and description of all major instances of suspected foreign interference targeting Canada's democratic processes, including summary, dates, target, country involved, key players, information flow and any responses taken.**

A listing and description of all major instances of suspected foreign interference targeting Canada's democratic processes will be provided under separate cover.

(2) A listing and description of all existing means at the disposal of each government department and agency to detect, deter and counter any foreign interference activities, including any relevant changes to or evolution in these means.

PCO undertakes numerous activities which are integral to the effectiveness of the Government of Canada's deterrence and countering of foreign interference, with responsibility for: (i) convening the security and intelligence community to ensure interdepartmental coordination and awareness of threats and response, including pertaining to policy development efforts and operations; (ii) providing advice to the Prime Minister and his office; (iii) supporting the work of Cabinet committees and Cabinet; and (iv) supporting the government in bringing legislation to Parliament.

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The DC-NSIA frequently engages with foreign counterparts, both to enable collaboration on important issues including foreign interference and to address issues of concern relating to national security. In particular, the DC-NSIA may raise Canada's concerns regarding the actions of a foreign state. Internal to the Government of Canada, the DC-NSIA leads efforts to enhance awareness among Ministers of current and emerging threats, identify options to mitigate those threats, and ensure a coherent approach and collective response, where appropriate.

As stated above, the DC-NSIA also oversees and guides the intelligence process from collection and assessment, through policy development, to the Government of Canada's response and operational coordination. One aspect of this work is the setting of Intelligence Priorities. Cabinet sets Intelligence Priorities every two years, based on recommendations from the NSIA, supported by S&I, and the intelligence community. The Intelligence Priorities themselves are broad categories of interest for which the Government of Canada, as a whole, requires intelligence support – they therefore reflect the national security threat environment; priorities identified in the Budget, the Speech from the Throne, and Mandate letters; and Government of Canada objectives defined in legislation and through departmental mandates. The Intelligence Priorities guide the intelligence community's production efforts and establish frameworks and processes, including the Intelligence Requirements, to ensure intelligence resources are focused on areas of highest interest and need. S&I manages the Intelligence Requirements process, where each Intelligence Priority is broken down into more granular and ranked Requirements. While the Priorities are broad and stand for two years, the Requirements are more specific and can be amended at any time, given shifts in the threat environment, geopolitics, resources, or consumer need.

PCO also acts as chair or co-chair for multiple interdepartmental governance committees, the mandates of which include the coordination of operational responses to national security threats, such as foreign interference, and the development of policy options to address and proactively counter foreign interference [see response to Question (8)] below for more details]. In particular, PCO chairs the Deputy Minister Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR). The mandate of this committee is to identify and discuss relevant, actionable intelligence, including on potential interference, and to decide how best to respond with coordinated operational, enforcement or policy action. While each member of the committee is responsible to act on the intelligence under their respective mandates, PCO, as secretariat, plays an important role in both setting the agenda for discussion and in following up with departments to track progress on actions.

As set out in more detail in the responses below, PCO has also led policy initiatives in support of the Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions, including the Plan to Protect Canada's Democracy and the CEIPP, as well as legislative amendments to the *Canada Elections Act*, to strengthen the electoral process and protect against foreign interference. PCO also led the development of the report *Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Institutions* (also referred to as the LeBlanc-Charette Report),³ which was published in April 2023.

³ [Countering an evolving threat: Update on recommendations to counter foreign interference in Canada's democratic institutions - Democratic Institutions - Canada.ca](#)

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Since 2019, PCO has worked closely with the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force, to ensure coordination of enhanced monitoring for potential foreign interference during general elections and (since 2023) has done the same during by-elections. PCO acts as a primary point of contact for political party representatives to share any concerns they have regarding potential foreign interference and, working with the SITE Task Force, offers briefings to political parties on foreign interference and cyber security.

PCO has also conducted security briefings related to foreign interference for Ministers, Members of Parliament, newly appointed members of the NSICOP, PCO and Prime Minister's Office staff. It has also developed training for public servants and educational materials for the public to increase resiliency to disinformation, including Toolkits and a Guidebook to counter disinformation.

PCO engages in a number of initiatives involving provincial, territorial and foreign government partners, industry, academia, and civil society (e.g. the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative through the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)); participates actively in workshops with domestic, international, civil society and academic partners (e.g. the Paris Call for Trust and Security and Cyberspace, the Democracy Xchange annual conferences); and commissions research studies. Additionally, PCO is working with Public Safety Canada (PS) to reinvigorate a Federal, Provincial and Territorial Committee of National Security Assistant Deputy Ministers to facilitate collaboration on addressing threats to national security including foreign interference.

Further details regarding PCO's involvement in policy and legislative initiatives related to foreign interference and educational and other outreach to foreign and domestic stakeholders is discussed in the responses below.

(3) A listing and description of all policy proposals, legislative plans and resource requests related to foreign interference, including but not limited to memos to the Deputy Minister (or equivalent) or Assistant Deputy Minister (or equivalent). At a minimum, this should include the date of the request, date of decision (where applicable), a summary of the proposed changes and the outcome of the request.

PCO has been involved in a number of policy and legislative initiatives related to foreign interference. The examples below provide an overview of such initiatives. However, these do not include any ongoing policy proposals that are being developed for consideration by Cabinet, draft legislation, or off-cycle funding or budget requests, as such information would disclose Cabinet confidences.

The Plan to Protect Canada's Democracy (PD Plan) is the key policy initiative led by DI. First adopted in 2019, and updated in 2021, the PD Plan was developed in recognition of the fact that attempts by foreign actors to interfere in elections around the world have become commonplace and continue to evolve. The Plan is a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to safeguarding Canada's elections and democratic institutions against interference. Initiatives

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under the PD Plan are led by a variety of departments and agencies. DI led on the development and implementation of the CEIPP and the Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online.⁴

DI has a policy-oriented mandate with limited operational responsibilities. As such, the DI secretariat works very closely with other PCO secretariats, including S&I and IAS, as well as other government departments (e.g., PS, Canadian Heritage, Global Affairs Canada (GAC)) as appropriate in supporting the implementation of the initiatives under the PD Plan.

With a view to continuously enhancing Canada's response to foreign interference, DI provides ongoing advice on policy initiatives to support the objectives of the PD Plan. DI supported the Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions in securing funding to support the creation of the independently administered Canadian Digital Media Research Network (CDMRN).

Budget 2022 provided \$2 million annually for the PDU in DI to coordinate, develop, and implement government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and protect Canada's democratic institutions and processes. This includes supporting a whole-of-society approach to protecting Canada's democracy, the implementation of a counter disinformation toolkit for elected officials, public servants and community leaders, as well as training and guidance for public servants on disinformation, building on the United Kingdom's RESIST model. The Government of Canada announced a \$5.5 million investment to strengthen the capacity of civil society and research partners to provide important insights into the dynamics of Canada's information ecosystem, including with respect to disinformation and activities of state actors. This investment was used to create the independently administered CDMRN. The PDU is also working with other government departments, academics and civil society to identify research gaps and draw from existing research and findings related to threats to democracy to help build the evidence base to support policy development and response.

DI also leads legislative initiatives related to the *Canada Elections Act*. Most recently, the introduction of Bill C-65, *Electoral Participation Act*, builds on the Government of Canada's work to further strengthen the electoral process, including protecting against foreign interference.

DI also led the initiative to introduce the *Elections Modernization Act*, which received Royal Assent on December 13, 2018. That legislation contained several provisions intended to address attempts to disrupt electoral campaigns or voting. These touched on, for example, prohibiting third parties from using foreign funds for partisan advertising and activities, and expanding the powers of the Commissioner of Canada Elections to make it more difficult for law breakers to evade sanction.

S&I performs PCO's traditional "challenge function" on departmental proposals to ensure that they meet the information needs of Cabinet and that they are consistent with the government's overall policy direction. They also support the drafting and introduction of legislation. S&I worked closely with departments and agencies across the national security community to ensure progress on policy proposals to counter foreign interference including the drafting and introduction of Bill C-70, *Countering Foreign Interference Act*. Bill C-70 amends the *Canadian*

⁴ [Critical Election Incident Public Protocol](#); [Canada Declaration on Electoral Integrity Online](#)

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Security Intelligence Service Act, Security of Information Act, Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, as well as introduces the Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act.

In addition to performing PCO's traditional "challenge function," S&I sometimes leads on policy initiatives. With respect to foreign interference, S&I developed proposals in 2019, 2020 and 2022 to brief parliamentarians on foreign interference and other national security threats in response to NSICOP recommendations. More recently, under the direction of the DC-NSIA, S&I drafted, in collaboration with the security and intelligence community, a protocol for providing regular, classified briefings to leaders of major opposition parties who hold the appropriate security clearance. These briefings, which have recently been offered to parties but have not yet begun, are intended to provide classified information on national security issues, including foreign interference in democratic processes, to help inform leaders' positions and enhance collective awareness of the threats facing Canada.

In Fall 2023, S&I initiated a review of the governance architecture of Canada's national security and intelligence community. This initiative aims to improve the overall efficiency and effectiveness of governance committees and to reassess how the community should be organized to work effectively in support of the new National Security Council. Among the goals of this exercise are streamlining the committee structure, enhancing accountability, improving information flow, and delivering greater efficiency and effectiveness overall. To date, the exercise has concentrated on the DM level, with the intent to re-evaluate lower levels of governance once any changes to the DM level are fully determined and agreed upon. While not specifically focused on foreign interference, these changes would impact how the community organizes itself to share information and work collectively on foreign interference-related matters.

Lastly, S&I also centrally manages the community's relationship with NSICOP and NSIRA. In the case of the recent reviews by those bodies of foreign interference, S&I played a coordinating function on day-to-day issues while the reviews were underway, on the redaction process for the resulting reports, and the government's response to the recommendations.

(4) A listing and description of all existing arrangements and undertakings (including Memoranda of Understanding) between government departments and agencies, and with international partners, aimed at detecting, deterring, and countering foreign interference activities, including the dates that the arrangements have been in place.

Detecting and countering foreign interference in democratic processes is a priority for many of our international partners, including Five Eyes countries, with which PCO shares intelligence assessments and discusses policy initiatives. These exchanges are captured under broader bilateral and multilateral engagements. PCO receives, and has access to, significant volumes of intelligence reporting by domestic and foreign partners, including reports on foreign interference. PCO also produces intelligence assessments based on such reporting.

Foreign interference has featured as a key topic of discussion in several established bilateral and multilateral fora in which the S&I Secretariat participates:

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- The Intelligence Policy Forum (IPF) convenes the central security and intelligence coordination of the Five Eyes. It is an ongoing forum to address strategic, policy and management issues within the Five Eyes intelligence function.
- The Canada-UK National Security Partnership (NSP) is the result of a March 2022 commitment by the Canadian and British prime ministers to enhance collaboration on national security. Under the NSP, officials work to advance initiatives of mutual interest. Currently, foreign interference is one of its pillars for collaboration, within which Canada and the UK are identifying specific areas of focus (e.g., sharing of best practices, studies on topics of mutual interest). This line of work is led by appropriate departments in Canada and the UK.

Additionally, DI has ongoing engagement through the Reinforcing Democracy Initiative of the OECD, which was established to reinforce and protect democratic governance from existing and emerging threats. Specific areas of DI work include disinformation (leadership in the OECD Information Integrity Hub), trust (active engagement supporting the OECD Trust Survey), and membership in the Steering Committee for the 2024 Global Forum on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy.

Additionally, as part of the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace (Paris Call), DI held a series of six workshops with Microsoft, the Alliance for Securing Democracy (ASD) and other international partners from government, industry and civil society focused on how to prevent interference in the electoral process. The workshops culminated in the publication of a compendium of practices on countering election interference.

- (5) A listing and description of all warrant applications related to foreign interference submitted to the Minister of Public Safety, and ministerial authorizations submitted to the Minister of National Defence, including date submitted to the Minister, date approved by the Minister, date of decision by the Federal Court and, if applicable, the reasons for decision.**

Not applicable.

- (6) A listing and description of the date, venue, participants and summary of discussion for all engagements by senior executives (ADM and above, including Ministers) with representatives of foreign governments (especially China, Russia and India) where the subject of foreign interference was raised.**

The chart below contains details regarding engagements between senior PCO officials and representatives of foreign governments in which the subject of foreign interference in democratic processes was raised. Please note that records may not be complete in all cases.

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
Clerk		
July 31, 2023 Ottawa	Clerk of the Privy Council, John Hannaford; High Commissioner to Canada Sanjay Verma (India)	Introductory meeting with Indian High Commissioner Verma. Discussion covered the bilateral relationship broadly and may have touched on foreign interference in democratic processes. ⁵
NSIA/DC-NSIA/DNSIA		
August 15, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; National Security Advisor Sir Tim Barrow (United Kingdom)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine's peace initiative.
August 15, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan (USA)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine's peace initiative.
August 17, 2023 New Delhi, India	NSIA Jody Thomas; FDPA Stephen de Boer; Bridget Walshe, Director of Operations, S&I; Cameron McKay, Canadian High Commission to India; other S&I official; National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (India)	NSIA Thomas met with NSA Doval to discuss a range of bilateral issues, including information suggesting India was interfering in Canadian federal elections. ⁶
August 17, 2023 New Delhi, India	NSIA Jody Thomas; FDPA Stephen de Boer; Bridget Walshe, Director of Operations, S&I; Cameron McKay, Canadian High Commission to India; other S&I official; Ravi Sinha, Secretary of Research and Analysis Wing (India)	NSIA Thomas raised the topic of foreign interference in Canadian federal elections during this meeting. ⁷

⁵ TS_CAN032355

⁶ TS_CAN21047; TS_CAN032429; TS_CAN032389; TS_CAN032652; TS_CAN047319; TS_CAN047386; TS_CAN047259; TS_CAN047254

⁷ TS_CAN032702; TS_CAN047319; TS_CAN047386; TS_CAN032652

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
September 6-12, 2023 New Delhi, India	NSIA Jody Thomas; CSIS Director David Vigneault; David Morrison, GAC Deputy Minister; Cameron McKay, Canadian High Commission to India; other PCO officials; National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (India)	The NSIA led two meetings (one with Indian NSA Doval and one with a senior official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (“Secretary East”), while Director Vigneault led a meeting with his counterpart from RAW. All meetings touched on FI in Canadian democratic processes, though also a range of other topics including transnational repression, the state of the bilateral relationship, and other issues including extradition processes, and Khalistani extremism.
September 13, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Sir Tim Barrow (United Kingdom)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine’s peace initiative.
September 15, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; High Commissioner to Canada Sanjay Verma (India)	During this meeting, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, diplomatic security, and other bilateral irritants.
September 18, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan (USA)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine’s peace initiative.
October 15, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines (USA)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza).
October 15, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Sir Tim Barrow (United Kingdom)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
		security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine's peace initiative.
October 27, 2023 Ottawa	DNSIA Dan Rogers; Sandra Arseneault, Director, Review Coordination Unit, S&I German Visitors	Meeting with the German Parliamentary Oversight Panel during which German and Canadian experiences with national security oversight regimes were discussed. ⁸
November 3, 2023 Dubai, UAE	NSIA Jody Thomas; David Morrison, GAC Deputy Minister; National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (India)	The NSIA and DM Morrison had a meeting with Indian NSA Doval. The meeting touched on FI in Canadian democratic processes, though also a range of other topics including transnational repression, the state of the bilateral relationship, and other issues including extradition processes, and Khalistani extremism. ⁹
November 6, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Sir Tim Barrow (United Kingdom)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine's peace initiative.
November 29, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines (USA)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza).
December 2, 2023 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (India)	During this meeting, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, diplomatic security, and other bilateral irritants.

⁸ TS_CAN047341; TS_CAN047342; TS_CAN047239; TS_CAN047240; TS_CAN047241; TS_CAN047242; TS_CAN047243; TS_CAN047244; TS_CAN047245; TS_CAN047246; TS_CAN047247; TS_CAN047248; TS_CAN047249; PBH_CAN047028

⁹ TS_CAN047238

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
December 16, 2023, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia	NSIA Jody Thomas; FDPA Stephen de Boer; National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (India)	The NSIA and FDPA De Boer had a meeting with Indian NSA Doval. The meeting touched on FI in Canadian democratic processes, though also a range of other topics including transnational repression, the state of the bilateral relationship, and other issues including extradition processes, and Khalistani extremism. ¹⁰
January 11, 2024 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; High Commissioner to Canada Sanjay Verma (India)	During this meeting, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, diplomatic security, and other bilateral irritants.
January 11, 2024 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines (USA)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza).
January 11, 2024 (call)	NSIA Jody Thomas; National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan (USA)	During this bilat, FI in democratic institutions was discussed, in addition to a range of other domestic national security topics such as transnational repression, and geopolitical crises (Ukraine, Israel/Gaza), as well as ongoing NSA-track discussions on Ukraine's peace initiative.
January 15, 2024, London, UK	NSIA Jody Thomas; FDPA Stephen de Boer; other PCO official; National Security Advisor Ajit Doval (India)	The NSIA and FDPA De Boer had a meeting with Indian NSA Doval. The meeting touched on FI in Canadian democratic processes, though also a range of other topics including transnational repression, the state of the bilateral relationship, and other issues including extradition processes, and Khalistani extremism. ¹¹

¹⁰ TS_CAN047363¹¹ TS_CAN047364

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; DNSIA Dan Rogers; National Intelligence Andrew Shearer (Australia)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; Scott Ryan, High Commissioner to Canada (Australia)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; David Cohen, Ambassador to Canada (United States)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; Jonathan Finer, Deputy National Security Advisor (United States)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; Cecile Hillyer, High Commissioner to Canada (New Zealand)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; Bridget White, Executive Director, National Security Group (New Zealand)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; National Security Advisor Sir Tim Barrow (United Kingdom)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; DNSIA Dan Rogers; Susanah Goshko, British High Commissioner to Canada (United Kingdom)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
May 3, 2024 (call)	DC-NSIA Nathalie Drouin; National Security Advisor Doval (India)	Call regarding Public Inquiry into Foreign Interference
S&I		
June 14, 2019 London, UK	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, S&I, Mike MacDonald FVEYS Intelligence Policy Forum (IPF) Principals	IPF Principals meeting in which the topic of threats to democratic institutions was discussed. ¹²
April 18, 2023 Washington, DC	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Mike MacDonald; Canadian Embassy officials; S&I official;	Meeting to discuss the Intelligence Policy Forum, including areas for collaboration and ways to advance files

¹² SE_CAN047048

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
	Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines (USA); Officials from the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (USA)	of common interest, including foreign interference. ¹³
April 18, 2024 Washington, DC	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Nabih Eldebs; Canadian Embassy officials; S&I official; US officials, Foreign Malign Influence Center	Introductory meeting where US officials explained the role of the Foreign Malign Influence Centre. Explored areas for collaboration and exchange including sharing lessons learned related to foreign interference and elections security. ¹⁴
April 19, 2024 Washington, DC	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Nabih Eldebs; US officials, National Security Council	Introductory meeting where Director for Countering Malign Influence outlined the National Security Council's work with regards to countering foreign interference. ¹⁵
May 1, 2024 Washington, DC	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Nabih Eldebs; Central Intelligence Agency officials; US Official, Embassy of the United States of America	Meeting to receive an intelligence briefing on a particular country.
IAS		
November 20, 2018 Ottawa	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, Martin Green; other IAS officials; OGD delegation: CSE/SITE, S&I, CSIS, GAC, PCO-DI Cecile Hillyer, Director of NAB (New Zealand), other NAB Delegates	Compared objectives and tradecraft in Russian and Chinese foreign interference activities. ¹⁶
February 11, 2019 Ottawa	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Martin Green; other IAS, S&I and FDP officials; OGD delegation: CFINTCOM, CSE, FINTRAC Claire Hancock, Head (IIC) of Joint State Threats Assessment Team (JSTAT), other JSTAT delegate	Exchange: Russian interference: Assessment conclusions, gaps, trends & forward look. ¹⁷

¹³ TS_CAN047283¹⁴ SE_CAN047118¹⁵ SE_CAN047118¹⁶ SE_CAN047052; SE_CAN047051¹⁷ SE_CAN047055; TS_CAN047250

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
November 24, 2022 Ottawa	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Martin Green; Antti Peltari, Director, Finnish Security and Intelligence Service; other IAS officials	Exchange: CPC foreign interference and disinformation. ¹⁸
January 18, 2023 Ottawa	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Martin Green; Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, S&I Mike MacDonald; other IAS officials Vice President Dr. Ole Diehl, The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), BND officials	Briefing: Foreign Interference in Canada to German officials (BND). ¹⁹
May 16, 2023 Ottawa	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Martin Green; German Ambassador to Canada Sabine Sparwasser	Discussion: Foreign Interference in Canada from multiple states. ²⁰
September 28, 2023	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Martin Green; Multiple OGD officials and IAS officials; Heads of Assessment from all FVEY countries	Discussion: Evolution of China's foreign interference activities; Coordination between Russia and China; Engagement with India in the face of increased FI activities. ²¹
FDP		
December 7, 2023 Ottawa	FDPA Stephen de Boer; officials of the Netherlands Embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Government of Canada officials and former officials; academics/civil society.	Exchange of views on foreign interference-related issues. ²²
DI		
November 18, 2022 Luxembourg	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Democratic Institutions and Machinery of Government) Allen Sutherland; OECD Delegates	Ministerial Meeting: issues related to foreign interference in democratic elections are raised among OECD delegates as part of the Public Governance Committees' focus on

¹⁸ TS_CAN047274¹⁹ SE_CAN047070; SE_CAN047071; SE_CAN047072²⁰ SE_CAN047075²¹ TS_CAN047335; SE_CAN047093; SE_CAN047094; TS_CAN047251²² TS_CAN047359; TS_CAN047356

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Date and Venue	Participants	Description
		establishing trust in public institutions and reinforcing democracy. ²³
October 18-19, 2023 Paris, France	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Democratic Institutions and Machinery of Government) Allen Sutherland; OECD Delegates	OECD Public Governance Committee Meeting: issues related to foreign interference in democratic elections are raised among OECD delegates as part of the Public Governance Committees' focus on establishing trust in public institutions and reinforcing democracy.
April 23-24, 2024 Paris, France	Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Democratic Institutions and Machinery of Government) Allen Sutherland; OECD Delegates	OECD Public Governance Committee Meeting: issues related to foreign interference in democratic elections are raised among OECD delegates as part of the Public Governance Committees' focus on establishing trust in public institutions and reinforcing democracy.

(7) A listing and description of all education campaigns aimed at Parliamentarians and their staff, political parties, government employees at federal, provincial or municipal levels, diaspora groups, or the general public related to foreign interference.

Several PCO secretariats have been involved in relevant education campaigns, including those addressed in the sub-sections below.

A. DC-NSIA

The DC-NSIA has participated in the following informational and education campaigns aimed at Parliamentarians and their staff:

Date and time	Name and title of Parliamentarian	Attendance	Topic
May 1, 2024 1:30 to 2:00 PM Call	Ian Todd Chief of Staff to P. Poilievre Conservative Party	Nathalie G. Drouin Marie-Claude Filion	Specific Intel General briefings going forward
May 8, 2024 3:15 to 4:45 PM Meeting	Mr. Singh, NDP Leader Jennifer Howard Clare Parkin James Chapman Ali Chatur	Nathalie G. Drouin Dan Rogers	India Specific Intel (PRC) General briefings going forward Docs from CSIS

²³ PBH_CAN026174; TS_CAN030153

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Date and time	Name and title of Parliamentarian	Attendance	Topic
May 9, 2024 10:00 to 10:15 AM Call	Mathias Boulianne Chef de Cabinet de M. Blanchet Bloc Québécois	Nathalie G. Drouin Dan Rogers	Specific Intel General briefings going forward
May 9, 2024 11 :00 to 11 :15 AM Call	Debra Eindiguer Chief of Staff Green Party	Nathalie G. Drouin Dan Rogers	Specific Intel General briefings going forward
May 23, 2024 Lead: PCO	Letter to Opposition Leaders (E. May, YF. Blanchet, J. Singh, P. Poilievre)	Email Correspondence sent by DCNSIA	Re: General briefings of parliamentarians
May 29, 2024 Lead: PCO	Letters to Sergeant at Arms and Usher of the Black Rod		Briefings of Parliamentarians
May 30, 2024	Security Briefings for Minister's Offices	Email from Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet Matthew Shea to Minister's Offices Chiefs of Staff	Virtual bilingual sessions available for Security briefings (June 14, 18 & 21 2024)
June 10, 2024	Elizabeth May, Green Party	On her own to read report	NSICOP FI Report (classified report)
June 12, 2024	Mr. Singh, NDP Leader and Chief of Staff	Organized by S&I On his own to read report	NSICOP FI Report (classified report)
June 12, 2024 Lead: PS	NDP Caucus Briefing	9 AM - Bilingual briefing, 45 minutes	Security briefings as per email from Bridget Walshe (June 10)
	BQ Caucus Briefing	11 AM - French only briefing, 30 minutes	
	Liberal Caucus Briefing	6 PM – Bilingual briefing, 45 minutes	
June 13, 2024 Lead: PS	CPC Caucus Briefing	1:15 PM - Bilingual briefing, 45 minutes	

B. S&I

SECOPS within S&I provides a security briefing to Ministers and their Chiefs of Staff following a General Election or Cabinet shuffle, scheduled in the months following the election according to each Minister's availability. The briefing covers key security information and foreign interference.

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S&I Operations and SECOPS have facilitated offering security clearances to political party leaders in the House of Commons, first to review the classified report of the Independent Special Rapporteur and, in 2024, to enable more direct understanding of the threats facing parliamentarians and all Canadians.

Jointly with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), SECOPS also provides a security briefing to all newly appointed members of the NSICOP.²⁴

As noted in Question 2, above, S&I has supported the NSIA in engaging with senior officials and leaders of provinces and territories to share information on potential foreign interference. As noted in Question 2, above, S&I is working with PS to reinvigorate a Federal, Provincial-and Territorial ADM-level Committee on National Security, where PCO will identify additional opportunities to share information from the federal government that will aid provinces and territories in addressing foreign interference.

Beyond parliamentarians, S&I Operations has offered security clearances to senior level officials in every province and territory to improve the ability of security agencies to share information about national security threats.

As noted in Question 3, above, PCO has offered regular classified briefings to leaders of major opposition parties who hold the appropriate security clearance. The briefings will enable PCO to facilitate the sharing of intelligence on threats, including foreign interference.

C. DI

Since the creation of the PDU in late 2022, DI has increased its engagement efforts within the government, with civil society and academics, with other orders of government, and internationally. For instance:

- **Engagement with civil society:** For the last two years, PDU has partnered with civil society stakeholders, including to host workshops during the Democracy Xchange annual conferences. Similarly, in June 2024, PDU sponsored a workshop with the Canadian Vote Summit, hosted by Toronto Metropolitan University which convened election management bodies, municipal election administrators and civil society leaders to identify and discuss pressing threats to Canada's election integrity and trust in the democratic process. PDU is additionally working with the Canadian association of public libraries to assess needs for further tools to support their media literacy efforts.
- **Engagement with academics and commissioned research:** PDU has significantly increased its engagement with academics to better understand the threat of FI and disinformation, its impact on Canadians and how to respond. Research reports from leading academics in Canada and internationally have been commissioned in 2022-2023 and in 2023-2024.

²⁴ PBH_CAN047024

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- **Collaboration with the Canada School of Public Service (CSPS):** PDU is working with CSPS on two projects in 2024. First, an information session on trust and disinformation was held on January 11, 2024 and attended by close to 600 public servants. Another session was held on June 12, 2024 and attended by close to 300 federal, provincial and territorial public servants. Second, CSPS and PDU are working with the University of Ottawa to develop online, self-paced training modules to be available to all public servants over the next year.
 - **Engagement with provinces and territories:** Work is ongoing to implement strategies for further engagement with provinces and territories with the objective of ensuring they have access to the tools and information they need to be resilient to foreign interference threats to their elections, This includes the Minister responsible for Democratic Institutions sharing with his PT counterparts the Guidebook for public servants and Toolkits to help public servants, elected officials and community leaders identify and combat the threats of disinformation. These tools were additionally shared with officials in PTs, as well as with PT Chief Electoral Officers. On June 6, 2024, PDU presented at the annual meeting of the FPT Continuing Committee of Officials on Human Rights (CCOHR) and is organizing training events with the CSPS that will be open to PT public servants, as well as federal public servants.
 - **International engagement:** Ongoing engagement through the OECD's Reinforcing Democracy Initiative, established to reinforce democratic governance and protect democratic governance from existing and emerging threats. Specific areas of DI work include mis- and disinformation (leadership in the OECD Information Integrity Hub), trust (active engagement supporting the OECD Trust Survey), and membership in the Steering Committee for the 2024 Global Forum on Building Trust and Reinforcing Democracy. DI also engages bilaterally to share lessons and best practices with like-minded partners including the UK, France, the US, and Australia.
- (8) (PCO and/or Public Safety) For each interdepartmental committee related to foreign interference, listing of meeting frequency (or meeting dates if ad hoc) and description of what documentation is routinely produced for each committee (e.g. agendas, list of participants, annotated agendas for the Chair, meeting summaries, minutes).**

PCO participates in the following interdepartmental committees at the Deputy Minister, Assistant Deputy Minister, Director and working levels that engage issues related to foreign interference:

A. Deputy Minister level committees with PCO participation

i. Panel of Five

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This committee manages the CEIPP, which is a mechanism to communicate clearly, transparently, and impartially with Canadians during an election in the event of an incident or incidents that threaten Canada's ability to have a free and fair election.

The CEIPP mandates a group of five senior civil servants (known as the Panel of Five) who, working with national security agencies within those agencies' existing mandates, are responsible for informing Canadians if an incident or series of incidents threatens the integrity of the election. The Panel of Five is chaired by the Clerk of the Privy Council and includes the DC - NSIA, the Deputy Minister of Justice and Deputy Attorney General, the Deputy Minister of Public Safety, and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Canada's national security agencies, as part of the (SITE) Task Force, provide regular briefings to the Panel of Five on emerging national security developments and potential threats to the integrity of the federal election. The Panel may also receive information and advice from sources other than these agencies, including from entities outside of the Government of Canada.

The agencies will also directly inform the affected party (e.g., a candidate, a political party, or Elections Canada) of an incident, subject to any applicable legal privileges or immunities, including information the disclosure of which would be injurious to Canada's national security, international relations, or national defence. If advised of an incident, on a consensus basis and with consultation as required, the Panel of Five will determine whether the threshold to inform the public, as set out under section 6 of the *Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol* has been met.

The Panel of Five meets weekly during the writ period and every six weeks outside the writ period. As mentioned above, DI supports the Panel of Five by providing secretariat services, with S&I supporting on materials classified Top Secret or higher.

ii. *DM Electoral Security Coordination Committee (DMESCC)*

The DC-NSIA and the Chief Electoral Office co-chair DMESCC. The committee ensures a coordinated approach and common understanding among the security and intelligence community, Elections Canada and the Commissioner of Canada Elections. Operational coordination between DMESCC and the SITE Task Force allows key players to quickly coordinate, assess, and verify threat-related information regarding potential interference activities. DMESCC meets on an *ad hoc* basis when required, with more regular meetings in the lead up to and during federal election cycles. It is supported by an ADM Electoral Security Coordinating Committee. Documentation produced to support DMESCC includes meeting agendas, minutes, periodic annotated agendas, and yearly forward agendas. The committee's membership is comprised of: PCO-S&I, PCO-DI, PS, Elections Canada, CSIS, Communications Security Establishment (CSE), GAC, Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Commissioner of Canada Elections. This committee does not have terms of reference.

iii. *DM Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR)*

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The DC-NSIA chairs DMCIR. The committee is a forum for discussing particularly sensitive information and/or intelligence reporting, which may be identified by either the DC -NSIA, the DNSIA, or deputy heads of intelligence agencies who are members of the committee. It reviews operational and tactical intelligence reporting that requires a timely response.

DMCIR was established in spring 2023 to examine intelligence, direct appropriate response and develop related advice for the government. It initially focused on operational and policy considerations related to sensitive domestic intelligence issues, including foreign interference, and also served as the DM-level committee that received updates from the SITE Task Force. IAS provided administrative functions for DMCIR until the winter of 2024, when the secretariat responsibilities were transitioned to S&I.

The committee's permanent membership is comprised of: CSE, CSIS, GAC, PS, RCMP, PCO-FDP, PCO-EPCRS, PCO-DSG and other deputy ministers may be included depending on the issue discussed. DMCIR met weekly for most of 2023, and then moved to a bi-weekly schedule in 2024. It met on May 18, 2023, May 25, 2023, June 1, 2023, June 8, 2023, June 15, 2023, June 29, 2023, July 6, 2023, July 13, 2023, July 20, 2023, September 1, 2023, September 7, 2023, September 14, 2023, September 21, 2023, September 28, 2023, October 6, 2023, October 12, 2023, October 19, 2023, November 2, 2023, November 16, 2023, November 23, 2023, November 30, 2023, January 18, 2024, February 15, 2024, February 29, 2024, March 14, 2024, March 28, 2024, April 11, 2024, April 25, 2024, May 9, 2024, May 23, 2024, June 6, 2024 and June 20, 2024. Documentation prepared to support DMCIR includes meeting agendas, relevant meeting documents based on the agenda, annotated chair's agenda, task trackers, meeting minutes and terms of reference.²⁵

iv. DM Operational Coordination (DMOC)

The DC-NSIA chairs DMOC, which is an informal meeting of deputy ministers to discuss a variety of operational matters. It is supported by an ADM level National Security Operations Committee. The composition of the Committee is: PCO, Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), CSIS, RCMP, GAC, CSE, Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), PS, Transport Canada (TC), Canadian Coast Guard (CCG), and Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). It met on February 1, 2022, February 2, 2022, February 11, 2022, February 14, 2022, February 15, 2022, February 16, 2022, February 18, 2022, February 21, 2022, February 22, 2022, February 2, 2023, February 10, 2023, three times on Feb 13, 2023, March 7, 2023, November 22, 2023, November 30, 2023, February 1, 2024, February 8, 2024, February 15, 2024, February 22, 2024, February 29, 2024, March 7, 2024, March 14, 2024, March 21, 2024, March 28, 2024, April 4, 2024, April 11, 2024, April 18, 2024, April 25, 2024, May 2, 2024, May 9, 2024, May 16, 2024, May 23, 2024, May 30, 2024, June 6, 2024, June 13, 2024 and June 27, 2024. There are no documents to support DMOC meetings nor are there records of discussion or minutes. This committee does not have terms of reference.

v. DM Intelligence Committee (DMIC)

²⁵ SE_CAN047043

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The DC-NSIA chairs DMIC. The committee's role is to flag important strategic intelligence assessments to deputy heads and ensure a coordinated response. In contrast with DMCIR, it is intended to review more strategic, longer term, forward-looking intelligence assessments. DMIC is supported by an ADM level Intelligence Analysis Committee. The committee's membership is comprised of: PCO, CSE, CSIS, CBSA, CAF, DND, GAC, and PS. It met on Mar 20, 2023 and June 29, 2023. DMIC has not met since June 2023, as the role of the committee has been under review by the former NSIA and the current DC-NSIA. Documentation to support DMIC included meeting agendas and minutes and periodic annotated chair's agendas. DMIC has discussed strategic-level FI only once, on January 14, 2021.²⁶

vi. DM National Security (DMNS)

The DC-NSIA and the Deputy Minister of PS co-chair DMNS, which meets approximately on a monthly basis. The committee considers security, defence, and foreign policy issues and priorities, as well as their linkages with one another to inform advice, as required. It also coordinates the government's response to current and emerging issues related to Canada's national security. DMNS is supported by two ADM level committees, ADM Intelligence and ADM National Security Policy. The committee's core membership is comprised of: CAF, CBSA, CSIS, CSE, Department of Justice (DOJ), DND, GAC, Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED), Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS), PCO, PS and RCMP. The committee may invite the following members on a subject-specific basis: Canada Revenue Agency, Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA), Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Finance, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Health Canada (HC), IRCC, Natural Resources Canada (NRCAN), Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC), Public Services and Procurement Canada, TC. Documentation produced for DMNS includes meeting agendas, a yearly forward agenda, annotated chairs' agenda, lists of participants, terms of reference, and decks and other supporting documents.²⁷

vii. DM Review Coordination (DMRC)

The DC-NSIA chairs DMRC. The committee's mandate is to provide strategic guidance and direction on the interaction between the security and intelligence community and NSICOP, NSIRA, and, as required, the Intelligence Commissioner (IC). DMRC is supported by an ADM level committee. The committee's membership is comprised of: PCO, CSIS, CSE, GAC, DOJ, DND/CAF, PS and RCMP. Deputy Ministers from departments/agencies not represented at DMRC may also be invited to participate as required. DMRC meets on an *ad hoc* basis when required. It was created in 2021, and met nine times that year (January 21, February 18, March 18, April 15, May 20, June 22, July 22, September 16, and December 7). It did not meet in 2022-2023, but met again on June 7, 2024 to discuss responses to the recommendations contained in the NSICOP and NSIRA FI reports released in 2024. Documentation prepared in support of DMRC includes meeting agendas, minutes and periodic annotated chair's agendas.²⁸

viii. DM China Committee (DMCC)

²⁶ SE_CAN047044

²⁷ PBH_CAN047026

²⁸ PBH_CAN047027

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Meetings are chaired by GAC and are typically held on a monthly or bi-monthly basis to discuss Canada's strategic approach to China. The committee discusses issues relating to foreign policy and, from time to time, those related to foreign interference. Agendas are prepared by GAC. FDP typically prepares an annotated agenda when one of its principals participates. The committee's membership is comprised of the deputy heads of Foreign Affairs (GAC), International Trade (GAC), PCO, DND, ISED, NRCan, IRCC, PCH, Agriculture and Agri-Food, Finance, Labour, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC), TC, HC, PS, CSIS, CSE, CBSA and the CFIA. No readouts or meeting summaries are shared with FDP.²⁹

ix. DM-Clerk on Foreign Interference (DMC FI)

This DM committee was created in 2023 by the former Clerk, Janice Charette, and continued under the current Clerk, John Hannaford, to discuss and consider potential actions by the public service and advice to the government on next steps that could be taken to respond to the issue of foreign interference in democratic processes. It met on the following dates: May 11, 2023, May 18, 2023, May 25, 2023, June 1, 2023, June 8, 2023, June 15, 2023, July 7, 2023, July 13, 2023, July 20, 2023, July 25, 2023, August 17, 2023, November 3, 2024, and February 9, 2024. Documentation prepared in support of DMC FI includes meeting agendas, scenario notes for the chair, records of decision, and minutes (minutes for earlier meetings were not circulated). As of the time of writing, there are no planned meetings of DMC FI. The committee while not formally disbanded would consider meeting only on an *ad hoc* basis going forward, at the discretion of the Clerk. The committee's membership is comprised of: PCO, PS, CSIS, RCMP, DOJ, GAC, and CSE. This committee does not have terms of reference.

x. Deputy Minister Committee on Foreign Interference (DM FI)

This committee meets on an *ad hoc* basis and was chaired by Public Safety. It was created in 2023 and met on a weekly basis during spring and summer of 2023, but has not met since that time. Details regarding documentation prepared in support of DM FI and meeting dates are provided in the Public Safety Institutional Report.

xi. DM Committee on Cyber Security (DMCS)

The mandate of DMCS is to develop and lead on Canada's cyber security policies and operations in support of the Government of Canada's economic and social priorities. Co-chaired by PS and the CSE, meetings are organized approximately once a month to discuss policy issues and direction based on operational findings and results. The committee's membership is comprised of: Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), CSIS, Finance, GAC, ISED, HC, DOJ, DND, CAF, NRCan, PCO, Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), RCMP, Shared Services Canada (SSC), TC and TBS. Meeting materials usually include an agenda and any sort of supporting background materials (i.e. decks). DMCS is supported by the Assistant Deputy Ministers' Committee on Cyber Security (ADMCS).³⁰

²⁹ SE_CAN047045

³⁰ PBH_CAN047033

UNCLASSIFIED**B. Assistant Deputy Minister level committees with PCO participation*****i. ADM Electoral Security Coordinating Committee (ADM ESCC)***

This committee, co-chaired by Elections Canada and PCO, provides direction for ensuring interagency collaboration and coordination and system preparedness as it relates to electoral security. It meets bi-weekly or as required. Documentation produced in support of ADM ESCC includes meeting agendas, annotated agendas and a yearly forward agenda. The committee's membership is comprised of: PCO-S&I, PCO-DI, PS, Elections Canada, CSIS, CSE, GAC, RCMP and Commissioner of Canada Elections. This committee does not have terms of reference. The Director General Electoral Security Coordinating Committee meetings have been combined with the ADM ESCC and are now being conducted in a single meeting.

ii. ADM National Security Operations Committee (ADM NS Ops)

This committee, co-chaired by Public Safety and PCO, formed in 2010, is responsible for ensuring situational awareness of key operational issues across the security and intelligence community. It also enables strategic coordination across the Government of Canada in response to national security events or emergency situations. It is not a decision-making body. ADM NS Ops usually meets on a weekly basis and is co-chaired by PCO and PS. The Committee Secretariat, housed at PS, prepares the official meeting agenda, the annotated agenda for the PS co-chair, as well as the meeting summary, which supports discussion at DMOC. The committee's membership is comprised of: PS, PCO, CSIS, RCMP, CBSA, CSE, Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), DND, Canadian Forces Intelligence Command (CFINTCOM), TC, GAC, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC), and IRCC. Foreign interference is not a standing item at ADM NS Ops, but the subject has been discussed on numerous occasions in the past few years. This committee facilitates decision-making during national security incidents. The committee coordinates security and intelligence federal activity, provides situational awareness, and can integrate other key partners as needed to facilitate a response.³¹

iii. Tactical ADM National Security Operations Committee (Tactical ADM NS OPS):

This committee is a sub-set of ADM NS OPS and was created to provide a forum to share sensitive information and ensure situational awareness of emerging operational issues among key security and intelligence partners (PCO, PS, CSIS, CSE, RCMP, GAC, ITAC). Tactical ADM NS OPS usually meets on a bi-weekly basis but can be stood up on short notice when pressing issues arise. The committee is co-chaired by PCO and PS. The Committee supports DMCIR by making recommendations of intelligence to be included in DMCIR discussions, providing advice to deputy ministers on options to address intelligence and in serving as a coordination body to follow up on actions from DMCIR. This committee does not have terms of reference.

³¹ PBH_CAN047030

UNCLASSIFIED***iv. ADM National Security Policy Committee (ADM NS Pol)***

This committee is co-chaired by Public Safety and PCO and serves as a strategic-level table for senior-level members of departments and agencies in Canada's security and intelligence community to meet on the development and implementation of policy issues related to national security. ADM NS Pol supports, primarily, but not exclusively, the discussions and policy work directed to the Deputy Ministers' National Security Committee, to Ministers, and to Cabinet. The committee's core membership is comprised of PCO, PS, CSIS, ITAC, CSE, CBSA, GAC, DOJ, RCMP, DND, IRCC, TC, FINTRAC, ISED, PHAC, and CFIA. It meets on a bi-weekly basis, with every third meeting oriented to a research security format. Documentation prepared in support of ADM NS Pol includes meeting agendas, annotated chairs agendas, lists of participants, terms of reference, a yearly forward agenda, and decks and other supporting documents.³²

v. ADM Review Coordination Committee (ADMRC)

This committee, chaired by PCO, supports DMRC in providing strategic guidance and direction in the interaction between the security and intelligence community and NSICOP, NSIRA, and, as required, the Intelligence Commissioner (IC). The committee's core membership comprises: PCO, DOJ, CBSA, CSIS, CSE, GAC, DND, CAF, PS, and RCMP. ADMRC met twice in 2021 (July 19 and October 7), three times in 2022 (June 29, September 14, December 9), twice in 2023 (April 12 and November 16 – the November meeting included a status update on the then ongoing NSICOP and NSIRA FI reviews), and once so far in 2024 (May 22) to discuss the responses to the recommendations contained in the NSIRA and NSICOP FI reviews. Documentation prepared in support of ADMRC includes meeting agendas.

vi. ADM Intelligence Assessment Committee (ADM IAC)

ADM IAC serves as a venue for ADM-level discussion about strategic intelligence assessments, and corporate developments that relate to the Canadian intelligence community. The committee features presentations and discussions on a range of strategic intelligence assessment products produced by IAS and other key partners (CFINTCOM, GAC, CSE, ITAC, CSIS, RCMP, CBSA, etc.), which may include items related to FI. Following the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC), ADM IAC has also been leveraged to review products before they go to the NSC. The committee's membership is comprised of: PCO, ITAC, CSIS, CSE, RCMP, CBSA, PS, DND, GAC, and FINTRAC. ADM IAC used to meet on a weekly basis but, given its supporting role to the NSC, now meets on a roughly monthly basis. Documentation produced includes meeting agendas, forward agendas, terms of reference and other supporting documents. ADM IAC has discussed strategic-level FI issues on the following dates: December 12, 2018, December 2, 2022, February 24, 2023, April 21, 2023, May 5, 2023, May 19, 2023, June 2, 2023, June 16, 2023, June 30, 2023, December 15, 2023, January 12, 2024, and February 12, 2024.³³

³² PBH_CAN047036

³³ TS_CAN047237

UNCLASSIFIED**vii. ADM Intelligence Committee (ADM INT)**

This committee meets on an *ad hoc* basis, and meetings are chaired by the Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet, S&I. The committee is responsible for implementation, management, and oversight of the government's Intelligence Priorities and Requirements, which includes discussions on Government of Canada intelligence needs, operational gaps, and intelligence coordination. It is also responsible for the provision of accountability reporting to Cabinet with respect to the community's implementation of the Intelligence Priorities. The committee includes: PCO-IAS, CBSA, CCG, CSIS, CSE, DND/CAF, ECCC, Finance, FINTRAC, IRCC, ITAC, ISED, GAC, PHAC, PS, RCMP, TC. Documentation prepared in support of ADM INT generally includes meeting agendas, minutes and briefing materials related to intelligence requirements and the Intelligence Priorities MC. The committee met the following dates: January 24, 2018; February 23, 2018; March 9, 2018; April 27, 2018; May 30, 2018; July 13, 2018; August 30, 2018; October 5, 2018; November 13, 2018; March 4, 2019; April 13, 2019; June 3, 2019; July 8, 2019; September 16, 2019; October 28, 2019; December 16, 2019; March 5, 2020; April 7, 2020; April 27, 2020; October 6, 2020; November 19, 2020; December 9, 2020; January 13, 2021; February 9, 2021; March 17, 2021; April 13, 2021; May 19, 2021; July 5, 2021; August 26, 2021; October 3, 2021; December 8, 2021; March 2, 2022; April 11, 2022 (specific HASA discussion item); May 6, 2022; June 7, 2022; July 22, 2022; October 12, 2022; November 2, 2022; December 7, 2022; March 1, 2023; April 5, 2023; October 3, 2023; October 23, 2023; April 26, 2024.³⁴

viii. ADM China Committee (ADMCC)

Meetings are chaired by GAC and are typically held on a monthly or bi-monthly basis to discuss issues relating to foreign policy, Canada-China relations and, from time to time, those related to foreign interference. Agendas are prepared by GAC. FDP typically prepares an annotated agenda when one of its principals participates. The committee's membership is comprised of the deputy heads of Foreign Affairs (GAC), International Trade (GAC), PCO, DND, ISED, NRCan, IRCC, PCH, Agriculture and Agri-Food, Finance, Labour, ECCC, TC, HC, PS, CSIS, CSE, CBSA and the CFIA. No readouts or meeting summaries are shared with FDP. Additional details are available in the GAC Institutional Report. The committee does not have terms of reference.

ix. ADM bi-weekly meeting on India

FDP convenes meetings on India to discuss issues relating to foreign policy, including, from time to time, those related to foreign interference. These meetings are typically on a bi-weekly schedule but are *ad-hoc* in nature. Participation fluctuates, but typically includes PCO S&I, PCO Comms, GAC, PS, RCMP, and CSIS. FDP typically develops the agenda, in coordination with GAC, and prepares an annotated agenda for its principals to chair the meeting. No readouts or summaries are drafted. The committee does not have terms of reference.

³⁴ PBH_CAN047037

UNCLASSIFIED**x. ADM Committee on Foreign Interference (ADM FI)**

This committee meets on an *ad hoc* basis and is chaired by Public Safety. Details regarding documentation prepared in support of ADM FI and meeting dates are provided in the Public Safety Institutional Report.

xi. ADM Cyber Security (ADMCS)

This committee is co-chaired by PS and CSE and supports DMCS. It meets monthly. Meeting materials usually include an agenda and any sort of supporting background materials (i.e. decks). The committee's core membership comprises: PCO, PS, CSE, CSIS, Finance, GAC, ISED, HC, DOJ, DND, CAF, NRCAN, PSPC, RCMP, SSC, TC, and TBS.³⁵

C. Director-General or Director level committees with PCO participation**i. Director General Hostile Activity by State Actors (DG HASA)**

This is an informal committee chaired by Public Safety that has met on an *ad hoc* basis. No meetings have taken place in the last year. Based on available records, recent previous meetings were held: January 27, 2023; January 13, 2023; December 8, 2022; August 4, 2022; April 1, 2022; January 13, 2022; December 16, 2021; November 27, 2020; September 17, 2020; and September 10, 2020. Documentation prepared in support of DG HASA includes meeting agendas; documents pertaining to agenda items were also provided (e.g., decks, papers). The committee's participants is comprised of: PS, PCO, CBSA, CSE, CSIS, DND/CAF, FINTRAC, GAC, DOJ, RCMP, ISED, IRCC, PCH, PHAC, TBS, and TC. This committee does not have terms of reference.

ii. Director General Cyber Operations Committee (DG Cyber Ops)

This role of this committee is to ensure that the federal response to cyber threats and incidents of national interest is coordinated and that national operational policy issues are advanced. Participation in DG Cyber Ops is limited to those organizations with mandated operational cyber security functions. DG Cyber Ops consists of those government departments that have an operational role inside and/or outside of the federal government: CSIS, CSE, CCCS, DND, CAF, PCO, PS RCMP, SSC, GAC, and TBS.³⁶

iii. Director General Coordinating Group on Protecting Democracy

This is a steering committee led by DI created to lead the efforts to enhance the PD Plan. It meets as required. The membership of the steering committee is: PCO, PCH, PS, GAC, ISED, TBS, DOJ, CIRNAC, ISC, IRCC, WAGE, DND, RCMP, CSE, CSIS, and ESDC.

³⁵ PBH_CAN047032

³⁶ PBH_CAN047031

UNCLASSIFIED***iv. Director General Intelligence Committee (DG INT)***

This committee meets on an *ad hoc* basis and is chaired by the PCO S&I Director of Strategic Policy and Planning. DG INT supports ADM INT. Documentation prepared in support of DG INT generally includes meeting agendas, minutes and briefing materials related to intelligence requirements and the Intelligence Priorities MC. DG INT meetings are generally held 1-2 weeks prior to ADM INT (see meeting list above under ADM INT). The committee does not have terms of reference, but references to DG INT are included in the terms of reference for ADM INT.

v. Director General Intelligence Assessment Coordination Committee (DG IACC)

The DG IACC is co-chaired by the PCO-IAS Director of Operations and the Director General, Policy and Programs for ITAC. This committee serves as a venue to coordinate, advance and make recommendations to ADM IAC on assessment community enterprise development issues, to align community-wide intelligence assessment production, monitor and deconflict senior level international engagements and serve as a consultation body for intelligence assessments prior to discussion at ADM IAC when required. DG IACC has discussed strategic-level FI issues on the following date: December 12, 2023. Since 2018, frequency of meetings vary from bi-weekly to monthly to *ad-hoc*. This committee's membership consists of: CBSA, CSIS, CSE/CCCE, DND/CFINTCOM, FINTRAC, GAC, ITAC, PHAC, and PS.³⁷

vi. Interdepartmental Directors' Committee on Protecting Democracy

This is an interdepartmental group of directors, which meets quarterly, engaging over 15 different departments and agencies. The group shares information on initiatives related to protecting democracy and combatting disinformation. The membership of the committee is: PCO, PCH, PS, GAC, ISED, TBS, JUS, CIRNAC, ISC, IRCC, ECCC, HC, PHAC, WAGE, DND, RCMP, CSE, and CSIS.

D. Working level committees with PCO participation***i. Working Group on Foreign Interference Policy Work***

PS organizes a weekly call at the working level with CSIS, DOJ and PCO to coordinate policy work on foreign interference matters (for example, coordination of public consultations on the Foreign Interference Bill and study of Bill C-70 in committee). No documents are prepared for the meeting. Participants included those with a direct stake in Bill C-70: PS, PCO, CSIS, DOJ. The committee does not have terms of reference.

³⁷ PBH_CAN047022

UNCLASSIFIED*ii. The Intelligence Working Group (INT WG)*

This working group is chaired by PCO-S&I and meets on an *ad hoc* basis to recommend updates to the Intelligence Priorities and Requirements in accordance with Cabinet approved processes. Documentation prepared in support of INT WG generally include documents to be reviewed and/or approved by DG INT and ADM INT. INT WG meetings are generally 1-2 weeks prior to DG INT meetings. The committee does not have terms of reference, but references to INT WG are included in the terms of reference for ADM INT.

iii. DI Interdepartmental Engagement

Since the creation of the PDU in late 2022, DI has increased its engagement efforts within the Government of Canada, as well as civil society, academics, other orders of government, and internationally. In terms of working level committees, DI has engaged interdepartmentally with a view to develop a research strategy on disinformation and democracy, avoid duplication of efforts across government, and best leverage limited resources.

(9) A listing of all engagements at divisional Director level (or equivalent) or above with representatives of diaspora groups where the subject of foreign interference was discussed. Listing should include dates, names of departmental and diaspora representatives and summary of discussion.

Nil.

(10) Any relevant updates related to the information provided in the Stage 1 Institutional Report.

There have been the following additional relevant briefings on interference by China, Russia, or other actors to the Prime Minister since the Stage 1 Institutional Report.

Date	Briefing Entity	Other Participants
To the Prime Minister		
April 30, 2024	John Hannaford, Clerk of the Privy Council; Nathalie Drouin, DCNSIA; Daniel Rogers, DNSIA	PMO Staff