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**PUBLIC INQUIRY INTO FOREIGN INTERFERENCE IN FEDERAL
ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS**

INSTITUTIONAL REPORT – PRIME MINISTER’S OFFICE – STAGE 2

- 1. A listing and description of all major instances of suspected foreign interference targeting Canada’s democratic processes, including summary, dates, target, country involved, key players, information flow and any responses taken.**

The Prime Minister’s Office (“**PMO**”) understands that a list is being prepared by intelligence agencies. It should be noted that not all instances of foreign interference in the list would have been brought to PMO’s attention.

- 2. A listing and description of all existing means at the disposal of each government and agency to detect, deter and counter any foreign interference activities, including any relevant changes to or evolution in these means.**

PMO receives intelligence from officials at PCO, who may involve officials from other departments or agencies as required. Foreign interference is one of a very large number of topics on which PMO receives intelligence information from officials. As described in PMO’s initial institutional report, this intelligence information is delivered in many different forms, both in writing and orally, not all of which have been formally tracked. This information can potentially inform any of PMO’s activities, and often may be delivered for situational awareness only.

One significant channel by which PMO receives intelligence information is when officials conduct security vetting on candidates for potential appointments for roles where a security clearance is required, including but not limited to Cabinet positions.

Responsible ministries, the Privy Council Office (“**PCO**”), and relevant departments and agencies are best placed to list specific means to detect, deter, and counter foreign interference. Many such means have been developed by this government and were outlined in the institutional reports for Stage 1, including that of the PMO. In developing new means of detecting, deterring, and combating foreign interference, the Prime Minister sets goals and priorities. During the development of policy, PMO and PCO engage across government as required, and can be consulted on specific policies. Finally, Cabinet considers and decides whether to approve a developed policy.

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3. A listing and description of all policy proposals, legislative plans and resource requests related to foreign interference, including but not limited to memos to the Deputy Minister (or equivalent) or Assistant Deputy Minister (or equivalent). At a minimum, this should include the date of the request, date of decision (where applicable), a summary of the proposed changes and the outcome of this request.

This government has been particularly active in terms of advancing policy proposals and legislative initiatives to address foreign interference, as outlined in the PMO institutional report for Phase 1 (see pages 3-6). The priority that this government has made on foreign interference is further evidenced by the Prime Minister's mandate letters to three Ministers in December 2021 – those of the Ministers of Public Safety, Foreign Affairs, and Innovation, Science and Industry. In turn, the Minister of Public Safety also set out priorities related to combating foreign interference in his mandate letter to the Director of CSIS in 2022.

These actions have been accompanied by related funding decisions set out in the federal budget (see ANNEX A). Of note, this government has committed approximately \$500 million towards countering foreign interference since 2018. This includes :

- significant investments in CSIS and the RCMP to enhance intelligence capabilities and investigative capacity,
- funding for CSE to establish the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, and to provide cyber security advice and guidance to Canadian political parties and election administrators ,
- funding for Public Safety Canada to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office,
- setting up the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism unit in Global Affairs Canada,
- improvements to the Elections Act, and
- funding for Heritage Canada to launch a Digital Democracy Project to strengthen Canadians' resilience to online disinformation, as well as the Digital Citizen Initiative

Most recently, in May 2024 the Government introduced Bill C-70, *An Act Respecting Countering Foreign Interference*, in the House of Commons. This Bill includes changes to the *Criminal Code*, the *Security of Information Act*, the *CSIS Act*, and the *Canada Evidence Act*; as well as a proposal to establish a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry.

Specifically, Bill C-70:

- modernizes the existing sabotage offence in the *Criminal Code* to ensure the offence is responsive to today's threat environment, including a new offence on conduct directed at essential infrastructure and specific categories of protected essential infrastructure.
- amends the *Security of Information Act* by creating three new offences related to foreign interference: 1) a general foreign interference offence committed for a foreign entity, 2) an indictable offence committed for a foreign entity, and 3) a political interference offence committed for a foreign entity, and modifies the existing offence for intimidation, threats and violence to make them more responsive to modern-day threats, like harming relatives of a Canadian citizen living in a foreign state.

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- amends the *CSIS Act* to ensure it can successfully operate in a digital world, provide information to non-federal partners, and enable CSIS to respond to evolving threats. These changes create modern and transparent authorities, while maintaining robust Ministerial and judicial oversight, and parliamentary and independent review .
 - amends the *Canada Evidence Act* to establish a regime to govern the disclosure, protection and use of sensitive or potentially injurious information in administrative proceedings before the Federal Court or Federal Court of Appeal such as judicial reviews or statutory appeals arising from federal administrative decision-making.
 - introduces the *Foreign Influence Transparency and Accountability Act* (FITAA) in which a new Foreign Influence Transparency Commissioner will administer the new registry and enforce the Act through monetary and criminal penalties.
- 4. A listing and description of all existing arrangements and undertakings (including Memoranda of Understanding) between government and departments and agencies, and with international partners, aimed at detecting, deterring, and countering foreign interference activities, including the dates that the arrangements have been in place.**

The types of agreements referred to are generally within the purview of responsible ministries, relevant departments and agencies, who are best placed to list such arrangements and undertakings. As highlighted in the institutional report of PCO, there have been many recent developments to improve inter-governmental coordination in areas relevant to foreign interference. During the development of policy, PMO and PCO engage across government as required, and can be consulted on specific policies. Finally, Cabinet considers and decides whether to approve a developed policy. In terms of international agreements, in 2018 the Government of Canada led the creation of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, as detailed in the response to question 6 below, and has participated in its expansion over time.

- 5. A listing and description of all warrant applications related to foreign interference submitted to the Minister of Public Safety, and ministerial authorizations submitted to the Minister of National Defence, including date submitted to the Minister, date approved by the Minister, date of decision by the Federal Court and, if applicable, the reasons for decision.**

Not applicable to PMO.

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6. A listing and description of the date, venue, participant and summary of discussion for all engagements by senior executives (ADM and above, including Ministers) with representatives of foreign governments (especially China, Russia and India) where the subject of foreign interference was raised.

The Prime Minister has raised foreign interference with representatives of foreign governments many times. He has done so in bilateral conversations, whether in person or on the phone, as well as at multilateral meetings. Foreign interference has also been addressed in the agreements and outcomes of various summits and bilateral visits.

A list follows of engagements by the Prime Minister with representatives of foreign governments that substantively touched on the issue of foreign interference in democratic institutions .

Please note that this list is not exhaustive. No list will be able to exhaustively catalogue informal or *ad hoc* engagements. Given the nature of foreign affairs, many engagements are conversations which are not formally scheduled. They can occur on the margins of other events.

The list does not include the many engagements that concerned defending and strengthening democratic values generally, or that concerned how to address the conduct of countries such as China and Russia that does not specifically relate to foreign interference in democratic institutions , including specific instances of transnational repression of common concern to Canada and our likeminded partners.

As several of the examples illustrate, there are sequences of engagements that build on each other, with each engagement touching on foreign interference (e.g., multiple G7 meetings, the Summits for Democracy). Some of these engagements may also involve policy processes that capture Canadian actions to counter foreign interference or reflect international commitments to cooperate and take collective action.

The list also does not include engagements by Canadian government officials other than the Prime Minister. Interactions between staff of the Prime Minister's Office and representatives of foreign governments are not themselves tracked. Interactions between public service officials and representatives of foreign governments would be listed in other institutional reports.

Date	Venue	Participants	Summary
2018-06-10	G7 Summit, Canada		To build a more peaceful and secure world, leaders committed to take strong action in response to foreign actors who seek to undermine our democratic societies and institutions, our electoral processes, and our sovereignty. G7 leaders agreed to establish a G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, which will strengthen coordination among our countries to identify and respond to these diverse and

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			<p>evolving threats. Through this initiative, G7 countries will share information and analysis, and identify new opportunities where we can work together to defend our democracies.</p> <p>See link</p>
2018-07-10	Visit to Latvia	Raimonds Vējonis, President of Latvia	<p>The leaders discussed issues of mutual interest including their commitment to regional defence and security, the upcoming NATO Summit and Canada's contribution to NATO's enhanced Forward Presence in Latvia. Other issues of security were also discussed between the Prime Minister and the President including cyber security, hybrid warfare and foreign interference.</p> <p>See link</p>
2018-09-05	Telephone call	Prime Minister Theresa May of the United Kingdom	<p>After a discussion of the UK's recent arrest of two Russians in connection with a poisoning in Salisbury, the leaders spoke more broadly about the need for democratic countries to respond to threats. The recent G7 RRM agreement was mentioned as a tool for closer collaboration and information-sharing.</p>
2019-07-17 and 18	Canada-EU summit in Montreal	President of the European Council, Donald Tusk	<p>Leaders discussed the need to be vigilant about protecting and reinforcing our democratic institutions, processes and principles against foreign threats. They agreed to continue to collaborate and share best practices, both bilaterally and through multilateral mechanisms, including the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) established under Canada's 2018 G7 presidency.</p> <p>See link</p>
2021-01-19	Telephone call	Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson of Sweden	<p>The Prime Minister raised threats to democracy including those arising from technology, social media, and artificial intelligence. He mentioned China and Russia</p>

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			as actors seeking to undermine and destabilize democracies and thus the international order.
2021-02-23	Roadmap for a Renewed U.S.-Canada Partnership	President Joe Biden	<p>It was agreed that Canada and the United States will increase cooperation to strengthen cybersecurity, and to confront foreign interference and disinformation.</p> <p>See link</p>
2021-06-11 to 13	G7 Summit in Carbis Bay, United Kingdom	Leaders of the G7	<p>There was commitment to increase cooperation on supporting democracy, including through strengthening the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism to counter foreign threats to democracy including disinformation.</p> <p>Leaders reaffirmed their call on Russia to stop its destabilising behaviour and malign activities, including its interference in other countries' democratic systems, and to fulfil its international human rights obligations and commitments.</p> <p>See link</p> <p>This summit also resulted in the Open Societies Statement which expressly commits to “continue to exchange information and coordinate effective responses to shared threats to human rights, democracy and the rule of law, such as disinformation and arbitrary detention, including through relevant partnerships such as the Rapid Response Mechanism, as appropriate.”</p>
2021-06-15	Canada-European Union Summit	Leaders of the European Union	<p>Leaders agreed to continue to cooperate closely in promoting international peace and security and our shared values, including defending human rights, gender equality, media freedom, liberal democracy, the rule of law, and the rules based international order. In the face of growing threats to democratic institutions and processes, there was commitment to advance cooperation in frameworks such as the G7 Rapid Response</p>

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			<p>Mechanism to tackle foreign interference and disinformation, strengthen resilience against these activities, and support partners in their efforts. They also decided to coordinate diplomatic action to prevent, discourage, deter and respond to malicious cyber activities and hybrid threats.</p> <p>See link</p>
2021-12-09	Summit for Democracy	Various	See link to Prime Minister's remarks. While they do not address foreign interference in depth, the overall process at this summit concerned foreign interference more substantively.
2022-02-26	Telephone call	President of Moldova Maia Sandu	The leaders discussed attempts by Russia to interfere in Moldova's elections.
2022-04-04	Telephone call	Prime Minister of Australia Scott Morrison	The two leaders discussed Russian disinformation and the possibility of diplomatic responses.
2022-05-30	Telephone call	Senior Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore	The Prime Minister raised, and the two leaders discussed, the circulation of Russian disinformation in their respective countries.
2022-06-28	G7 Summit, Germany	Various leaders	Leaders decided to halt democratic backsliding and undermining of fundamental values by coordinating closely across the G7 and with partners to strengthen democracies and our institutions against disinformation, including foreign information manipulation. In light of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, G7 nations remain committed and will enhance cooperation through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) in order to protect our democratic systems and open societies from foreign threats, such as information manipulation and interference, including disinformation. ... To this end, there was commitment to further develop the G7 RRM through an expanded focus on hybrid threats and to enhance its capabilities

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			<p>to respond to foreign interference also at the sub-national level. More broadly, G7 countries will also enhance the resilience of public actors and institutions, business, academia, and civil society through a whole-of-society-approach, as well as cooperation within the OECD.</p> <p>See link</p>
2022-06-27	G7 Summit, Germany	Various leaders	<p>Leaders at the summit issued the Resilient Democracies Statement, which built on the 2021 Carbis Bay Open Societies Statement (see above) and expressly committed to “Countering hybrid threats, in particular information manipulation and interference, including disinformation”, “cooperating to counter information manipulation, promote accurate information, and advocate for our shared democratic values worldwide”, and “building resilience against malign foreign interference and acts of transnational repression that seek to undermine trust in government, society and media, reduce civic space and silence critical voices.”</p> <p>See link</p>
2022-11	G20 Summit, Indonesia	President Xi Jinping	<p>Along with other issues, the Prime Minister raised Canada’s serious concerns about China’s interference activities in Canada. The two leaders discussed the importance of continued dialogue.</p>
2023-03-29	Second Summit for Democracy	Various	See link
2023-05-17	Meeting in Seoul, South Korea	President Yoon Suk Yeol	<p>Leaders discussed the impact of emerging technologies on preserving democratic values and institutions and the threats posed by disinformation and information warfare. Leaders also agreed to work closely together to develop, along with other like-minded countries, policies that are grounded in inclusion, human rights, and the rule of law, in order to defend against and to increase</p>

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			<p>citizen and societal resilience to disinformation online.</p> <p>See link</p>
2023-05-20	G7 Summit, Japan		<p>Leaders reaffirmed their commitment to protecting the information environment by supporting media freedom and online freedom, including protection from online harassment and abuse, internet shutdowns and disruptions, as well as addressing foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, which is designed to undermine trust in democratic institutions, and sow discord in the international community. They strongly condemned the widespread use of information manipulation and interference by Russia in order to gain support for its war of aggression against Ukraine and to obscure the facts of its aggression.</p> <p>Through the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), G7 nations will work to strengthen our collective efforts to counter threats to democracy, including such manipulation, with full respect for international human rights law, in particular freedom of expression. G7 countries will work towards ensuring that fact-based, quality, and trustworthy information is promoted, and call on digital platforms to support this approach. Members will increase cooperation on these issues with government and non-governmental partners from all regions who share the determination to promote access to such information, including through supporting relevant international initiatives, such as the Partnership for Information and Democracy, and efforts by the UN and OECD.</p> <p>See link</p>
2023-06-26	Visit to Iceland	Leaders of Iceland, Denmark,	Prime Minister Trudeau underlined Canada's efforts to strengthen democratic resilience and address challenges such as foreign

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		Finland, Norway, Sweden, the Faroe Islands, Greenland, and Åland	<p>interference, cyber incidents, online harms, disinformation, assaults on democracy, and emergency management. The Prime Minister highlighted Canada's leadership of the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism, which fights misinformation and disinformation, and our efforts to support media freedom and advance responsible business conduct for Canadian companies operating abroad, and our joint efforts through the Freedom Online Coalition. He stressed the importance for Canada and Nordic countries to continue to work together to counter cyber threats, promote stability in cyberspace, uphold the rules-based international order, and impose costs on those who engage in malicious cyber activity.</p> <p>See link</p>
2023-11-24	Canada-EU Summit in St. John's, Newfoundland	Leaders of the European Union	<p>Leaders agreed to continue to strengthen collaboration to counter foreign threats to democracy, including through platforms like the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. Member countries will continue to work together to protect information integrity – grounded in inclusion, human rights and the rule of law – with the objective of defending against and increasing citizen and societal resilience to information manipulation and disinformation both online and offline, including through working on the development of international norms and principles, such as those in the Global Declaration on Information Integrity Online. Leaders called on all foreign actors to cease and to refrain from interference activities, aimed at undermining the security and safety of communities, the integrity of democratic institutions and processes, and our economic prosperity.</p> <p>See link</p>
2024-03-20	Third Summit for Democracy	Various	See link

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2024-06-04	Telephone call	President of the European Commission, Ursula van der Leyen	The two leaders discussed foreign interference in European public opinion, including cyber-attacks and strategically organized demonstrations. The Prime Minister mentioned foreign interference by China, Russia, and India in Canadian democratic processes.
2024-06-14	G7 Summit, Apulia, Italy	Various	<p>With the rapid evolution of emerging technology, G7 nations are more concerned than ever about Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) in our democratic institutions and processes, and how attempted interference campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and transnational repression collectively undermine sovereignty and democratic values. Participants pledged to strengthen coordinated efforts to better prevent, detect, and respond to FIMI threats through human rights-respecting practices and by supporting freedom of expression and free, independent, and pluralistic media.</p> <p>Participants asked relevant Ministers to bolster the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism by creating a collective response framework to counter foreign threats to democracies, including publicly exposing foreign operations of information manipulation by the end of the year. G7 members also called on tech companies, in particular social media platforms, to intensify their efforts to prevent and counter FIMI campaigns and the potential abuse of AI for this purpose and work towards higher standards of transparency and accountability on these issues. Member countries will continue to cooperate with governments and non-governmental partners to work towards the promotion of fact-based, quality, and trustworthy information and will support relevant international initiatives, in particular in the UN and OECD.</p> <p>See link</p>

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7. A listing and description of all education campaigns aimed at Parliamentarians and their staff, political parties, government employees at federal, provincial or municipal levels, diaspora groups, or the general public relating to foreign interference.

Responsible ministries, PCO, and relevant departments and agencies are best placed to list such education campaigns. Further, in relation to Parliamentarians and political parties specifically:

- Newly-elected MPs receive a series of security briefings from the House of Commons;
- Intelligence agencies do not need authorization from the Prime Minister’s Office to brief MPs on the threat of foreign interference. Indeed, as the report acknowledges elsewhere, CSIS has done so in many cases, as the need has arisen.
- CSIS has increased the number of defensive briefings it provides to elected officials. According to CSIS’s 2023 public report, these increased by 31% to 122 in 2023, including 19 to federal elected officials in 2023 alone.
- In 2019 and 2021, political parties received dedicated threat briefings at the Secret level from Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.
- In December 2020, Minister Blair sent a lengthy and detailed letter to all Parliamentarians, describing the threat of foreign interference.
- In May 2023, the Minister of Public Safety issued a Ministerial Directive that, among other things:
 - Requires that “threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament and parliamentarians, including those conducted through their family and staff, receive the highest level of attention from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service”;
 - Requires that “CSIS will seek, wherever possible within the law and while protecting the security and integrity of national security and intelligence operations and investigations, to ensure that parliamentarians are informed of threats to the security of Canada directed at them”; and
 - Requires that “The Minister of Public Safety will be informed of all instances of threats to the security of Canada directed at Parliament or parliamentarians in a timely manner.”
- In January 2024, the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs published a suite of tools and resources for spotting and fighting disinformation and foreign interference (available [online](#)), including:
 - Toolkit to resist disinformation and foreign interference for elected officials and public office holders

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- Toolkit to resist disinformation and foreign interference for community leaders
- Toolkit to resist disinformation and foreign interference for public servants
- Countering Disinformation: A Guidebook for Public Servants
- In June 2024, all party caucuses received a general briefing on foreign interference from Public Safety officials.

8. For each interdepartmental committee related to foreign interference, listing of meeting frequency (or meeting dates if *ad hoc*) and description of what documentation is routinely produced for each committee (e.g., agendas, list of participants, annotated agendas for the Chair, meeting summaries, minutes).

Not applicable – directed at PCO and/or Public Safety

9. A listing of all engagements at divisional Director level (or equivalent) or above with representatives of diaspora groups where the subject of foreign interference was discussed. Listing should include dates, names of departmental and diaspora representatives and summary of discussion.

This question is better directed at other ministries, including Public Safety and the Department of Justice. These departments and their associated agencies consulted with diaspora groups extensively in connection with the legislation tabled as Bill C-70.

10. Any relevant updates related to the information provided in the Stage 1 Institutional Report.

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ANNEX A

Federal Budget Items to Counter Foreign Interference

Foreign interference has been a priority for this government over the years. The table below outlines the policy initiatives and dedicated funding (approximately \$500 million) to combat foreign interference in Canada.

2018	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$7.1M over five years, beginning in 2018–19, and \$1.5M per year ongoing, to support the work of the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections. • \$507.7M over five years starting in 2018-19, and \$108.8M per year ongoing to support Canada’s first comprehensive National Cyber Security Strategy and to establish the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security.
2019	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • up to \$4.2M over three years, starting in 2019–20, for CSE to provide cyber security advice and guidance to Canadian political parties and election administrators. • \$2.1M over three years, starting in 2019–20, for Global Affairs Canada to set up a Rapid Response Mechanism unit, with Canada taking on an added coordination role on behalf of the G7 • \$19.4M over four years, starting in 2019–20, for Heritage Canada to launch a Digital Democracy Project to strengthen Canadians’ resilience to online disinformation • \$7.5M over two years, starting in 2018–19, for the Digital Citizen Initiative, which supports digital, news, and civic literacy programming and tools, ahead of the 2019 General Election. • \$23M over four years, starting in 2020-21, for CSIS under the umbrella of Protecting Democracy (budget line item only)
2021	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • introduced amendments to the Canada Elections Act to specify that making or publishing a false statement in relation to a candidate, prospective candidate, or party leader would be an offence.
2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$13.4M over five years, starting in 2022-23, with \$2.8M ongoing to Global Affairs Canada to renew and expand the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism. • \$10M over five years, starting in 2022-23, with \$2M ongoing for the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop, and implement government-wide measures to combat disinformation and protect our democracy.

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2023	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$48.9M over three years on a cash basis, starting in 2023-24, to the RCMP to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation, increase its investigative capacity, and more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted. • \$13.5M over five years, starting in 2023-24, and \$3.1M ongoing to Public Safety Canada to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office. • Expanded the mandate of the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions (OSFI) to include supervising federally regulated financial institutions (FRFIs) in order to determine whether they have adequate policies and procedures to protect themselves against threats to their integrity and security, including protection against foreign interference.
2024	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • \$655.7M over eight years, starting in 2024-25, with \$191.1M in remaining amortization, and \$114.7M ongoing to CSIS to enhance its intelligence capabilities, and its presence in Toronto. • \$18M over two years for PCO and Justice to cover legal fees associated with the public inquiry into foreign interference in federal electoral processes (budget line item only)