



Foreign Interference Commission

Public Consultation Process

Small Group Consultation Meeting Public Summary

In the summer of 2024, Commissioner Marie-Josée Hogue and members of the Foreign Interference Commission's (the "**Commission**") Public Consultation Process ("**PCP**") team met with six individuals belonging to the Hong Kong Canadian community in a consultation meeting organized with the assistance of the Chinese Canadian Concern Group on the Chinese Communist Party's Human Rights Violations. This is the summary of the information provided during the consultation meeting.

Notes to reader:

- The Commissioner has not and will not be making any findings about the accuracy of the information shared at the consultation meeting or make any findings of fact based on this information.
- The meeting attendees did not make an oath or swear to tell the truth before sharing information at this meeting.
- The meeting attendees were not subjected to cross-examination.
- The meeting attendees have reviewed and approved the contents of this public summary.
- Meeting attendees were given the option of anonymizing themselves for the purposes of the present public summary. Where meeting attendees opted to anonymize themselves, they are designated as "Participant 1", "Participant 2", etc.
- At each of the consultation meetings, the meeting attendees were asked to answer two questions, which are set out below. The meeting attendees were each given a total of 15 minutes to respond to both questions.
- Where necessary, Commission counsel have provided explanatory notes in square brackets and in the footnotes to assist the reader.

Executive Summary

- Certain attendees provided information about tactics used by the Chinese Communist Party (“**CCP**”) and its proxies to threaten, harass, and intimidate members of the Chinese Canadian community, including spreading misinformation and disinformation, organizing counter-protests, following people who attend protests and rallies, surveillance and photographing people, death threats and threats of sexual violence made in anonymous phone calls, and physical violence.
- Certain attendees provided examples of the above-noted tactics. Certain attendees spoke about the impact these actions had on them, including stress and fear for their loved ones. Certain attendees spoke about the self-censorship that results from such tactics, and the resulting chilling effect on members of the community. Certain attendees discussed that these tactics interfere with or prevent people from exercising their rights and engaging with Canada’s democratic processes.
- Certain attendees described the impact of Hong Kong’s National Security Law on Canadian Hong Kongers. Certain attendees described the chilling effect the extraterritorial reach of this law has on Hong Kongers living in Canada.
- One attendee described counterprotesting efforts to interfere with a prayer meeting that was so disruptive neighbours called the police and the attendees had to be escorted from the meeting. One attendee described vandalism to church property. One attendee described an individual attending and overtly photographing people attending a church service.
- Certain attendees spoke about the CCP and its proxies interfering with efforts to advertise pro-human rights and democracy events.

1. Participants’ responses to Question 1

The first question posed to the participants was: *How are you, your loved ones and members of your community impacted by foreign interference in Canada's electoral processes and democratic institutions?*

Participant 1

Participant 1 said they are a member of an organization advocating for democracy (the “**Organization**”), which was founded in 1989, right after the June 4th [Tiananmen Square] massacre. Participant 1 said that the Organization has been targeted by the CCP since 1989. Participant 1 said that since that time the CCP has continued to influence the Chinese Canadian community to disrupt and attack the Organization’s work. Participant 1 provided examples of the tactics used, including spreading information that the Organization is anti-People’s Republic of China (“**PRC**”), and threatening that Members of Parliament (“**MP**”) who supports the Organization will be isolated from the Chinese community. Participant 1 said that such MPs have been excluded from Chinese Canadian community events.

Participant 1 said that in 1990, the Organization submitted an application to erect a commemorative statue for the victims of the Tiananmen massacre in Vancouver’s Chinatown. However, their application was denied. Participant 1 said that the Organization then sought to erect the statue on the campus of the University of British Columbia (“**UBC**”). Participant 1 said that a call was issued for all Chinese associations to protest the statue and the Chinese consulate sent a letter to the Chair of UBC’s Arts Department opposing the statue. Participant 1 said that despite those efforts, the Organization was able to successfully work with UBC and a UBC student association to have the statue erected.

Participant 1 said that the Organization places ads in Chinese newspapers and over Chinese radio to organize events commemorating the June 4th massacre in Tiananmen Square. Participant 1 said that in 2012, one of the radio stations refused to broadcast the ads, stating that the events could incite public unrest. Participant 1 said that, since that time, the station has refused to run the ads. Participant 1 said that the same station invited a Chinese consular official to talk about the benefits of the National Security Law implemented in Hong Kong.

Participant 1 said that they are concerned about the repercussions their activism may have for their loved ones. Participant 1 said that after they leave an event associated with

their activism, they take evasive maneuvers before returning home to avoid being followed. Participant 1 said that they warn their loved ones not to travel to the PRC or to countries that have extradition treaties with the PRC. Participant 1 fears for the safety of their loved ones.

Participant 2

Participant 2 described examples of threats, intimidation, and attacks by the PRC. Participant 2 said that on August 18, 2019, they were involved in leading a prayer meeting for peace in Hong Kong that became the target of intimidation in downtown Vancouver. Participant 2 said that the participants to the prayer meeting were almost all Hong Kongers. Participant 2 said that the prayer meeting organizers wanted to provide an opportunity for people to share their heartache. Participant 2 said that in the midst of the prayer meeting, they heard shouting outside, and found that the church the prayer meeting was held in had been surrounded by approximately 100 people. According to Participant 2, this mob was composed of people who were carrying PRC flags and trying to break in the church and attack the prayer meeting attendees. Participant 2 said that this mob was part of a larger group of counter-protesters that had also appeared at a pro-Hong Kong protest taking place in front of the PRC consulate earlier that day. Participant 2 said that it was reasonable to deduce that this group was directed and organized by the PRC.

Participant 2 said that their prior prayer meetings had taken place peacefully. Participant 2 said the targeting of this prayer meeting was shocking and disturbing. Participant 2 said that the neighbors called the police, who had to use barriers to prevent the mob from entering the church. Participant 2 said that as prayer meeting attendees were escorted from the church, members of the mob tried to take their pictures, and the picture of a female journalist trying to report on the event, to dox them. Participant 2 said that the occurrence was so egregious that it was covered by the media and is discussed in a book authored by Sam Cooper. Participant 2 said they could only conclude that the mob was comprised of PRC agents. Participant 2 said that the mob was trying to prevent the prayer meeting attendees from exercising their freedom of speech, freedom of religion, right of

assembly, and ability to live by Canadian values. Participant 2 said this is typical of the PRC playbook, which seeks to intimidate people who try to speak out.

Participant 2 said that there are many demonstrations in favour of Hong Kong, and on the weekend of the prayer meeting, there were counter-protests. Participant 2 said that the counter-protestors were not making their own speeches, they were simply trying to drown out the speeches made by the Hong Kong supporters. Participant 2 said that the PRC directed that counter-protests be organized all over Canada on that same day. Participant 2 said that if these were legitimate Canadians expressing legitimate concerns, the counter-protests would not have been a one-off like these counter-protests were.

Participant 2 said that the weekend following the mobbed prayer meeting, an Asian stranger took photos of the people who attended their church service, then walked out in the middle of the service. Participant 2 said that by the time they realized what had happened, the stranger had driven away and it was too late to call the police. Participant 2 said that they drafted a protocol to respond to such events in the future. Participant 2 said they submitted complaints about both incidents to the Canadian Council of Churches.

Participant 2 said that that same week, they found manure spread conspicuously in front of the church building. Participant 2 said that this was the first time something like this had happened and that, given the timing, they suspect that it was part of the PRC intimidation campaign.

Participant 2 said that these threats have a lasting effect on their targets, who are haunted by the specter of vandalism or, worse, personal attacks and baseless libel and slander. Participant 2 said that victims are left wondering what will happen next. Participant 2 said that these threats and intimidation efforts are designed to frighten victims into self-censorship, to cease their human rights activism. Participant 2 said the goal is to leave the victims feeling unsafe in Canada. Participant 2 said that the trope that you can always call the police is inadequate when the threat has already been carried out.

Participant 2 provided two further examples of intimidation tactics:

- Participant 2 recounted an instance when a friend who is an activist unsuccessfully sought to evade serious threats to their physical integrity; and,
- Participant 2 said that a member of their community went to the house of a friend who had been threatened by the PRC and its agents. Participant 2 said that when the community member went to speak to those who had made the threats, the community member was beaten up so badly they had to be hospitalized and almost lost their sight. Participant 2 said that when the victim went to the police, the perpetrators claimed they were simply demonstrating and accused the pro-human rights activists of being PRC agents. Participant 2 said this catches the police, who wish to remain neutral, in a dilemma. Participant 2 said that this is a common tactic used by the PRC and its agents: to accuse your victims of committing the crimes that you are committing.

Participant 2 urged the Commission not to be derailed by those who side with foreign interference actors who use the trope of anti-Asian hate to derail actions against foreign interference. Participant 2 said that foreign interference is a manifestation of anti-Asian hate and that Asian Canadians are the first victims of foreign interference.

Participant 3

Participant 3 said that they are part of a pro-Hong Kong democracy group. Participant 3 said that the group works with citizen engagement on foreign interference and organizes awareness campaigns on the subject. Participant 3 said that the group's work includes educating Canadians about issues related to Hong Kong, protesting, engaging with elected officials, and attending vigils.

Participant 3 said that in August 2019, there were anti-extradition protests in Hong Kong. Participant 3 said that their group was protesting with a large number of people in Vancouver at a busy intersection near a SkyTrain station to raise awareness about Hong Kong. Participant 3 said that shortly after the protest began, a large group of counter-protesters caused a ruckus and were yelling slurs at the protesters. Participant 3 said that the counter-protesters all had signs identical to each other as well as to signs that had been used across Canada in other counter-protests, so Participant 3 suspected they were

organized by the Chinese consulate. Participant 3 said that they have a friend who knows that the Chinese consulate approached people to participate in these counter-protests, and that the counter-protesters were paid a fee or given free lunches.

Participant 3 spoke about a close family friend who met with another activist in a Canadian city. Participant 3 said that when their friend was done, they saw a car with Chinese police insignia that followed them for about a block. Participant 3 said that there was a public report regarding the incident. Participant 3 said that there was information which indicated that the car was proudly used to harass known activists.

Participant 3 said that members of their activist group have been followed home from rallies by cars. Participant 3 said one activist said there was a car parked outside of their family home. Participant 3 said that during their rallies, individuals try to take close-up pictures of your face, which raises questions about whether they are working with the PRC to gather biometric information. Participant 3 said that once after one of their rallies they found a tracking device in their protest equipment, which they quickly disposed of.

Participant 3 said that experiences like these make people wary and cause them to question whether they should participate in rallies and voice their opinions. Participant 3 said that experiences like these cause a lot of stress for the people who participate. Participant 3 said that they have a lot of friends who used to post a lot about Hong Kong democracy that no longer post because of the potential that their activities are being monitored, especially now that the Hong Kong National Security Law is in place and simply posting material of that nature online is an infraction. Participant 3 said that now your activism has to be very discrete or you will be targeted.

Participant 3 said that when the Hong Kong police were invited to participate in police games in Winnipeg, a group attended to protest. Participant 3 said that the names, ages, and backgrounds of the three protest organizers were published in a newspaper in Hong Kong.

Participant 3 said they think that foreign interference is a huge issue in Canada. Participant 3 said that not every Canadian understands the extent of foreign interference

and its manifestation in Canada. Participant 3 expressed the hope that the Commission can help.

Participant 4

Participant 4 said that they are a first-generation immigrant from Hong Kong who has been in Canada for 20 years. Participant 4 said that while they do not consider themselves an activist, they have been forced to react because of what has been happening in Hong Kong.

Participant 4 said that a lot of people who are involved in advocating in defence of Hong Kong in Vancouver are newcomers who have temporary status in Canada. Participant 4 said that people do not use their real names because they are afraid of what will happen to their loved ones in Hong Kong. Participant 4 said that when they attend events in support of Hong Kong, they mask up and wear black glasses and non-identifying clothes. Participant 4 said that it is quite scary that they have to do this, but it is necessary as a safety precaution to avoid identification.

Participant 4 said that they work in a space in which there might be PRC agents and they therefore have to be careful about what they say and do. Participant 4 said that they feel that they almost live a double life, and that they sometimes feel guilty for participating in protests even though they know that doing so is completely legal in Canada.

Participant 4 said that during the last two federal elections, a lot of the members of the organizations and community they belong to wanted to ask questions to candidates about their positions on Hong Kong, their sources of funding, and other issues, but, at the same time, there was a lot of fear about showing their identities in asking such questions. Participant 4 said that this chilling effect is one of the goals of the harassment and intimidation of the community.

Participant 5

Participant 5 said that they are an immigrant from Hong Kong and that they have been involved in community activism for the last 30 years. Participant 5 said that they are a

core member of the Chinese Canadian Concern Group. Participant 5 said that the main message they want to convey is that PRC interference is comprehensive.

Participant 5 said that since 1970 the PRC has maintained a relationship with the Canadian government, Canadian civil society, and Canadian academic society. Participant 5 said that the PRC has used these relationships to its advantage in conducting its foreign interference activities, particularly when it comes to Chinese Canadians.

Participant 5 said that the PRC claims that Chinese Canadians are discriminated against in Canada and the United States. Participant 5 said that the PRC considers Chinese Canadians to be Chinese nationals. Participant 5 said that the PRC spreads propaganda that the motherland will always protect Chinese citizens, and that this messaging is used in conjunction with the assertion that Chinese Canadians suffer from discrimination to try to bolster the allegiance of Chinese Canadians to the PRC.

Participant 5 spoke about the benefits that are offered to PRC proxies, including dinners, trips, meetings with consular officials, and business opportunities. Participant 5 said that the PRC seizes upon the feeling of nostalgia that exists amongst Chinese Canadians. Participant 5 said that, over the years, the CCP has helped local groups to present themselves as leaders of the community. Participant 5 said that affiliated groups have been used by the Chinese consulate to host events on its behalf. Participant 5 said that the Consulate has directed groups to purchase full-page ads in support of CCP policies.

Participant 5 said that those who speak out face consequences, isolation, harassment, and threats against themselves, their loved ones, and their colleagues. Participant 5 spoke about the consequences Canadian politicians may face if they speak out or take actions contrary to the wishes of the PRC. Participant 5 said that this explains why people are reluctant to speak up and show their support for Hong Kong, citing the people who abstained from voting on the Uyghur genocide recognition motion [passed by the House of Commons in February 2021] as an example. Participant 5 also provided an example of a Canadian politician who was criticized by the PRC for actions they took, and who was not subsequently re-elected.

Participant 6

Participant 6 said that while they were living in Hong Kong, they were prosecuted and convicted for three criminal charges for their involvement in the Hong Kong democracy and student protest movements.

Participant 6 said that while they were engaged in graduate studies in the United Kingdom, they maintained close contact with some members of the Hong Kong community there. Participant 6 said that the Chinese embassy conveyed the message “Hi” to them through a Chinese student association. Participant 6 said that messages of this kind are intended to threaten and disturb the recipient and dissuade the recipient from exercising their right to free speech.

Participant 6 said that after they returned to Canada, they met with a close friend from Hong Kong who was visiting Canada. Participant 6 said that, after their meeting, their friend stated they would be reporting the meeting to the Hong Kong National Security Department. Participant 6 said that this report would be made to secure their friend’s safety.

Participant 6 said that these efforts to threaten and intimidate them hinder them from exercising their rights in Canada, including their participation in Canada’s electoral processes.

2. Participants’ responses to Question 2

The second question posed to participants was: *What are your suggestions for how you and others in your community who may be vulnerable to foreign interference could be supported and protected, and for how foreign interference could be detected or combated?*

Participant 1

Participant 1 said their suggestions were based on their observations over the last 35 years, stating that they had been involved in many campaigns to raise awareness among

Canadians about the situation in Hong Kong, including those organized by the Organization.

Participant 1 said that Canada's elected officials should be educated on the danger of infiltration by the PRC and the United Front Work Department, including that there are silent agents in Canada that can be "awakened" at any time to do their work. Participant 1 said that many of these agents are trying to get very close to our top officials and decision-makers. Participant 1 provided an example of a friend who used to be very enthusiastic about human rights and diversity, equity, and inclusion issues. Participant 1 said that this friend became an elected official. Participant 1 said that this friend now believes that there was no genocide in Xinjiang and that the protests in Hong Kong are not real. Participant 1 said that this friend has been influenced by misinformation from people around them.

Participant 1 said that a hotline should be established to enable human rights activists to report suspicious cases directly to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service ("**CSIS**") and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("**RCMP**").

Participant 1 said that measures or guidelines should be provided to Canadian media outlets to educate them about how to deal with foreign government propaganda.

Participant 1 said that people have been waiting for the Foreign Agent Registry for a long time and that the Registry should be implemented as soon as possible.

Participant 1 said that the CCP has been working diligently within the community and has a good understanding of Canadian community organizations. Participant 1 said that the CCP understands that it needs new organizations to carry out its efforts. Participant 1 said the PRC is using the pretense of anti-Asian racism to influence the Canadian government. Participant 1 said the PRC is using the presence of anti-Asian racism to work against the Foreign Agent Registry.

Participant 2

Participant 2 said that pro-human rights Members of Parliament have lost their seats due to foreign interference, which means that activists have lost political allies. Participant 2 urged the Canadian government to work closely with real pro-democracy and human rights groups who can help identify groups that are acting on behalf of the PRC.

Participant 3

Participant 3 would like to see improvements on the detection of foreign interference in non-English Canadian media outlets. Participant 3 said that the target audience for this form of foreign interference does not usually speak English. Participant 3 said that the target audience is not exposed to the other side of issues presented in this form of foreign interference, because that information is generally found in English-language media. Participant 3 said that the target audience is easy to sway as a result.

Participant 3 said that the Canadian government should improve its ability to detect foreign interference on social media.

Participant 3 said that unless a political candidate publicly identifies that they are a victim of foreign interference, Participant 3 is nervous to approach the candidate due to concerns about what the candidate may do with the information shared with them. Participant 3 said that having a greater level of transparency about political candidates and their relevant relationships would allow people with different opinions to vote with a higher degree of confidence and to have the confidence to voice their opinions to candidates without worrying about harassment and retribution.

Participant 4

Participant 4 said that many Mandarin or Cantonese-speakers use WeChat, and that content that is not supported by the Chinese authorities is not permitted on WeChat. Participant 4 explained that WeChat was governed by Chinese laws, and that its use by Chinese individuals and businesses is prevalent. Participant 4 stated that this obviously presents issues with freedom of expression. Participant 4 said that it would be very

valuable to have a discussion about how to combat foreign interference perpetrated through foreign apps such as WeChat.

Participant 4 said that the first step in supporting and protecting people who are targeted by foreign interference is to understand that investigating foreign interference is not racist. Participant 4 said that it is not racist to identify and investigate incidents that threaten Canadian interests and rights protected by the Canadian Constitution. Participant 4 said that governmental institutions and agencies are nervous about being labelled as racist, especially law enforcement. Participant 4 observed that racialized people are more likely to be targets of foreign interference. Participant 4 said that a more nuanced understanding of racism is required.

Participant 4 said that law enforcement needs to be more sensitive to the realities of activists and victims of foreign interference, providing the following examples:

- Participant 4 said that the Hong Kong police were invited to attend the Winnipeg world police games taking place on the anniversary of the Hong Kong protests. Participant 4 said that this raised concerns that the Hong Kong police would spy on advocacy and activism events related to the anniversary of the Hong Kong protests. Participant 4 said that Members of Parliament have raised concerns about invitations like this to the Hong Kong police, and that people have protested such invitations, but such invitations continue to be made. Participant 4 said that things like this negatively impact the trust people place in the police.
- Participant 4 said that the police asked a protester to remove their mask at an event held outside of the Chinese consulate. Participant 4 said that masks worn during such events protect attendees from being identified and doxed. Participant 4 said that there were cameras on the outside of the consulate, presenting the risk that the protester would be identified. Participant 4 said that the request that the protester remove their mask in these circumstances indicated that the police force did not understand the protesters' concerns.
- Participant 4 said that in 2021, they would notify the City of Vancouver and its police department in advance about public events that were going to be held.

Participant 4 said that in one such communication, they shared concerns about counter-protests. Participant 4 said that the police responded that if people don't feel safe attending protests, they were encouraged not to attend. Participant 4 said that training about supporting people who are exercising their rights should be provided, and that such training would increase public confidence.

Participant 4 said that it is important to ensure that information shared with the Canadian government is secure against access by foreign actors. Participant 4 said this is important in the case of data about Hong Kongers, particularly newcomers to Canada. Participant 4 provided an example of a newcomer who sought to access Canadian services and was referred to a service-provider based in Guangzhou, which raised concerns about data access.

Participant 5

Participant 5 said that the indictment of a PRC proxy in Canada would send a very strong signal to the community. Participant 5 questioned why there have been no prosecutions for foreign interference in Canada, referencing a finding of slush funds used by Chinese consular offices.

Participant 5 said that the Panel of Five does not have the same institutional independence that judges have. Participant 5 noted that David Vigneault's testimony contradicted the Prime Minister's testimony. Participant 5 said that they have seen government officials downplay CSIS intelligence on PRC foreign interference in Canada. Participant 5 said there is a need for mechanisms to investigate, disclose, and prosecute MPs and Senators that wittingly collude with foreign states. Participant 5 said that when parliamentarians or party staffers willingly collude with foreign states, the party leader should be informed of this collusion.

Participant 5 said that politicians and government officials should be educated about foreign interference so they don't semi-wittingly or unwittingly fall prey to foreign interference.

Participant 5 said that Elections Canada should be responsible for overseeing political party nomination competitions. Participant 5 said that since only citizens can vote in Canadian elections, permanent residents and non-Canadian citizens should not have the right to vote in those contests.

Participant 5 questioned the inclusion of administrative monetary penalties in Bill C-70¹, noting that there are no administrative monetary penalties in the *Lobbyist Act* and in similar laws in the United Kingdom and Australia. Participant 5 said that administrative monetary penalties undermine the deterrent factor of Bill C-70. Participant 5 also suggested the adoption of a tiered approach to disclosure obligations under Bill C-70.

Participant 5 said that the Canadian government should provide the public with information about foreign interference. Participant 5 said the public should not have to rely on circumstances like the CSIS leaks to obtain such information.

Participant 5 said that Chinese Canadian groups have semi-wittingly and unwittingly helped the PRC government. Participant 5 said that a public education strategy is required to inform the Canadian public about the dangers of foreign interference.

Participant 5 said that the Canada Revenue Agency (“**CRA**”) should investigate groups that fail to report foreign funding in their disclosure. Participant 5 said that the government may want to decide whether groups that obtain foreign funds should receive funding from the federal, provincial or municipal governments.

Participant 5 said that for transparency purposes Canadian media outlets that have received funding from foreign media should be required to disclose that funding. Participant 5 said that the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (“**CRTC**”) should refuse to renew radio and television permits for stations that help to spread propaganda or misinformation from hostile foreign states.

Participant 5 said that the CRA should enforce Section 19 of the *Income Tax Act*, which prohibits taxpayers, including businesses, from claiming a deduction for advertising

¹ Bill C-70, *An Act respecting countering foreign interference*, received royal assent on June 20, 2024.

expenses placed in foreign-owned newspapers and periodicals. Participant 5 said that the Canadian government should increase the funding provided to the Chinese branch of Radio Canada International, which was established after the June 4th 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, to counter increased propaganda efforts by the PRC.

Participant 5 said Canada may consider following the U.S.'s lead in designating PRC state media as foreign missions and requiring them to register as foreign agents. Participant 5 said that, alternatively, Canada could ban PRC state media when it violates the CRTC's licensing regulations.

Participant 5 said mass media and social media platforms also have a responsibility to refrain from spreading misinformation, disinformation, defamation and discriminatory content. Participant 5 said that the Canadian government may want to require social media platforms to be owned and operated by Canadian companies so that they can effectively handle complaints, be subject to government scrutiny, and promptly remove posts that violate regulations.

Participant 5 said that although Public Safety Canada has a webpage to report foreign interference, it should be expanded to provide information on foreign interference in various languages.

Participant 5 said that measures are required to tackle TikTok, WeChat, and other PRC social media apps.

Participant 6

Participant 6 said that the Chinese government takes different approaches to foreign interference depending on the prosperity of the country being targeted. Participant 6 said that for developing countries such as Tonga, Fiji, and Micronesia, the Chinese government uses business associations to further its interests. Participant 6 said that for countries like Canada, the Chinese United Front Work Department works through or in collaboration with the Chinese Foreign Affairs Office and the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office gets involved in kinship and clan societies, with whom they act in concert.

Participant 6 provided an example of a single individual behind three different organizations that appeared on their face to be neutral community or cultural organizations, but had connections with the PRC. Participant 6 said that the Canadian government should be aware of and consider discrepancies between the Chinese and English names of Chinese community organizations.

Participant 6 said that the term “anti-China” is used to arouse sentiments against political candidates during elections.

Participant 6 said that broader disclosure about political affiliations and other relevant relationships should be sought during the immigration process.

Participant 6 said that media organizations in Canada should have to disclose if they receive funds from foreign states. Participant 6 said that media organizations in Canada that have received funding from foreign states should be prohibited from reporting about Canadian elections.

Participant 6 suggested that elected officials who go on kinship trips to the PRC that are funded by the Chinese government should be obligated to disclose these trips.

Participant 6 said that anti-money laundering systems implemented by banks may provide useful information and inspiration to the federal government about how to identify and counter foreign interference.