Frequently Asked Questions
Public Hearings
Yes, the Commission expects to hold three sets of public hearings. The hearings will take place at 395 Wellington Street, in Ottawa, in Salon A.
The preliminary hearings took place from January 29 – February 2, 2024. The second set of public hearings were held in March and April, 2024. Information from these hearings, including transcripts and documents introduced into evidence, is available on the Public Hearings and Documents pages.
A third set of public hearings will be held between October 21 and October 25, 2024. Dates for these hearings will be posted to the Commission’s website when they are confirmed.
Members of the public are welcome at the hearings. Those wishing to attend will be required to go through a courthouse-style security screening at the building entrance. Members of the public will be admitted to the hearings on a first-come-first served basis.
The hearings are streamed live on the Commission’s website to allow Canadians to follow the work of the Commission.
At the end of each hearing day, a recording of the day’s hearing will be archived on the Commission’s website. Archived hearings can be viewed at any time from the Commission’s Public Hearings page.
The preliminary hearings were mandated by Clause (a)(i) D of the Commission’s Terms of Reference. They took place over five days starting on January 29, 2024. They focused on National Security Confidentiality (NSC). The purpose of the NSC hearings was to identify the best ways to address the challenge of making as much of the information received by the Commission as possible public in its hearings and reports, when much of that information will originate from classified documents and sources.
The Commission heard from both fact witnesses and recognized experts at the NSC Hearings.
These hearings served to prepare the next set of public hearings in March, when the Commission examined the substantive issues arising from Stage 1 of its work.
Phases of the Commission’s work and Participants’ Rights
As required by Clause (a)(i) D of the Commission’s Terms of Reference, the Commission held public hearings from January 29 to February 2, 2024 to identify the challenges, limitations and potential adverse impacts associated with the disclosure of classified national security information and intelligence to the public, for the purpose of fostering transparency and enhancing public awareness and understanding (the “National Security Confidentiality” hearings).
The Factual phase is divided in two parts.
The first part of the Commission’s factual phase corresponded to paragraphs (a)(i)(A) and (a)(i)(B) of the Commission’s Terms of Reference.
During the first part of the factual phase of the Commission’s work, the Commission examined and assessed the interference by China, Russia and other foreign states or non-state actors, including any potential impacts, on the 2019 and 2021 federal elections.
The Commission also examined and assessed the flow of information to senior decision-makers, including elected officials, and between the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force and the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol panel during the election periods that led up to the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, and actions taken in response.
The Commission held public hearings on these matters in March and April 2024. Following the end of those hearings, the Commission released an Initial Report on the matters investigated in the first part of the Commission’s factual phase on May 3, 2024.
The second part of the Commission’s factual phase corresponds to paragraphs (a)(i)(C) of the Commission’s Terms of Reference.
In this second part of the Factual phase, the Commission will examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes. This work will include a further examination of certain facts and events addressed in the Stage 1 hearings.
The second part of the Commission’s Factual phase will include public hearings in September and October 2024. Dates for these hearings will be posted to the Commission’s website when they are confirmed.
The Policy Phase of the Commission’s work corresponds to paragraph (a)(i)(E) of the Commission’s Terms of Reference. In the Policy Phase, the Commission will consider means for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference, with a view to making recommendations.
The Policy Phase will include public hearings, from October 21 to October 25, 2024, at which the Commission will hear from various experts.
The Parties are individuals and groups with the most direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry and/or who can only make a necessary contribution to the work of the Commission through the exercise of full participatory rights.
Parties have full participation rights, including the right to access certain non-public documents and to question certain witnesses at the Commission’s public hearings.
The following Participants have Party Standing in the Factual phase of the Inquiry:
1. The Government of Canada
2. The Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections
3. Han Dong
4. Michael Chan
5. The “Human Rights Coalition”
6. Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance
7. Ukrainian Canadian Congress
8. Michael Chong
9. Jenny Kwan
10. Sikh Coalition
Two applicants for standing were granted Party Standing in relation to the (a)(i)(D) hearings only:
1. The “Media Coalition” (Limited to (a)(i)(D) hearings, January 29 to February 2, 2024)
2. The Centre for Free Expression (Limited to (a)(i)(D) hearings, January 29 to February 2, 2024)
The Interveners are individuals and groups with a more general interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry and/or who can make an important contribution to the work of the Commission without full participatory rights.
Participants who are Interveners have the following rights:
- The right to notice of all public hearings of the Commission, and the right to be present at them as Participants;
- The right to access copies of exhibits entered into evidence during the public hearings;
- The right to make oral or written submissions as the Commissioner may direct in subsequent procedural rulings or notices; and
- With leave of the Commissioner, Interveners may be granted other Participatory rights in appropriate circumstances.
The following Participants have Intervener Standing in the Factual phase of the Inquiry:
1. Erin O’Toole
2. Yuen Pau Woo
3. The Conservative Party of Canada
4. The New Democratic Party of Canada
5. The Churchill Society for the Advancement of Parliamentary Democracy
6. Democracy Watch
7. Chinese Canadian Concern Group on the Chinese Communist Party’s Human Rights Violations
8. The Pillar Society
9. The Bloc Québécois
10. Iranian Canadian Congress
The following Participants in the Factual Phase of the Inquiry also have standing in the Policy Phase of the Inquiry:
- The Government of Canada
- The Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections
- Erin O’Toole
- Yuen Pau Woo
- The Conservative Party of Canada
- The New Democratic Party of Canada
- The Churchill Society for the Advancement of Parliamentary Democracy
- Democracy Watch
- The “Human Rights Coalition”
- Russian Canadian Democratic Alliance
- Ukrainian Canadian Congress
- . Michael Chong
- Jenny Kwan
- Sikh Coalition
- The Bloc Québécois
- Chinese Canadian Concern Group on the Chinese Communist Party’s Human Rights Violations
- The Pillar Society
The following additional Participants have standing in the Policy phase of the Inquiry only:
- Iranian Justice Collective
- Justice For All Canada
- The Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights
- The Centre for International Governance Innovation
- The International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group
For general information on the roles of Participants at the Inquiry please see the First Commissioner’s Decision on Standing (especially paragraphs 21-34) and the Commission’s Rules of Practice and Procedure.
For information about the additional rights granted to the Conservative Party of Canada, Canada’s New Democratic Party, the Bloc Québécois, and Erin O’Toole, please see the Commissioner’s Decision on Intervener Participation in Stage 1 Hearings.
Commissions of Inquiry
Commissions of Inquiry are public investigations of issues important to Canadians. They aim to inform and educate the public, politicians and government on specific subjects, including making recommendations to resolve issues and develop policy.
Yes. Commissions of inquiry are loosely categorized into three types:
• Investigative
• Policy (or advisory)
• Blended investigative and policy
Investigative Commissions of Inquiry are focused on examining past events, fact-finding and giving recommendations about what should be done to correct a past problem. Policy Commissions of Inquiry seek to inquire into a particular situation of public importance and offer a forward-looking perspective on the topic about how it could be handled in the future.
The Foreign Interference Commission is a blended type of Commission of Inquiry, with both investigative and policy phases.
The Governor in Council (the Governor General acting on the advice of Cabinet) can establish a Commission of Inquiry to investigate any matter connected with the good government or public business of Canada. This power comes from the federal Inquiries Act.
The Foreign Interference Commission is led by the Honourable Marie-Josée Hogue, a judge from the Court of Appeal of Quebec. Commissioner Hogue can summon witnesses and require them to give evidence by providing testimony or producing any document or thing she deems necessary to investigate issues within her mandate. Commissioner Hogue has the same power to compel witnesses to attend and evidence to be presented as the courts in civil cases.
Commissions do not determine who, or which institution, may be civilly or criminally responsible for anything under investigation. However, they may reach factual conclusions about a person or institution’s conduct.
Also see the FAQ section below, “Civil and Criminal Liability”
Commissions of Inquiry are led by a non-partisan individual, such as a judge, referred to as a Commissioner. Commissioners are independent from the government. They work in the public interest, not political interests.
Commissioners can hire lawyers (i.e., Commission counsel) as well as other professionals, such as research and policy personnel, to help them with their work.
Commissions should perform their work transparently by holding public hearings and issuing public decisions, rulings and reports. However, in certain circumstances, a Commission of Inquiry may have to take special measures to protect security interests, including national security. This may impact the commission’s ability to be public in all aspects of its work.
Commission counsel are responsible for ensuring evidence, such as documents or testimony, is introduced so the Commissioner can make findings and recommendations. All participants may propose witnesses for the hearings. Participants are people or groups that can participate directly in the Commission's proceedings. Specific categories of participants may also provide evidence, cross-examine witnesses and comment on certain forms of evidence before it is filed. In this way, participants also help ensure the evidence before the Commissioner is as complete as possible.
Commissions of Inquiry do not have as strict rules of evidence as the courts. However, they must respect the principles of fundamental justice and procedural fairness. Commissioners draft their own rules of practice and procedure to govern their specific Commission. Participants usually have input into the drafting of these rules.
Once a Commission has submitted its final report to the Governor in Council, its role ends. It plays no part in implementing the recommendations.
Although established by the government, Commissions of Inquiry are independent from the government that created them. Once the terms of reference are in place, governments have no control over the direction or process of the Commission, unless they amend the Commission’s terms of reference by an Order in Council.
The Foreign Interference Commission is not the only entity that has a mandate to investigate and review events related to Foreign Interference. There have been several other recent reviews and investigations into the matter. Each has been independent from the others, and each has had its own, specific mandate.
On March 6, 2023, the government asked the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP) to review foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes, with a focus on elections. NSICOP has a broad mandate to review Canada’s national security and intelligence organizations. A public version of NSICOP’s report, entitled Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions, was released on June 3, 2024.
On March 15, 2023, the government appointed the Right Honourable David Johnston as the Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference. The Independent Special Rapporteur on Foreign Interference released a report on May 23, 2023.
On May 23, 2023, the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) started a review of the production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 Canadian federal elections. NSIRA is Canada’s independent expert review body for national security and intelligence activities. Its report, Review of the dissemination of intelligence on People’s Republic of China political foreign interference, 2018-2023, was published on May 28, 2024.
Over the past few years, a number of reviews and investigations have been undertaken by various Canadian federal public institutions in connection with foreign interference. The distinguishing features of the Foreign Interference Commission are that:
- It is an independent, transparent and non-partisan review of events and issues, including but not limited to the role of government.
- It can order people to provide evidence.
- It has the assistance of legal, policy and administrative experts.
- It can take a long-term view of complex issues.
- Its decisions can be challenged in court.
The Commission will thoroughly review foreign interference in Canadian federal elections and democratic institutions. The investigation is both retrospective (i.e. fact-finding) and prospective (i.e. policy-focused).
Other foreign interference reviews and investigations do not necessarily have the following elements, which are included in the Commission’s Terms of Reference:
- Examining and assessing the extent and impact of foreign interference at both the national and riding level.
- Educating the public about the challenges of disclosing national security information and intelligence as well as the limitations on what can be disclosed.
- Striving to be as transparent in the Commission’s work as possible without injuring national security or the critical interests of Canada and its allies.
Additional information about Commissions of Inquiry is available in the Commission’s Initial Report, and in the presentation, Commissions of Inquiry and the Foreign Interference Commission.
Civil and Criminal Liability
The Foreign Interference Commission is a fact-finding body that cannot find civil or criminal liability. Its mission is not to make findings of liability, or to determine who, or which institution, is civilly or criminally responsible for anything under investigation.
In addition, the Commission’s mandate specifically directs the Commissioner to perform her duties “in such a way as to ensure that the conduct of the Public Inquiry does not jeopardize any ongoing criminal investigation or proceeding, or any other investigation.” As a result, the Commissioner cannot share information with Participants or the public that would compromise ongoing investigations.
Even without this limitation in the Terms of Reference, there would have been limits to how much the Commission could disclose information related to ongoing investigations. This type of information may be protected under section 37 of the Canada Evidence Act, among other legal protections.
Further, the Commission is conducting its work in accordance with the rules and principles applicable to any independent commission of inquiry, which include the obligation to respect the principles of procedural fairness and the fundamental rights of any person affected by its work, in compliance with the rule of law.
The Mission of the Foreign Interference Commission
The Commission’s mandate, as defined in Clauses A to E of the Terms of Reference, involves both fact-finding and policy work. The first phase of the Commission’s work only relates to fact-finding (Clauses A, B and D) while the second phase relates to both fact-finding (Clause C) and policy (Clause E).
The Commission must submit two reports to the Governor in Council detailing the evidence collected as well as findings, conclusions and recommendations.
The Commission submitted its Initial Report on May 3, 2024, which covered clauses A, B and D of its mandate.
The Commission intends to submit its Final Report to the Governor in Council by December 31, 2024.
Also, if the Commission relies on classified information that cannot be disclosed to the public, it must submit a separate classified report containing this information.
The table sets out the five divisions of the Commission’s mandate according to the two aspects of its work (fact-finding and policy) and the two reports (Initial and Final).
As summarized in the table above, the Initial Report addressed the potential impacts of foreign interference in the 2019 and 2021 general elections (Clause A) and the flow of information about foreign interference within the federal government and to decision-makers relating to those elections (Clause B). The Initial Report also addressed the challenge of disclosing classified national security information to the public (Clause D).
The Commission’s investigation into the potential impacts of foreign interference and the flows of governmental information regarding the 2019 and 2021 general elections (Clauses A and B) are continuing beyond the Commission’s Initial Report.
The second part of the Commission’s factual phase corresponds to paragraphs (a)(i)(C) of the Commission’s Terms of Reference.
In this second part of the factual phase, the Commission will examine and assess the capacity of relevant federal departments, agencies, institutional structures and governance processes to permit the Government of Canada to detect, deter and counter any form of foreign interference directly or indirectly targeting Canada’s democratic processes.
In addition, the Final Report will address the Policy Phase of the Commission’s work, which corresponds to paragraph (a)(i)(E) of the Commission’s Terms of Reference. In the Policy Phase, the Commission will consider means for better protecting federal democratic processes from foreign interference, with a view to making recommendations.
The Policy Phase will include public hearings, from October 21 to October 25, 2024, at which the Commission will hear from various experts.
The Final Report will have the Commission’s complete set of conclusions and recommendations about these issues. The Commission’s recommendations will be mainly based on conclusions from the factual investigation.
Context for the Creation of the Commission
The notion that foreign states or non-state entities are attempting to interfere in Canadian affairs, more specifically in our democratic life and institutions, is not new. However, what is relatively new is the rise of public awareness of this issue and the rapidly evolving technical means available to foreign actors to successfully conduct interference.
Since at least the mid-2010s, the government has been increasingly concerned about foreign interference with our democratic institutions. After reports of Russian interference in the 2016 United States presidential election and the leaks relating to the French presidential election, Canadian security and intelligence agencies began to report publicly about this situation.
In 2018, in anticipation of our 2019 federal elections, concern about foreign interference in the electoral process continued to grow. This change in policy was no surprise to Canada’s security and intelligence agencies. They confirmed the threat and provided detailed descriptions of its magnitude in a series of reports.
Official analyses and reports on foreign interference mentioned its existence, with limited impact in the beginning, but with progressively increased risk in the 2021 general election timeframe.
Subsequent to this, Parliament’s concern grew, with House committees studying the issue, MPs debating the response from the government and all opposition parties calling for a public Commission of Inquiry. Pressure to find innovative ways to detect, investigate and counter such foreign interference increased. As a result, new entities were created, further reports were published and additional actions were taken. Ultimately, this growing public and parliamentary pressure led to the appointment of the Independent Special Rapporteur in March 2023, and the creation of the Foreign Interference Commission in September 2023.
The first chapter of the Commission’s Initial Report provides a detailed overview of the many factors that led to the creation of the Commission. You’ll find more information on pages 31-45 of the Commission’s Initial Report.